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IN THIS ISSUE

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Goode, W. J. 1967. "The Protection of the Inept." *American Sociological Review* 32:5-19.

Moore, Wilbert E., and Arnold S. Feldman. 1960. *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas*. New York: Social Science Research Council.

Sanford, Nevitt, ed. 1962. *The American College*. New York: Wiley.

Weber, Max. (1921) 1968. "Society's Problems." Pp. 12-16 in *Economy and Society*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. New York: Bedminster.

The Social Structure of a National Securities Market¹

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The Synectics Group, Inc.

In this article, a national securities market—the stock options market—is characterized as a social structure represented by the networks of actors who traded options on the floor of a major securities exchange. Trading among actors exhibited distinct social structural patterns that dramatically affected the direction and magnitude of option price volatility. The argument that this market is socially structured is constructed in four parts: behavioral assumptions about the nature of economic actors, models of micronetworks, models of macronetworks, and price consequences. In the ideal-typical model of the market, actors are assumed to be hyperrational and never to act opportunistically. With these behavioral assumptions, the micronetworks of actors should be *expansive*, a condition which would result in undifferentiated and homogeneous macronetworks. Such macronetworks would tend to reduce the volatility of option prices. But in the empirical market studied here, actors are subject to bounded rationality and some act opportunistically. Because of these behavioral constraints, actors' micronetworks are *restrictive*. In large markets, restrictive micronetworks generate well-differentiated macronetworks; both large size and differentiation impede communication among actors, a fact which results in exacerbated option price volatility. In small markets, restrictive micronetworks generate less differentiated market structures. Both small size and less differentiated markets are conducive to efficient communication which results in dampened option price volatility. The findings are discussed in relation to some major premises in microeconomic theory, and some consequent implications for public policy are presented.

The market is one of the preeminent institutions of modern capitalist societies. It is not only the predominant mode of economic exchange but

¹ I acknowledge gratefully the helpful comments, suggestions, and ideas provided by James Burk, Allan Schnaiberg, Harrison C. White, and Christopher Winship on earlier drafts of this paper. The paper benefited especially from the insightful, detailed, and constructive comments of the two anonymous reviewers. The section on price consequences was presented as a paper at the 1982 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in San Francisco. Mark Granovetter and Peter Marsden provided some very useful comments on that paper which were incorporated in the present one. Requests for reprints should be sent to Wayne E. Baker, The Synectics Group, 1130 Seventeenth Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036.

also a major mechanism of social integration. Surprisingly, the market has rarely been the object of direct analytic inquiry in mainstream economics (Barber 1977). Furthermore, the market has received only sporadic attention in sociology (e.g., Weber 1947; Parsons and Smelser 1956). However, sociologists have begun recently to focus their attention on markets, analyzing them as concrete social structures (e.g., White 1981a, 1981b; 1984; Faulkner 1983). This article continues this renewed sociological interest in markets by analyzing the social structure of a major market in capitalist society: the stock options market.

The history of sociological interest in securities markets, and their kindred commodity futures markets, runs the same course as the general history of sociological interest in markets. Although the securities and futures markets have not been ignored (Rose 1951, 1966; Glick 1957), only recently have a number of sociologists begun to scrutinize closely the structure and operations of these markets. For example, Adler and Adler (1980) have analyzed the stock market from a social psychological perspective; Burk (1982) conducted an institutional analysis of the American stock market; and I have focused on the stock options market, presented here and elsewhere (Baker 1981, 1982, in press). Similarly, Abolafia (1982, in press) and I have analyzed various characteristics of the contemporary futures markets (Baker 1976, 1983). The best indicator of the resurgence of sociological interest in the securities and futures markets is a forthcoming collection of essays on the social dynamics of financial markets (Adler and Adler, in press).

Even though these studies approach securities and futures markets from various sociological perspectives, their common theme is that markets may be viewed as social rather than exclusively economic structures. Not only are these markets characterized more realistically as social structures, but conceptualizing them as social phenomena implies that the full range of sociological research methods, qualitative and quantitative, may be used to study them.

In this study, I have conceptualized the structure of the stock options market as a social network of buyers and sellers and have examined the patterns of trading that occur among participants on the floor of a major securities exchange ("Exchange"). At the Exchange, trading is organized so that options on a particular underlying stock (or small set of stocks) are traded at a unique location on the floor. Each location is thus the observable marketplace for specific options. The aggregates of buyers and sellers who trade in these marketplaces are called "crowds." Two such crowds, one large and one small, were selected for network analysis. The patterns of networks within each crowd, as well as the effects of these networks on the prices of stock options, were analyzed over several periods of trading. Contrary to the expectations of conventional economic

and financial research, this market exhibited discernible social structural patterns with demonstrable effects on the determination of prices. The findings are presented here in the context of a theoretical explanation of the social processes that produced the observed market structures and their outcomes.

The theoretical argument is elaborated in Section I. The research design is presented in Section II. Findings are presented in Section III. Discussion and conclusions are presented in Section IV.

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The argument that the stock options market is socially structured is constructed in four parts: behavioral postulates of the market, models of micronetworks, models of macronetworks, and consequences of network structure. Behavioral postulates refers to basic assumptions about the nature of market actors. Micronetworks refers to the structure of ego-centric linkages—networks from the perspective of the individual actor. Macronetworks refers to the overall structure of the market that emerges from micronetwork formations. Finally, consequences refers to the effects of market networks on price determination. (The relationships of these four components are presented schematically in fig. 1.)

The perfectly competitive market is a theoretical model of how actors should behave and how markets should operate. Although it has long been recognized that many empirical markets depart radically from this theoretical model, it remains fundamental to mainstream economic theory (e.g., Malinvaud 1972; Debreu and Scarf 1963). Because this model

(1) General Model:



(2) Ideal-Typical Model:



(3) Empirical Model:




FIG. 1.—Models of markets as networks

refers to how markets should work, it is an ideal-type. Throughout this paper I compare and contrast how the options market should operate as an ideal-type with how it actually operates.

Behavioral Postulates of the Market

In the ideal-typical model of the market, actors are assumed to be hyper-rational; each actor is a self-interested maximizer endowed with unlimited information-processing and analytical faculties. In contrast with these assumptions, I submit that market actors may be described more realistically by two behavioral assumptions made explicit in the "transaction cost approach" to the study of economic organization: "(1) the recognition that human agents are subject to bounded rationality and (2) the assumption that at least some agents are given to opportunism" (Williamson 1981, p. 553).

Bounded rationality emphasizes the inherent limitations of human cognitive powers and capacities to transmit and assimilate information, analyze data, and make decisions under the conditions of complexity and uncertainty (e.g., Williamson 1975, 1979a, 1979b, 1981; Simon 1978, 1982; Thompson 1967). Opportunism refers to the observation that some actors are not entirely trustworthy and honest; in any given economic situation, at least some actors will take advantage of others, provide false or misleading information, break agreements, and so forth. The purely self-interested maximizer, in contrast, is presumed to be trustworthy and to follow and abide by the rules of the game. As Williamson (1981, p. 554) puts it, "Whereas economic man engages in simple self-interest seeking, opportunism makes provision for self-interest seeking with guile."

The two postulates of bounded rationality and opportunism fit well the options market observed in this study (as well as the securities and futures markets studied by the sociologists cited above).² Floor participants (brokers and market makers, defined below) are acutely aware of their limitations in receiving, processing, and responding to market information. For instance, noise and the physical separation of potential trading partners are often cited as major impediments to the efficient communication

² Although I begin with the same two behavioral postulates as does the transaction cost approach, my focus on the implications of these postulates for the internal organization of the options market differs substantially from the three main foci of the transaction cost approach—the overall structure of the enterprise, the choice between which activities should be performed within the firm and which outside it (i.e., hierarchies vs. markets), and the organization of human assets (Williamson 1981, p. 549). The internal structure of markets, especially competitive and "atomistic" ones such as the options market, has not been examined. Given the difference in focus, both my use of the concepts of bounded rationality and opportunism and their structural implications depart from Williamson's arguments. For example, I argue that bounded rationality and uncertainty in the market lead to opportunism (see also Leblebici and Salancik 1982).

of offers to buy and sell. Furthermore, in an active and fast-moving market, a floor participant is not able to survey fully all potential partners to a trade. Searching for all the alternatives is a costly process (Simon 1978, p. 10). A broker cannot take the time fully to search the "other side" of the market to obtain the best possible price for a customer. Executing an order, therefore, invokes satisficing (taking the first good response to an offer) rather than maximizing behavior.

Opportunism in the market can take many forms, some more insidious than others. Trading with friends, to use a minor example, is a form of opportunism because it bases partner selection at least partially on idiosyncratic and particularistic (i.e., noneconomic) criteria, thereby excluding those who do not share this personal tie. Graver examples are "trading abuses"—behaviors proscribed by Exchange and federal rules—that typically involve fraud, market manipulation, or the misuse of insider information. The language of the market is replete with many colorful terms to describe trading abuses: fictitious trading, chumming, capping, pegging, and so on (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] 1978, pp. 169–89; also Commodity Futures Trading Commission [CFTC] 1982). But a catalog of abuses is unnecessary here; the main point is that opportunism in the market is a widely recognized phenomenon.

Uncertainty in the market.—Uncertainty is an intrinsic part of the market. Because the futures market is designed to approximate a perfectly competitive market ideal, Glick (1957) argues, it naturally creates an environment of extreme uncertainty for brokers and traders. Although trading can be lucrative, there is no guarantee of profits. For instance, in 1977, fully 40% of the 1,153 registered broker-dealers who reported market-making activities on national securities Exchanges reported losses (U.S. SEC 1978, p. 129). Generally, any transaction with a long-term contractual provision (such as futures and options) produces uncertainty about the "future value" of a transaction (Leblebici and Salancik 1982, pp. 229–31). Since the buyer and seller of an option have contrary expectations about the future value of the option, it will always be in the interest of one or the other party to alter or break the agreement.

The volatility of prices itself is a major source of uncertainty, as Leblebici and Salancik (1982) have argued, since it makes the future value of transactions unpredictable. To cope with the uncertainty engendered by price volatility, actors must limit or restrain their trading, and some actors will act opportunistically on occasion. In addition, market actors develop and use many informal "coping mechanisms" to help alleviate the anxiety aroused by uncertainty about price movements (Glick 1957; Baker 1976).

Another source of uncertainty is the formal obligations of a market maker. Market makers must trade for their own accounts to maintain

fair and orderly markets (their "affirmative obligations") and they must avoid trading that would be inconsistent with this objective (U.S. SEC 1978, p. 131). In order to fulfill these affirmative obligations, a market maker, on the demand of another member of the crowd, must quote the prices at which he or she is willing to buy an option ("bid") and sell an option ("ask") and must trade at least one contract at a quoted price. Responding to such demands often means that market makers must trade against their own positions. Even if they anticipate correctly the future value of an option, their affirmative obligations may yet force them to incur losses. Thus, it may be assumed that shirking their affirmative obligations will always be in the interest of at least some market makers. In the language of options trading, some market makers will attempt to limit their "participation" (i.e., to ignore some demands for making markets, thereby reducing the number of undesirable trades they make).

Stock price volatility and crowd size.—While price volatility generates uncertainty about the future value of transactions, it simultaneously creates opportunities for profit making. Consider a simple example: if the price of a stock shows little historical fluctuation, there will be little uncertainty about its future value, but there will also be little potential for making profits. Widely fluctuating prices, in contrast, generate a great deal of uncertainty but also many opportunities to make profits (or suffer losses). Good profit-making opportunities will always attract profit seekers. And, in the options market, actors are formally free to trade in any marketplace, and no limits are set on the size of a crowd. Therefore, the options marketplace with greater price volatility should attract more traders and be much larger than the marketplace with lower price volatility.³

Crowd size determines the potential number of trading relationships available to participants. Furthermore, as the number of actors increases, the number of potential relationships increases even faster (Hare 1962, pp. 228–30). As Mayhew and Levinger (1976, p. 107) put it, "The interaction potential in a human aggregate is a multiplicatively increasing function of aggregate size." Therefore, a large crowd presents many more

³ Leblebici and Salancik (1982) use the volatility of futures prices, rather than the volatility of underlying cash market prices, to operationalize uncertainty. In the present analysis, I use the volatility of the underlying market prices (stock prices) rather than the volatility of the derivative market prices (stock option prices) for two reasons. First, the volatility of stock prices is not determined by options market floor participants and thus may be treated as an exogenous "input" to the options market. This avoids any potential problems of tautology, such as having actors create the uncertainty/profit-making opportunities that attract them to the market. Second, this allows option price volatility to be treated as an "output" or consequence of options trading; thus, it permits an evaluation of the effects of trading networks on prices. I assume that option price volatility does not affect stock price volatility. While there is some evidence that options trading reduces the weekly volatility of stock prices (Hayes and Tennenbaum 1979), it is reasonable to assume that such feedback does not occur in the short (two-hour) time intervals used here.

potential relationships to market actors than a small crowd. If rationality were not bounded, an actor in a large crowd would be able to take advantage of the many trading relationships available. But numerous actors generate a great deal of noise which interferes with communication. And, as small-group research has found, noise has a detrimental effect on group performance, especially when accurate communication of information is required (Hare 1976, pp. 272-73). In addition, the sheer physical dimensions of a crowd made up of many actors increase the distances between all potential trading partners. Consequently, actors are not able to expand their trading circles significantly, even though many more trading relationships are available. Whether an actor trades in a small crowd or a large crowd, the actor's circle of trading (e.g., number of relationships engaged in) will not differ markedly.

The expectation that actors' trading circles will not differ substantially in small and large crowds runs counter to Mayhew and Levinger's (1976) thesis that, by chance alone, increases in aggregate size should result in increases in the number of contacts per actor. However, they recognize that other factors than size alone influence interaction (Mayhew and Levinger 1976, pp. 93-94; Durkheim 1893). For example, their model is less applicable the larger the distance between actors and more applicable the higher the level of contact technology (also Hawley 1971). In options marketplaces, both large size and growth increase distance; furthermore, the level of contact technology is the same in all crowds. In large (or growing) crowds, the increased probability of interaction is offset by increased distances in a context of unchanging contact technology. Consequently, the trading circles of actors in small and large crowds are quite similar.

Opportunism and social control.—By operationalizing uncertainty as price volatility, Leblebici and Salancik (1982) have shown that opportunism varies with the level of uncertainty in the market. The more volatile a market, the greater the uncertainty; the greater the uncertainty, the more incentive to act opportunistically. Therefore, the more volatile a market is, the more market makers will attempt to avoid their affirmative obligations by ignoring demands for making markets and will thereby lower the number of relationships they form.

Avoiding affirmative obligations, however, can incur negative sanctions. Affirmative obligations were established by Exchanges to guarantee a certain level of market liquidity, depth, and competition. Formal sanctions, such as reprimands, fines, and suspensions, can be applied to offenders. Formal controls, however, are usually last resorts and are applied only in cases of flagrant and recurrent opportunism. Informal controls reportedly work much more effectively to ensure that market makers do not decrease their participation. For, while it may be in an actor's interest

to decrease participation, it is in the interest of others to ensure that all market makers participate so that the financial risks and burden of market making will be shared. As one market maker put it, "We had a new guy in our crowd. He would just trade what he wanted and then hang back. The rest of us were buying all the time as the market went down, and we were selling as the market went up. You can't just take the plums—you have to participate. You have to be willing to buy when the market is going down, buy all the way down, not just here and there. . . ."

Several different informal controls were reported, as I have detailed elsewhere (Baker, in press). Here I report briefly one principal control mechanism. As a floor broker stated, "I would only trade with those market makers who fulfilled that requirement [i.e., high participation]. No matter how deep in the market they were, they would always make markets. I traded with those who added to the liquidity—and the validity—of the market. I know that others will be 'first'—they just wait for the one trade they want—but I won't trade with them." The first person to respond orally to an offer (the "first") is formally entitled to the entire volume offered or any part thereof. Although others may desire to make the trade, they cannot preempt the person who responds first. The potential for social control is obvious. The formal "first" rule is used to exclude any person with whom one does not wish to trade. The broker quoted above used the first rule to exclude market makers who failed to participate fully—he simply never heard the opportunist as the first to respond. In response to such trading ostracism, market makers either increase participation or move on to another crowd. Although it is difficult to state quantitatively the extent to which such informal controls are actually used, their widespread use and effectiveness in maintaining market-maker participation were reported in all interviews. Moreover, the network data are consistent with field observations and reports of informal control of participation.

Participants reported that they were better able to elicit high participation from market makers in small crowds than in large crowds. In small crowds, the relative ease of communication and high visibility of actors' behaviors made it easy to spot opportunists and apply sanctions. In large crowds, where actors are more anonymous and communication is impaired, opportunism can go undetected. The twist here is that social controls work less well in the market situation that provides more incentive to act opportunistically. Even though there would be more demand for market-maker participation in a large crowd because of its size, market makers would be able, to some extent, to avoid their affirmative obligations. In general, while functionalist logic would suggest that the *solution* to opportunism (i.e., social control) would be induced by the *need* for social control (i.e., prevalent opportunism in large crowds), large size

interferes with efficient communication and observation of opportunists, allowing opportunism to go largely unabated. In a small crowd, informal control of participation prevents market makers from avoiding their affirmative obligations but, because of a relatively lower demand for participation in a small crowd, would not result in trading circles that would be substantially larger than those observed in the large crowd.

Market Network Models

The two sets of behavioral assumptions—hyperrationality and no opportunism versus bounded rationality and opportunism—carry very different implications for the probable patterns of market networks. These implications may be viewed on two levels: the micronetwork level and the macronetwork level. Furthermore, the consequences of market networks must be considered—the effects of macronetwork structure on prices (see fig. 1).

Models of micronetworks.—The elemental unit in a market is the dyad, the two parties to a trade; correspondingly, the elemental relationship in a market is the link between two actors, formed by trading. The essential question is, How would individual actors form their egocentric networks?

In an ideal-typical market, actors would not be limited in their ability to communicate with all other actors and to search the “other side” fully in order to find the best price. Furthermore, the lack of opportunism would mean that actors’ only motivation would be to find the best price, and market makers would never lower their participation. In this situation, actors’ micronetwork should be *expansive*: on the average, each actor would trade with many other actors, and exchange high volume (number of options contracts) in each trading relationship. Without opportunism and limited capacities, actors would not tend to curtail or restrict trading. Although individual differences might exist, both the average number of relationships in which an actor engages and the average volume exchanged in a relationship should be high.

Under the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism, actors would be compelled to limit and restrict their trading. Participants’ limited information-reception and -processing abilities force them to restrict their search for partners to a trade. Furthermore, opportunism results in a reduction in trading as market makers curtail their participation.

One way in which actors restrict their trading is to trade with those in proximity. A veteran market maker described the problems in trading in a large crowd: “Noise, static. The errors increase as an inverse square of the distance between brokers. . . . You trade with people in close proximity to reduce the risk; there’s money at risk. [For example] if a broker makes a certain percentage on a trade, and has an error, it might take

20 trades to make it up." Bounded rationality compels participants to trade with those in proximity. This behavior is consistent with the finding in small-group research that physical proximity increases the probability that communication will occur between people (Hare 1976; Festinger 1950; Festinger, Schacter, and Back 1950; Thibaut 1950).⁴

In response to bounded rationality and opportunism, actors develop *restrictive* micronetworks. This behavior results in a lower average number of relationships per actor, and a lower average volume exchanged per relationship, than it would under ideal-typical conditions. For reasons discussed above, I expect these two micronetwork characteristics to be virtually the same in both large and small crowds.

Models of macronetworks.—In the ideal-typical market, actors' micronetworks are expansive. Given a sufficient number of transactions, expansive micronetworks should produce an undifferentiated overall market network. In particular, there would be no reason for multiple subgroups to form; under ideal-typical conditions, the structure of a macronetwork would be that of a single clique ("clique" is formally defined in Sec. II). Note that crowd size would not be an important determinant of network structure. Whether a crowd was large or small, the overall network would still be a single, dense clique.

In contrast, empirical markets are differentiated structures of roles and relationships (White 1981a, 1981b; Faulkner 1983). In options markets, size is the key determinant of the extent of market differentiation (i.e., the extent of multiple subgroup formation). The effects of size on market differentiation are similar whether considered statically or dynamically. If the average number of links per actor and the average volume exchanged in a link are held constant, a large crowd should be more differentiated than a small crowd. Similarly, given that micronetworks are constant, as crowd size increases, trading becomes more decentralized, diffused, and fragmentary, thereby increasing structural differentiation. Therefore, a large crowd should exhibit more differentiation (i.e., multiple cliques) than a small crowd, and an increase in crowd size should increase differentiation. (Look ahead to fig. 3 which portrays the empirical macrostructure of two market networks.)

Size is also a critical concept in microeconomic and in organizational theory, as I will demonstrate briefly here.⁵ In microeconomic theory, size is viewed as a key determinant of market structure and performance.

⁴ Actors' tendency to trade with those in proximity suggests that the formation of micronetworks is not random but, instead, systematic. In addition to proximity, there is some qualitative evidence that systematic partner selection may be based on other noneconomic factors: friendship, enmity, sycophancy, and so forth (Glick 1957; Baker 1976).

⁵ Although I argue that group size is an important constraint on trading interactions, small-group research has produced little systematic evidence of the effects of size on social interaction (see reviews by Hare [1976]; McGrath and Altman [1966]; Thomas and Fink [1963]).

Two major premises of microeconomic theory are (1) a market with a large number of actors is more competitive and more "atomistic" (i.e., less differentiated) than a market with a small number of actors; and (2) as the number of actors increases in a market, the market becomes more competitive and less differentiated (e.g., Malinvaud 1972; Debreu and Scarf 1963).⁶ Were it not for bounded rationality and opportunism, these premises would have been supported by this analysis. However, large size and growth were found to increase market differentiation, reduce competition, and impair market performance. Small size and stable numbers were found to reduce market differentiation, enhance competition, and improve market performance.

In organizational theory, size is considered a prime generator of structural differentiation (e.g., Mayhew et al. 1972; Blau 1970). Blau (1970, p. 203) argues that increasing organizational size generates differentiation. For example, formal organizations cope with large size by subdividing responsibilities. But unlike Blau's explanation of differentiation as a rational adaptation to large size, my argument is that a market differentiates because large size and growth outstrip the capacity of actors to communicate efficiently. In Blau's model, communication and coordination problems are recognized, but they "feedback" and act to attenuate the rate of differentiation before the system malfunctions. But an empirical market has no such built-in limits or constraints on size, and it may expand virtually unabated, exceeding communication capacities and impairing performance.⁷

Mayhew et al. (1972) argue that, by chance alone, size can be expected to induce structural differentiation. The hypothesized relationship of market size and differentiation is consistent with the Mayhew et al. model. However, they only posit an association between size and differentiation. My argument specifies the causal relationships of stock price volatility, size, differentiation, and consequences under the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism. Although by chance alone size may be ex-

⁶ In economics, "market structure" is usually not defined in explicitly relational terms. For example, in the field of industrial organization, where "market structure" is an important concept and object of inquiry, structure is operationalized as the number of buyers and sellers, product differentiation, barriers to entry, market share, etc. (Scherer 1980; Shepherd 1972). Similarly, a perfectly competitive market is typically described as "atomistic" (e.g., Malinvaud 1972, p. 164), but how this image translates into the structure of relationships is not addressed. Given this lack of a relational definition, I have interpreted the image of "atomistic" to mean structurally undifferentiated; in network terms, this is the homogeneous form of a single, dense clique of market actors.

⁷ There are some outside limits to the size of the market. For example, the number of actors on the floor of a securities Exchange is finite. Examining the movements of all actors among all marketplaces would reveal that the securities Exchange is a closed system: an increase in the size of one crowd would be reflected in a decrease of equal size of another crowd. But, if only two marketplaces are examined, each may be viewed as an open system with no limits on size.

pected to generate differentiation, in the market situation studied here differentiation is shown to be a result of specific social processes.

Price consequences.—Price has many different characteristics. As White (1981a) emphasizes, the average of prices, such as that implied by the cliché of supply equals demand, is of most interest to economists; but to sociostructuralists, the dispersion or variance of prices is of more concern. In this analysis, I focus on the dispersion of prices, specifically price volatility (formally defined in Sec. II). Two volatilities are of interest: underlying stock price volatility and option price volatility. One analytic advantage of examining the options market is that it is a *derivative* market—its prices are based on prices of the underlying stock. By controlling for the volatility of underlying stock prices, it is possible to assess the effects of network structure on option price volatility. In the model presented here, stock price volatility is viewed as an exogenous variable, an input to options trading; option price volatility is viewed as a consequence or output of options trading.

The single, very dense clique generated under ideal-typical conditions would represent high competition in the market. Without the constraints of bounded rationality and opportunism, market makers would be aware of all offers and would be able to compete aggressively in forming their individual bid-ask spreads. Such aggressive competition would cause their bid-ask spreads to narrow and converge, which would decrease the volatility of executed prices. In short, ideal-typical macronetworks would dampen the volatility of option prices. Framed in terms of market performance, such a dampening effect would improve the orderliness of the options market.

In the empirical marketplaces studied here, size is a critical determinant of option price volatility. In a large market, restrictive micronetworks result in a decline in the pervasiveness of communication among all actors in the market. Growth affects the pervasiveness of communication similarly; as a market grows, actors are increasingly unable to communicate with one another. The decline in the pervasiveness of communication, induced by large size and growth, causes market makers' bid-ask spreads to widen and diverge, resulting in an increase in option price volatility. This process would impair options market performance by decreasing the orderliness of the market.

The detrimental effects of large size on communication and the resulting influence on price volatility were described clearly by a veteran market maker: "In the really large crowds that are really active, it's possible to get trading in very different prices. [Why?] It's noisy; you can't hear. It happens when the stock is changing. Some people trade, and they tell others, and then lots of people are coming over. There are some aberrations sometimes." As might be expected, the participants themselves

are aware of the communication problems created by crowds made up of numerous market actors.

Past a certain point, size induces the formation of multiple cliques. This differentiation exacerbates the communication problems already created by size alone and adds to the increase in option price volatility. While fragmentation contributes to volatile prices, it is important to note that large size (and growth) is the main cause of heightened price volatility. Even if a market does not grow large enough to induce fragmentation, a large market would still tend to produce volatile prices.

Small size should not increase price volatility; in fact, smallness is conducive to a decrease in the volatility of prices. Although actors in a small market are still subject to bounded rationality, each actor is confronted with fewer actors with whom to communicate, compared with the numbers confronting each actor in a large crowd. They are able to make contact with a relatively high percentage of actors and consequently are quite aware of the offers available in the crowd. With such information, actors can compete aggressively in forming their bid-ask spreads. Such aggressive competition would cause actors' bid-ask spreads to narrow and converge, resulting in a decrease in the volatility of option prices. A substantial decrease in the volatility of option prices would increase the orderliness of the market, indicating improvement in market performance.

The effects of macronetworks on option price volatility are analyzed using formal path models. The general theoretical model that guides this analysis is presented in figure 2. As shown, stock price volatility is expected to have direct effects on option price volatility. Macronetwork structure (represented by selected variables) acts as an intervening factor between stock price volatility and option price volatility. The two principal variables used to represent macronetworks are size, the key variable in this analysis, and a measure of the density of interaction in cliques. (Operational definitions of these two are presented in Sec. II.)

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research Setting

A single national securities exchange ("Exchange") was selected for this study. This Exchange, like others, is involved in the purchase and sale of stock options. Stock is the proportionate share of ownership held by a stockholder, represented by shares in the form of stock certificates. Stock options are contingent claims to purchase stock ("call options") and to sell stock ("put options"). Only calls were traded in the markets analyzed in this study.

Options are grouped into classes. A class includes all options traded on a particular underlying stock. For example, all options to buy or sell stock in ABC corporation are grouped into a single class of options. Options in each class represent several combinations of expiration months and striking prices (also called exercise prices). The expiration month specifies the last month in which an option may be exercised; the striking price specifies the fixed price at which the underlying stock is either bought or sold. Options are usually written for blocks of 100 shares and issued for periods of less than one year (Gastineau 1979).

Many different classes of options were traded at this Exchange. Trade in each class (or small set of classes) takes place at an assigned location on the floor of the Exchange, representing the physical marketplace for each class. The trading of options outside their designated locale is not permitted. Thus, each marketplace for a class of options may be analyzed as a relatively self-contained and bounded market.

Trading activities in the Exchange's marketplaces share several features:

1. **Aggregates of buyers and sellers:** In each marketplace, all buyers and sellers form a social aggregate of people who stand together at the appropriate locale. Such an aggregate is labeled, socially, a "crowd." Since all participants are formally free to trade in any marketplace, an aggregate (crowd) is defined as the collection of all persons who traded in a particular marketplace during a specified period of time.




FIG. 2.—General theoretical path model

2. Two formal roles: Each actor may trade in only one of two roles, broker or market maker. A broker buys and sells for other people; a broker is not permitted to buy and sell for his or her own account. A market maker is a professional speculator, trading for his own account; a market maker is not permitted to act as a broker. The market maker's obligations are described above. (Market makers are also called "traders.")

3. Face-to-face interaction: All buyers and sellers interact face-to-face; trading is characterized by close proximity.

4. Open-outcry. All participants must communicate publicly and orally their desires and intentions to buy and sell. These marketplaces are auction-type markets.

Crowds exhibit markedly different patterns of buying and selling. Through fieldwork, I observed two modal types of crowds/marketplaces: high-volume marketplaces in which large crowds traded, and low-volume marketplaces in which small crowds traded. To maximize the potential for discovering different structures of trading, one crowd from each type was selected for analysis. The first crowd, a large collection of participants, traded a very active class of options. The second crowd, a relatively small collection of participants, traded three moderately active option classes. These aggregates and their networks are referred to as ABC and XYZ, respectively.

Research Methods and Data

Multiple methods were used to study the options market. The initial stage of research involved exploratory fieldwork, primarily participant observation, and informal interviewing at the Exchange over a 10-week period. The second stage involved analyses of the networks of participants in each of the two crowds in order to model the structure of trading relationships. Details of the network analysis are presented below. In the third stage, key participants who traded in the networks were interviewed to elicit their perceptions and explanations of the market structures discovered through network analysis. These interviews provided information on the social dynamics behind the observed network configurations.

Network methods.—From a social network perspective, an options market may be defined as a specific set of trading relationships, represented by linkages formed by transactions in a particular class (or small set of classes) of options, among a defined set of brokers and market makers. A link is a recorded transaction between two actors. When multiple transactions occur between the same two actors, the trades are interpreted as one link, representative of a single trading relationship. The strength of a relationship is represented by the total volume exchanged in the relationship.

The basis of links and their strengths is the set of extant trades of the options traded in ABC and XYZ marketplaces. These data, forming the raw data for the networks, are the trades recorded by the Exchange.⁸ As a trade occurs in the crowd, the option writer (seller) writes all pertinent information on a card and hands it to a computer terminal operator who enters the information in the Exchange's computer. Each entry contains several bits of information: date and time of the trade, option traded, volume, premium (option price), buyer's ID code, seller's ID code, and the current price of the underlying stock. As originally entered, IDs were the participants' identifying acronyms, unique codes assigned to each broker and market maker. To ensure the anonymity of the individuals, the Exchange masked the original acronyms by replacing each unique ID with a unique alternative code.

A network of options trading is determined by the set of transactions that are formed into links and arrayed as a set of relationships. Since options are traded continuously throughout each day, the stream of transactions was segmented into discrete sets of transactions. Veteran traders interviewed in the first stage of research noted that the typical day is divided naturally into three distinct periods, each characterized by a distinct pattern of trading. Their perceptions were corroborated by field-work observations. Therefore, each day was divided into three two-hour intervals. All trades occurring in a given interval were used to form a single network of trading; each day is represented by three distinct networks.⁹

In some network studies, a single observed network is sufficient to represent underlying structure (e.g., Breiger 1976; Burt 1978). In other studies, several observations of networks (i.e., multiple networks) have been analyzed to model the formation of groups (Doreian 1979/80) and the structure of change in groups (White, Boorman, and Breiger 1976; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1981). Since options trading is often capricious, it is necessary to analyze several observations of networks in order to

⁸ Two types of data are generally used for network analysis: cognitive data (i.e., recall of who one talks to) and behavioral data (i.e., who one actually talks to). Data used in this study are behavioral data: actual records of who traded with whom. The use of behavioral data greatly increases the inherent validity of any network analysis. Several network analysts have focused on the accuracy of cognitive data in comparison with behavioral data. They state categorically that, based on their studies of cognitive and behavioral data, cognitive data cannot be used for drawing any valid inferences about behavioral social structure (Bernard and Killworth 1977; Killworth and Bernard 1976, 1979; Bernard, Killworth, and Sailer 1979/80).

⁹ A small percentage of trades (usually 5%–15%) in each period were deleted because of missing data (e.g., either buyer's or seller's IDs or both were missing). Since a single link often comprises multiple trades and the typical participant trades with multiple partners, the deletion of a small percentage of trades omits very few links and participants from the networks.

model the underlying structure of trading relationships. Therefore, 10 days of trading were analyzed, randomly sampled from a month of 20 business days in the late 1970s. All trades in the option classes traded in ABC and XYZ marketplaces within each sampled day were included. Each day of trading was divided into three two-hour intervals, resulting in 30 observations of ABC networks and 30 observations of XYZ networks.

A clique-detection program called NEGOPY (Richards and Rice 1981; Richards 1975) was used for macronetwork analysis. This program searches a network for regions of dense interconnections, grouping well-interconnected nodes into cliques (Richards calls cliques "groups"). A clique is formally defined as a subset of at least three nodes in which each node trades more than 50% of its volume with other nodes in the subset, a direct or indirect path exists from each node to every other node in the subset, and no node is "critical" (a node is critical if its removal from the clique causes the clique to fail to meet the other criteria). There are four types of nonclique nodes. A liaison is a node that connects two or more cliques but is not a member of any clique because it fails to meet the 50% criterion for clique membership. An isolate is a node connected by a single link to another node. A dyad is composed of two nodes connected only to each other. A tree node is found in a subset of nodes with $n - 1$ links (where n = number of nodes). A tree structure often has isolates on both ends and tree nodes between them. (Refer to fig. 3 for graphic representations of options market networks.)

Price volatility and network variables.—In the field of finance, the variance (or standard deviation) is one of the measures typically used to represent price volatility (e.g., Bookstaber 1981; Black and Scholes 1972, 1973). But since the variance is an unstandardized measure of dispersion, it cannot be readily used to compare the relative volatility of two or more distributions. Therefore, Martin and Gray's (1971) measure of relative variability based on the mean absolute deviation from the mean was used to represent stock and option price volatility. The formula for this measure is:

$$V(D\bar{x}) = \frac{\sum |X - \bar{X}| / n}{\bar{X}} \bigg/ 2 \left(1 - \frac{1}{n} \right),$$

where $V(D\bar{x})$ = a standardized measure of relative variability (volatility), X = observed price (weighted), \bar{X} = mean price (weighted), and n = number of observations (weighted). This measure of relative dispersion varies from zero to one and may be stated as a percentage of its maximum (Martin and Gray 1971, p. 497). For the regression analyses, this measure was divided by the number of transactions to express volatility on a per transaction basis.

Size and the density of interaction within cliques are the two variables

used to represent macronetwork structure. Size may be defined in several ways. In microeconomics, size is usually defined as the number of actors in a market. From a social network perspective, however, a relational definition of size, one that reflects the quantity of interactions among actors, is preferable. Thus, I have defined and operationalized size as the total number of buying and selling relationships in a crowd during a period of trading. Note that from a purely technical point of view, either definition of size is appropriate because the number of relationships and




FIG. 3.—Empirical examples of XYZ and ABC market networks (graphic representations of actual networks of trading in XYZ and ABC marketplaces during the same afternoon period).

the number of actors are very highly correlated ($r = .93$ in ABC; $r = .80$ in XYZ). The density of interaction within subgroups is operationalized as "clique density" (the actual number of links within cliques as a percentage of maximum potential links within cliques).

III. FINDINGS

Stock Price Volatility and Crowd Size

Over the 30 periods of trading, the average volatility of ABC stock prices was 2.77%. That is, the prices of ABC stock varied 2.77% of the maximum variability possible. In contrast, the average volatility of the prices of the three stocks underlying XYZ market was substantially lower. Over the 30 periods of trading, their average volatility was only 0.75%. Therefore, the stock prices underlying ABC options market were over 3.5 times as volatile as the stock prices underlying XYZ options market.

Since profit-making opportunities vary directly with stock price volatility, many more actors should be attracted to ABC marketplace than to XYZ marketplace. The data support this hypothesis. While 648 different actors made at least one trade in at least one period of trading in ABC, only 203 different actors made at least one trade in at least one period of trading in XYZ.¹⁰ An average of 70.8 actors traded in ABC marketplace during a period, but an average of only 27.2 actors traded in XYZ marketplace during a period. Similarly, there were marked differences in the average number of trading relationships in a period. In ABC an average of 151.8 links were formed in a period, while in XYZ an average of 63.5 links were formed in a period.

Patterns of Micronetworks

Egocentric patterns.—Under ideal-typical conditions, each ABC actor would trade with every ABC actor, and each XYZ actor would trade with every XYZ actor. While both sets of actors would engage in a maximum number of relationships, the observed differences in size would mean that many more relationships were available to ABC actors than to XYZ actors. Thus, an ABC actor would engage in a higher number of relationships than an XYZ actor. Furthermore, given that the number of potential links is a multiplicative function of size, potential trading volume would, similarly, be a multiplicative function of size. Since large size offers ABC participants the opportunity to trade very high volume,

¹⁰ These figures also indicate that ABC crowd experienced much faster turnover than did XYZ crowd. Not only was ABC much larger than XYZ, but also it was involved in a relatively quicker circulation of actors in and out of the marketplace. These differences in "relative stability" are analyzed elsewhere in detail (Baker 1981).

they would exchange higher volume in each relationship than their XYZ counterparts.

Under the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism, ABC and XYZ egocentric networks should be similarly restrictive. In fact, only minor differences exist between ABC and XYZ egocentric networks, analyzed as averages over all periods ($N = 30$). On the average, each ABC participant engaged in 2.12 relationships in a period; similarly, on the average, each XYZ participant engaged in 2.34 relationships in a period. Further, the average volume exchanged in a relationship is virtually the same. There were 5.79 option contracts in each ABC relationship and 5.80 option contracts in each XYZ relationship. Regardless of the trading opportunities available in a crowd, the micronetworks of options market actors are quite similar—a finding in stark contrast with the structure of micronetworks suggested by the economic model of markets.

Diurnal patterns of micronetworks.—The qualitative data indicated that trading patterns varied systematically throughout a typical day. The possibility of diurnal patterns provides an opportunity to test further for differences between ABC and XYZ market networks, as well as to examine the daily processes and dynamics of trading.

Heightened activity in both markets occurs in the morning and afternoon periods; the midday period is typically the slowest and least active of the three periods. This diurnal pattern can be explained by examining the flow of orders to the market. Orders from public and institutional investors build up overnight; the accumulation is released when the market opens in the morning. Speculative activity follows the flow of public orders, accentuating trading activity in the morning period. Trading diminishes during the middle of the day as public, institutional, and consequently speculative activity declines. Trading activity picks up again in the afternoon when participants make the final trades of the day. Both network patterns, as demonstrated below, tend to follow the diurnal flow of orders, but in different ways.

The diurnal patterns of network structure may be stated as a general hypothesis of curvilinearity, expressed formally in three specific interrelated hypotheses:

$$\begin{array}{lll} (1) H_0: P_1 = P_2 & (2) H_0: P_2 = P_3 & (3) H_0: P_1 = P_3 \\ H_1: P_1 > P_2 & H_1: P_2 < P_3 & H_1: P_1 \neq P_3 \\ \text{where: } P_1 = \text{Period 1; } P_2 = \text{Period 2; } P_3 = \text{Period 3.} \end{array}$$

(Note that I do not want to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between P_1 and P_3 [hypothesis 3] in order to support the general hypothesis of curvilinearity.) This set of hypotheses represents a strict definition of

curvilinearity. The strict definition may be relaxed by omitting hypothesis 3.

To test these hypotheses, the means of selected network variables were calculated and differences between means were tested using the *t*-test for paired samples. The *t*-test for paired samples was used because periods were sampled in triplets (trading days were sampled, and all periods within a day were included). Pairing reduces the extraneous influences on the network variables measured; that is, pairing reduces the effects of period-to-period variability. All statistics are reported in table 1.

The number of actors in ABC marketplace reveals a U-shaped curvilinear pattern. Thus, many more potential trading relationships are available in the morning and afternoon periods than in the midday period. Under ideal-typical conditions, these potentialities would be realized in a higher number of links per ABC actor, and higher volume exchanged per link, in the first and third periods than in the second period. In other words, these two measures of egocentric networks also should be curvilinear. However, the average number of links per ABC actor is constant across the three periods of the day; ABC actors do not engage in significantly more relationships even though more potential ones are available. Furthermore, the average volume exchanged in each ABC relationship does not vary significantly across the three periods. The egocentric networks of ABC actors remain constant throughout the day even though the number of actors is curvilinear.

The ABC micronetworks remain constant throughout the day for two main reasons. First, although an increase in the number of actors presents more trading opportunities, bounded rationality prevents actors from engaging in significantly more relationships or increasing the volume exchanged in a relationship. Second, even though an increase in the number of actors increases the demand for market making, ABC market makers are able to ignore some of these demands and thereby hold their participation constant. In ABC, both bounded rationality and opportunism operate to produce micronetworks that do not change substantially throughout the day.

Unlike ABC marketplace, XYZ does not reveal significant differences in the number of actors trading over the three periods. But the number of links per actor is strongly curvilinear: XYZ actors engage in significantly more relationships in the first and third periods than in the second period. Even though the number of potential relationships does not change, XYZ actors expand their trading circles. They do not, however, vary the volume exchanged in a relationship across the three periods.

The expansion of trading circles probably reflects increased market-maker participation during the morning and afternoon periods. In addition, with small size (and therefore less noise and shorter distances),

TABLE 1—PAIRED *t*-TESTS FOR DIURNAL NETWORK PATTERNS

VARIABLE AND PERIOD	ABC CROWD			XYZ CROWD		
	Mean	SD	Hypothesis	Mean	SD	Hypothesis
Number participants:*						
P ₁	79.60	21.573	P ₁ > P ₂	27.50	6.916	P ₁ > P ₂
P ₂	61.80	20.996	P ₁ < P ₂	24.90	5.840	P ₁ < P ₂
P ₃	71.00	13.197	P ₁ ≠ P ₂	29.10	11.396	P ₁ ≠ P ₂
Mean volume per link:*						
P ₁	6.2373	1.299	P ₁ > P ₂	5.6267	1.195	P ₁ > P ₂
P ₂	5.7488	1.381	P ₁ < P ₂	6.0639	1.654	P ₁ < P ₂
P ₃	5.3966	.879	P ₁ ≠ P ₂	5.7076	1.567	P ₁ ≠ P ₂
Mean links per participant:*						
P ₁	2.1077	.090	P ₁ > P ₂	2.6662	.601	P ₁ > P ₂
P ₂	2.0354	.423	P ₁ < P ₂	1.9829	.395	P ₁ < P ₂
P ₃	2.2307	.341	P ₁ ≠ P ₂	2.3410	.396	P ₁ ≠ P ₂
Number of cliques:						
P ₁	1.40	.516	P ₁ > P ₂	1.10	.316	P ₁ > P ₂
P ₂	1.00	.471	P ₁ < P ₂	1.10	.876	P ₁ < P ₂
P ₃	1.70	.675	P ₁ ≠ P ₂	1.10	.568	P ₁ ≠ P ₂
Clique density:						
P ₁1478	.040	P ₁ > P ₂	.2971	.038	P ₁ > P ₂
P ₂1597	.061	P ₁ < P ₂	.2219	.134	P ₁ < P ₂
P ₃1419	.015	P ₁ ≠ P ₂	.2859	.122	P ₁ ≠ P ₂
% clique volume:						
P ₁6153	.236	P ₁ > P ₂	.8605	.142	P ₁ > P ₂
P ₂6587	.241	P ₁ < P ₂	.5926	.335	P ₁ < P ₂
P ₃6430	.154	P ₁ ≠ P ₂	.7155	.268	P ₁ ≠ P ₂
% clique links:						
P ₁5294	.183	P ₁ > P ₂	.6610	.126	P ₁ > P ₂
P ₂5689	.220	P ₁ < P ₂	.4613	.276	P ₁ < P ₂
P ₃5457	.156	P ₁ ≠ P ₂	.5415	.202	P ₁ ≠ P ₂

NOTE.—(S) = strong support of curvilinear hypothesis ($P < .05$), (W) = weaker support of curvilinear hypothesis (either $P_1 > P_2$ or $P_2 < P_3$ is not significant [$P > .05$]), (N) = no support of curvilinear hypothesis.

* In overall network.

† Marginally significant.

XYZ participants may be able to communicate efficiently and search the "other side" of the market rather completely. Though still subject to the immutable constraints of bounded rationality, participants may not be pushed beyond their human limits. The fact that XYZ actors do not increase the volume exchanged in a relationship, however, continues to indicate that even XYZ actors must limit their trading in some ways.

The differences in observed diurnal patterns run counter to those expected under ideal-typical conditions. When ABC crowd grows, egocentric networks should also expand—but they remain constant; because XYZ crowd remains stable, egocentric networks should also stay constant—but they expand significantly. Given the more realistic assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism, the observed diurnal dynamics of ABC and XYZ micronetworks make sense.

Patterns of Macronetworks

Size differences.—The critical macrostructural difference between ABC market and XYZ market is size. As discussed in the second paragraph of Section III, on the average ABC is much larger than XYZ: there are approximately 2.5 times as many relationships in ABC market as in XYZ market. Given that the micronetworks of actors in both markets are similar, the observed difference in size indicates that communication is much less pervasive in ABC than in XYZ. Because ABC is much larger than XYZ, ABC is expected to be much more differentiated than XYZ (see below), resulting in a further breakdown in communication in the larger market. But it is important to reiterate that large size alone is sufficient to impede communication among all actors.

Market differentiation.—In the ideal-typical situation, market actors would interact in ways that would generate an undifferentiated macronetwork: a single, dense clique. If ABC and XYZ were produced under ideal-typical conditions, both would take this form. Given the observed micropatterns, however, each macronetwork is expected to be more or less differentiated.

Theoretically, at least one clique should always form; thus, one clique is the theoretical baseline from which empirical macrostructures can be assessed. Structural differentiation is defined operationally as the occurrence of multiple cliques (two or more) during a given period. Because at least one clique is always expected, evaluating differences in differentiation between empirical markets focuses on the relative frequency with which more than one clique forms in one market compared with another market. The complete absence of cliques should be rare, occurring only when the quantity of interactions is insufficient to support the formation of macrostructures (e.g., as in a thin or very inactive market).

Because ABC and XYZ egocentric networks are very similar, but ABC is much larger than XYZ, I expect that (1) multiple cliques should form more often in ABC than in XYZ, (2) single cliques should form less often in ABC than in XYZ, and (3) the complete absence of cliques should occur less often in ABC than in XYZ. As shown in table 2, the data support these expectations. Most important, multiple cliques formed more than twice as often in ABC than in XYZ. Single cliques formed often in both networks, but they formed less frequently in ABC than in XYZ. Cliques were seldom absent in either network, but as expected, cliques were missing less frequently in ABC than in XYZ. The data also support the assumption that cliques fail to form when the quantity of interactions is low. There were fewer ABC links (41) in the period in which no cliques formed than in any other period of ABC. Similarly, two of the three periods of XYZ in which no cliques formed contained fewer links (21 and 25) than any other period of XYZ. The other period in which no cliques formed contained the fourth lowest number of links (33) of all XYZ periods. (The third lowest period contained 32 links, and one other period contained 33 links; cliques formed in both of these periods.)

For illustration, refer to figure 3, which presents graphically the empirical macrostructure of ABC and XYZ networks during the same period of trading. As shown in the upper panel, during this period XYZ market was composed of a single clique, surrounded by a periphery of isolates. Although this structure reveals some differentiation (i.e., a center-and-periphery structure), it approximates the ideal-typical structure much more closely than does ABC network. As shown in the lower panel, during this period ABC market was fragmented into two cliques, each with its own periphery of isolates. The occurrence of some cross-subgroup trading indicates that the two cliques were not completely separate; but, since a clique represents an arena in which each of its respective members concentrates more than 50% of his volume, ABC market is shown to be divided into two distinct areas of concentrated activity. As such, ABC macrostructure represents a well-differentiated market.

TABLE 2
EXTENT OF STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION IN
ABC AND XYZ NETWORKS ($N = 30$)

NUMBER OF CLIQUES IN A PERIOD	PERCENTAGE OF PERIODS	
	ABC	XYZ
Multiple cliques	36.7	16.7
Single clique	60.0	73.3
No cliques	3.3	10.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Network density and concentration within cliques.—Under ideal-typical conditions, everyone should be able to trade with everyone else, which would result in a single, dense clique. At the extreme, the density of relationships (actual links as a percentage of potential links) in such a network would approach 100%. Although ABC is larger than XYZ, the density of each would be similarly high if these networks were produced under ideal-typical conditions. Even if these networks were not produced under ideal-typical conditions, by chance alone the density of the larger crowd should be higher than the density of the smaller crowd (Mayhew and Levinger 1976). But, given that ABC and XYZ actors engage in approximately the same average number of relationships per actor, the density of ABC is expected to be much lower than the density of XYZ. In fact, the average density of ABC networks is only 6.2%, while the average density of XYZ networks is 17.5%. Trading in the larger crowd is much more diffused and decentralized than it is in the smaller crowd.

In the ideal-typical market, all trading activity would be concentrated within the single clique; all links formed in the network would be formed within the clique, and all volume exchanged in the network would be exchanged within the clique. But since ABC differentiates more often than XYZ, and trading is more decentralized in ABC than in XYZ, lower percentages of links and volume should occur within ABC cliques compared with the percentages of links and volume that should occur within XYZ cliques.

While the average percentage of relationships within cliques is approximately the same in both ABC and XYZ (about 55%), a substantially higher average percentage of total volume is traded within XYZ cliques (76%) than is traded within ABC cliques (64%). Thus, trading is somewhat more heavily concentrated within XYZ cliques than within ABC cliques.

Diurnal patterns of macronetworks.—The macronetworks of ABC and XYZ exhibit diurnal patterns that correspond to the diurnal patterns of their respective micronetworks. First and foremost, given that the number of ABC actors is curvilinear but the number of links per actor is not, ABC macronetworks should be more differentiated in the first and third periods than in the second period. As shown in table 1, only one clique tended to form in the midday, but a significantly higher number of cliques per period formed in the morning and afternoon. Given that the size of XYZ crowd does not vary significantly throughout the day, there should be no differences in the number of cliques per period. As shown in table 1, the average number of XYZ cliques per period is identical across the three periods.

The concentration of trading within ABC cliques did not change throughout the day. Neither the percentage of total volume traded within

cliques nor the percentage of total links formed within cliques varied significantly throughout the day. Also, clique density did not change significantly across the three periods. Although the increase in ABC crowd size in the first and third periods would be expected to increase the concentration of trading within cliques, the concomitant increase in structural differentiation offsets this potential by decentralizing and fragmenting trading.

In contrast, the concentration of trading within XYZ cliques should reveal a U-shaped curvilinear pattern. Since crowd size and the number of cliques remain constant but the number of links per actor is curvilinear, trading should be concentrated more heavily in the first and third periods than in the second period. Such is the case: both the percentage of links formed within cliques and the percentage of volume exchanged within cliques are curvilinear. Also, clique density reveals a curvilinear pattern (though differences in means are marginally significant).

The observed diurnal patterns of ABC and XYZ market networks illuminate some of the basic social processes that underlie these markets. The process of trading in ABC may be characterized as "fragmentation." The networks in ABC frequently exhibit the formation of multiple cliques, distinct subgroups of participants trading in the crowd during a given period. In periods of heightened activity, the morning and afternoon, traders from other crowds migrated to ABC marketplace to trade ABC options. The influx of newcomers increased the size of ABC crowd. But neither the average number of relationships in which each participant engaged nor the average strength of relationships changed in periods of greater activity. This created greater potential for subgroup formation, a potential that was realized empirically in the fragmentation of ABC networks into multiple cliques.

The process of trading in XYZ may be characterized as "intensification." The XYZ networks rarely fragmented; instead, they were usually composed of a single central clique and a periphery of isolates. During periods of heightened activity, XYZ crowd did not experience a substantial immigration of newcomers. Instead, the expansion of activity in XYZ options was fostered and facilitated by the central core of regular participants in XYZ marketplace. Members of this core intensified their trading with each other by increasing the average number of relationships in which they engaged and increasing the concentration of trading within subgroups. Thus, the central clique's intensification accommodated increases in trading activity.

Effects on Option Price Volatility

In the ideal-typical market, macronetworks should act to dampen the volatility of option prices. However, given the observed structure of ABC

networks (large size and fragmentation), I expect that ABC macronetworks will exacerbate the volatility of option prices. With the small size of XYZ macronetworks and the fact that they resemble ideal-typical market structure, I expect that XYZ macronetworks will dampen the volatility of option prices.

The general theoretical path model is presented in figure 2. As discussed above, network structure is represented by two principal variables: the total number of trading relationships (total links) and the density of interaction within cliques (clique density). Since option prices are considered to be derivatives of stock prices (e.g., Gastineau 1979), stock price volatility should be correlated positively with option price volatility in both ABC and XYZ. For ABC, stock price volatility is expected to be correlated positively with total links. As the volatility of underlying stock prices increases, greater profit-making opportunities in ABC options become available which attract newcomers to ABC marketplace. Therefore, crowd size (total links) should be correlated positively with stock price volatility. Crowd size should also be correlated positively with option price volatility. Since clique density is constant in ABC (due to fragmentation in periods of increased size), neither stock price volatility and clique density nor clique density and option price volatility should be associated significantly.

For XYZ, stock price volatility is expected to be correlated positively with clique density. As the volatility of underlying stock prices increases, XYZ actors increase participation and compete more aggressively, causing the central clique to become denser. Clique density should be correlated negatively with option price volatility. Since the volatility of XYZ stock prices is generally low compared with ABC stock prices, an increase in XYZ stock price volatility does not attract enough newcomers to increase significantly the number of actors. (Faced with a choice between trading in ABC or XYZ, profit seekers would choose ABC.) Therefore, total links should not be associated with stock price volatility or with option price volatility.¹¹

The path model for ABC crowd.—The decomposition of effects table for the ABC path model is presented in table 3. As expected, stock price volatility is correlated positively with option price volatility: a 1 standard deviation (SD) increase in stock price volatility increases option price volatility by .454 SD, with the network variables held constant. Total links is correlated positively with option price volatility. When stock price volatility and clique density are controlled, a 1 SD increase in total links increases option price volatility by .471 SD. Stock price volatility also

¹¹ As noted above, three option classes were traded in XYZ marketplace. To avoid any potential for confounding influences, the analysis of price volatility focused on the most active of the three classes. Over 60% of the total volume of options traded in XYZ belonged to this option class.

has moderately strong indirect effects on option price volatility, almost exclusively through total links instead of through clique density. Furthermore, clique density is not correlated significantly with either price variable, as expected, and may be dropped from the model.

The regression equation for this model of ABC is $\hat{Y} = .471(TL) + .454(SV)$, where TL = total links measured in SD units, SV = stock price volatility measured in SD units, and \hat{Y} = predicted option price volatility in SD units.

This model explains about 66% (adjusted R^2) of the total variation of option price volatility. That is, two-thirds of the total variation of the volatility of option prices can be explained by the volatility of stock prices and the total number of relationships in the crowd.

The path model for XYZ crowd.—The decomposition of effects table for the XYZ path model is presented in table 4. As expected, stock price volatility is correlated positively with option price volatility: a 1 SD increase in stock price volatility increases option price volatility by .423 SD, with the network variables held constant. Clique density has a strong direct effect on option price volatility. When stock price volatility and

TABLE 3
DECOMPOSITION TABLE FOR ABC PATH MODEL

BIVARIATE RELATION	TOTAL CORRELATION	CAUSAL			NONCAUSAL
		Direct	Indirect	Total	
Stock/links629*	.629*	None	.629	None
Stock/density095	.095	None	.095	None
Stock/option746*	.454*	.292	.746	None
Links/option756*	.471*	None	.471	.285
Density/option016	-.033	None	-.033	.049
Links/density014	None	None	None	.014

* $P < .001$.

TABLE 4
DECOMPOSITION TABLE FOR XYZ PATH MODEL

BIVARIATE RELATION	TOTAL CORRELATION	CAUSAL			NONCAUSAL
		Direct	Indirect	Total	
Stock/links	-.219	-.219	None	-.219	None
Stock/density007	.007	None	.007	None
Stock/option424*	.423*	.001	.424	None
Links/option	-.309	-.019	.004	-.015	-.294
Density/option	-.573*	-.569*	None	-.569	-.004
Links/density346	None	None	None	.346

* $P < .001$.

total links are controlled, a 1 SD increase in clique density decreases option price volatility by .569 SD. Stock price volatility has virtually no effect on clique density; the trading behavior of XYZ clique members does not respond to changes in volatility. As a result, the indirect effect of stock price volatility on option price volatility through clique density is quite weak. The total links variable is not associated significantly with either price variable and thus may be dropped from the model.

The regression equation for this model of XYZ is $\hat{Y} = -.576(CD) + .428(SV)$, where CD = clique density measured in SD units, SV = stock price volatility measured in SD units, and \hat{Y} = predicted option price volatility measured in SD units.

This model explains about 47% (adjusted R^2) of the total variation of option price volatility. That is, almost half of the total variation in option price volatility can be explained by the volatility of stock prices and the density of relationships within cliques. (Less of the total variation of the dependent variable is explained in this model than in the previous model owing to the lack of major indirect effects of stock price volatility on option price volatility.)

In sum, ABC and XYZ macronetworks influence option price volatility in opposite ways. In ABC, as the total number of relationships increases, so does the volatility of ABC option prices, when the volatility of underlying stock prices is controlled. In other words, an increase in the size of ABC market increases the volatility of option prices above and beyond that expected by the volatility of stock prices alone—an exacerbating effect. In XYZ, as the density of relationships within cliques increases, the volatility of option prices decreases, when the volatility of underlying stock prices is controlled. That is, the intensification of trading within cliques decreases the volatility of option prices below that expected by the volatility of stock prices alone—a dampening effect.

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings support the argument that the stock options market is socially structured. Both options marketplaces exhibited substantial social structural patterns that dramatically influenced the direction and the magnitude of price volatility. In addition, the differences in structure between the two empirical markets run counter to some of the fundamental premises of microeconomic theory. Microeconomic theory asserts that ABC market should be more competitive than XYZ market since a larger number of competitors (participants) trade in ABC marketplace. If ABC were more competitive than XYZ, it would exhibit less differentiation than would XYZ. But the opposite is true: ABC, the larger market, exhibits greater structural differentiation than does XYZ, the smaller

market. The ABC market is, in fact, less competitive than XYZ because large size and differentiation impede the efficient flow of information among all market actors.

Microeconomic theory also presumes that a market becomes more competitive, and hence less differentiated, as the number of actors increases. But whenever ABC market grew in size (usually in the first and third periods), the market exhibited greater—not lesser—differentiation. Market growth was found to impair the competitiveness of ABC market. Conversely, in a manner quite paradoxical to microeconomic theory, stable size (XYZ) was found to be conducive to heightened competitiveness.

Microeconomic theory argues that there is no rationale for trading in subgroups in a competitive market. According to this logic, ABC participants are not economically rational when they form multiple cliques because trading in cliques should not enable actors to achieve greater profits than they could by behaving competitively (i.e., by not forming cliques). But this premise is predicated on both the assumption of hyper-rationality and the belief that ABC actors form multiple cliques intentionally. In reality, both bounded rationality and opportunism compel actors to restrict and curtail their trading. One of the results of the curtailment of trading in large crowds is the formation of multiple subgroups. These subgroups are truly emergent—they are the unintended outcomes of human limitations on trading in the context of large aggregates.

The discovery that the options market is socially structured would be interesting but not as important if the structure of the market did not influence price determination. Implicit in much research on the options market is the assumption that trading networks do not substantially affect the volatility of prices. However, as the path analyses of price consequences demonstrate, empirical macronetworks substantially influence option price volatility.

Price volatility is related to the relatively abstract economic concept of "market orderliness." Usually, market orderliness is defined arbitrarily as low price volatility and disorderliness as high price volatility, although either low or high volatility may be appropriate for actual market conditions (Burns 1979; Logue 1975). But, as the findings show, orderliness is a relative matter. A market may be considered to be relatively orderly if social networks act to dampen price volatility and relatively disorderly if social networks act to exacerbate price volatility.

The findings may be summarized as "the paradox of large numbers." While under ideal-typical conditions large numbers and growth create a competitive and minimally differentiated market, the opposite occurs in actual market situations. This paradox cannot be explained adequately by conventional microeconomic theory. But the sociological model of markets-as-networks presented here offers a better explanation of the

observed patterns of ABC and XYZ markets and their effects on price volatility.

Given the observed constancy of micronetworks, the main determinant of market structure is size. In XYZ, the market rarely expanded to the point at which fragmentation would occur; in ABC, the market often grew large enough to induce fragmentation. This implies that there may be a threshold for market size below which fragmentation is less likely to occur and above which fragmentation is more likely to occur. From the monopoly (or monopsony) situation up to this threshold, an increase in size would tend to improve market performance. Beyond this threshold, an increase in size would tend to impair market performance. In short, the relationship between market size and performance is not linear, as assumed in microeconomics; rather, it is curvilinear. This relationship is depicted in figure 4.

As shown on the curve in figure 4, ABC is located beyond the threshold and XYZ is located near the threshold. The other labeled sections of the




FIG. 4.—Microeconomic theoretical and observed relationships of market size and market performance.

curve are derived from the qualitative data (see Baker, in press). At the extreme low end, a monopoly (monopsony) situation exists. Here there is only a single seller (buyer) in the options market crowd. The price at which transactions will occur in this situation is largely determined by the monopolist (monopsonist). Although this has occurred at the Exchange, it is much more common at other Exchanges.¹² In a somewhat larger market, a phenomenon known as the "negotiated market" has been reported to occur. In this situation, prices are negotiated rather than determined by competitive bidding. The crowd is large enough to avoid a monopoly (monopsony) situation but small enough that actors can make greater profits by coordinating trading and sharing orders than by competing aggressively with one another.¹³ Such cooperation is a minor form of opportunism known as price fixing. Beyond the negotiated market is the range of market sizes that generate truly competitive markets (this is the area in which XYZ market operates). After this optimum range, market size and performance are related inversely (this is the area where ABC operates).

The specific relationship of size and performance represented by figure 4 is likely to apply to other Exchange-based markets in the securities and futures industry. The general nonlinear relationship of size and performance may apply as well to empirical markets that are not Exchange based, but further research on other empirical markets is required to specify the precise relationship of size and performance.

To economists, the finding that crowds on the floor of an Exchange grow so large that communication is impaired and price volatility increased is captured in the concept of "transaction costs." For some time, several economists have argued that the comparatively high transaction costs of floor trading could be eliminated by replacing it with electronic trading (trading in which orders are displayed and matched by impersonal computer algorithms) (e.g., Mendelson and Peake 1979; Burns 1982). Electronic trading would indeed circumvent the communication problems and constraints on information flows associated with large and differentiated crowds like ABC. But electronic trading would be at best a mixed blessing, for electronic trading can never eliminate the facts that

¹² Monopoly (monopsony) situations are more likely to occur at Exchanges that utilize the "specialist system" of trading. In the specialist system, competing market makers do not exist; instead, a single person (the specialist) trades from his own account to make markets. In this role, the specialist acts as a dealer. As the only person to make markets, the specialist can be in a position to act as a monopolist (monopsonist). In addition, the specialist also handles the book of unexecuted public orders and thus acts as a broker. The dual roles of the specialist—dealer and broker—invariably create role conflict in that the duties of dealer and broker are inherently contradictory (see Baker, in press).

¹³ The production markets studied by Harrison C. White fit approximately into the "negotiated market" region (White, personal communication; White 1984).

human actors are subject to bounded rationality and that some actors will act opportunistically. Though orders could be matched by a computer algorithm, the buyers and sellers who place these orders are still subject to bounded rationality and still operate in an environment of uncertainty and complexity. Furthermore, while electronic trading would eliminate the abuses associated with floor trading (Burns 1982), it would simultaneously create new possibilities for opportunism, such as various forms of computer crime. Changing the contact technology of the market would affect the social structure of the market, but it would never escape the fact that markets are socially structured.

The results of this study have public policy implications made even more important by the recent rapid proliferation of new financial markets that are Exchange based. Both the Exchanges themselves and their federal regulators base policy decisions on the presumption that securities and futures markets are not socially structured. But as this analysis demonstrates, the options market is socially structured in ways that substantially affect its operations and outcomes. Exacerbated price volatility (ABC market) is inconsistent with the regulatory goal of "fair and orderly" markets. This makes it incumbent on the Exchanges and their regulators to investigate and ameliorate the detrimental effects caused by trading in large crowds. Limiting the size of crowds might be an effective (though exceedingly unpopular) way to accomplish this.

Part of the power and the appeal of economic models is that they provide normative guidance. For example, options valuation models (e.g., Black and Scholes 1972, 1973) are based on the concept of "fair value"—an estimate of what the price of an option *should* be in an efficient market. Empirical prices are compared with "fair value" to determine if an option is "overvalued" or "undervalued" in the market. The results of the present study also provide normative guidance, though not the kind that aids investors because the critical determinant of price volatility—the social structure of the market—is invisible to most participants.

Price volatility is used by investors as an important indicator of the risk of holding a security and of the intrinsic value of the assets represented by a security. Both exacerbated and dampened option price volatility present distorted information about the "true" volatility of prices—what volatility *should* be if markets were not socially structured. Such distortions are likely to result in misallocations of funds among markets. Exacerbated price volatility makes a security appear to be much riskier than it should be; conversely, dampened price volatility makes a security appear to be less risky than it should be. Conservative investors (risk averters) would tend to shun the first market and enter the second; speculators (risk assumers) would be attracted to the first market and tend to ignore the second. Although one may only speculate about the effects of such

migration patterns, the attraction of speculators to a market with already exacerbated price volatility might result in even more volatile prices; in the extreme, this might create a speculative bubble of some sort. The attraction of conservative investors to a market with lowered price volatility could result in a further decrease in price volatility, but it could instead, by increasing size, counterbalance lowered volatility and start to exacerbate price volatility.

Exacerbated and dampened price volatilities also affect investors who use derivative markets (options, futures) to reduce the risk of holding a position in an underlying market. For example, an investor with an exposed position in the stock market may offset some of the risk of adverse price movements by taking a position in the stock options market (or the stock index futures market). But exacerbated option price volatility introduces an additional element of risk to the investor. Dampened option price volatility, in contrast, enhances the use of options as a tool for reducing risk.

The social structure of the options market also affects the corporations whose stocks are listed for options trading. One of the presumed merits of listing a corporation's stock for options trading is that an active options market seems to reduce the volatility of underlying stock prices and reduced volatility reduces the corporation's cost of capital (Gastineau 1979, pp. 192-93). This may happen if option prices are made less volatile by the social structure of the options market. But exacerbated option price volatility may have a detrimental effect on underlying stock prices. If it did, the corporation's cost of capital would increase, and its ability to form new capital would be impaired.

Every corporation watches the volatility of the price of its securities in order to decide if and when to issue new securities. A firm may perceive exacerbated price volatility as an indicator that the market is too uncertain for issuing new securities. Conversely, a firm may perceive dampened price volatility as an indicator that the market will support the issuance of new securities. Both perceptions, however, are based on distorted information about the "true" volatility of prices and would result in ill-timed issues of new securities. The effects of basing decisions on socially structured prices are difficult to predict. Further research is needed to specify the effects of exacerbated and dampened price volatilities on investment decisions and ultimately on the ability of the financial markets to facilitate capital formation.

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Household Work as an Ordeal: Culture of Standards versus Standardization of Culture¹

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Some feminist authors assert that household work is inexorably debasing for women. This paper questions that hypothesis on both theoretical and methodological grounds by exploring (a) ambiguities in the links between patriarchy and capitalism and (b) the meanings of housework across cultural and historical settings. A research agenda is proposed in which it is suggested that housework is both an ordeal of civility through which individuals judge their joint membership in the same social milieu and an ordeal of conviviality through which individuals who pass within the same milieu reinforce social bonds. The conclusion elucidates why changes in the division of housework should not be synonymous with the eradication of tasks.

Reason not the need. Our basest beggars
are in the poorest thing superfluous.

[KING LEAR]

Once innocuous and seemingly unnoticed by even the most eclectic social thinkers, housework has long been reduced to a collection of "value-free and meaning-free" techniques deserving the attention of only home economics teachers, those specialists of domestic engineering. Now this essential component of everyone's daily life has been thrust onto center stage by feminist authors, who assert that household chores are inexorably oppressive for women (Oakley 1974, p. 195; 1980, p. 8; Frankenburg 1966; Gavron 1966) and that the "family remains a primary arena where men exercise their patriarchal power over women's labor" (Hartmann 1981, p. 377). This stance raises fundamental epistemological problems.

¹ Both of us are members of the Women's Studies Program at the University of Maryland and would like to thank the following colleagues for their comments: Susan Cardinale, Ariel Clignet, Elaine Anderson, Madeleine Hage, and Anne Imamura. We are grateful also to Esther Press, former chef of gourmet restaurants in Philadelphia, for her comments. Requests for reprints should be sent to Joseph J. Valadez, Department of Family and Community Development, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742.

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First, as it equates housework with oppression, it eliminates unjustifiably from the research agenda women (among whom are some feminists) who consider housework to be as much a source of pride and power as a source of frustration and submission. Second, as it treats housework in generic terms, it minimizes the specific symbolic properties of each household task and of each task's cultural components.²

In the first part of the paper, we show that such analyses of housework view unjustifiably the processes and outcomes of domestic activities as mere by-products of larger social conflicts and draw inappropriate analogies between the dissatisfaction and the time budgets of houseworkers and those of industrial wage earners (Oakley 1974; Szalai 1972; Chapin 1974; Berk and Shih 1980; Berk and Berk 1979). Hartmann, for example, writes, "Time spent in housework as well as other indicators of housework can be fruitfully used as a measure of power relations in the home" (1981, p. 377). This first part focuses, therefore, on the ambiguities of the links between patriarchy and capitalism or colonialism in order to show the reductionist fallacies which threaten the validity of the analyses of housework.

In the second and third parts of the paper, we explore housework as a specific commitment shared by houseworkers and those who benefit from their services. We suggest that housework is a two-tiered ordeal which mediates tensions between nature and culture and expresses both sacred and profane manifestations of human presence in the world (Eliade 1959). In the third part we show how this ordeal involves simultaneously (a) a test of civility by which people evaluate their respective performances of household tasks in order to determine whether they are members of the same milieu or culture and (b) a test of conviviality by which individuals of the same milieu or culture assess their common bonds.

Because our argument focuses on the symbolic properties of the intra- and interfamily relations producing housework and produced by it, the second part of this paper might be labeled "structuralist" (Rigby 1976, p. 2). Indeed, our argument is inspired by the works of such researchers as Lévi-Strauss (1969, 1975, 1978), Douglas (1975), and Rigby (1976). The first of these authors looks for a precoded, prehuman message in the language of food (Lévi-Strauss 1969). The second shows how the grammar of food reveals the "hierarchical relations of exclusion and inclusion inherent in the status assigned to individuals" (1975, p. 249). Finally, Rigby suggests that these patterns of exclusion and inclusion take place both within and outside familial groups. Among the Baraguyu Masai, "eating

² First, household tasks should be treated in terms of categories that are analytically distinct (for an illustration see Strasser [1982]). Furthermore, both the variety and the evolution of cookbooks suggest that cooking is a culture involving paradigms with their sets of symbolic generalizations, models, and exemplars (Kuhn 1977). To deny the existence of a culture of cooking is to take an "elitist" stance which denies the existence of so-called folk cultures.

rituals represent the historical interdependence of their relations with non-Baraguyu" (1976, p. 22). Capitalizing on the work of these writers, we will explore how the *production* and the *consumption* of housework services foster specific patterns of social interaction both within and between households and how these orderings vary across cultures as well as over time.

In conclusion, we will suggest that conflicting feminist ideologies parallel diverging analytical styles in the social sciences. As such differences affect family policies, we show why changes in the allocation of housework tasks should not be made synonymous with their eradication.

REDUCTIONISM IN ANALYSES OF HOUSEWORK

An essential premise of certain feminist writers is that the household is primarily a locus of conflict between genders (Oakley 1981; Hartmann 1981). Following this premise, they believe that analyses of the social psychological consequences of such conflicts, notably, alienation, require interpretation of household activities in terms of theories that have already been developed to account for conflicts in other settings.

Whether the alienating properties of housework are assumed to result from the specific rules of division of labor by gender (Oakley 1974, pp. 27-28) or from an extension of capitalistic structures (Oakley 1981, p. 167; Berk and Berk 1979, pp. 9-14), these two stances assume unjustifiably that the concepts of oppression and alienation present invariant and universal properties. As noted by both Fanon (1960) and Memmi (1968), the determinants and implications of dominance are necessarily historically and culturally relative.³ Indeed, to treat housework as being conceptually and experientially identical to industrial or colonial work raises historical, semantic, and conceptual problems.

Historically, relationships between patriarchy and capitalism or colonialism take various forms (Hartmann 1981, pp. 372-75; Donzelot 1979). Certain phases in the development of capitalism and colonialism are associated with a transformation of households from income-producing into income-pooling units; this transformation involves a concomitant reinforcement of patriarchal structures and ideologies. Yet other, Dickensian phases of capitalism and colonialism have been accompanied by

³ Both Memmi (1968) and Fanon (1960) suggest that alienation varies across populations and settings. Psychiatric and economic alienation differ from one another. Psychiatric alienation may be seen as a bourgeois phenomenon insofar as it has historically enabled the most powerful segments of this population to remove their enemies to asylums in order to usurp their assets (Foucault 1965). Similarly, colonial oppression can be seen as cultural as much as economic. Competing definitions of alienation generated a number of controversies between Fanon and the French Communist party (Nguyen 1963).

an erosion of patriarchy. Because households and marketplaces appear to be subjected to different structural and historical forces, one cannot assume that conflicts within male-dominated homes and within other social institutions follow the same mechanical or cumulative patterns and, hence, that conflicts in the first context can be reduced to those that take place in the second.

Semantically, the suffix "ism" in both capitalism and colonialism signals their explicit ideological orientations. In contrast, the term "patriarchy" is used explicitly in legal, anthropological, and sociological discourses. The terms capitalism and colonialism are overtly value loaded, but the term patriarchy is seemingly value free because it is used to describe political structures rather than to prescribe or proscribe them. To ignore the conceptual distinction between the labels used to describe a particular type of familial organization and its overtly ideological justification can but prevent the changes one seeks to promote.

Conceptually, two contrasting traits of familial, industrial, and colonial contexts call for distinct modes of analysis. On the one hand, the social, political, and economic constraints faced by the typical actors of each of the three environments are different. In contrast to the classlike status of workers who may enjoy mobility, ethnicity and gender are permanent attributes. Furthermore, although race and sex are both castelike, the term "colonized" precludes any image of intimacy with or love of the oppressor and evokes a number of inter- and intrarole conflicts which are at odds with the various meanings of the term "housewife."⁴ On the other hand, the functions that families perform in the larger social structure do not correspond to those of industries or colonies (for an opposite view, see Glazer-Malbin [1976], p. 919). These last two institutions produce objects to be consumed externally and are expected to generate an economic profit, at least for the dominant classes. In contrast, housework ensures the physical and social welfare of insiders. These two contrasting traits generate four differences in the tasks that characterize each of these three contexts.

Organizational Divergences of Industrial or Colonial Work and Housework

First, the historical evolution of industrial or colonial work and the parallel transformation of cottage industries into assembly lines have involved

⁴ For a general elaboration, one should consult Brown (1963). More specifically, the expression "student or woman as nigger," so frequently used on American campuses during the sixties, masks more than it reveals about the specific economic and psychological alienation experienced by students or women on the one hand and blacks on the other.

a transfer of personal activities from the private to the public domain. More recently, the evolution of housework has followed the opposite direction. In preindustrial societies with limited patterns of social stratification, women gathered to fetch water, wash laundry, and shop. Such intragender public contacts generated both bonds and bondages (Sennett 1979, 1980), as revealed by the richness of songs, tales, and proverbs dealing with such encounters (Desforges 1981). In contrast, postindustrial residential arrangements and technological innovations minimize the frequency of both collective domestic work and interhousehold contacts. Thus, housework has become private in two ways: it involves less intimacy with others both within and between households.

Second, technological equipment is both more sophisticated and less likely to vary across industrial or colonial settings than across households. The specialization of industrial work minimizes inter- and intrafirm variations in the use of machinery. In contrast, the use of technological equipment varies widely within and among households. Some domestic chores are more easily automated than others; some households are more prone than others to purchase technological equipment. As a result, houseworkers are generalists whose activities require diverse and changing skills.

Third, whereas industrial work involves the enduring repetition of the same task eight hours a day and five days a week, domestic work involves constant tensions among the rhythms specific to each activity. For example, not only are the timetables of cooking, washing, and cleaning of differing duration, but also their schedules can overlap. Furthermore, the performance of these tasks is routinely interrupted by the intrusion of other members of the household or persons from the outside world (e.g., neighbors, mailmen). Thus, work conditions in households differ from those in industrial or colonial settings (Oakley 1974, pp. 81, 182).

Fourth, the centralization and large scale of economic organizations implies a classlike institutionalization of relations between employers and employees (Leclerc 1978). For various reasons, employers create a variety of homogeneous castes (e.g., manual vs. nonmanual, assembly liners vs. maintenance workers, core vs. peripheral employees), although they may introduce particularistic exceptions to their own rules in order to further their dominance. In contrast, domestic relations are symmetrical, as spouses are pitted against each other, and each of them against each of their children. Although the asymmetry of industrial relations is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for the emergence of class struggles in organizations, the symmetry of domestic relations impedes such an occurrence in the context of homes. While the centralization of economic organizations is linked to economic productivity and political dominance,

the centralization of families may result from two inconsistent logics which do not necessarily enhance economic productivity. This decentralization may reinforce the control of men over women, but it also facilitates intimacy.

Social Psychological Variations in Responses to Industrial or Colonial and to Familial Environments

Three elements differentiate the social psychological responses of individuals to industrial or colonial and to familial environments: (a) self-definition by the actors, (b) conflicts in which actors oppose one another, and (c) subordinates' ways of dealing with the exploitation to which they are subjected.

First, commitment to a task and commitment to others as implied in the task are more closely intertwined in the case of the household than in the case of the factory, whether in a metropolis or in a colony. Thus, when German culture restricts women to *Kinder*, *Küche*, and *Kirche*, it also identifies the realms in which women exert definite claims over things and people (Quataert 1979, pp. 22–26). Although these three realms may be belittled and derided, they are not invaded by men and remain sources of power for women (Branca 1975, p. 22; Oakley 1974, p. 14). Indeed, “when women clean well, sew well, and cook well, they make important contributions to the economic survival and general well-being of their families” (Rossi 1972, p. 72). Because of these contributions, the extent to which women transform restrictions imposed on them into sources of authority and control might explain not only why housewives look at housework with “taste and love” (Rossi 1972, p. 74) but also why their militancy against men is historically and culturally selective. Indeed, in order to subvert social movements seeking equity, capitalists have often been “paternalist” in their attempts to corrupt the ideology of love which has dominated the domestic scene for so long (Sennett 1980).

Second, both the goals and the strategies of familial conflict differ from those in industrial or colonial contexts. Although, in both the firm and the household, subordinates use slowdowns in defiance of the quotas imposed by those in power, strikes have no equivalents in the domestic landscape, except in the imaginary universe of Aristophanes or in the context of certain African societies where married women have the collective power of retaliating against the misdeeds of their husbands (Harrel Bond, personal communication). Furthermore, whereas industrial conflicts concern primarily the allocation of the firm's resources, the objects of domestic conflicts are more diverse. As in industrial or colonial contexts, domestic conflicts may pertain to the allocation of income or of tasks, but

they may also result from the "privatization" of familial residential arrangements. Some women feel locked inside the domestic realm and challenge men's participation in the labor force.

Third, the very lack of standardization of housework leads to greater intra- and interindividual variation in the behavioral manifestations of feelings of oppression. Some housewives may resent cooking per se and opt for TV dinners; others resent only the preparation of a particular dish. Similarly, while the rejection of ironing can be wholesale, it may be more narrowly focused on the ironing of certain items, such as multitextured garments or embroidered tablecloths. In short, the contrasting requirements of housework and industrial or colonial work threaten the validity of comparisons of their alienating properties, regardless of whether these comparisons pertain to levels of dissatisfaction or to time budgets.

Discussion

Regardless of the merits of comparing colonies and factories with households, is it appropriate to ask, as Hartmann (1981, p. 387) does, *whether* these work environments are perceived as oppressive? It may be more appropriate to ask *who* in each of these environments has such perceptions and under what conditions. To ask the first question may threaten the validity of the analyses of these environments because it reflects the political projects of the researchers rather than those of the subjects studied (Cicourel 1974). When Hartmann writes that "gender struggles may be bearing fruit. Standards may be changing, allowing for a reduction in the overall time spent in housework" (1981, p. 389), she asserts rather than demonstrates a causal relationship between declines in housework standards and decreases in the amount of time spent on housework. Similarly, when other researchers use the term "commodity" to refer to housework and assert that the time spent on domestic chores is a clear indicator of the alienating condition of housewives (Berk 1980; Berk and Berk 1979), they reduce arbitrarily the inter- and intraindividual variability of attitudes and behaviors toward the various tasks that constitute housework. In both cases, research becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Furthermore, in the case of housework, standards vary necessarily both within and across tasks. One does not cook a leg of lamb in the same way one broils a hamburger. Similarly, one does not wash natural silk or wool in the same way as one washes synthetic textiles. Thus, changes of standards and correlative declines in time spent in housework may reflect a shift from legs of lamb to hamburgers, and from natural silk to synthetic fabrics, but they may also reflect changes in the standards used in dealing with any one of these items. In addition, standards reflect commitments not only to the task but also to significant others. One does not necessarily wash with the same care the clothing of one's spouse and one's children.

Because of the linkage between standards used for defining tasks and commitment to others, the elimination of direct objects to specify the tasks and of indirect objects to identify persons for whom these tasks are performed results in a questionable description of the actions under study (e.g., to cook, to wash, to clean), from both a grammatical and a phenomenological viewpoint. This elimination obscures fundamental decisions individuals make about their work, namely, decisions about the objects to be worked on, the procedures of their transformation, and the immediate beneficiaries of this work.

To conclude this section: all reform-oriented analyses of industrial and domestic work have been subjected to similar tensions. At one end of the continuum, work is seen as essentially degrading and meaningless. Analysts tend, therefore, to minimize the intrinsic properties of the tasks to be performed and concentrate their attention on the economic power relations inherent in all work situations. At the other end of the continuum, as other analysts remain faithful to Marxian views on the multifaceted meaning of work, they are sensitive to the variability of emotional reactions which go with specific tasks (Friedman 1950).⁵ These analysts are sensitive to the dual meaning of the word "work" which refers both to the performance of externally controlled and routinized tasks and to the consummate forms of individual creativity. In other words, work refers both to assembly lines and to concertos, to paintings and to the *chefs d'oeuvre* of cooks. "There entered the dining room *le boeuf aux carottes*, laid by the Michelangelo of our kitchen on huge crystals of aspic analogous to blocks of translucid quartz" (Proust 1964, p. 458 [our translation]).⁶ Hence a systematic exploration of the symbolic or structural properties of all work situations, including housework, is needed.

HOUSEWORK AS A DIALECTIC BETWEEN NATURE AND CULTURE

Because services (e.g., cooking, cleaning) are embedded in nature (Lévi-Strauss 1969, 1975, 1978), some of their components are constant across cultural settings. Whether domestic or commercial, services are natural because our survival as biological beings is contingent on our ingestion

⁵ Marx himself insisted that the expropriation of workers from their work was not only economic but sociopsychological as well. Hence his elaboration of the distinction between "use value" and "exchange value."

⁶ It is noteworthy that in French the kinds of work are differentiated by the words used for them. The word *travail* can be value free or can convey the possibility of alienation. It is to be contrasted with *oeuvre*, which evokes exclusively the creative properties of work. The fact that Proust equates the cook Françoise with Michelangelo suggests that servants and, a fortiori, housewives achieve more prestige and power than some feminist writers would like us to believe. This point is made clear not only in the plays of Molière, Shakespeare, Marivaux, and Beaumarchais but also more recently in Losey's film *The Servant* with a scenario by Pinter.

of food and our protection from disease. Furthermore, while human needs follow natural patterns (e.g., days, seasons, life cycles), their satisfaction is governed by ecological constraints, for instance, by the availability of flora and fauna, or by climatic and geological changes (e.g., floods, earthquakes, droughts).

However, because nature is a social construct, housework varies also across cultures. Cultural systems of emotions, cognitions, and values distinguish what is edible from what is not (Sahlens 1976, pp. 175–76), what is clean from what is dirty (Douglas 1975), and what is durable from what is transient or even rubbish (Thompson 1979). In this sense, the definition of housework standards is culturally relative.⁷

Second, cultural systems specify housework materials and, hence, which food should be roasted rather than boiled; which artifacts (e.g., which rugs, clothes, pots) should be exempt from mechanical or chemical cleaning, because of the fear that such techniques destroy as much as they preserve; or which flowers should be used fresh rather than dried as decorations. Despite the emphasis that highly technological societies place on the standardization and fast turnover of various artifacts used in daily life (e.g., paper cups, plates, handkerchiefs), their utilization is limited to certain places and occasions (e.g., picnics).

Third, cultural systems identify technological innovations that are acceptable for services and the circumstances under which these innovations are legitimate (Strasser 1982). Canning, freezing, and preserving are acceptable only insofar as it is deemed legitimate to regularize the natural cycle of affluence and scarcity. Similarly, while the primary function of such equipment as microwave ovens is to save time, additional functions of electric mixers and Cuisinarts are to reduce the unpredictability of certain techniques and to maximize the homogeneity of the end product. In more general terms, culture specifies the procedures of housework.

Fourth, cultural systems specify the allocation of service chores, the rank order of beneficiaries from the work, and the rank order of services in terms of their symbolic importance. For example, these systems specify (a) the sequential order in which individuals are served, (b) their seating at the table, and (c) the "high" or "low" quality of the dishes or services offered to them. All these rules reflect and reinforce the rank order of genders, age groups, and kinship positions.

Relativity of the Dialectic between Nature and Culture

Although distinctions between the natural and cultural determinants of housework serve heuristic and analytical purposes, the two terms are

⁷ While nature-based odors or smells affect moral status, stereotypes, and patterns of avoidance and attraction, the positive or negative qualities imputed to them are contingent on social and cultural arrangements (Largey and Watson 1972).

interrelated. Both the development of household artifacts (e.g., dishes and clothes) and the ordering of the components of housework (e.g., classification of tasks, of workers and beneficiaries, and of accompanying rituals) reflect the way in which members of a culture believe the products of nature to be segmented and ordered (Lévi-Strauss 1969; Leach 1974). Cultural variations in the corresponding sets of prescriptions and proscriptions may be placed on a continuum ranging from the stress placed on nature to the stress placed on culture. For example, the cuisine of the French chef Guérard preserves the natural segmentation of egg yolks and egg whites; by teaching his students to separate them by hand and then to beat them with a fork rather than a machine, he limits the intrusion of culture into the natural realm. As cooking "au naturel" appeals to "basic" life, Guérard nurtures an informal "undramatic" atmosphere by cultivating small talk among his students while cooking. At the other end of the continuum, the production of housework may be intended to diverge from natural processes of segmentation and ordering. In contrast to Guérard, Vergé makes "machine cooking" mandatory and tells his students "to always beat egg whites with the mixer set at no. 6" (Wells 1980).

The same holds true for housecleaning. First, individuals differ not only concerning the objects to which they are attached but also concerning the "natural" or "technical" precautions which should be taken in order to ensure their survival. In addition, the "naturally" boring qualities imputed to the corresponding tasks may be lowered by inducing cultural diversions. "Without using my clean up musical tapes, cleaning takes half of the weekend; with them I get it all done in less than two hours" (Merhabian 1976, p. 48).

To contrast service systems across cultures in terms of whether they are analogous or antithetical to their referents in nature is insufficient, because the concept of nature itself involves two distinct domains: the constraints imputed to the physical nonhuman world and the constraints imputed to the existential human condition. Thus, the patterns of social interaction related to housework can be located on a continuum that ranges from practices which curb human impulses to those which allow their free expression. As far as the production of housework services is concerned, the activities performed by household members may follow rigidly existing rules of division of labor. Conversely, the performance of these tasks may correspond to individual whims. As an example, a Japanese woman reports, "Don't tell my husband I told you, but he loves to iron. He does not call it housework, he calls it pastime" (Berger 1976, p. 61). The same holds true for the consumption of household tasks. At one end of the continuum, housework etiquette implies domestication and hence submission to a series of institutional roles which specify what should be eaten or cleaned, in what order, where, when, and with whom

(Zerubavel 1981; Douglas 1975). At the other end, the consumption of the products of housework implies indulging immediate and uncontrolled biological impulses (Turner 1976). To certain homes where elaborate rituals govern the organization of meals (e.g., sitting and serving arrangements), one can contrast the homes where each family member throws things together in the silence of the kitchen in order to appease his own hunger, according to an erratic schedule which precludes reinforcement of existing familial bonds. Thus, both the production and the consumption of housework may involve connection to the social world, with its necklace of prescriptions and proscriptions, but conversely, it may be dominated by separateness and by the centrifugal forces of raw competition (Chodorow 1978).⁸

Service activities also reveal dialectical links between the meanings of "physical" nature (e.g., likes or dislikes for some or all vegetables, meat, etc.) and human nature (e.g., positive and negative feelings toward others). On the one hand, these two natures converge insofar as housework protects human groups from both naturally and socially induced defilements, pollutions, and disruptions. On the other hand, the requirements that physical and human nature impose on housework may also be seen as mutually exclusive. For certain housewives, the challenge consists of meeting the highest standards in preparing food, setting the table, and thereby transforming physical nature into cultural artifacts, but the same housewives view the audience as the burdensome pretext of these achievements. In contrast, others define their tasks as exerting optimal control over human nature by achieving the best possible mix of their guests; they see decors and meals as cover-ups whose functions are only to underscore their social skills. In the words of Françoise de la Renta, "What amuses me is to direct a dinner, [and] to cast it. It will be all the better and to everyone's pleasure if I have good actors" (Stanfill 1980, p. 21).⁹

The tensions between the components of housework which confirm and those which deny their referents in nature evolve differentially across subcultures. Hence, subcultures may be hostile toward each other's practices. For example, in the United States today, groups that stress "natural" eating habits (e.g., organic-health-food eaters) may be considered conservative if not downright reactionary by those groups whose practices emphasize the "cultural" end of the same continuum (e.g., fast-food eaters).

However, contemporary social arrangements tend to mask the intensity of the contradictions between standardization of culture and the perpetuation of cultures of standards. As an example, eateries or carryout ser-

⁸ While Chodorow contrasts connectedness and separateness as, respectively, female and male characteristics, it is unclear whether this distinction is contingent on the characteristics of the society at large or on gender per se.

⁹ For a more theoretical treatment see Kanter (1977).

vices, such as Colonel Sanders or MacDonalds, create a standardized culture which obliterates interhousehold variations in cooking styles and denies personalized relations between preparers and clients. Yet they also use a conflicting strategy which appeals to the tastes of children (those very symbols of human nature), and they use a decor that purposefully imitates the old-fashioned kitchen (that very symbol of the transformation of nature into culture). The same compromises characterize the currency of certain condiments. Despite the increased popularity of natural spices, notably, garlic, the use of the giant variety, specially cultivated with a mild scent, allows pretensions to gourmandism without the socially undesirable consequences of the pungent smell of the normal variety (Sass 1980). Indeed, in a mass society, cosmopolitanism tends to imply a bland regression of individual attitudes and behaviors toward the mean (Martinelli 1979).

HOUSEWORK AND THE CULTURE OF SYMBOLS

The lament of King Lear used as an epigraph to this paper expresses his shock on learning of his daughter's treachery in disbanding his coterie of knights. After abandoning his throne, he expected to indulge in his favorite leisure activities with them: hunting, feasting, and making merry. His daughter Regan's rationale that he no longer had need for the band stirs a ferocious exclamation of indignation at her ignorance. The band was certainly not a labor force required by logistical imperatives but an interest group with which he could share comradeship and conviviality. Hence his response: "Reason not the need. Our basest beggars are in the poorest thing superfluous."

Lear's statement highlights the ritualistic importance of household life. In many traditions, household work is embedded in an encompassing network of values and norms. The expression "one sleeps the way one makes one's bed" implies elaborate standards for preparing one's own bed, the bed of honored guests, or that of honored members of the household. Thus, "to make the bed" refers both to reordering sheets and blankets in the morning and to the style with which it should be turned down or warmed at night before retiring. Similarly, while the French dictum "bread and freedom" summarizes the essential political demands of the oppressed, it also suggests that those on whose side one struggles for freedom are also those with whom one is willing to share bread. In this sense, those with whom one is willing to share one's intimate space are also those who can be trusted in political confrontations. In more general terms, the linkage between housework and friendship is consistent with existing analyses of symbolic processes and, more specifically, with the

theory that symbols express several levels of reality simultaneously (Firth 1973; Valadez 1978).

Far from being monopolized by bourgeois populations, these symbolic properties of housework were developed to a full political ritual by the American counterculture of the 1960s.¹⁰ Its "back to the earth" ideology emphasized the role of the household in the search for an alternative social order. Communal cooperatives did not represent only a particular way of coping with scarce resources; they were also the privileged loci for restoring basic values in social relations (e.g., trust, symbiosis, reciprocity) which had degenerated into hollow rituals in society at large (Douglas 1970). The practices of communal eating bowls, division of household labor, and potluck dinners illustrate these meanings of household life.

Communal eating bowls were the centerpieces of dining tables and were often filled with no more than a large salad composed of an array of vegetables, fruits, nuts, and the like. In order to experience immediately a sense of sharing and intimacy, diners would eat directly from these bowls rather than serve themselves on "private" plates.¹¹

Similarly, division-of-labor rosters magnified the sharing of domestic work. Irrespective of their genders or ages, individuals were expected to participate in household work (Kanter 1972; Gottschalk 1975). These requirements were not only rooted in the need to ensure the survival of the commune; they were also used as tests of individual commitment to the norm of sharing—the *raison d'être* of cooperative living. Typically, the allocation of tasks was mediated through a self-organizing system of interpersonal negotiations. Ultimately, however, each member would be responsible for participating in maintenance chores at a level of performance commensurate with his professed commitment to the commune. Those who failed to meet the expectations would be sanctioned, not only for failing to carry out their fair share but also for "copping out" and being unfaithful to the ideology.

Finally, in addition to alleviating individual cooking chores, potluck dinners were expressions of the self in relation to the entire group. A delicate quiche made with a naturally aged cheese would bring praise to the chef. A salad made from the preparer's own organically grown vegetables would prompt inquiries about backyard agricultural secrets.

Such vignettes illustrate the shortcomings of a strictly metric explanation of housework. Why should a member of the counterculture spend as much time preparing a single dish as it would normally take to prepare

¹⁰ The ignorance of the meaning of countercultural rituals displayed by functionalist and neo-Marxist scholars of housework indicates their insensitivity to the symbols which accompany domestic life.

¹¹ In her play *The Art of Dining*, T. Howe (1979) illustrates graphically how this aspect of the counterculture has been preempted by chic restaurants.

a full meal? If eating is simply "stoking the furnace," why is it that language distinguishes the actions of human beings who eat from animals which feed, and how can we explain the positive or negative, verbal or nonverbal reactions of the diners to what they are offered? These questions can but emphasize the importance of standards or values in the performance of housework and in the social interactions it generates.

Housework as an Ordeal of Civility and of Conviviality

From Teutonic antiquity to the present, ordeals have been based on the notion that logical and rational presentations of the self offer insufficient evidence of the credibility of individuals' roles and of their status. In order to reveal publicly their true worth, individuals subject themselves to tests which appeal to mystical forces. To pass or fail an ordeal is to satisfy or fail the gods and hence to establish the contestant's status in the community. Successful accomplishment of an ordeal brings about favors of witnesses and judges, but failure leads to criticisms and to minor or major forms of ostracism. Housework performed in the domestic context is such an ordeal both because of its symbolic translation of the links between nature and culture and because of the consequences of those links for social bonds.

Certain ordeals are single rites of passage which determine once and for all the entrance to a superior category. Others, however, involve a succession of tests whose consequences vary with each situation or with the passage of the seasons or of the years. During the medieval era, a page's achievement of knighthood exemplified the first type of ordeal, but this first success was only a prerequisite to being allowed to joust and hence to engage in a succession of other ordeals. Likewise, housework constitutes a recurring ordeal. The successful completion of domestic chores or rituals in the past does not determine future evaluations of such performances, for there may be changes in the evaluators as well as variations in the judgments passed by the same evaluators.

Housework involves two types of recurring ordeals. On the one hand, it represents domination of nature through cultural contests of civility between providers and beneficiaries of housework, the challenge being to ascertain *who* "passes" as a member of *whose* culture. On the other hand, it involves contests of conviviality, the challenge being to ascertain which members of the *same* culture display the least equivocal marks of fraternity.

Housework as an ordeal of civility.—Housework brings about domination of nature through a variety of cultural prescriptions and proscriptions which identify ingredients, tools, and operators as well as the finished products expected from labor. The saying "one sleeps the way one makes

one's bed" emphasizes the importance of (a) choosing appropriate materials (e.g., a suitable mattress and sheets) and (b) arranging them properly. The ordeal of washing clothes implies an adequate knowledge of detergents and other cleansers as well as of the effects imputed to soaking, beating, and scrubbing various types of clothes. The same kind of statement holds true a fortiori of cooking, which has its own specific grammar and lexicon. "One acquires a certain power over sausages and haddock in writing their names" (Woolf 1959, p. 365). Furthermore, a rule such as "cook until done" requires the codification of relevant anterior experiences and is meaningless if one has not cooked a comparable dish before or does not remember how it should look (Aberle 1980, p. 1). The ordeal can be more diffuse, as, for example, when Kosher rules specify the permissible and forbidden ingredients, the tools with which ingredients should be prepared and eaten, and the times at which they should be prepared and consumed. Housework, like religion, represents a "body of practices which regulate the details of everyday life" (Cuddihy 1974, p. 160).¹²

These practices constitute recurrent ordeals of civility, insofar as they specify "who adapts best his inner life to the appropriate and conceals most effectively unseemly depths" (Cuddihy 1974, p. 13). As such, housework separates insiders from outsiders both within and outside the household. It is the very test through which individuals discover whether they "pass" in the environment in which they live. Within the home itself, this notion of "passing" elucidates the essence of conflicts between parents and between them and their children about whether and by whom beds should be made, whether and by whom rooms should be cleaned, and, finally, what should be eaten by whom and when. "The serving of vegetables was judged too crucial a task to be delegated to children and I watched anxiously the size of helpings . . . often there were lectures about the need to eat vegetables and about how good they were. Encouragements were tried, then firm words and finally ultimatums. . . . I closed my eyes, hoping that the reduction of one sense would diminish the other so that the stuff would pass down my throat untasted" (Bailey 1981, p. 70). As these decisions specify boundaries between genders or between age groups, they specify what "passing" implies among the various members of the household and hence the reference group to which each one should aspire to belong.

Eating, cleaning, and decorating also represent ordeals of civility between households. Maté drinking and its relevance to "passing" in the gaucho culture of southern Patagonia offers a case in point. Because of demanding environmental conditions, gauchos must decide quickly

¹² The ordering of daily life has also been a major preoccupation of the most famous utopian writers, e.g., Fourier or Cabet.

whether a stranger met on a trail might be a suitable companion. Although the preparation and the sharing of the maté tea may symbolize a sense of community, it is primarily a test by which one can quickly gather information about whether the person encountered might "pass" as a suitable fellow traveler. There are analogues in European societies. "The way a seminarist eats his boiled eggs reveals his progress in his pious life," wrote Stendhal in *The Red and the Black*.

The role played by housework as an ordeal of civility explains why mothers are not keen to see their children eating unexpectedly at somebody else's house (Giard and Mayol 1980, p. 204). When children eat elsewhere, including at school, they act as proxies for their parents. Their behavior enables outsiders to form an opinion about the civility of their parents and about whether or not they "pass." Furthermore, children themselves may ascertain whether their own parents belong to the proper environment, and in doing so they may jeopardize the "civility" of their own household.

In summary, housework as an ordeal of civility includes socially conditioned ways of dealing with domestic life that reaffirm within and across households the boundaries of the culture to which individuals claim to belong. The corresponding fear inspired by this ordeal explains why we often delay inviting a stranger to a formal visit or a formal meal. The decor, the standards of taste and cleanliness silently displayed by furniture and clothing, the arrangement of the dining table and the properties of each dish, all these details bare the identities of hosts and guests alike. Their presence and our reactions to them constitute the ultimate test of whether "we" and "they" are insiders in the same culture (Lévi-Strauss 1970; Hubert and Mauss 1909). In other words, the tensions and anxieties created by this ordeal underline the social significance of the dictum that "one's home is one's castle." We are never sure whether our home is a fortress which protects us from the scrutiny of others or a palace where we are willing to evaluate others' public performances. Because of these uncertainties, there is always a fundamental ambiguity in the distinction we establish between being a maker of confidences and being a bore. There is always a similar fundamental ambiguity between being implicitly or explicitly allowed to "drop in" informally and feeling subject to the accusation of acting like a freeloader or a scrounger.¹³ What are opportunities for some turn out to be importunities for others.

Housework as an ordeal of conviviality.—Housework also implies an ordeal of conviviality. In contrast to ordeals of civility, which distinguish insiders from outsiders, ordeals of conviviality forge bonds among insiders. As an illustration of this second kind of ordeal, many grandmothers

¹³ Thus, the frequency with which scroungers are described in fiction is not fortuitous, as shown by the writings of La Bruyère, Chekhov, and Turgenev.

invite their grandchildren to be treated to their favorite dish, and their offer symbolizes their special relations (Giard and Mayol 1980, p. 202). This kind of ordeal also explains the persistence, in a desacralized world such as the contemporary West, of such rituals as Thanksgiving or Christmas which reinforce familial bonds. Although these examples of the ordeal of conviviality pertain to extraordinary occasions, the same ordeal is also rooted in daily life.¹⁴

Although the ordeal of conviviality follows logically and chronologically the ordeal of civility, their interrelationships obey complex and culturally relative logics. Thus, to fail the ordeal of civility generates variations in the subsequent ordeal of conviviality. At one end of the continuum, Gertrude Stein's maid H  l  ne thought that a Frenchman should not stay unexpectedly for a meal, particularly if he asked the servants beforehand what there was for dinner. She said that "foreigners had a perfect right to do these things but not a Frenchman . . . and Matisse had once done it. So when Miss Stein would tell her, 'Monsieur Matisse is staying for dinner,' she would say, 'In that case, I will not make an omelette but fry the eggs. It takes the same number of eggs and the same amount of butter but it shows less respect and he will understand' " (David 1965, p. 34). Thus, H  l  ne did not hold the same expectations about those who shared the same "civility" (i.e., Matisse) and those who did not. In her eyes only an insider like Matisse could appreciate the discreet disapproval that fried eggs represented. Yet, at the other end of the continuum, Gertrude Stein felt that Matisse's status as a painter entitled him to take liberties with the ordeal of civility. As another example, consider gauchos who are dealing with gringos unskilled in the gaucho ordeal of civility symbolized by mat   drinking. These gauchos are left with two opposite choices with regard to the ordeal of conviviality. They may offer such strangers a sweetened mat   tea, an offer which displays a subtle form of contempt because this preparation of the drink is reserved for women. Or they may offer them regular mat   tea in order to test whether such strangers are sufficiently "cosmopolitan."

In summary, housework represents a dual test through which the individuals reveal themselves. While it encapsulates the dialectical tensions between the public and private components of self-identity, the functions it serves in this regard are mediated through nature, notably through the resolution of the tensions between cleanliness and dirt or purity and defilement. As such, it highlights (a) the standards adopted by individuals for defining their territories in a household and (b) their identity during public encounters, regardless of whether these take place in their own

¹⁴ In his novels, Simenon shows the role played by the ordeal of conviviality in the daily rhythms of Inspector Maigret's cooperation with his wife around the kitchen and the market. This ordeal helps him in his search for the culprit.

household or in somebody else's. For this reason, housework is as much a language of the body as of the mind.¹⁵ The ways we touch, smell, or taste are as revealing of our culture as the rationales we use in order to justify our deeds and misdeeds.

Variations and Retention in the Ordeals of Housework

Anthropologists have systematically stressed the role played by mothers in the transmission of culture. Whether the ordeals described in the previous pages reflect conscious or unconscious models, the fact is that no adult really eats, washes, or dresses alone, since all these activities incorporate consciously or unconsciously the earliest eating, washing, and dressing experiences with one's parents, but more generally one's mother (Bourdieu 1979, pp. 83–86; Farb and Amelagos 1980; Giard and Mayol 1980).

Hence, the emotional and moral meaning of the expression "come home." On the one hand, the expression refers to the reassurance and comfort that human beings experience on returning from voluntary or forced journeys when they recognize the smells, tastes, and touches imprinted on them from early childhood by their mothers or other significant female figures. On the other hand, the expression also means, as in the rallying slogan of Senator McGovern, to come back to one's senses and to recapture the fundamental systems of values and ideals characterizing one's culture. Both of these interpretations are captured by Proust when his feelings are stirred by the memories of the *madeleine* offered by his mother when he was sick (1954, p. 47).

The key role played by women in this regard seems to be resistant to change, as their increased participation in the labor force seems neither to modify drastically their involvement in household tasks nor to lower the standards they use to evaluate their own performances (Badinter 1980; Michel 1978, p. 148; Hartmann 1981, pp. 377–81).¹⁶

Despite this universality, the tests which constitute the ordeals of house-

¹⁵ The ordeal of conviviality does not only involve culinary symbols. In a recent novel, Navarre (1974) describes the tests that this ordeal represents for a French family. As the mother of the hero comes out of a hospital where she has been treated for a deep depression, she visits her family one last time in order to celebrate the sale of the house which sheltered their intimacy. For the occasion, she wears the same dress she wore in a photograph taken of her playing with the hero and his brother who was killed during the war in Algeria. In so doing, she reminds all the participants in the dinner of the key role played by the hero's brother in shaping the conviviality of the family.

¹⁶ This observation is subject to conflicting interpretations. First, it may reflect the persistence of overt pressures exerted by men. Second, it may reflect the guilt that women experience when they are "liberated" from a traditional role. Finally, the fact remains that these observations are obtained from responses to questionnaires and do not necessarily correspond to actual behaviors.

work vary along cultural lines and differ, therefore, among social classes and ethnic groups. These variations can concern cooking materials. In contemporary France, for instance, endives are a vegetable of upper and middle classes, leeks a vegetable of farmers, and potatoes a vegetable of the working classes. Similarly, the middle and upper classes are more likely to eat rice than working-class people, who eat beans and lentils more often. Finally, the former prefer strawberries and raspberries, while the latter choose apricots and plums (Grignon and Grignon 1980).

The variations concern also cooking procedures and kitchen equipment. In England and in France, the preference of white-collar workers for industrially processed food contrasts with the ideological commitment of intellectual workers (e.g., teachers, social workers) to natural produce or with the tastes for such produce that artisans and shopkeepers derive from their traditional attachment to greengrocers. There are similar social class variations in the use of refrigerators. Some social groups stock pre-cooked foods, but others stock fresh produce.

In addition to varying across cultures, ordeals of housework also vary with family structures, not only with the number, the gender, and the age of children but also with child-rearing practices. In some cultures, children are seen as impediments to the upkeep of the household and to the perpetuation of high culinary standards; hence, they are restricted to some parts of the house, eliminated from the table, and fed separately. There are also other cultural contexts where children and household tasks are treated synonymously. "My mother serviced human bodies with the same products as those she used for cleaning the house. As far as she was concerned, our bodies belonged to the home in the same way as curtains, dishes, and clothing" (Prassinis 1966, p. 180 [our translation]). In these cultures, children are indeed scrubbed with the same passion and with the same brushes as other parts of the "decor." Finally, in a third context, children may be identified as the centers of domestic life, in which case both the main objects and the culinary style of the household are tailored to their specific needs.¹⁷

These cultural and familial differences are not necessarily stable. Housework ordeals are affected by geographic mobility, notably tourism, which entails the selective diffusion of regional culinary and decorative practices. Similarly, housework is influenced by such events as wars or economic depressions.¹⁸ As an illustration, the lawns or flower beds of

¹⁷ The role of mother is culturally relative. As an example, Clignet (1970) suggests that in the Ivory Coast, the only universal difference between monogamous and polygynous families concerns the sequential order in which individuals eat their meals. In polygynous households, husbands eat first, followed by their wives and then by children, the latter in sib-rank order.

¹⁸ In a more general vein, societies dominated by an ideology of scarcity tend to develop the art of dealing with leftovers (Aron 1979).

many European houses were transformed into vegetable gardens during the Second World War. The same period was also characterized by the rediscovery of recipes substituting carrots for chocolate in baking cakes, and by the imitation of meat patés with lima beans. Finally, periods or cultures of scarcity and affluence differ from one another not only in the frequency of ceremonial meals but also in the number or status of the guests invited.

CONCLUSIONS

Our purpose in this paper has been to delineate the epistemological problems of a mode of analysis that treats housework as an "undifferentiated commodity" which supposedly can be understood with the help of the same tools that are used to explore strictly economic behavior. This mode views households as mere reflections of macro social processes which do not have idiosyncratic histories of their own. The choice of this mode of analysis results both from the assumption that women are necessarily oppressed and from the corresponding desire to modify existing patterns of division of domestic labor.

Yet this view is not characteristic of the entire feminist movement. In contrast to those women who would like to eradicate housework altogether because it represents subservience both to men and to children, others aspire to bring more humane feelings and hence more diversity to the world (Rossi 1972).¹⁹ Furthermore, far from being specific to the feminist movement, this contradiction splits the entire social science community along disciplinary and cultural boundaries. At one end of the continuum, a certain brand of American sociology takes an atomistic view of social phenomena and assumes that the quest for equality involves only the redistribution of material assets. At the other end of the continuum, anthropologists and an increasing number of European male and female social scientists attach a greater importance to the variability of processes of social integration in differing types of communities. As such, they are as much interested in the distribution of symbolic power as in that of economic power.²⁰

¹⁹ For a vivid description of a functionalist strategy of change in housework patterns and of its negative implications for the symbols of the household, see J. Davison (1980). For a description of the angry puzzlement that this type of behavior generates on the part of cleaning women, see Coles and Coles (1979).

²⁰ The first style tends to be associated with externalist approaches to cultural worlds. Indeed, it tends to deny their specific histories and traditions and emphasizes arbitrarily the significance of purely atemporal measures derived from answers to questionnaires. In contrast, internalist scholars will pay more attention to nonreactive and nonobtrusive measures in order to get at the influence of traditions on actual patterns of behaviors. For a more general discussion of the distinction between externalist and internalist approaches, see Kuhn (1977), Merton (1973), and MacLeod (1977).

These contrasts in analytical styles are not without political consequences. To identify one monolithic solution to the political problems of housework in the name of an egalitarian ideology and to favor fast-food services is to run the risk of enslaving all members of familial groups to the dicta of mass market institutions (Ewen 1976; Lasch 1979; Marcuse 1964). To see cooking, cleaning, and child care as amorphous and interchangeable categories eradicates their specific symbolic properties and fosters a self-fulfilling prophecy beneficial to companies catering to a mass market.²¹ Moreover, to opt for a planned revolution and for the eradication of housework—that is, for universal, rapid, encompassing, and irreversible changes—is to reduce, in the name of a knowledge which is not necessarily available, the variability of existing patterns of housework. The point is that this reduction may be detrimental to the women of various cultures.

In view of these risks, it seems more appropriate to explore the differential evolutions of household tasks, of the patterns of division of labor which govern them, and of their symbolic properties. As an example, one might explore why bread baking, which was an activity characteristic of the housewives of the business class in Middletown some 20 years ago, diffused to all social classes during the seventies. Alternatively, one might explore how the use of takeout cookeries by recent urban immigrants or poor workers in the cities of the past has diffused to other segments of society in the modern metropolis. Similarly, one might seek to understand the processes underlying the creation of all-male or all-female service companies whose purpose is to replace the cleaning women of the past. As another example, one might seek to identify the conditions under which men begin to become more absorbed by various household tasks which they treat as hobbies rather than as chores, especially in the kitchen. In the same vein, one might seek to ascertain the conditions under which housewives form cooperatives in order to complete their tasks (Lebra 1980, pp. 133–42) or in order to buy the services of launderers and cooks (Bliven 1982, p. 105). Finally, one might seek to understand why the claims and demands of “functionalist” feminists have often generated political backlash, as exemplified by the mythology of the total woman.

In short, this paper constitutes a plea for a research agenda devoted to the identification of the connections that various subcultures establish between the functional and the symbolic properties of housework, of the flexibility of such connections, and of the processes by which these subcultures borrow from one another with regard to domestic arrangements. To acknowledge the historical and cultural relativity of existing patterns of housework and of the strategies aimed at modifying them is simply to

²¹ Because functionalist authors focus singlemindedly on the alienation fostered by production, they tend too often to forget the alienation generated by consumption.

recognize the plurality of the forms taken by social life in various contexts (Gould 1981). Far from being value free, this stance is faithful to the notion that in order to be effective, "revolutions" must not only be bound by space and time (Fanon 1960) but must also preserve an enduring striving for excellence (Hayek 1978; Campbell 1979).

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Processes of Hispanic and Black Spatial Assimilation¹

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Processes of Hispanic and black spatial assimilation were examined in selected SMSAs in the southwestern United States using 1960 and 1970 census data. Residential succession was much less prevalent in Hispanic areas than in black areas, and established Hispanic areas were quite rare. However, for both groups average SES fell as areas underwent transition from Anglo to established minority areas. The main difference between Hispanic and black areas was that black invasion was almost always followed by succession, while Hispanic invasion was followed by succession in less than 50% of cases. Whether tracts lost or gained Anglos following invasion by Hispanics depended on the objective characteristics of the invaders and the location of the tract relative to established minority areas. Overall, blacks were much less able to translate status attainments into mobility out of the ghetto and into contact with Anglos. Path models of Hispanic and black spatial assimilation revealed structural differences in processes between the two groups. Given the same socioeconomic inputs, the ultimate probability of residential contact with Anglos was much lower for blacks than for Hispanics. Results contradict the view that race is declining in importance within U.S. society.

Recent theory and research have overlooked spatial aspects of assimilation and stratification. While sociologists have long recognized a relationship between social and spatial mobility, we go further to stress that spatial assimilation is an essential step in the process of assimilation, with important ancillary effects on stratification. The socioeconomic position of any group cannot be understood apart from its spatial location in society.

Assimilation is the process by which a group comes to resemble, on a variety of dimensions, some larger society of which it is a part. Gordon (1964) has divided this process into seven distinct phases. The first is

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acculturation. During this phase a group acquires the language and cultural practices of the host society. It is the least problematic step in the assimilation process, and most groups complete it within two generations. The second stage is structural assimilation, the large-scale entrance of a group into primary relationships with members of the host society. It may occur concurrently with acculturation, subsequent to it, or not at all. According to Gordon, this is the crucial step in the process of assimilation. Once structural assimilation has occurred, all other phases of assimilation (marital, identificational, behavioral receptional, attitudinal receptional, and civic) follow automatically.

However, this scheme does not consider spatial elements in the assimilation process. Assimilation does not occur in a vacuum. Groups and individuals interact in a physical world. We suggest that spatial assimilation is a necessary intermediate step between acculturation and other types of assimilation. Spatial elements strongly affect nearly all stages of assimilation subsequent to acculturation. For example, research has shown residential propinquity to be a primary determinant of such variables as friendship (Whyte 1956), prejudice (Deutsch and Collins 1951; Jahoda and West 1951; Allport 1954; Works 1961), and marriage (Bossard 1932; Kennedy 1943; Koller 1948; Catton and Smircich 1964; Hanson, Marble, and Pitts 1972; Peach 1981), all mentioned by Gordon as elements of assimilation which are contingent on prior acculturation. If a group is not physically integrated within a society, structural assimilation, and consequently the subsequent stages of assimilation, will be exceedingly difficult. Spatial assimilation thus provides a mechanism relating acculturation to other types of assimilation. In order to comprehend the process of assimilation, one must first explicate the nature of spatial assimilation.

By *spatial assimilation*, we mean the process whereby a group attains residential propinquity with members of a host society. In the United States, it has generally involved the movement of minority groups out of established racial or ethnic neighborhoods into a larger urban environment inhabited primarily by "nonethnic" native whites (Cressy 1938; Ford 1950; Kiang 1968). The dynamic force behind this process is social mobility. As Park noted long ago, changes in education, income, and occupational status are usually followed by changes in location (1926, p. 9). Over the years, many studies have documented the association between social and spatial mobility (cf. Lieberman 1963; Nelli 1970; Ward 1971; Thernstrom 1973; Esslinger 1975; Kobrin and Goldscheider 1978). Indeed, this association appears to have grown stronger over time (Burstein 1981).

The reasons for the relationship between socioeconomic advancement and spatial mobility are not hard to understand. Opportunities and resources vary geographically. To take advantage of them, people move.

In a profound way, where one lives plays a large role in determining one's life chances. A list of important variables determined by residential location includes the cost and quality of housing, health and sanitary conditions, exposure to crime and violence, quality of services (the most important of which is education), and access to economic opportunity, as well as a host of less tangible factors ranging from the character of one's children's playmates to the kinds of role models they emulate. Thus in urban society, socioeconomic advancement tends to be accompanied by spatial movement aimed at bettering personal or familial circumstances.

In achievement-oriented societies like the United States, this bond between social and physical mobility is created and reinforced through acculturation. According to Brian Berry (1973, p. 50):

As growth has taken place, links between social and spatial mobility have been reinforced by a peculiarly American social dynamic. . . . The drive for achievement is a variable of key importance within the "mainstream" American culture—a culture in which status and self-respect come from what a person does, in the material world, rather than from his ancestry or his holiness. Social and spatial mobility are built into and interrelated within individuals' nervous systems as a result of the attitudes and pressures of the culture. . . . Earnings must be spent on the best possible homes and material possessions in the best possible neighborhoods. Any increase in job or financial status must be matched by a move to a better neighborhood in which the new and higher-status life style may be pursued.

In other words, a logical outgrowth of acculturation is the progressive spatial integration of an ethnic group within society at large, with the degree and kind of integration being determined by the objective socioeconomic characteristics the group has achieved (see Timms 1971).

This theoretical perspective suggests three specific hypotheses which we will test using data on racial and ethnic groups in selected U.S. cities: (1) The average socioeconomic status of minority members is higher in areas of recent entry composed primarily of majority members than in established ethnic or racial neighborhoods. (2) The average socioeconomic status of minority members varies directly with distance from an established ethnic or racial neighborhood. (3) The probability of contact with majority members is positively related to a minority's average socioeconomic status.

Spatial mobility is not only a key component in the process of assimilation; it also has important feedback effects on social mobility itself and is therefore an important element in social stratification—that is, the process by which socioeconomic inequality is generated. Because social and economic resources vary geographically, patterns of spatial assimilation have a clear impact on the opportunities for socioeconomic advancement. Barriers to spatial mobility are barriers to social mobility.

This line of reasoning is particularly relevant to the recent debate on "the declining significance of race" (Wilson 1978). During the 1970s, a variety of scholars made the case that race was becoming less important as a dimension of stratification in U.S. society (Banfield 1970; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Sowell 1981). However, notably lacking in this debate has been serious attention to the effects of persistent racial residential segregation. Given the important impact of residential location on individual life chances, racial segregation, to the extent that it exists, cannot be ignored as a salient dimension of stratification in the United States.

For example, institutionalized discrimination has led to racially segregated housing markets which constrain the ability of black buyers to realize their locational aspirations (see Helper 1969; Pearce 1979). As a result, blacks pay more than whites for housing of comparable quality (Kain and Quigley 1975; Jackman and Jackman 1980; Villemez 1980). Residential segregation thus lowers the discretionary income of blacks compared with whites earning the same annual income. Insofar as it restricts their ability to escape high-crime ghetto areas, segregation also forces blacks to bear a disproportionate share of the economic losses stemming from urban crime (Hindelang 1976; Lee 1981). In addition, blacks are more likely to absorb costs associated with illness and loss of life, since black neighborhoods have higher mortality rates than white ones (Kitagawa and Hauser 1973). Social mobility is further impaired by inferior education within racially segregated inner-city schools, which results directly from residential segregation (Coleman, Kelly, and Moore 1975; Farley 1978). Finally, to the extent that black ghettos house a "culture of poverty" (Lewis 1965; Banfield 1970), the spatial confinement of blacks within them insures that poverty will be passed from generation to generation.

This paper elaborates on these issues by documenting the mechanisms which generate racial segregation in U.S. cities. This goal is accomplished by comparing patterns of black and Hispanic spatial assimilation. Previous studies have shown widespread differences between these groups in the level and pattern of segregation (see Grebler, Moore, and Guzman 1970; Massey 1979a, 1979b, 1981; Lopez 1981). In general, black segregation is far greater than that of Hispanics and is less likely to be affected by such factors as social class, suburbanization, and generation (native vs. foreign birth for Hispanics; northern vs. southern birth for blacks). Thus we anticipate fundamental differences between black and Hispanic spatial assimilation. Assuming that non-Hispanic whites (henceforth called Anglos) are more likely to avoid living near blacks than near Hispanics, these differences can be precisely specified in terms of four hypotheses concerning the relative ability of each group to achieve spatial assimilation in U.S. society: (4) Areas of black settlement display a higher probability

of Anglo population loss and subsequent turnover (i.e., residential succession) than areas of Hispanic settlement. (5) Blacks are less able than Hispanics to translate socioeconomic achievements into spatial separation from an established racial/ethnic area. (6) Blacks are less able than Hispanics to convert socioeconomic achievements into residential proximity with Anglos. (7) Consequently, at any time, the probability of black contact with Anglos (i.e., the extent of spatial assimilation) is less than the probability of Hispanic contact with Anglos.

The hypotheses are examined in the ensuing paragraphs using data on blacks and Hispanics in selected U.S. cities.

DATA

Any study of residential succession requires comparable areal units at two census dates. Seven SMSAs containing significant Hispanic populations and having similar census tract grids in 1960 and 1970 were selected for analysis: Tucson, El Paso, Sacramento, Denver, San Diego, San Francisco-Oakland, and Los Angeles. Only in five southwestern states were data on Hispanics available for census tracts at both dates, and only these seven SMSAs simultaneously contained enough Hispanics and grids similar enough to sustain analysis.² Unfortunately, these constraints led to a data set more representative of the urban conditions of Hispanics than blacks. Therefore, comparisons between these groups focus on Los Angeles, an SMSA with large concentrations and established communities of both groups.

In order to establish comparabilities between 1960 and 1970 census tracts, the investigators inspected maps and consulted Census Bureau lists relating the two sets of tracts to one another. When tracts were not comparable because of a boundary redefinition, an attempt was made to aggregate several tracts into a larger unit that was the same in both years. In the few cases for which comparability could not be established, tracts were excluded from analysis. A single 1960-70 data file was created by combining published data for 1960 tracts with data taken from the Fourth Count Summary Tapes for 1970.

A major problem in combining 1960 and 1970 data is that the Hispanic population was defined differently at the two dates. In 1960, data published for census tracts defined Hispanics as persons of Spanish surname; in 1970 they were defined as persons of Spanish language *plus* those of Spanish surname but not of Spanish language. Within census tracts this change creates the erroneous impression of a loss in Anglo population and gain in Hispanic population between 1960 and 1970, a shift in ethnic

² In the New York SMSA, Puerto Ricans were enumerated by census tract in both 1960 and 1970, but this urban area is the subject of a separate study.

composition due solely to the different definitions. Within areas of Hispanic settlement there is therefore a bias toward the identification of succession tracts. Fortunately, it is conservative with respect to the findings of this paper. A more detailed documentation of this bias and its effects appears in Massey (1983).

These difficulties reflect a broader conceptual problem inherent in any study of ethnic segregation. The ambiguities involved in defining "Hispanics" imply that some persons of Hispanic ancestry might be excluded entirely from the "Hispanic" population. For example, in this study, people who did not have a Spanish surname and did not come from a household where Spanish was spoken would be counted as "Anglos," even if their grandparents were born in Mexico. However, it is virtually impossible for someone of black ancestry to be classified as white. While ethnicity is an ambiguous concept that provides some individuals with a choice of ethnic affiliations, race is an ascriptive concept over which an individual has little control. It is therefore always possible to argue that ethnic segregation might be greater, and residential succession more prevalent, were a broader definition to be employed. Since this problem does not arise in studying black segregation, apparent differences between blacks and Hispanics can always be questioned as artifacts of the definition chosen.

While this competing hypothesis cannot be eliminated, the widely divergent patterns of black and Hispanic spatial assimilation found in this study render it implausible, even if one makes liberal allowances for discrepancies between the census definition and the true population of Hispanics. Moreover, the 1970 definition of Hispanics used in this paper (that based on language and surname) is the most inclusive available, giving a larger "Hispanic" population than other alternatives (Siegel and Passel 1979). Ultimately, however, the ambiguity of identification is an intrinsic characteristic of ethnicity, one which broadens the parameters of assimilation and sets Hispanics distinctly apart from blacks in their dealings with U.S. society, a fact which is clearly reflected in our results.

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

In earlier work (Massey 1983), the analytic scheme of Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) was used to analyze the dynamics of Hispanic and black segregation. Their procedure classifies census tracts according to the type of interethnic change over a decade shown by shifts in the number and percentage of different groups in each tract. When applied over all census tracts in an urban area, it measures the prevalence of succession and classifies tracts according to their stage in the succession process. However, some classifications made using this method proved ambiguous in

Hispanic areas, since they were often made on the basis of intercensal changes in the percentage Hispanic, changes that were highly suspect given the shift in definitions (Massey 1983). Therefore, a simpler classification scheme based only on absolute changes was developed. This scheme is presented in table 1.

In using this scheme to classify tracts, we took care not to confound processes of black and Hispanic succession. Tracts containing 250 or more Hispanics and fewer than 250 blacks were considered separately from those containing 250 or more blacks and fewer than 250 Hispanics. The former are referred to as "Hispanic tracts" while the latter are called "black tracts." Census tracts containing 250 or more of both groups—called "mixed tracts"—were not classified.

This scheme was applied in a sequential and hierarchical manner to classify tracts according to type of interethnic or interracial change between 1960 and 1970. First, tracts were defined as either Hispanic, black, mixed, or non-Hispanic/black. The former two sets were then classified as either established or invasion areas. Tracts that were 60% minority at both dates were considered to be established areas. Those that contained fewer than 250 minority members in 1960 but more than that number in 1970 were called invasion areas. If not classifiable as invasion or estab-

TABLE 1

CLASSIFICATION SCHEME USED TO MEASURE THE INCIDENCE OF RESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION WITHIN AREAS OF HISPANIC AND BLACK SETTLEMENT

Tract Classification	
A. Hispanic tracts:	In 1970, fewer than 250 blacks and more than 250 Hispanics
1. Established	Hispanics exceed 60% of population in both 1960 and 1970
2. Invasion	Hispanics fewer than 250 in 1960; more than 250 in 1970
3. Succession:	Hispanic population growing; Anglo population falling
3.1. Early	Percentage Hispanic less than 20%
3.2. Middle	Percentage Hispanic more than 20% and less than 40%
3.3. Late	Percentage Hispanic more than 40%
4. Growth	Hispanic population growing; Anglo population growing
5. Displacement	Hispanic population falling; Anglo population growing
6. Decline	Hispanic population falling; Anglo population falling
B. Black tracts:	In 1970, fewer than 250 Hispanics and more than 250 blacks
1. Established	Blacks exceed 60% of population in both 1960 and 1970
2. Invasion	Blacks fewer than 250 in 1960; more than 250 in 1970
3. Succession:	Black population growing; Anglo population falling
3.1. Early	Percentage black less than 20%
3.2. Middle	Percentage black more than 20% and less than 40%
3.3. Late	Percentage black more than 40%
4. Growth	Black population growing; Anglo population growing
5. Displacement	Black population falling; Anglo population growing
6. Decline	Black population falling; Anglo population falling

lished areas, tracts were entered into one of four remaining categories. Succession tracts gained minority members but lost Anglos over the decade. Growth tracts experienced a gain in both groups, while declining tracts showed a loss in both groups. Finally, displacement tracts gained Anglos but lost minority members. The definitional problems mentioned earlier obviously bias Hispanic tracts toward the identification of invasion and succession areas.

The index of spatial assimilation we chose is the asymmetrical P^* , which measures spatial isolation as the probability of interaction or contact between groups. It is defined as

$${}_xP_y^* = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{(x_i)}{X} \frac{(y_i)}{t_i}, \quad (1)$$

where X is the total size of group X in the city in question, x_i is the number of group X in tract i , y_i is the number of group Y in this tract, and t_i is the total tract population. Here ${}_xP_y^*$ represents the weighted average of within-tract Y -proportions, where weights are the proportion of group X living in each tract. The index gives the probability that for a randomly selected member of group X , someone else selected from the same residential area will be a member of Y (Bell 1954; Lieberson 1980). Hence it gives the probability of residential contact with Y experienced by the average X . Unlike the index of dissimilarity, which is also widely used to measure residential segregation, the P^* index is dependent on the relative size of the group being considered, since this is a key factor in determining the probability of intergroup interaction (Blau 1977). Thus, as the minority proportion varies among cities, so too will P^* for the group in question.

PREVALENCE OF HISPANIC AND BLACK SUCCESSION

The scheme of table 1 was applied to classify census tracts in the data set in order to shed light on our fourth hypothesis, that black areas have a greater chance of Anglo loss and turnover than Hispanic areas. Table 2 presents tracts in each of the seven SMSAs grouped by type of residential change observed between 1960 and 1970.

This table reveals important contrasts between patterns of black and Hispanic segregation. First, blacks are confined to a much smaller share of each SMSA's residential areas than are Hispanics. While 77% of all tracts contained at least 250 Hispanics, the comparable figure for blacks was only 27%. The contrast was especially marked in Los Angeles, where 78% of all tracts contained Hispanics but only 23% contained blacks. Second, Hispanics were considerably less likely than blacks to be living in an established area. Only in El Paso did such tracts constitute an

TABLE 2

CLASSIFICATION OF CENSUS TRACTS BY TYPE OF RESIDENTIAL CHANGE IN SEVEN SOUTHWESTERN SMSAS: 1960-70 (%)

	HISPANIC TRACTS						BLACK TRACTS				
	Tucson	El Paso	Sacramento	Denver	San Diego	San Francisco--		Total	San Francisco--		Total
						Oakland	Los Angeles		Oakland	Los Angeles	
Established tract.....	13.5	40.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	4.3	3.8	26.7	61.1	48.8
Succession tract:.....	27.0	45.7	27.4	29.7	10.8	28.0	27.8	26.4	18.4	24.0	22.0
Late.....	13.5	42.8	3.2	11.7	.6	1.8	11.0	8.9	11.7	23.1	19.0
Middle.....	2.7	2.9	12.9	10.6	5.1	10.1	10.5	9.5	.0	.9	.6
Early.....	10.8	.0	11.3	7.4	5.1	16.1	6.3	8.0	6.7	.0	2.4
Invasion:.....	37.8	2.8	50.0	58.5	73.4	54.4	53.7	54.5	15.0	10.2	11.9
Anglo gain.....	16.2	2.8	37.1	29.8	46.8	30.4	26.2	29.2	3.3	.0	1.2
Anglo loss.....	21.6	.0	12.9	28.7	26.6	24.0	27.5	25.3	11.7	10.2	10.7
Other tracts:.....	21.6	11.5	22.6	11.7	15.8	17.6	14.2	15.2	13.3	3.6	7.8
Growth.....	21.6	8.6	14.5	8.5	13.3	17.1	13.1	13.6	.0	.9	3.6
Displacement.....	.0	.0	.0	1.1	.0	.0	.3	.2	8.3	.9	3.6
Decline.....	.0	2.9	8.1	2.1	2.5	.5	.8	1.4	5.0	2.8	3.6
Total black or Hispanic tracts (N).....	37	35	62	94	158	217	743	1,346	44	108	152
Mixed Hispanic-black tracts (N).....	11	11	26	14	26	125	165	378	125	156	290
Total tracts with Hispanics or blacks (N).....	48	46	88	108	184	342	908	1,724	169	273	442
Percentage of all tracts in SMSA ..	96.0	100.0	81.5	69.7	82.9	70.0	77.5	76.9	34.6	23.3	26.6

important share of Hispanic tracts. Overall, only 4% of Hispanic tracts were established areas, compared with 49% of black tracts. Again the contrast was particularly noteworthy in Los Angeles, which contains the well-known barrio of East Los Angeles as well as the Watts ghetto. While 61% of black tracts in this city were established racial areas, only 4% of Hispanic tracts could be classified as established ethnic areas. A barrio-centered residential pattern simply does not typify the experience of Hispanics in the same way that a ghetto-centered pattern typifies that of blacks.

Table 2 also reveals differences in the dynamics of black and Hispanic segregation. Although Hispanic tracts are somewhat more likely than black tracts to be undergoing residential succession, they are more evenly distributed between stages and are more likely than black areas to be in the earliest stages of succession. Only 11% of black succession tracts are classified as being within the early stage, compared with 30% of Hispanic succession tracts. This pattern is consistent with Massey's (1983) results which showed that when succession occurs in Hispanic areas, it happens at a much slower pace than in black areas. Given the dearth of established Hispanic areas and the slower pace of neighborhood transition, it seems reasonable to conclude that Hispanic succession, when it occurs, stabilizes at a much lower minority proportion than does black succession. Finally, given the direction of prevailing biases, the prevalence of Hispanic residential succession is probably overstated by the data in table 2. If anything, the contrast between patterns of black and Hispanic succession is greater than our figures indicate.

Perhaps the greatest contrast between the two minority groups lies in the relative importance of invasion areas. Among Hispanic tracts, invasion is the modal category in all SMSAs save El Paso. In five of the seven, the percentage of invasion areas is 50% or more; and across all seven the figure is 55%. In contrast, only 12% of black tracts were classified as invasion areas. The relative frequency of invasion tracts in Los Angeles was 54% for Hispanics and 10% for blacks. Inspection of tract maps for that SMSA revealed that black invasion areas were invariably located on the periphery of established black areas, while Hispanic invasion areas could be found throughout the city. Black penetration of Anglo areas is apparently limited to a minority of tracts adjacent to existing black areas, thereby accounting for their relative paucity.

Table 2 also shows that invasion by Hispanics is far less likely to be followed by Anglo population loss than is invasion by blacks. In Los Angeles, for example, a tract had about a 50-50 chance of gaining Anglos following invasion by Hispanics. Given the fact that the definitional change biases the data toward finding an Anglo loss, this figure must be regarded as conservative. After invasion by blacks, no tracts in Los Angeles showed

an Anglo increase over the decade. Thus, while succession may be initiated when an Anglo area is penetrated by Hispanics, it is clearly not inevitable or even likely.

These results verify our fourth hypothesis. Black areas display a much higher probability of Anglo loss and subsequent turnover than do areas of Hispanic settlement. Indeed, when the proportion of invasion tracts which experienced an Anglo gain is added to the proportions of growth and displacement tracts, we obtain the total share of tracts which showed an Anglo increase. Across all SMSAs, this figure is 43% for Hispanic tracts, but only 8% for black tracts. The presence of Hispanics does not seem to render a residential area unattractive to Anglo settlement in the same way as the presence of blacks does.

SOCIOECONOMIC CORRELATES OF SUCCESSION

The ecological perspective that spatial assimilation should accompany social mobility led to our first hypothesis that the average socioeconomic status of minority members should be higher in areas composed primarily of Anglos than in established ethnic or racial neighborhoods. This broad proposition in turn leads to two specific hypotheses regarding the socioeconomic concomitants of succession. First, leaders in the process of spatial assimilation should be later-generation Hispanics of high SES (Park 1926; Duncan and Lieberman 1959; Taeuber and Taeuber 1965). Thus we hypothesize that within invasion areas, Hispanics will be of high SES and predominantly native stock, but that these indicators will decline progressively through the various stages of succession to an established Hispanic area. Second, from previous research on residential succession, we expect Hispanics within invasion tracts to resemble socioeconomically the Anglos that live there (Duncan and Duncan 1957; Taeuber and Taeuber 1965). As residential succession proceeds we also expect dissimilarity between Anglos and Hispanics to increase, as lower-status Hispanics move into the formerly high-status neighborhood.

The four panels of figure 1 confirm these hypotheses by plotting socioeconomic indicators by stage of succession, using data aggregated for the five smallest SMSAs in the data set (the omissions are San Francisco-Oakland and Los Angeles). Hispanics in invasion tracts are more likely to be of native stock (native born of native parents) than Hispanics in general; and the percentage of native stock declines with each succeeding stage in the succession process. Moreover, in terms of education, income, and occupational status, Hispanics in invasion tracts are well above the average for Hispanics as a whole. Indeed, their education and income place them just under the average for Anglos. All three indicators of SES show nearly monotonic declines across stages of succession. Within es-

tablished areas, Hispanic SES is considerably below the level for Hispanics as a whole.

As hypothesized, Hispanics and Anglos are of similar socioeconomic status in invasion areas. We measured degree of similarity using the index of dissimilarity, which ranges from a minimum of zero (for identical socioeconomic distributions) to a maximum of 100 (where there is no overlap between distributions). It gives the proportion of people who would have to change their socioeconomic status to achieve equality. Hispanic-Anglo dissimilarity is in the neighborhood of 15 within invasion tracts. It tends to decline slightly in the early and middle succession stages and then to rise dramatically during the late succession stage. The figures also show that while education and occupational status of Anglos in invasion areas are about average for that group, Anglo income is considerably above average. This fact implies that upwardly mobile Hispanics tend to locate within economically exclusive Anglo areas.

Figure 2 compares selected socioeconomic correlates of succession in Hispanic and black tracts using data combined for the San Francisco-Oakland and Los Angeles SMSAs. Average education is not shown since Hispanics display considerably more variation in schooling than blacks, a fact which exaggerates stage-of-succession effects among the former relative to the latter. (Taken separately, however, the educational correlates of black and Hispanic succession replicate the patterns of fig. 1.) Also, since only one black tract was classified as an early succession area in the two SMSAs, and it proved to be an outlier on all indicators, this tract has been excluded from the figures for blacks.

Patterns observed for Hispanic tracts replicate those in the other SMSAs, and patterns for blacks are generally similar, but with some interesting differences. First, socioeconomic dissimilarity between blacks and Anglos displays no clear trend as succession progresses. Inspection of the socioeconomic distributions (not shown) reveals that growing socioeconomic dissimilarity in the later stages of Hispanic succession occurs because high-status Anglos tend to remain in succession areas as they fill up with low-status Hispanics. For blacks, dissimilarity does not increase because Anglo losses are taken disproportionately from high-status groups. Consequently, as black succession proceeds, the socioeconomic distributions of blacks and Anglos tend to shift downward together.

A second difference is that black invasion areas are not characterized by the unusually high levels of Anglo income that typify Hispanic invasion tracts. Lower income levels in black invasion tracts probably result from the fact that they are located on the periphery of established black areas. They are thus universally inner-city areas, unlike Hispanic invasion tracts which are found also in suburban neighborhoods. The fact that black settlers are restricted to residential areas in and around existing black




FIG. 2.—Mean occupational status and median family income in Hispanic and black tracts by stage of succession: Los Angeles and San Francisco—Oakland SMSAs, 1970.

neighborhoods means that they do not generally have access to economically exclusive areas within the larger urban environment.

Thus both Hispanics and blacks conform to hypotheses derived from ecological notions of spatial assimilation. In both cases, leaders in the assimilation process are persons of high socioeconomic status who enter predominantly Anglo areas containing residents of a similar class background. Both groups attempt to assimilate spatially in roughly the same way and presumably for the same reasons. The difference is that invasion of an area by blacks almost always renders it unattractive to further Anglo settlement, setting off a process of residential succession which results in the rapid transition to an established black area. However, in at least 50% of cases, entry of Hispanics into an Anglo area does not initiate residential succession.

In order to specify the conditions under which Hispanic entry leads to residential succession, we performed a discriminant function analysis of Hispanic invasion tracts within the Los Angeles SMSA, attempting to discriminate socioeconomically between tracts that gained and those that lost Anglo residents between 1960 and 1970. Los Angeles contained 399 Hispanic invasion tracts, of which 195 gained and 204 lost Anglos during the 1960s. Because of the change in the definition of Hispanics, some tracts are probably misclassified as having lost Anglos. To the extent that differences between the two sets of tracts exist, such a bias will attenuate the discriminating power of the function.

Our leading hypotheses in this analysis stem from the ecological notion that physical distance between groups should reflect prevailing perceptions of social distance. The lower the social status and the larger the percentage of foreign stock among incoming Hispanics, the greater should be the social distance perceived by Anglos and the more likely avoidance on their part. However, the effect of Hispanic entry into a neighborhood should be conditioned by its distance from an established Hispanic or black area. If Anglos seek to minimize contact with minorities, the threat of unmanageable residential turnover is greater, or at least more salient, the closer the neighborhood is to an established black or Hispanic neighborhood. Thus Anglo avoidance of an invasion area should vary inversely with distance to established black or Hispanic areas. For each tract, we measured these distances as the smallest number of tracts that would have to be crossed to reach an established area along a straight line path, counting the tract itself.

The results of the discriminant function analysis are presented in table 3. When invasion tracts are divided into those that gained and those that lost Anglos during the 1960s, mean values of SES variables and distance measures behave in expected ways. Hispanics in areas which lost Anglos were more likely to be of foreign stock, had lower educations and incomes,

and had lower occupational statuses. These areas were also closer to established black and Hispanic areas. The significant canonical correlation indicates that these variables can indeed be used to discriminate between invasion areas that were gaining and losing Anglo residents. Its relatively low value in part reflects the attenuating effects of the definitional change.

The standardized function coefficients indicate the relative importance of each variable in discriminating between the two sets of tracts. The two most important factors in determining whether a Hispanic invasion area gained or lost Anglos were the distance of a tract from an established black area and the level of Hispanic education. The salience of the first variable suggests that Anglos may perceive Hispanic invasion to be more threatening if blacks might follow closely behind. The credibility of this threat is underscored by the very large proportion of black tracts which, in fact, contain Hispanics (see table 2). The next most important discriminating variables are percentage of foreign stock and distance to an established Hispanic area. Occupation and income are relatively less important. The effects of all variables in the function are in expected directions.

Thus results verify the social distance perspective of human ecology. In addition to stating that Anglo loss is less likely to follow Hispanic than black invasion, we can specify the conditions under which Hispanic succession tends to be initiated. Residential succession is likely to follow

TABLE 3
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS OF HISPANIC INVASION TRACTS THAT GAINED AND LOST
ANGLO RESIDENTS BETWEEN 1960 AND 1970: LOS ANGELES SMSA

CHARACTERISTICS OF HISPANIC POPULATION	MEAN VALUES		STANDARDIZED FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
	Anglo Gain	Anglo Loss	
Percentage foreign stock	48.4	55.3	-.337
Median education	11.4	10.8	.503
Mean occupational status	37.6	34.1	.044
Median family income (\$)	12,361	10,450	.131
Distance to established Hispanic area	14.3	12.2	.255
Distance to established black area	9.9	7.5	.500
Group centroids:			
Anglo gain429
Anglo loss	-.419
Canonical correlation390
χ^2	65.12
p-value00
N	195	204	

the entry of Hispanics into an Anglo area when the incoming Hispanics are poorly educated and foreign, with low occupational statuses and incomes, and when the tract is near an established black or Hispanic area. In contrast, residential succession follows black entry into an Anglo area no matter what the objective social characteristics of the incoming blacks.

With rising socioeconomic status, both blacks and Hispanics attempt spatial assimilation. Hispanics are more successful because, as their social status rises, Anglos evaluate them in terms of achieved more than ascribed status, as is consistent with the theory we outlined in our introductory section. However, blacks fail in their attempt to assimilate spatially: no matter what their achieved social characteristics, Anglos avoid residential proximity with them because of the ascribed characteristic of race.

DISTANCE FROM ESTABLISHED AREAS

According to the reasoning developed in the introduction, social status should vary not only by stage of succession but also by physical distance from established areas. If Hispanics and blacks attempt to translate their socioeconomic achievements into residential mobility out of the barrio or ghetto, we should observe a positive relationship between SES and distance from an established area, as stated in hypothesis 2. However, the foregoing section suggests that blacks should have a more difficult time in accomplishing this mobility than Hispanics. They should be less able than Hispanics to convert their status attainments into spatial separation from established ethnic/racial areas (hypothesis 5).

Figure 3 plots estimated relationships between status attainment variables and distance from established black or Hispanic tracts in the Los Angeles SMSA, where distance is measured as before. These relationships were estimated by regressing distance on average characteristics of Hispanic and black populations within census tracts. For blacks, the regression is across all tracts which contain black residents (including "mixed" tracts). Similarly, for Hispanics the regression is across all tracts containing Hispanic residents (again including "mixed" tracts).

The panels of figure 3 confirm our two hypotheses. For both groups social status is positively related to distance from an established area, but the lesser ability of blacks to achieve spatial separation from established areas is at once evident. For example, figure 3A shows that the expected location of a hypothetical population of black high school graduates is about six tracts from an established black area, while the expected location of an equivalent Hispanic population is 13 tracts from an established Hispanic area. Similarly, figure 3B indicates that blacks with an occupational status of 40 (roughly that of a skilled blue-collar worker) would




FIG. 3.—Estimated relationships between socioeconomic variables and distance from established black or Hispanic areas: Los Angeles SMSA, 1970

be able to live only five tracts away from the ghetto, but Hispanics of the same occupational status would be 13 tracts away from the barrio. Finally, whereas an average income of \$11,000 would let a group of blacks settle about five tracts from the ghetto, it would let a group of Hispanics settle 11 tracts from the barrio. In short, because the Anglo response to Hispanic invasion is not universally one of avoidance and flight, Hispanics are much better able than blacks to translate social into residential mobility.

PROBABILITIES OF INTERGROUP CONTACT

If spatial assimilation follows from social mobility, we should find a positive relationship between socioeconomic status and spatial assimilation (hypothesis 3). Moreover, if Anglos avoid residential proximity with blacks more than with Hispanics, blacks should be less able to convert status attainments into spatial assimilation (hypothesis 6). In this context, spatial assimilation is defined operationally as the proportion of Anglos within any Hispanic or black tract. This quantity is the second term on the right-hand side of equation (1), which is weighted across tracts to compute the city-wide probability of intergroup contact. By regressing it, across tracts, on overall characteristics of Hispanics or blacks in the same tracts, we estimate the effects of socioeconomic variables on spatial assimilation with Anglos. Because the dependent variable has a limited range, we employ the logit transformation (Hanushek and Jackson 1977, p. 200). Also, to avoid confounding the effects of blacks and Hispanics being in the same tract, we exclude mixed areas and estimate regressions separately over black and Hispanic tracts. The results of this analysis are presented in figure 4 for the Los Angeles SMSA.

The three panels of figure 4 confirm our hypotheses. First, blacks are clearly less able to convert achievements into assimilation. While a group of black high school graduates could expect to reside in a tract that was 27% Anglo, a similarly educated Hispanic population could expect to live in a tract that was 91% Anglo. Results for occupational status and income are similar. With an occupational status of 40 (skilled blue collar), the probability of Anglo contact is 35% for blacks but 87% for Hispanics; and at a family income of \$11,000 (about the median for Los Angeles in 1970), the likelihood of black-Anglo interaction was 18% compared with an 81% chance of Hispanic-Anglo interaction. In short, middle- and working-class Hispanics could expect to reside in a tract that was predominantly Anglo, but middle- and working-class blacks could not. At all but very high levels of socioeconomic status, blacks reside in predominantly black areas.

These figures also support our third hypothesis, that socioeconomic status is related positively to degree of spatial assimilation. No matter




FIG. 4.—Estimated relationships between socioeconomic variables and the probability of contact with Anglos: Los Angeles SMSA, 1970

which measure of SES is chosen, the probability of contact with Anglos rises for both blacks and Hispanics with rising SES. Interestingly, the estimated slope coefficients for blacks actually exceed those for Hispanics. The rate at which status attainments are converted into contact with Anglos is actually greater for blacks than for Hispanics. What differs, by a considerable margin, is the intercept. It simply costs blacks a great deal more capital—human and financial—before they are able to achieve any significant contact with Anglos. The social status required of blacks before they are not threatening to Anglos appears to be significantly higher than that required of Hispanics. In other words, a black lawyer or doctor may be able to move into a mixed neighborhood with other professionals, but a black plumber or bricklayer cannot buy into a working-class Anglo neighborhood. What is required for black spatial assimilation is a quantum leap in social status.

The end result of such differential processes of assimilation is that, within any city at any time, blacks are more spatially isolated from Anglos than are Hispanics (hypothesis 7). To measure spatial isolation we used the P^* index described earlier. It gives the probability of residential contact between two groups and is an asymmetric measure of segregation, depending not only on the residential strategies of blacks, Hispanics, and Anglos but also on their proportions of the total population. Thus the probability of Anglos interacting with blacks may be very different from the probability of blacks interacting with Anglos, especially if one group is much larger than the other (Lieberson 1980).

Probabilities of intergroup contact calculated using formula (1) are presented in table 4 for the years 1960 and 1970. In general, there was little change in these probabilities over the decade. Anglos were always extremely likely to be living in residential areas with other Anglos. In 1970 the average Anglo in the seven SMSAs lived in a tract that was 81% Anglo, compared with a figure of 87% in 1960. However, the probability of Anglo contact with blacks was very low—2% in 1960 and 3% in 1970. Anglos also displayed a fairly low probability of residential contact with Hispanics, but the average was nonetheless several times the probability of contact with blacks. Probabilities of black contact with Anglos illustrate the asymmetries alluded to before. The 1970 probability of black contact with Anglos was 37%, many times its Anglo-black complement. The average black had roughly a 40% chance of living near another black, and a 20% chance of living near a Hispanic. Consistent with our hypotheses, Hispanics were considerably less isolated from Anglos than were blacks. Indeed, the average Hispanic in 1970 was actually more likely to live near an Anglo than near another Hispanic. The probability of Hispanic contact with Anglos was 57%, compared with a 30% chance of interaction with other Hispanics. Like Anglos, Hispanics were unlikely to live near blacks. The probability was only 5% in 1970.

The contrast between blacks and Hispanics is attenuated when figures are averaged over all seven SMSAs. Many SMSAs have very small black populations so the probability of black-black interaction is low and black-Anglo interaction high because of composition effects alone. In Los Angeles, however, both groups constitute sizable minorities, and here blacks' spatial isolation from Anglos is pronounced. The average black in Los Angeles has a 71% chance of living near another black but only a 16% chance of living near an Anglo. In contrast, the average Hispanic is still more likely to live near Anglos than near other Hispanics. The likelihood

TABLE 4
PROBABILITIES OF INTERGROUP CONTACT IN SEVEN SOUTHWESTERN SMSAS:
1960 AND 1970

	PROBABILITY OF ANGLO INTERACTION WITH:		PROBABILITY OF BLACK INTERACTION WITH:		PROBABILITY OF HISPANIC INTERACTION WITH:	
	1960	1970	1960	1970	1960	1970
Tucson:						
Anglos87	.82	.42	.50	.47	.47
Blacks02	.02	.24	.18	.06	.04
Hispanics10	.15	.31	.30	.44	.46
El Paso:						
Anglos70	.58	.42	.44	.32	.27
Blacks02	.03	.11	.08	.03	.02
Hispanics27	.38	.46	.47	.46	.47
Sacramento:						
Anglos89	.84	.60	.55	.78	.73
Blacks02	.03	.23	.27	.05	.06
Hispanics06	.09	.09	.12	.11	.16
Denver:						
Anglos93	.88	.28	.29	.67	.66
Blacks01	.02	.54	.56	.08	.05
Hispanics05	.09	.15	.13	.23	.27
San Diego:						
Anglos92	.84	.46	.32	.73	.71
Blacks02	.02	.47	.45	.10	.06
Hispanics05	.12	.15	.19	.15	.19
San Francisco-Oakland:						
Anglos87	.79	.38	.32	.75	.66
Blacks04	.05	.50	.54	.09	.09
Hispanics06	.11	.06	.09	.12	.19
Los Angeles:						
Anglos89	.81	.21	.16	.58	.52
Blacks02	.03	.65	.71	.08	.06
Hispanics07	.14	.09	.09	.31	.38
Average:						
Anglos87	.81	.40	.37	.61	.57
Blacks02	.03	.39	.40	.07	.05
Hispanics09	.15	.19	.20	.26	.30

of Hispanic-Anglo contact was 52%, compared with a probability of Hispanic-Hispanic contact of only 38%. Thus Hispanics are over three times as likely as blacks to live near Anglos.

MODELS OF HISPANIC AND BLACK SPATIAL ASSIMILATION

We have verified all our hypotheses concerning the effects of socioeconomic status on spatial assimilation, as well as those concerning differences between processes for Hispanics and blacks. However, the effects of education, occupation, and income are not independent of one another, and the locational strategies of Hispanics, blacks, and Anglos interact with one another simultaneously, not singly. In order to ascertain the independent contribution of social status variables to the process of spatial assimilation, and to model their simultaneous effects on black and Hispanic assimilation, we combined elements of status attainment theory (Blau and Duncan 1967; Hauser and Featherman 1977) with the ecological model (Park 1926; Lieberman 1963) to derive an ecological theory of assimilation.

According to status attainment theory, different socioeconomic outcomes are generated in part by differences in human capital inputs. For example, occupational status is strongly determined by educational attainment, and income is in turn determined by both occupational status and education. In addition, education operates through occupational status to determine income indirectly (see Duncan, Featherman, and Duncan 1972). According to ecological theory, these socioeconomic processes have spatial correlates. As education, occupation, and income of Hispanics rise, they will interrelate to increase distance from established ethnic and racial areas. In doing so, they will also affect the probability of residential contact with Anglos and blacks. As Hispanics move away from the barrio, the likelihood of contact with Anglos will rise. But by moving away from the barrio, they simultaneously put distance between themselves and the ghetto, so the probability of contact with blacks will fall. Rising Hispanic SES also affects directly the probability of contact with Anglos by influencing the way these groups perceive one another. With rising status, the perceived social distance between Hispanics and Anglos should decrease and lead to spatial assimilation. However, if we assume that Hispanics, like Anglos, seek to minimize contact with blacks, rising social status should decrease the probability of interaction with blacks by providing the resources better to realize their locational goals.

This reasoning led to the specification of the following recursive models of Hispanic and black spatial assimilation. The signs indicate hypothesized directions of influence, and the social status measures refer to the minority in question:

Hispanics	Blacks
$OS = f(+ED),$	$OS = f(+ED),$
$IN = f(+ED, +OS),$	$IN = f(+ED, +OS),$
$DB = f(+ED, +OS, +IN),$	$DH = f(+ED, +OS, +IN),$
$DH = f(+ED, +OS, +IN),$	$DB = f(+ED, +OS, +IN),$
$PB = f(-ED, -OS, -IN,$	$PH = f(+ED, +OS, +IN,$
$\quad -DB, -DH),$	$\quad -DH, +DB),$
$PA = f(+ED, +OS, +IN,$	$PA = f(+ED, +OS, +IN,$
$\quad +DB, +DH);$	$\quad +DH, +DB);$

where

ED = median education,
 OS = mean occupational status,
 IN = median family income,
 DB = distance to established black area,
 DH = distance to established Hispanic area,
 PB = probability of contact with blacks,
 PH = probability of contact with Hispanics,
 PA = probability of contact with Anglos.

These variables are all ecologically defined. That is, they refer implicitly to census tract populations and characteristics. Specification of the models in this manner presents conceptual problems concerning the use of aggregate data to estimate what are often conceived of as individual processes. Status attainment theory, in particular, is usually specified at the individual level and estimated from micro data sets (see Blau and Duncan 1967; Duncan et al. 1972). However, we do not think it at all necessary to posit such models at the individual level. Social mobility is a group, as well as an individual, phenomenon, particularly when one focuses on spatial aspects of the process. Groups clearly differ in their rates of status attainment and assimilation (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Lieberson 1980), and residential decisions are often made on group criteria (Guest and Weed 1976). Assimilation, as defined here, is inherently a group phenomenon, and the ecological processes we consider involve the interaction of *populations* in space and time (Stephan 1972). Our interest lies in aggregate aspects of assimilation and social mobility and in the way that differences in the extent of spatial assimilation affect various aspects of a group's status. In specifying the models above, we have no interest in inferring individual behavior.

Estimating these models also presents certain technical problems. First is the problem of spatial autocorrelation. The results that follow have not been corrected for this bias. Existing procedures for such a correction are expensive and problematic. On balance, we felt the most judicious course

was to present uncorrected results concerning which the direction of biases is at least known.³ Since residuals from regression equations estimated using census tract data are almost certainly autocorrelated, variance estimators will be biased downward and the values of R^2 reported below will be biased upward (Cliff and Ord 1973). Because blacks are subject to more segregation than Hispanics, the spatial autocorrelation bias is probably more severe for the former than for the latter and would be a conservative bias given the direction of observed differences between these two groups. But while autocorrelation makes estimation inefficient, the structural coefficients are nonetheless unbiased estimates of underlying parameters (Cliff and Ord 1973, p. 90). However, biased variance estimates render significance tests inappropriate, and consequently they will not be reported. Coefficients will instead be judged on their substantive significance.

A second technical problem is that of aggregation bias (Blalock 1964; Hannan and Burstein 1974). The problem arises because census tracts are basically arbitrary units of analysis. We have no assurance that estimates of structural coefficients and R^2 s would not change were different units used (e.g., blocks or enumeration districts). Shifting areal units may affect the degree to which unknown or unmeasured variables affect coefficients in the equation. However, since the concepts we employ are inherently ecological, aggregation bias is an unavoidable issue. Therefore we do not center our interpretation on specific values of coefficients but on the relative strength and direction of relationships. Because of the comparative nature of this research, aggregation bias is not the problem it might otherwise be. Both Hispanic and black models are affected by this bias, so it cannot easily account for differences between them. Since our conclusions rest largely on the contrast between Hispanics and blacks,

³ Tests and corrections for spatial autocorrelation are analogous to those for temporal autocorrelation. However, spatial autocorrelation is more complex because the autocorrelative effects operate in two dimensions instead of one. In a time series, the temporal separation of points is unambiguous and easy to define. In space, degree of spatial separation is problematic to define and laborious to operationalize. All methods of testing and correcting for spatial autocorrelation require a matrix of weights reflecting the degree of spatial separation between pairs of areal units. In our Los Angeles data set, with 908 tracts containing Hispanics or blacks, adjustment would require filling in a matrix of some 824,000 cells. Given the technology at our disposal, this task would have to be done by hand and eye using census tract maps. However, even if the distances could be generated by a machine, there is no consensus on which measures represent appropriate indices of spatial separation. Suggestions range from a binary contiguity variable to linear distance to travel time to some index of interaction potential. But different measures of spatial separation will lead to different corrections, and the choice of one measure over the others probably introduces other biases whose effects are unknown. Therefore, for both practical and theoretical reasons we did not adjust the models for spatial autocorrelation. Practically, it was close to impossible; and theoretically, with the unadjusted models we can at least evaluate the direction of the bias and adjust our interpretation accordingly. For a recent discussion of these issues see Cliff and Ord (1973) or Doreian (1980).

and not on the particular value of one coefficient, we have considerable confidence in the validity of our conclusions.

The models were estimated using census tract data from the Los Angeles SMSA by the method of ordinary least squares. The Hispanic model was estimated across all tracts containing Hispanics, including mixed tracts ($N = 1,139$); the black model was estimated across all tracts containing blacks, again including mixed tracts ($N = 488$). In equations where the dependent variable was a probability, the logit transformation was employed. Estimation of models in this fashion yielded several trivial coefficients. Both models were reestimated eliminating these terms. The resulting structural coefficients are presented in table 5, and the corresponding path diagrams are presented in figures 5 and 6, along with estimates of path coefficients. Estimated direct and indirect causal effects implied by these path models are shown in tables 6 and 7.

The data for Hispanics are generally consistent with our hypotheses and succinctly summarize the process of spatial assimilation for this group. With rising education and income, Hispanics locate farther away from both Hispanic and black areas. This movement away from barrios and ghettos in turn means that the likelihood of contact with blacks decreases progressively, while that with Anglos increases progressively. In other words, SES acts indirectly through distance to affect the degree of Hispanic spatial assimilation with blacks and Anglos. However, these indirect effects are considerably weaker than the direct effects of SES on inter-group contact. As Hispanic education and income rise, the probability of interaction with blacks falls. High-status Hispanics apparently minimize contact with blacks irrespective of distance from established black areas. At the same time, rising SES markedly increases the probability of Hispanic-Anglo interaction by reducing the perceived social distance from Anglos. One very powerful determinant of Hispanic-Anglo interaction is distance from an established *black* area, a finding consistent with the earlier discriminant analysis. Anglos are apparently more likely to avoid proximity with Hispanics when there is an implicit threat of future black settlement. In general, occupational status has the least important effect on Hispanic spatial assimilation with Anglos, and education has the most important effect.

The black model is simpler than the Hispanic model because there are fewer direct causal linkages. There are no direct effects of black SES on the probability of contact with Hispanics. The only socioeconomic effects are indirect, through the distance variable. As SES rises, blacks are able to put distance between themselves and the ghetto, thereby increasing the probability of contact with Hispanics. At the same time, by propelling them away from established Hispanic areas, rising SES simultaneously reduces the chances for contact with Hispanics. In the absence of any

TABLE 5
ESTIMATED STRUCTURAL COEFFICIENTS IN MODELS OF HISPANIC AND
BLACK SPATIAL ASSIMILATION: LOS ANGELES SMSA, 1970

A. HISPANIC

PREDETERMINED VARIABLES	DETERMINED VARIABLES					
	Occupation	Income	Distance to Established Black Area	Distance to Established Hispanic Area	Logit of Proportion Black	Logit of Proportion Anglo
Education	3.23 (.08)	760.7 (76.2)	.53 (.08)	.98 (.13)	-.31 (.05)	.40 (.03)
Occupation	133.7 (17.6)02 (.01)
Income	1.33* (.04)	2.46* (.60)	-.70* (.20)	.30* (.01)
Distance to established black area29 (.02)	.14 (.01)
Distance to established Hispanic area04 (.01)
Constant	-.31	-1,788.9	.73	-1.40	1.18	-6.09
R ²56	.35	.08	.13	.32	.56

TABLE 5 (Continued)
B. BLACK

PREDETERMINED VARIABLES	DETERMINED VARIABLES					
	Occupation	Income	Distance to Established Hispanic Area	Distance to Established Black Area	Logit of Proportion Black	Logit of Proportion Anglo
Education	3.90 (.24)	1,332.4 (157.5)	.55 (.19)	.46 (.15)11 (.05)
Occupation	95.7 (23.7)	.05 (.03)02 (.01)
Income	1.60* (.40)42* (.10)
Distance to established black area	-.07 (.01)	.10 (.01)
Distance to established Hispanic area06 (.01)	.23 (.01)
Constant	-9.50	-8,612.5	2.47	-1.39	-1.62	-5.25
R ²34	.28	.05	.08	.13	.51

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are SEs. SEs are probably biased by autocorrelation.

* Coefficients times 10⁻⁴.




FIG. 5.—Path model for spatial assimilation of Hispanics in Los Angeles SMSA: 1970




FIG. 6.—Path model for spatial assimilation of blacks in Los Angeles SMSA: 1970

direct social class effects, the two indirect effects cancel one another out, and there is no overall association between black SES and the likelihood of black-Hispanic contact (table 7). This observation suggests that Hispanics tend to avoid contact with blacks irrespective of their socioeconomic status.

As in the Hispanic model, rising black SES does increase the likelihood of residential contact with Anglos. But in the black model, the indirect effects of SES are greater than or equal to the direct effects. Black contact with Anglos increases primarily because rising social class allows blacks to achieve some spatial separation from the ghetto. The social class of blacks per se matters less. This reflects the fact that Anglos avoid blacks

TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS IN PATH MODEL OF HISPANIC SPATIAL ASSIMILATION: LOS ANGELES SMSA, 1970

Relationship	Total Association	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Other*
Distance to established black area and:				
Education271	.208	.062	.000
Occupation244	.000	.030	.214
Income228	.111	.000	.117
Distance to established Hispanic area and:				
Education335	.258	.077	.000
Occupation277	.000	.037	.240
Income283	.138	.000	.145
Probability of contact with blacks and:				
Education	-.353	-.183	-.168	-.002
Occupation	-.319	.000	-.037	-.282
Income	-.293	-.089	-.049	-.155
Distance to established Hispanic area	-.084	.000	.000	-.084
Distance to established black area	-.512	-.441	.000	-.071
Probability of contact with Anglos and:				
Education651	.392	.257	.002
Occupation559	.104	.033	.422
Income461	.061	.060	.340
Distance to established Hispanic area340	.158	.000	.182
Distance to established black area491	.344	.000	.147

* Includes correlation involving unanalyzed association between predetermined variables and correlation due to joint dependence on common variables.

on the basis of race, not class. The fact that the relative sizes of direct and indirect social class effects are opposite one another for Hispanics and blacks underscores the greater difficulty blacks face in trying to assimilate spatially.

These models help us understand how differences in the extent of black and Hispanic spatial assimilation are generated. In Los Angeles in 1970, the probability of contact between Hispanics and Anglos was 52% compared with 16% for contact between blacks and Anglos. This difference exists for several reasons. First, blacks convert attainments into contact with less efficiency than Hispanics. At every stage in the assimilation process, the R^2 is less for blacks than for Hispanics. In general, the more

TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS IN PATH MODEL OF BLACK SPATIAL ASSIMILATION: LOS ANGELES SMSA, 1970

Relationship	Total Association	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Other*
Distance to established Hispanic area and:				
Education210	.157	.053	.000
Occupation184	.092	.000	.092
Income177	.000	.000	.177
Distance to established black area and:				
Education248	.156	.092	.000
Occupation232	.000	.034	.198
Income261	.181	.000	.079
Probability of contact with Hispanics and:				
Education	-.032	.000	-.011	-.021
Occupation	-.002	.000	-.019	.017
Income	-.085	.000	.036	-.121
Distance to established Hispanic area	-.310	-.288	.000	-.022
Distance to established black area231	.200	.000	.031
Probability of contact with Anglos and:				
Education402	.084	.318	.000
Occupation394	.126	.063	.205
Income392	.109	.097	.186
Distance to established Hispanic area265	.262	.000	.003
Distance to established black area587	.537	.000	.050

* Includes correlation involving unanalyzed association between predetermined variables and correlation due to joint dependence on common factors.

racial discrimination is found, the less variation should be explained by variables in the model. Second, in the black equations the intercepts are often lower, indicating the handicap with which blacks begin the process of spatial assimilation. Third, education plays a smaller part in the process of black assimilation. The structural coefficient for the effect of education on Anglo contact is three times greater for Hispanics than for blacks. Finally, while the effect of distance to their respective areas is six times greater for blacks than for Hispanics, this fact is of limited effectiveness in promoting black spatial assimilation. For all intents and purposes, blacks are restricted to a small minority of tracts in and around established black areas, in which Anglos are likely to be few and declining in number.

Thus, structural differences in processes of black and Hispanic spatial assimilation produce very different outcomes given the same starting point. Given a median education of 12 years, the model in table 5 predicts a Hispanic population living in an area 13 tracts from the nearest established Hispanic area, containing a population that is 90% Anglo with almost no blacks. With the same beginning level of education, the corresponding black model predicts a black population living in an area only six tracts from the nearest established black area, with only 51% of its population being Anglo and another 11% Hispanic. Hence, the high level of black segregation and the moderate level of Hispanic segregation in U.S. society can be attributed to measurable structural differences in processes of Hispanic and black spatial assimilation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Results for Hispanics have consistently supported the ecological theory of assimilation put forth in the introduction to this paper. Spatial assimilation occurs as Hispanics of high socioeconomic status enter predominantly Anglo areas located throughout the urban environment. Hispanic SES is positively related to distance from an established area and to probability of contact with Anglos. Our estimated structural model of Hispanic assimilation implies that increases in education, occupational status, and income will lead to geographic mobility which promotes spatial assimilation with Anglos. Increases in these variables also increase spatial assimilation directly by lessening the social distance from Anglos and thus lowering Anglo resistance to Spanish settlement.

But the spatial assimilation of Hispanics does have problematic aspects. Entry of Hispanics into an Anglo area is followed by Anglo population loss in about half of all cases. Whether an invasion area gains or loses Anglos is determined by the social status of the entering Hispanics and the distance of the area from established black and Hispanic neighborhoods. However, once begun, residential succession proceeds slowly and

stabilizes at a relatively low proportion Hispanic. Established Hispanic areas are therefore relatively uncommon.

In contrast, blacks face strong barriers to spatial assimilation which cause them to be spatially isolated from both Anglos and Hispanics, in spite of the fact that blacks themselves conform to predictions from the ecological theory of assimilation. Blacks within invasion areas possess relatively high levels of education, income, and occupational status compared with those in other neighborhoods; and black SES is positively related to distance from an established black area and to probability of contact with Anglos. Indeed, the slopes governing these relationships are even stronger than for Hispanics.

It is not blacks that contradict our theory of spatial assimilation, but Anglos. Increasing black social status apparently does not reduce the social distance that Anglos perceive between themselves and blacks. Areas of potential black settlement are restricted to tracts adjacent to existing black neighborhoods, and entry of blacks into these areas is almost always followed by residential succession, no matter what the objective socioeconomic characteristics of the entering blacks. In a sense, the ghetto follows upwardly mobile blacks as they attempt to assimilate spatially. As a result, they are less able than Hispanics to put distance between themselves and established areas, and they are less able to convert status attainments into spatial assimilation with Anglos. Thus our simultaneous equations model of black spatial assimilation shows that blacks face relatively stronger impediments to integration with Anglos at every stage in the process. The direct effects of social status variables on assimilation are fewer and generally weaker than for Hispanics. Blacks also convert status attainments into Anglo contact with less efficiency than Hispanics. Moreover, in estimated equations relating SES variables to distance from established areas and probability of Anglo contact, the intercepts are generally lower for blacks than for Hispanics, indicating the handicap with which blacks begin the process of spatial assimilation. The outcome of such measurable differences in spatial processes of assimilation is a high degree of black-Anglo segregation within cities at any time, in contrast to the more moderate degree of segregation between Hispanics and Anglos.

Both the Hispanic and black models of spatial assimilation suggest that Hispanics parallel the behavior of Anglos in avoiding residential contact with blacks. In the Hispanic model, direct as well as indirect effects of Hispanic socioeconomic status are quite strongly negative with respect to the probability of Hispanic-black contacts. In the black model, black social status variables have no direct effect on the likelihood of contact with Hispanics, and the indirect effects are negative. The reason the level of segregation between Hispanics and blacks is lower than that between

Anglos and blacks is probably that Hispanics have fewer socioeconomic resources than Anglos with which to realize their locational aspirations.

Our results stress the need to incorporate spatial elements into theories of assimilation. We have argued that spatial assimilation is a necessary precursor to other forms of assimilation, with strong effects on patterns of friendship, marriage, and prejudice among different groups. If this view is valid, the discrepant patterns of black and Hispanic spatial assimilation portend very different futures for these groups. After more than 200 years in the United States, blacks remain socially and spatially isolated within U.S. society. In contrast, Hispanic assimilation is very much an ongoing process. Our results contradict the view that these groups are similarly disadvantaged minorities trapped in declining urban areas from which escape is unlikely, a view recently put forth by the President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties (1980, p. 17): "Although the assimilation process had enabled earlier immigrants or their offspring to use the city as a launching pad, a growing proportion of poor blacks and Hispanics has been left behind, and sizeable proportions have become part of a nearly permanent urban underclass." If there is an underclass in the United States, Hispanics cannot be considered "permanent" members of it in the same way as blacks. Our results point consistently to an ongoing process of assimilation among Hispanics circa 1970. Unlike blacks, they are able to translate social mobility into residential mobility. Hispanics are simply not trapped in the barrio in the same way that blacks are trapped in the ghetto.

Our results also underscore the need to incorporate spatial elements into theories of stratification. Because so many important variables relevant to individual life chances are spatially determined, barriers to spatial mobility are barriers to social mobility. Our structural models of Hispanic and black assimilation represent a first step toward this goal, linking status attainment theory to the ecological model. These two traditions have developed along separate lines within sociology, notwithstanding the obvious interplay between socioeconomic and ecological processes. Our results demonstrate how the two perspectives can be fruitfully combined to shed light on processes of ethnic stratification in U.S. society.

The relevance of spatial processes to stratification is clearly illustrated in the current controversy over "the declining significance of race." It is only possible to make the case that race is becoming less salient as a dimension of stratification if one ignores the fact that blacks are segregated by virtue of race, not class. Because rising social status does not allow blacks to assimilate spatially in the manner of other groups, they are isolated within all-black or largely black neighborhoods confined to a minority of residential areas located disproportionately within declining

inner-city areas. Because of racial residential segregation, they pay exorbitant prices for low-quality housing, suffer higher rates of mortality and morbidity, and are disproportionately victims of urban crime. Social mobility is impaired by the low quality of public education within segregated schools and is further stifled when racial segregation forces blacks of all classes to raise their children within a "culture of poverty." Finally, as changes in the U.S. economy continue to shift jobs away from central cities to suburban and nonmetropolitan areas (a trend especially true for blue-collar jobs), blacks find themselves increasingly isolated from sources of employment in the United States. In short, as long as residential segregation is imposed on blacks in U.S. cities, race cannot be ignored as a salient dimension of stratification in American society.

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Racial Segregation and Racial Change in American Suburbs, 1970–1980¹

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Black migration to American suburbs accelerated in the 1970–80 period, increasing the proportion black in the suburban ring in all four major geographic regions of the country. The evidence presented here demonstrates that this process followed well-established patterns of segregation: in most SMSAs, the black population in 1980 was about as unequally distributed among suburbs as it had been in 1970. In the North, blacks moved disproportionately into communities with high initial black concentrations, while the majority of white suburbs gained very few black residents. In the South, in contrast, there were many cases of displacement, that is, black suburbs experienced declining black concentration. Finally, multivariate analysis of predictors of racial change in the North shows that an increase in the proportion of blacks has been significantly associated with high population density, proximity to the central city, residential instability, weak property tax base, and high tax rates.

As increasing numbers of blacks gained access to suburban communities during the 1960s, their concentration in a few suburbs with higher than average existing black populations reinforced racial segregation in the metropolitan ring. Early reports suggested that these communities tended to be “older suburbs which are experiencing population succession, new developments designed for Negro occupancy, and some impoverished suburban enclaves” (Farley 1970, p. 512; see also Connolly 1973; Rose 1976). More recently, Guest (1978) has pointed out that this pattern of change varies across geographic areas of the United States. Specifically,

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in southern metropolitan regions the increasing black population in some communities was accompanied by a countertrend of displacement of blacks by whites in other suburbs. In the North and West—despite some cases of more balanced black and white population growth—the typical pattern appears to have been consolidation of black population in segregated communities.

Racial change is one of several community characteristics associated with transition and succession in ecological theory (as applied, e.g., by Hoover and Vernon [1962] and Taeuber and Taeuber [1965]). Both Guest (1978), for a northern sample, and Logan and Stearns (1981), for a sample of Long Island suburbs, report strong negative correlations between proportion black in 1970 and community socioeconomic status and positive correlations with the age of community housing stock and proportion of rental units in a community. Using a national sample of suburbs in 1970, Schneider and Logan (1982) show that suburbs whose proportion black had increased during the 1960s were significantly closer to the central city, higher in density, slower growing, and poorer than other suburbs. These “ecological” characteristics were reinforced by a significantly weaker local property tax base and higher property tax rates, indicating that black suburbs share many of the disadvantages of older central cities.

Our purpose here is to determine whether black suburbanization in the 1970s, which accelerated in both the North and the South, continued to follow this established pattern. Did suburban racial segregation increase or decline between 1970 and 1980? Did the southern case remain distinct, or did the process of “displacement” cease in a period of more rapid black suburbanization? In the North, is there any indication that state or federal antidiscrimination policies have opened new areas for black settlement, or have blacks continued to find a dual housing market, with only the least desirable communities open to them?

SAMPLE AND DATA SOURCES

Our initial sample includes 1,604 incorporated suburbs in 44 metropolitan regions. These SMSAs were chosen from the largest 100 SMSAs in terms of 1970 population. Selection was subject to several additional constraints: no more than three SMSAs were selected from a single state, data on both 1970 and 1980 racial composition must have been available for at least five suburbs within the SMSA, and information on 1971–72 fiscal year municipal finances must have been available for these communities. The advance reports of the 1980 Census of Population released figures for white, black, and other minority populations for incorporated suburbs only, so that our conclusions regarding change in segregation between 1970 and 1980 must be considered tentative. However, because of our

interest in the effects of local fiscal conditions on racial change, unincorporated suburbs would have to be excluded from the latter part of our analysis in any event. Many of the incorporated suburbs in our sample have populations of over 50,000 and include several census tracts. Our research does not reflect racial segregation within these communities, but only that share of segregation which exists between suburbs.

Data on total population and black population for these communities have been coded from the 1970 Census of Population and from the advance reports of the 1980 Census of Population. Distance from the central city was measured from maps as the shortest straight-line distance between the outer boundaries of the central city (the nearest central city in cases with more than one central city) and the incorporated suburb. Information on the revenues and expenditures of municipal governments pertains to fiscal year 1971-72, collected by the 1972 Census of Governments. Because the census published data only for places of greater than 10,000 population, we have used data tapes provided by the Government Division of the Bureau of the Census. Fiscal information on effective property tax base and property tax rates is not available from a single central source. Our data have been provided by a variety of state and local sources, which we have been able to use only for cases in which raw tax base and tax rate could be adjusted for variations across communities in assessment practices. Thus our figures are corrected by estimates of the ratio of assessed valuation to market value of property to approximate the true value of property and actual tax rate. Finally, other community characteristics for 1970 have been coded from the 1970 Census of Population and Housing. These include density (population per square mile), median income, proportion "poor" (earning less than 50% of the regional median income), proportion of housing stock which is rented, and population stability prior to 1970 (proportion of 1970 residents who had already lived in the community for at least five years).

THE EXTENT OF BLACK SUBURBANIZATION IN THE 1970s

The Census Bureau has reported that from 1970 through 1977 the rate of growth of black population exceeded that of whites in the suburbs of the four major geographic regions of the country (see U.S. Bureau of the Census 1978, esp. table 3). To evaluate this trend in our sample, we have aggregated the total black and white populations of incorporated suburbs in each of the 44 SMSAs for which we have data. Across SMSAs, the mean increase in proportion black for these communities was from 5.0% to 6.4%. The figures for individual SMSAs are provided in the first two columns of table 1. In the Northeast, there were increases in all of the suburban rings, with the most dramatic changes in Newark, New York,

TABLE 1

BLACK POPULATION CHANGES IN AMERICAN INCORPORATED SUBURBS, 1970-80

	SUBURBAN		INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY		CORRELATION RATIO	
	PERCENTAGE BLACK					
	1970	1980	1970	1980	1970	1980
Northeast:						
Allentown (17).....	.3	1.3	53.4	53.6
Boston (16).....	1.7	2.5	42.1	44.5	.02	.05
Buffalo (20).....	3.9	4.6	55.9	57.0	.05	.07
Newark (45).....	13.6	21.8	54.4	59.6	.22	.39
New York (78).....	9.3	12.7	47.5	49.2	.13	.20
Paterson (66).....	2.3	3.0	72.1	67.2	.18	.21
Philadelphia (89).....	12.4	15.4	61.0	62.0	.24	.32
Pittsburgh (104).....	5.2	6.5	52.3	55.0	.11	.15
Rochester (15).....	1.8	3.2	40.6	43.1	.02	.03
North Central:						
Chicago (181).....	4.0	6.4	76.7	69.7	.31	.33
Cincinnati (57).....	4.4	6.0	67.0	63.0	.42	.36
Cleveland (58).....	3.7	8.2	76.5	73.1	.35	.45
Columbus (13).....	.9	1.8	48.7	35.2	.02	.01
Davenport (10).....	2.8	2.9	56.4	48.3	.04	.03
Detroit (70).....	4.0	5.5	86.7	80.1	.34	.41
Gary (15).....	.2	.2	58.0	41.5
Grand Rapids (12).....	.4	1.4	31.0	34.7
Indianapolis (18).....	.6	1.6	55.6	58.8	.01	.05
Kansas City (25).....	.7	1.5	52.5	36.6	.02	.02
Milwaukee (36).....	.2	.6	50.7	52.7
Minneapolis (64).....	.2	.7	33.7	30.4
Peoria (10).....	.2	.4	65.2	51.0
St. Louis (82).....	11.1	17.3	73.1	72.7	.46	.55
South:						
Atlanta (23).....	11.4	19.1	42.7	50.6	.13	.20
Birmingham (22).....	21.0	22.6	60.4	57.4	.33	.31
Dallas (26).....	4.6	4.8	52.9	38.5	.11	.07
Ft. Lauderdale (18).....	9.9	7.4	63.9	52.4	.17	.09
Greenville (8).....	17.3	15.5	20.7	24.7	.03	.04
Houston (35).....	5.1	5.4	60.3	47.4	.12	.07
Louisville (8).....	4.3	5.7	34.5	26.2	.04	.03
Miami (18).....	4.6	6.4	63.4	64.3	.24	.31
Oklahoma City (16).....	1.0	3.9	48.2	45.0	.04	.06
San Antonio (10).....	4.7	5.7	61.2	35.8	.08	.04
Tulsa (10).....	3.3	2.3	41.7	46.9	.03	.03
Washington, D.C. (28).....	7.1	14.7	52.0	53.2	.35	.32
Wilmington (9).....	13.4	14.5	46.1	46.9	.13	.15
West:						
Anaheim (22).....	.3	.9	36.0	21.5
Denver (20).....	.4	2.1	40.1	49.2
Los Angeles (70).....	4.3	7.1	74.3	65.9	.35	.26
Phoenix (13).....	1.2	2.5	44.1	46.5	.03	.08
Portland (14).....	.4	.6	48.4	27.3
Salt Lake City (15).....	1.1	.9	74.7	66.2	.07	.04
San Francisco (54).....	5.3	6.7	66.0	53.2	.19	.17
Seattle (23).....	.4	1.0	27.2	22.6

NOTE.—The correlation ratio has been omitted for suburban regions with less than .5% black in 1970. Numbers in

and Philadelphia. In the North Central census region, there are several cases in which the suburban proportion black still had not reached 1% by 1980—Gary, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and Peoria. In Columbus, Grand Rapids, Indianapolis, and Kansas City, the proportion black increased somewhat more but remains well below the national average. Only Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, and especially Cleveland and St. Louis experienced black suburban growth of 1.5 percentage points or more.

The pattern of change in the West is equally mixed. Anaheim, Portland, Salt Lake City, and Seattle suburbs averaged no more than 1% black in 1980, with more rapid but limited black suburbanization in Denver and Phoenix. Los Angeles and San Francisco, both of which began the decade with relatively large suburban black populations, experienced substantial black population growth in absolute terms.

Finally, table 1 shows that the suburban rings in the South continue to have on average higher proportions of blacks than do other parts of the United States. But in the 1970s these suburban black populations reversed the declining trend of earlier postwar years and began to experience more rapid growth of blacks than of whites. The exceptions are Fort Lauderdale, Greenville, and Tulsa, while the most remarkable gains occurred in the suburbs of Atlanta and Washington, D.C.

These findings suggest that black suburbanization has varied across metropolitan regions. One major source of variation is, of course, the great differences in central city black populations. Since the migration from central cities to suburbs has been the major source of black suburbanization (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1978), the racial composition of the central city determines the "potential" for outward movement of blacks. Thus black suburbanization has taken place in many of the metropolitan regions whose central cities experienced the greatest black in-migration from the South prior to 1970 and in southern SMSAs with traditionally large black populations.

TRENDS IN RACIAL SEGREGATION AFTER 1970

Where it has occurred, has increasing black access to suburbia been accompanied by a weakening of the barriers to entry into all-white suburbs, or has black suburbanization been channeled into the familiar pattern of segregation? Has the recent renewed growth of suburban black population in several southern metropolitan regions reversed the phenomenon of displacement of blacks by whites described for the period through 1970, that is, does the South now more closely resemble the North and West in this respect? We have approached these questions in two ways in the following analysis. First, we have calculated the changes over time in two of the classical measures of segregation between black

and nonblack population. These are the index of dissimilarity and the correlation ratio (see Duncan and Duncan [1955] and Winship [1977] for discussion of these two measures). Second, we have plotted the pattern of change in racial composition in individual suburbs for the North/West and the South separately. In our view, these are complementary approaches which direct attention to somewhat different conceptual issues. The aggregate measures reflect changes at the SMSA level, while the scatterplots reveal the nature of change at the community level.

Changes in Measures of Segregation

Table 1 presents values of both the index of dissimilarity and the correlation ratio for 1970 and 1980. These two measures appear to show quite different trends. The index of dissimilarity declined in the majority of suburban regions, while the correlation ratio more commonly increased. In several instances, therefore, the two segregation measures point toward opposite directions of change in segregation.

This different behavior of the two indices duplicates findings reported by Logan and Stearns (1980) for urban census tracts, which showed generally stable or declining values of the index of dissimilarity apparently contradicted by increasing values of the correlation ratio. We believe that in fact the behavior of these two measures is not contradictory but instead reflects different aspects of trends in segregation. Since this point has not been widely recognized, we will develop it further here.

The index of dissimilarity measures how differently blacks and whites are distributed among the communities in a region. It takes on high values when some communities house a disproportionately large percentage of the region's blacks while others house a disproportionately large percentage of the region's whites. The correlation ratio, however, measures the differences among communities in the percentage of their own population which is black. It takes on high values when some communities approach an all-white racial composition while others approach an all-black racial composition. Intuitively it seems that these two definitions are nearly identical, and cross-sectionally they are indeed highly correlated. However, a stable index of dissimilarity over time does not imply stability in the differences in racial proportion among communities (and vice versa). For example, if in a segregated region there were an increase in the black population, the index of dissimilarity would not change if the new blacks were distributed among communities in the same proportions as the previous black population. The index values would reflect this unchanging distribution of blacks among communities in the region. But what is the impact of the new black population on intercommunity differences in racial composition? Previously all-white communities would

have received no new black residents, while previously predominantly black communities would have experienced the greatest increases in black residents and thus would have moved toward the limit of 100% black. This increasing "racial polarization" would be reflected in increases in the correlation ratio.

The behavior of the two measures under these conditions is illustrated in the hypothetical example presented in table 2. Table 2 provides black and white population figures for two suburbs at times 1 and 2 and shows the computation of the index of dissimilarity and the correlation ratio (where T is total regional population and T_i is the individual suburb's population total). In this example, population growth increases the regional proportion black from 11% to 17%. The index of dissimilarity is unchanged, because at both times suburb 1 contains all of the region's black population and half of the region's white population. But the correlation ratio increased: while suburb 1 has increased from 20% to 29% black, suburb 2 has remained all white, increasing the disparity between the two communities.

Many sociologists have preferred the index of dissimilarity on the grounds that it is independent of the regional percentage black, whereas the correlation ratio includes the regional percentage black in its construction. (Indeed, the correlation ratio is close to zero and not meaningful for regions with very few blacks, which is why we have not reported its values for SMSAs in which the suburban population was less than .5% black in

TABLE 2

ILLUSTRATION OF CHANGES IN INDEX OF DISSIMILARITY AND CORRELATION RATIO

	TIME 1		TIME 2*	
	Suburb 1	Suburb 2	Suburb 1	Suburb 2
White population.....	1,000	1,000	1,100	1,100
Black population.....	250	0	450	0
Calculation of D :				
Proportion of region's whites (a_i)....	.50	.50	.50	.50
Proportion of region's blacks (b_i)....	1.00	.00	1.00	.00
$D = .5 \sum (a_i - b_i)$50		.50
Calculation of e^2 :				
Proportion white (p_i).....	.80	1.00	.71	1.00
Proportion black (q_i).....	.20	.00	.29	.00
Regional proportion white (p).....		.89		.83
Regional proportion black (q).....		.11		.17
$e^2 = (\sum T_i q_i^2 / T p q) - (q/p)$104		.144

* Assumes total increase of 200 whites and 200 blacks, each group distributed between suburbs as at time 1.

1970.) However, using only the index of dissimilarity overlooks a significant aspect of racial segregation (this point is developed more fully in Lieberson and Carter [1982]). It would be misleading to report that "segregation remained stable" without making clear that stability in segregation may involve increasing disparities in racial composition. Farley and Taeuber (1968, p. 955) questioned how their findings of declining segregation based on the index could "be reconciled with the rapidly increasing segregation perceived by most civil rights groups and many other observers." Part of the explanation of that paradox is that change in the index of dissimilarity alone is not an adequate indicator of segregation trends.

We find that the patterns of change in suburban racial segregation during the 1970s varied greatly among major geographic regions of the country. The Northeast experienced the most uniform trend: the index of dissimilarity increased in every case except Paterson, and even Paterson had an increase in the correlation ratio. Without question, in the Northeast the suburbanization of blacks proceeded with growing inequality in the distribution of blacks and whites among suburbs and growing differences in racial composition between communities.

In the North Central region the pattern was more complex. In the great majority of cases the index of dissimilarity declined, but the correlation ratio increased in four of these and remained the same in a fifth. Thus, with the notable exceptions of Cincinnati, Columbus, and Davenport, there is little unequivocal evidence of a lowering of segregation. In most North Central SMSAs, as in the Northeast, there was a tendency to concentrate a disproportionate share of new black population in suburbs with a high initial proportion black.

Just the opposite appears to have occurred in the South and West. Of 13 Sunbelt SMSAs in which the index of dissimilarity declined, only one experienced an increase in the correlation ratio. There are, of course, clear examples of growing segregation (both measures increased in Atlanta, Greenville, Miami, Wilmington, and Phoenix), but these appear as exceptions rather than the rule. In the light of past discussions of black suburbanization in the South, these results may be due in part to displacement of blacks by whites in previously "black" communities. If this were the underlying process, it could lead eventually to greater segregation as these suburbs tended to become all white. But these results could also be due to a general opening up of white suburbs to new black residents and a weakening of the dual housing market, in what many observers would be inclined to evaluate as "integration." But to choose between these two interpretations requires analysis of change in individual suburbs, to which we now turn.

Community Changes in Racial Composition

Figures 1 and 2 depict the relationship between the 1970 and 1980 proportions black for the communities in our sample. Figure 1 includes suburbs in the Northeast, North Central, and West census regions; figure 2 includes only southern suburbs. On both scatterplots, the straight line represents no change in proportion black. Both plots show a large number of suburbs which began the decade with less than 5% black and experienced little change. Other suburbs experienced a variety of types of change, which could be usefully summarized in terms of the well-known invasion-succession model (see, e.g., the categories of change described by Taeuber and Taeuber [1969], p. 106). Suburbs which are arrayed in a column of points along the left of the scatterplot (values of less than 5% black in 1970 but as high as 10% or more black in 1980) represent cases of what we might call "invasion." Cases falling below the diagonal line, which declined in proportion black during the decade, represent cases of displacement. These rarely involve "pure displacement" in which blacks are actually replaced by whites; typically the decline in proportion black is due to the rapid growth of white population. Suburbs that had more than 10% or 20% black residents in 1970 and lie close to the diagonal line are "stable" or "established" black communities, while those which lie far above the line can be thought of as experiencing "transition and succession." In our sample, the latter cases typically lost white population and gained blacks during the 1970s.

Inspection of the two figures reveals continuing differences between racial change in the South and elsewhere, similar to those described in studies of earlier periods. In both the North and the South, there are a large number of "stable white" suburbs, as well as some suburbs which were mostly white in 1970 but experienced significant black increases during the decade. However, only in the North did suburbs with substantial existing black populations commonly undergo "succession"; in the South many such suburbs underwent the opposite process, "displacement." As we anticipated from the existing literature, we found from other scatterplots (not reproduced here) that in the North the greatest increases in proportion black took place in inner suburbs, particularly those bordering on the central city. For the South we had envisioned displacement as a phenomenon of incorporation of black, rural, fringe communities into the metropolitan urbanized area. Thus we anticipated that declining proportions of blacks would be concentrated among the more distant suburbs. We found, to the contrary, that while increasing proportion black was more typical of inner suburbs in the South, the phenomenon of displacement was spread widely throughout the suburban ring.

Another way to summarize the difference between racial change in the





FIG. 1.—Proportion black in 1970 and 1980 in American suburbs (non-South)



North and that in the South is to present the results of attempts to fit linear or quadratic models to these scatterplots. Guest (1978, pp. 198–99) reported the following equations, in which it was necessary to include a squared term for the North which would reflect curvature in the line produced by the many “succession” cases (here Y and X represent percentage black in 1970 and 1960, respectively): for the North, $Y = .808 + 1.543X - .006X^2$, $R^2 = .456$; for the South, $Y = 1.881 + .747X$, $R^2 = .726$. Our results for the 1970–80 period replicate Guest's findings. We find that a linear equation is a satisfactory model for the South and that the quadratic form is required for the North. The major difference for the later period is that the fit to the quadratic model for the North is much greater than that reported by Guest (an R^2 of .846 for 1980, compared with .456 for 1970): for the North, $Y = .007 + 1.50X - .005X^2$, $R^2 = .846$ ($N = 1,347$); for the South, $Y = .032 + .96X$, $R^2 = .700$ ($N = 257$).

THE CAUSES OF RACIAL TRANSITION AND SUCCESSION IN NORTHERN SUBURBS

Thus far our analysis suggests that racial change in suburban communities in the North and West has followed a pattern consistent with the ecological model of invasion, transition, and succession. What are the causes of this pattern? In the ecological literature, the underlying assumption appears to be that both racial discrimination and socioeconomic differences account for segregation but that racial change should be understood also within the context of a larger complex of community changes. These include increasing population density, a shift from single-family to multiple-unit structures, a decline in socioeconomic status, and conversion of land from residential to nonresidential use. Guest (1978) shows that indeed the bivariate associations between such community characteristics and racial change are in the predicted direction, but his analysis is in the mode of seeking “correlates” rather than “predictors” of racial change. The only example of a multivariate analysis of predictors of racial change is limited to the case of Long Island suburbs (Logan and Stearns 1981). That study reports correlations consistent with Guest's results but finds that only the initial proportion black, ethnicity, and population density have significant independent effects on change in racial composition.

Another recent study (Schneider and Logan 1982) has documented the correlates of racial concentration in terms of characteristics of municipal government: the strength of the local property tax base, tax levels, and levels of public services. Those findings suggest the relevance of a theory of urban political economy for the study of racial change—to what extent are the locational decisions of blacks and whites, and the operation of the dual housing market, sensitive to local fiscal differences?

To deal with these issues, we have applied multiple regression techniques to determine the independent effects of various predictors of change in racial composition, including variables from several theoretical traditions. Those drawn from ecological theory are distance from the central city, density, proportion of rental housing units, and proportion of residents whom we have categorized as "poor" (defined as earning less than 50% of the regional median income), and residential stability (the proportion of community residents in 1970 who had lived in the community for at least five years). Ethnicity (proportion of foreign stock) could not be used because it was reported in 1970 only for suburbs with populations greater than 10,000. Finally, we have included several characteristics of local government finances drawn from the urban political economy tradition. It is hypothesized that blacks will have less access to suburbs with a strong tax base and low tax rates, but that—with these indicators of fiscal wealth controlled—blacks may be drawn disproportionately to suburbs with higher levels of public services, particularly social services.

The regression results for northern suburbs are presented in table 3.² A similar analysis for southern suburbs was not possible because too many

TABLE 3
PREDICTORS OF CHANGE IN BLACK POPULATION IN INCORPORATED SUBURBS
DURING THE 1970s (Non-South, $N = 975$)

	<i>b</i>	R^2	Step Increment as Percentage of Residual R^2
Percentage black 1970.....	1.43 [.04]***	.858	.858 $F(1,973) = 5,879$
Percentage black 1970 squared ...	-.004 [.0005]***	.868	.070 $F(1,972) = 68$
Set of 27 SMSA dummies.....876	.061 $F(27,945) = 2.1$
Density 1970 (hundreds per square mile).....	.14 [.04]***
Distance from city (miles).....	-.079 [.024]***
Residential stability 1970 (%).	-.049 [.017]***
Tax base 1972 (thousands of dollars per capita).....	-.093 [.043]**
Tax rate 1972 (dollars per hundred dollars).....	.052 [.03]*	.882	.048 $F(5,940) = 9.1$

NOTE.—Dependent variable = percentage black in 1980. Numbers in brackets are SE's.

* $P < .05$ (one-tailed test).

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

² The regression reported here deals with nonlinearity in the relationship between 1970 and 1980 proportions black by introduction of a squared term, consistent with the models discussed above. An alternative method involves a logit transformation of proportion black (the natural logarithm of the ratio between proportion black and proportion white) (see Pindyk and Rubinfeld 1976, pp. 247–51). Results of the logit model are essentially consistent with the regression analysis; they display minor differences: proportion poor shows a significant effect on racial change, while density and tax base do not. The details of that analysis may be obtained directly from John Logan.

cases lacked data on local fiscal characteristics. The effects of initial proportion black (including the size of the squared term) simply replicate those presented above. The strongest single determinant of increasing black concentration in suburban communities is the initial proportion black, and there is a strong tendency for increasing racial disparities in the following sense. On the basis of initial proportion black alone, a suburb which in 1970 had 30% black population would in 1980 have a black population of 42.9%, while a suburb beginning with 2% black would increase by about the same proportion but reach only 2.9%.

In the next step we entered into the regression equation a set of dummy variables representing SMSAs for the purpose of partialing out the effects of SMSA differences in black suburbanization. Although they are not statistically significant as a group, we have retained them because several individual dummies are significant. Their inclusion is analogous to an alternative procedure of measuring all variables as deviations from SMSA averages.

Of the standard ecological variables, both distance and density have significant effects on racial change: blacks gained access primarily to suburbs close to the central city with high population density. Surprisingly, the proportion of poor residents was not a significant predictor, even though there is a high cross-sectional correlation between percentage poor and percentage black. Although low income is important in determining which communities will initially experience growth in blacks, it may play a smaller role in predicting further change. In addition, rental housing failed to produce a significant effect in the regression equation.

The effect of residential stability, in contrast, is statistically significant and merits some discussion. It might be thought that a stable residential population simply means that there is less possibility of replacement of whites by blacks, so that this result is interpretable in terms of the standard invasion-succession (or vacancy-chain) model of racial change. However, our measure of residential stability is based on the five-year period prior to 1970 and is not in fact very highly correlated with population growth during the 1970s. For this reason, we are more inclined to interpret this variable as an indicator of community attachment, of the existence of a strong core of "permanent" community residents, and, in short, of the potential for collective opposition to community change. This interpretation parallels the discussion of the effects of ethnicity on racial change in the research of Logan and Stearns (1981).

Finally, two characteristics of local government finances have significant effects on racial change. Increasing black concentration is more likely to occur in communities with a weaker property tax base and in suburbs with higher tax rates. It is not plausible to argue that blacks are more attracted to such places or that whites are more sensitive to fiscal differ-

ences than blacks. Instead we believe that this finding indicates that the dual housing market effectively steers blacks to disadvantaged communities. Other governmental variables—general and social service expenditure levels and indebtedness—have no significant effect.

DISCUSSION

Information from the 1980 census reveals that black suburbanization took place at a rapid pace during the 1970s, with the exception of those metropolitan regions in the Midwest and West which have never had a significant urban or suburban black population. Black suburbanization accelerated in the South during this decade, following a period in which the already large suburban black population had been relatively static.

Where it has occurred, black suburbanization has largely followed the segregated pattern already established in the 1950s and 1960s. There are, however, sharp regional differences in changes in segregation. In much of the Sunbelt, suburban racial segregation declined during this period. Although some southern and western suburbs evolved toward a predominantly black population composition, others with substantial initial black populations experienced a decline in the proportion black, continuing a process described in previous studies as "displacement." In the North, in contrast, a high initial black percentage remained a strong predictor of further growth of black population. Although some initially "white" suburbs became accessible to blacks, the more typical cases were those of white suburbs which maintained barriers to black entry and black suburbs which underwent further racial change.

Our research has examined the causes of transition and succession only in northern suburbs, evaluating the independent effects of various predictors of racial change. In support of the classic ecological model, we found that increases in percentage black were associated with initial black presence, and that racial change occurred particularly in high-density, inner suburbs—a process consistent with the metaphor of "spillover" from the central city. However, neither rental housing nor low-income population showed a significant effect. We have interpreted the negative effect of residential stability as supporting a collective action model of resistance to racial change, consistent with field reports of the success or failure of residents' efforts to block racial integration (Molotch 1972; Berry et al. 1976). There is no evidence that blacks are particularly attracted to suburbs with higher funding levels for general or social services. The principal finding in this respect is that blacks have access primarily to those suburbs which have the weakest tax base and highest current tax rates and which may have the most difficulty providing municipal services at acceptable tax rates.

Thus our main conclusion is the continuity in black suburbanization: a familiar pattern of segregation and inequality whose underlying causes—whether in economic inequality, racial prejudice, the organization of local government, or local housing markets—have yet to be challenged.

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Sources of the Family Income Differentials among Hispanics, Blacks, and White Non-Hispanics¹

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Data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education are used to analyze the family income differentials among the five major Hispanic-American groups (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Central and South Americans, and "other Spanish"), black non-Hispanics, and white non-Hispanics. Total family income is first classified by its four major sources: earnings of a male head, earnings of a wife or female head, earnings of other family members, and property or transfer income. Next, each potential source of intergroup differences is analyzed for male earnings and then for female earnings: differences in family structure, labor force participation, weeks employed, hours worked per week, and wage rates. For each factor, the ratio of each minority group's average value to that of white non-Hispanics is computed to determine where the overall income gaps arise. In order to adjust for group differences in demographic composition, Fisher's ideal index is also computed for the factors exhibiting sizable gaps.

In 1981, according to the official statistics, the average black family in the United States had an income of \$16,696, only 62% of the average white family's \$26,934. The average Hispanic-headed family was only slightly better off, with an income of \$19,370, 72% of the white families' average (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982, p. 9). If the Current Population Survey undercounts the low-income minority population in general, and illegal immigrants in particular, while underreporting the property income of upper-income groups, these official figures understate the true gaps between minority and white non-Hispanic families.

What causes these enormous disparities? Obviously, total family income depends on the earnings of each family member as well as on the amount

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of income from property and transfer payments. Thus, intergroup differences in family income are the outcome of differences in family structure and different levels of labor market activity by various family members, as well as differences in their wage rates and nonlabor income.

In this paper I use data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education to analyze the gaps in family income between Hispanics and blacks, on the one hand, and white non-Hispanics, on the other.² Because the goal is to understand the sources of the officially reported family income differentials, I follow the U.S. Census Bureau's definition of a "family": two or more persons related by blood or marriage who are living in the same household. Thus, a husband and wife without children are a "family," as are a single parent and child (or grandparent and grandchild), or adult siblings who share a home. I analyze separately the five major Hispanic groups in the United States (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Central and South Americans, and others of Spanish origin ["other Spanish"]), as well as black and white non-Hispanics, to illuminate the differences among them. First I compare average family income from four broad sources: earnings of a husband or male head, earnings of a wife or female head, earnings of other family members, and nonlabor income. Then I assess the contribution of differences in average family composition and average labor force participation rates, employment rates, weekly hours worked, and hourly earnings of male heads and wives or female heads. Finally, I explore the extent to which these differences exist even after adjustments are made for intergroup differences in education, age, presence and age of children, marital status, and regional distribution.

RELATIVE INCOME BY SOURCE

First, family income is classified by source: earnings of a husband or male head, earnings of a wife or female head, earnings of other family members, and income from property or transfer payments. Table 1 shows the average amounts of income received from each source in 1975 by families in each of the five major Hispanic groups in the United States and by black and white non-Hispanic families.

² For a description of this data set, see U.S. Bureau of the Census 1978. The Survey of Income and Education is particularly useful for our purposes because it is more recent than the 1970 census and has a considerably larger sample than the Current Population Survey. With over 150,000 households, it enables us to examine the major Hispanic groups separately. Families are classified into seven mutually exclusive groups—five Hispanic groups, black non-Hispanics, and white non-Hispanics—according to the race and ethnic origin of the family head. Race was determined by the interviewer, and ethnic origin was identified by the respondent from a list that included Mexican American, Chicano, Mexican, Mexicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, and "other Spanish." The first four groups constitute our "Mexican" category. Non-Hispanics who are neither black nor white (e.g., Asians) are excluded from this study.

Looking at the Hispanic groups one by one, we can see how much is obscured by lumping them together under the "Hispanic" rubric. Moreover, we see how different these minority groups are from black Americans. Mean family income in 1975 ranges from the Puerto Ricans' low of \$9,690—58% of white non-Hispanic mean family income—to the "other Spanish" group's \$13,990—84% of the white non-Hispanic figure. Cubans and Central and South Americans also average over 80% of white non-Hispanic family income, while Mexican families have only 65% as much income as white non-Hispanics, about the same ratio as blacks. Mexicans, about 60% of the Hispanic population in the United States, dominate the aggregate statistics for Hispanics.

Because this paper focuses on incomes of Hispanics and blacks in relation to those of white non-Hispanics, the latter are used as the reference group. Let us start with the ratio of each group's average family income to that of white non-Hispanics. This ratio is a weighted average of the ratios of average income from the separate sources, the weights being the proportions of white non-Hispanic average family income coming from each source (see Appendix A). Examination of the individual ratios, together with their weights, will show the source of the difference of a particular group's family income from that of white non-Hispanics.

Therefore I computed the mean of each component of family income

TABLE 1

MEAN FAMILY INCOME (\$) OF MAJOR HISPANIC GROUPS AND BLACK AND WHITE NON-HISPANICS, BY SOURCE, 1975

Source	White Non-Hispanics	Black Non-Hispanics	All Hispanics	Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	Cubans	Central and South Americans	Other Spanish
Total family income (\bar{Y})	16,740	11,040	11,460	10,900	9,690	13,890	13,660	13,990
Male heads' earnings (\bar{E}_M)*	10,110	4,860	6,710	6,450	5,270	7,980	8,510	8,200
Wives/female heads' earnings (\bar{E}_F)*	2,710	3,080	2,000	1,830	1,610	2,810	2,910	2,330
Other family members' earnings (\bar{E}_O)*	1,110	1,150	1,020	1,100	580	1,270	1,110	980
Nonlabor income (\bar{T})†	2,810	1,940	1,740	1,520	2,230	1,840	1,130	2,480

SOURCE.—U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976 (my computations).

* Wage and salary, self-employment, and farm income.

† Social Security, railroad retirement, SSI, AFDC, general assistance, veteran's benefits, unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, interest, dividends, pensions, estates, trusts, rents, royalties, alimony, child support, other regular contributions.

and formed its ratio to the mean for white non-Hispanics. These ratios are shown in table 2. There we see that Puerto Rican families have the lowest earned incomes, member by member, of any Hispanic group. They get only about half as much income from male heads or from other family members as white non-Hispanics do, and only 60% as much from wives and female heads. Puerto Rican families' property and transfer income, however, amounts to 79% of white non-Hispanics'. These ratios average out to a total family income that is only 58% of white non-Hispanics'.

Earnings of Mexican heads of either sex are only about two-thirds as large on average as earnings of their white non-Hispanic counterparts. Mexican families get only a little over half as much as white non-Hispanics from sources other than current earnings. They do get the same contribution as white non-Hispanics from other family members, but this represents only 7% of white non-Hispanic family income. Thus, the total income of Mexican families is only 65% of that of white non-Hispanics.

Cuban and Central and South American families actually get more earnings from wives and female heads and from other family members than do white non-Hispanic families. That these two Hispanic groups still fall below white non-Hispanics in total family income is due to the lower earnings per family of their male heads (who provide 60% of total white non-Hispanic family income) and to their much lower nonlabor income per family.

From each source, the "other Spanish" have over 80% of white non-Hispanic income. They share some interesting patterns with the other

TABLE 2

DECOMPOSING MINORITY/WHITE NON-HISPANIC MEAN FAMILY INCOME RATIOS

SOURCE	MEAN VALUE FOR WHITE NON-HISPANICS (\$)	WEIGHTING FACTOR (Fraction of Total Anglo Family Income)	BLACK/ ANGLO RATIO OF MEANS	HISPANIC/ANGLO RATIO OF MEANS				
				Puerto Mexicans	Ricans	Cubans	Central and South Americans	Other Spanish
Total family income (\bar{Y})	16,740	1.00	.66	.65	.58	.83	.82	.84
Male heads' earn- ings (\bar{E}_M)	10,110	.60	.48	.64	.52	.79	.84	.81
Wives'/female heads' earnings (\bar{E}_F)	2,710	.16	1.14	.68	.60	1.04	1.07	.86
Other family members' earn- ings (\bar{E}_O)	1,110	.07	1.04	.99	.52	1.14	1.00	.88
Nonlabor income (\bar{T})	2,810	.17	.69	.54	.79	.65	.40	.88

SOURCE.—Calculations based on table 1.

Hispanic groups. In all cases, the Hispanic-Anglo income gap is greater for male heads than for female heads. Except for Puerto Ricans, Hispanic other family members' earnings are also closer to white non-Hispanics than are male heads' earnings. The Hispanic groups, with the exception of the Puerto Ricans and "other Spanish," have a wider gap in property income and transfer payments than in earnings. The Puerto Ricans are different in that nonlabor income pulls their total income ratio up, and other family members' earnings pull it down.

In contrast, black American families get more earnings from wives and female heads, and less from male heads, than any other group. Black wives and female heads contribute 14% more to family income than white women do, while black families get less than half as much income from male heads as do white families—even less than Puerto Rican families.

DECOMPOSITION OF RELATIVE EARNINGS OF MALE HEADS

To get behind these differences in income by source, we can begin by noting that mean earnings over all families for a given type of family member (e.g., male heads) are equal to mean earnings of those in that family role who have earnings, times the proportion of families that have such a member with nonzero earnings. If E_{ijk} = earnings of member in role j in family k in group i , n_i = total number of families in group i , n_{ij} = number of families in group i with a member in role j , and n_{ij}^* = number of families in group i with $E_{ijk} \neq 0$, then

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{E}_{ij} &= (n_{ij}/n_i)(n_{ij}^*/n_{ij})(\sum_k E_{ijk}/n_{ij}^*) \\ &= (n_{ij}/n_i)(n_{ij}^*/n_{ij})(\bar{E}_{ij}/E_{ijk} \neq 0).\end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, each ratio $\bar{E}_{ij}/\bar{E}_{aj}$ can be approximated by the product of the ratios of the means of the factors of E_{ijk} ; that is, if $E_{ijk} = A_{ijk}B_{ijk}C_{ijk}$, then $\bar{E}_{ij}/\bar{E}_{aj} \approx (\bar{A}_{ij}/\bar{A}_{aj})(\bar{B}_{ij}/\bar{B}_{aj})(\bar{C}_{ij}/\bar{C}_{aj})$. (See Appendix B for elaboration.) A person's earnings are, by definition, $E = (\text{weeks in labor force})(\text{weeks worked/weeks in labor force})(\text{hours/week})(\text{hourly wage})$. We can therefore express the ratio of mean earnings of Mexican and Anglo male heads, for example, as the product of the following factors: the ratio of the percentages of families with a male head present, the ratio of the percentages of those present who were in the labor force, the ratio of their average weeks in the labor force, the ratio of average employment rates (weeks worked/weeks in labor force), the ratio of average hours worked per week, and the ratio of mean hourly earnings. Insofar as any of these ratios falls below unity, that factor contributes to a shortfall in mean earnings of Mexican male heads.

Tables 3, 4, and 5 tell us what lies behind the disparities in the various sources of family income. The shortfall in earnings of male heads is

decomposed in table 3. (Remember that the overall Hispanic/Anglo earnings ratio is the product of the ratios shown.) There we see that a major reason Puerto Rican families have only 52% as much income from male heads as white non-Hispanic families is that Puerto Rican families are only three-fourths as likely to have a male head present. They are very similar to black families in this respect. This disadvantage afflicts all the Hispanic groups, except the Cubans, to some degree. However, it is offset somewhat for the Mexicans and Central and South Americans by the higher percentage of earners among the male heads who are present. It is from much lower average earnings per worker (only two-thirds as much) that the Mexican male heads lose ground to white non-Hispanics. If their earnings per worker were on a par, Mexican average family income would be 84% of the Anglo average instead of only 65%.

Puerto Rican male heads are slightly less likely to earn money than white non-Hispanics, and they, like blacks, earn less than three-fourths as much when they do work. Combine this with the much greater like-

TABLE 3

DECOMPOSING MINORITY/WHITE NON-HISPANIC MEAN MALE HEADS' EARNINGS RATIOS

FACTOR	MEAN VALUE FOR WHITE NON-HISPANICS	BLACK/ANGLO RATIO OF MEANS	HISPANIC/ANGLO RATIO OF MEANS				
			Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	Cubans	Central and South Americans	Other Spanish
Earnings of male heads	\$10,110	.48	.64	.52	.79	.84	.81
Percentage of families with male head present	89.7	.71	.92	.74	.99	.86	.91
Percentage of those present who have earnings	85.5	.98	1.03	.96	.95	1.13	.99
Earnings of those with earnings \neq 0	\$13,190	.69	.67	.73	.84	.86	.91
Percentage of male heads present who are civilians	98.2	.99	1.00	.99	1.01	1.02	1.00
Percentage of civilians in labor force	85.6	1.00	1.04	1.01	1.00	1.13	.96
Weeks in labor force of those in labor force	49.3	.99	1.00	1.02	1.03	1.03	1.01
(Weeks employed)/(weeks in labor force) for those in labor force*949	.96 (.97)	.97 (.99)	.93 (.91)	.89 (.89)	.99 (.93)	1.00 (1.01)
Hours worked per week* . . .	44.3	.94 (.94)	.97 (.96)	.95 (.90)	.98 (.95)	.98 (.90)	.96 (.96)
Hourly earnings*	\$6.60	.74 (.83)	.69 (.78)	.73 (.75)	.83 (.88)	.81 (.75)	.88 (.92)

SOURCE.—U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976 (my computations).

* In parentheses, standardized for region, age, and education—Fisher's ideal index; see text for explanation.

lihood that Puerto Rican and black families lack a male head, and we have the average Puerto Rican or black family getting only half as much income from male heads as the average Anglo family. If working Puerto Rican males were able to earn the same as white non-Hispanics, Puerto Rican families would still have only 69% of the average white non-Hispanic family's income. (Blacks would have 79%.) Even if all other components of family income were also on a par with white non-Hispanic components, the black or Puerto Rican/Anglo family income ratio would still be only .83. Such is the importance of family composition—in particular, the absence of a male head—in determining family income.

Cuban families are as likely as white non-Hispanics to have a male head present, but like Puerto Ricans, Cuban male heads are somewhat less likely to work than white non-Hispanics (perhaps because this refugee population is older). However, the main reason for the shortfall in the Cuban males' earnings is that earnings per worker average only 84% of white non-Hispanics'. If Cuban male workers earned as much as white non-Hispanics, their family income ratio would rise from .83 to .92.

Central and South American families are more likely to lack a male head than are any other Hispanics but the Puerto Ricans. Those who are present are much more likely to be working, however, than in any other group, including the white non-Hispanics. This nearly balances the effect of their lower earnings per worker. If this group were as likely to have a male head in each family as are white non-Hispanics, or if their male workers earned as much, their family income ratio would rise from .82 to .89. The rest of the gap is due to their low unearned income—only 40% as large as that of white non-Hispanic families.

"Other Spanish" families lag equally in having male heads present and in male earnings per worker. They are as likely as white non-Hispanics to work, if present. If their male earnings per worker were on a par with the Anglo majority's, their family incomes, overall and from male earnings, would be 90% of the latter group's.

Clearly, lower earnings per male worker are a major reason for lower family incomes in every group. If we want to know what roles are played in these lower earnings by lower labor force participation, shorter hours, and lower wage rates, we must restrict our attention to the civilian population. (Weeks and hours worked are not available for the armed forces.) Table 3 shows that hourly earnings are the major reason for the shortfall in every Hispanic group and among black men, too. The men of every group but "other Spanish" spend at least as many weeks in the labor force during the year as do white non-Hispanic men. However, except for "other Spanish" and Central and South Americans, they are employed during a smaller fraction of those weeks. This is especially true of Cubans and

Puerto Ricans. Also, the fact that all the minority groups average somewhat fewer hours of work per week than white non-Hispanics compounds the effect of the lower average wages.

RELATIVE EARNINGS OF WIVES AND FEMALE HEADS

While wives and female heads actually contribute more to black, Cuban, and Central and South American families than to white non-Hispanic families, they are a source of much less income for Puerto Rican and Mexican families. Table 4 shows the sources of these differences. Unlike differential rates of presence of a male head, those of a wife or female head are not a factor, but differential female labor force participation rates are a major one, in family income differences. Central and South American, and especially black and Cuban, wives and female heads spend more weeks in the labor force than white non-Hispanic women. Mexican and "other Spanish" female heads spend about 90% as much time in the labor force as Anglos, while Puerto Rican women are in the labor force only two-thirds as much of the time. This is mainly a result of the much

TABLE 4
DECOMPOSING MINORITY/WHITE NON-HISPANIC MEAN FEMALE HEADS'
EARNINGS RATIOS

FACTOR	MEAN VALUE FOR WHITE NON-HISPANICS	BLACK/ANGLO RATIO OF MEANS	HISPANIC/ANGLO RATIO OF MEANS				
			Puerto Mexicans	Ricans	Cubans	Central and South Americans	Other Spanish
Earnings of female heads...	\$2,710	1.14	.68	.60	1.04	1.07	.86
Percentage of families with female head present	97.6	.98	.98	1.01	1.01	1.00	1.00
Percentage of female heads in labor force*	54.9	1.21 (1.14)	.99 (.92)	.72 (.66)	1.13 (1.07)	1.19 (1.03)	.96 (.91)
Weeks in labor force of those in labor force*	41.6	1.03 (1.05)	.91 (.97)	.94 (.98)	1.09 (1.08)	.93 (.95)	.96 (.96)
(Weeks employed)/(Weeks in labor force) for those in labor force†906	.92 (.94)	.96 (1.00)	.83 (.84)	.90 (.86)	.94 (.91)	.92 (.93)
Hours worked per week	35.0	1.03	1.06	1.04	1.10	1.08	1.03
Hourly earnings†	\$3.64	.95 (1.05)	.77 (.89)	.95 (.94)	.88 (.88)	.95 (.94)	1.21 (1.13)

SOURCE.—U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976 (my computations).

* In parentheses, standardized for age, presence and age of children, and marital status—Fisher's Ideal Index; see text for explanation.

† In parentheses, standardized for region, age, and education—Fisher's Ideal index; see text for explanation.

larger fraction of Puerto Rican women who do not participate at all, rather than of fewer weeks in the labor force per participant.

All groups of Hispanic and black women suffer more from unemployment than do white non-Hispanics. This hits Puerto Rican wives and female heads much harder than others. When they do work, Hispanic women of all groups, like black women, work longer hours per week than do white non-Hispanic wives and female heads. "Other Spanish" women have higher wage rates than white non-Hispanic women; black, Puerto Rican, and Central and South American women earn wages nearly as high as white non-Hispanic women. Thus the shortfall in Puerto Rican income from female heads is due mostly to lower labor force participation and higher unemployment rates. For Mexicans, however, the gap stems mainly from lower average hourly earnings. Blacks, Cubans, and Central and South Americans, the groups that have higher earnings from wives and female heads than white non-Hispanics, have them despite higher unemployment and lower wage rates, by dint of higher female labor force participation and longer weekly hours.

INCOME FROM OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS

Disparities in income from members of the family other than the heads—teenage children and adult relatives—also contribute to intergroup differences in average family income. The effect is muted, however, by the small fraction of total family income (7%) that comes from this source. Table 5 shows that, like black families, Mexican families have more

TABLE 5
DECOMPOSING MINORITY/WHITE NON-HISPANIC MEAN OTHER FAMILY
MEMBERS' EARNINGS RATIOS

FACTOR	MEAN VALUE FOR WHITE NON-HISPANICS	BLACK/ANGLO RATIO OF MEANS	HISPANIC /ANGLO RATIO OF MEANS				
			Mexicans	Puerto Ricans	Cubans	Central and South Americans	Other Spanish
Earnings of other family members	\$1,110	1.04	.99	.52	1.14	1.00	.88
Number of other family members aged 14 or more62	1.54	1.37	.99	1.38	.89	1.19
Percentage of other family members with earnings...	57.7	.74	.85	.60	.81	.92	.80
Earnings of other family members with earnings ≠ 0	\$3,100	.92	.85	.87	1.02	1.22	.93

SOURCE.—U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976 (my computations).

members of working age than white non-Hispanics, but fewer of them work and the workers earn less, so that this source provides about the same amount of income to Mexican and black families as to Anglos.

Cuban families, too, have more members over age 14 than others. Even though a smaller proportion of them work than in white non-Hispanic families, earnings per worker are on a par, and other family members contribute more to family income than in any other ethnic group. Central and South Americans have fewer other family members of working age than the other groups, and a smaller fraction of them work than among white non-Hispanics. However, their earnings per worker are so much higher that income from this source is as great as for white non-Hispanics.

"Other Spanish" families also have more potential other family earners than white non-Hispanics. However, fewer of them have earnings, and the earnings of those who do are lower. Less income is therefore derived from this source than in any other group but the Puerto Ricans. The latter derive only half as much income from other family members as do white non-Hispanics, despite the fact that their families are as large. But only 60% as many of the potential workers actually work, and they earn 13% less on average.

ADJUSTMENT FOR DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Some of the differences described above in labor force participation rates, hours worked, and wage rates among racial and ethnic groups may stem from differences in age structure, education levels, presence and age of children, geographic location, and other demographic characteristics. Earnings tend to rise with age. Lower educational levels normally translate into lower wage rates. A group with more of its women in their child-rearing years will probably supply less female labor to the market. A group that is concentrated in low-cost areas of the country will, other things being equal, have lower average wages than one living primarily in northern cities. Besides the differences in hours of work and wage rates due to demographic characteristics, there may be differences due to cultural attitudes about work, the role of women in the family, and, last but not least, discrimination.

A full-scale analysis of the determinants of racial and ethnic differences in individual earnings and labor force behavior is beyond the scope of this paper (but see, e.g., Carliner 1981; Cooney 1979; Gwartney and Long 1978; Reimers 1983, 1984; Smith and Welch 1978; and Tienda and Niedert 1980). It is possible, however, to get some idea of the importance of demographic characteristics in producing these intergroup differences by controlling for group composition and then recomputing the ratios of earnings factors on which the minority's shortfall is serious.

For men, the minority-Anglo ratios of average employment rates, hours worked per week, and hourly earnings were computed with each of these variables standardized for age, education, and regional distribution. A total of 27 categories was created by all possible combinations of the control variables, grouped as follows: age—below 25, 25–54, and over 55; educational attainment—less than 12 grades, 12 grades, and more than 12 grades; and region—North (i.e., the census divisions of New England, Middle Atlantic, East and West North Central), South (i.e., South Atlantic, East and West South Central), and West (i.e., Mountain and Pacific). In principle, it would be desirable to use more categories and to control for more demographic characteristics. However, given the sample sizes, the number of categories must be limited in order to keep cell sizes reasonable. Therefore only the most important control variables and categories were selected for standardization.

For women, the ratios of average employment rates and hourly earnings were standardized by the same 27 age-education-region categories as for men. Other standardizations were also performed for females. Their ratios of percentage in the labor force and average weeks in the labor force were standardized for age, presence and age of children, and marital status. The age brackets are the same as for men: below 25, 25–54, and over 55. Four categories describe children: youngest child under 6, youngest aged 6–11, youngest aged 12–17, and none under 18. Marital status is a dichotomy: married, spouse present, or not. Thus, there are 24 cells altogether for this standardization.

The question arises immediately, What weights should be used for standardization? The minority group's composition, if used as weights, will in general lead to different results than will that of white non-Hispanics. (This is an example of the familiar index-number problem.) An attractive solution is Fisher's ideal index, which is the geometric mean of these two indexes—one using the minority's weights and the other using the white non-Hispanics' weights. Fisher's ideal index has the especially attractive property that it decomposes the unadjusted ratio (e.g., of average hourly earnings) into two component indexes, one reflecting differences in average hourly earnings within demographic categories, and one reflecting differences in group composition (see Appendix C). (For further discussion of Fisher's ideal index, see Kitagawa [1964], pp. 304–5, 309.)

The standardized ratios (i.e., Fisher's ideal indexes) are reported in parentheses in tables 3 and 4. For men, controlling for age, education, and region changes the hourly earnings gap more than the other factors—narrowing it for all groups except Central and South Americans and narrowing it by four to nine percentage points for all the other groups except Puerto Ricans. Standardizing the ratio of hours worked per week

tends to reduce it, especially for Puerto Ricans and Central and South Americans. Fisher's ideal index of weekly hours for these groups is only .9 that of white non-Hispanic men. Standardization does not appreciably change the ratios of employment rates, except for Central and South American men. For them it drops from .99 to .93. Thus, in the cases of employment rates and weekly hours, differences in demographic composition tend, if anything, to work in favor of the minority groups, masking within-category gaps in these earnings factors. Hourly earnings differences remain, however, the largest factor in the lower earnings of minority men, even after group composition is taken into account.

For women, standardization for age, children, and marital status affects the two aspects of labor force participation in opposite directions. It lowers the minority-Anglo ratio of percentages in the labor force for one week or more but tends to increase the ratio of weeks in the labor force for those who participate at all. This indicates that demographic characteristics work in favor of the minority women with respect to participating at all but against them with respect to participating more weeks in the year. This paradox can be resolved by observing that, on the one hand, fewer minority than Anglo women are old enough (or rich enough) to be completely "retired," while, on the other hand, the minority women have more children and therefore those who do enter the labor force tend to work fewer weeks per year.

The ratio of weeks in the labor force varies from .95 for Central and South American women to 1.08 for Cubans, once demographic differences are taken into account. Before standardization, the percentage of black, Cuban, and Central and South American women who are in the labor force at all is higher than that of white non-Hispanics. This continues to be true even after age, children, and marital status are controlled, but the gap is narrower. Mexican and "other Spanish" women have a little over 90% of the participation rate of Anglo women, with demographic variables controlled. The standardized percentage in the labor force at least one week is lowest for Puerto Rican women, who have only two-thirds the participation rate of Anglo women. This is the major factor in the lower earnings contributed to families by Puerto Rican women.

Standardization for age, education, and region closes half of the wage gap between Mexican and Anglo women; Fisher's ideal index for Mexicans is .89. Black women's wage rates are 5% higher than white women's after standardization, while the "other Spanish" women's wage ratio is reduced to 1.13. The wage ratios for the other groups are essentially unchanged. Standardization increases the ratio of employment rates for Mexican women to 1.00, while decreasing the ratio for Cubans to .86 and for Central and South Americans to .91. It does not appreciably change this ratio for the other groups.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have identified the main sources of income inequality between black or Hispanic and white non-Hispanic families in the United States. I have shown how intergroup differences at the individual level add up to differences in average income at the family level. The differences among the Hispanic groups and between them and black non-Hispanics are striking. For instance, for blacks and Puerto Ricans, but not the other Hispanic groups, the greater prevalence of female-headed families is a major reason for lower family incomes. Puerto Ricans also have much lower female labor force participation rates than other groups, even after adjustments for differences in demographic composition. Mexican and "other Spanish" women also have somewhat lower labor force participation than other women, especially when demographic characteristics are taken into account. However, Cuban and Central and South American women are like black women in having even higher labor force participation rates (and weekly hours worked) and, consequently, larger average earnings than white non-Hispanic women—despite higher unemployment rates (and in the Cuban women's case, considerably lower wages). Unemployment is a more important factor in the lower earnings of Puerto Rican and Cuban women and Cuban men than it is for the other groups. Unstandardized weekly hours are similar across ethnic groups, but standardization reveals that within demographic categories, Puerto Rican and Central and South American men work fewer hours per week than the other groups of men. Nevertheless, the most important single reason for the lower family incomes of Hispanics and blacks than of white non-Hispanics is lower wage rates—especially for men, but also for Mexican and Cuban women—even after differences in age, education, and regional distribution are controlled.

APPENDIX A

To see this, let \bar{Y}_i = mean family income of ethnic group i ($i = a$ if Anglo), \bar{E}_{ij} = mean earnings of family members in role j in group i , and \bar{T}_i = mean family income from property and transfer payments of group i . Since total family income is just the sum of its parts, $\bar{Y}_i = \sum_j \bar{E}_{ij} + \bar{T}_i$, and therefore $\bar{Y}_i/\bar{Y}_a = \sum_j [(\bar{E}_{ij}/\bar{E}_{aj})(\bar{E}_{aj}/\bar{Y}_a)] + (\bar{T}_i/\bar{T}_a)(\bar{T}_a/\bar{Y}_a)$.

APPENDIX B

In general, if $Z = \prod_{i=1}^L A_i$, then

$$E(\ln Z) = \sum_{i=1}^L E(\ln A_i), \quad (1)$$

where E is the expectation operator. For any X , we can approximate $\ln X$ by a Taylor series expansion around $E(X)$: $\ln X \approx \ln [E(X)] + [X - E(X)]/E(X) - (1/2)[X - E(X)]^2/[E(X)]^2$.

Taking the expectation of both sides, we have

$$E(\ln X) \approx \ln [E(X)] - (1/2) \text{var}(X)/[E(X)]^2. \quad (2)$$

With (2) to approximate each side of equation (1) and rearranging,

$$\ln [E(Z)] \approx \sum_{i=1}^L \ln [E(A_i)] + (1/2)\{\text{var}(Z)/[E(Z)]^2 - \sum_{i=1}^L \text{var}(A_i)/[E(A_i)]^2\};$$

so

$$\begin{aligned} \ln [E(Z_1)/E(Z_2)] &\approx \sum_{i=1}^L \ln [E(A_{1i})/E(A_{2i})] \\ &\quad + (1/2)\{\text{var}(Z_1)/[E(Z_1)]^2 - \text{var}(Z_2)/[E(Z_2)]^2\} \\ &\quad - \sum_{i=1}^L \text{var}(A_{1i})/[E(A_{1i})]^2 + \sum_{i=1}^L \text{var}(A_{2i})/[E(A_{2i})]^2. \end{aligned}$$

With the assumption that the coefficients of variation are similar for groups 1 and 2, the term in curly brackets can be neglected, so that $E(Z_1)/E(Z_2) \approx \prod_{i=1}^L [E(A_{1i})/E(A_{2i})]$.

APPENDIX C

Let w_i be the fraction of minority group members in demographic category i , w_i' be the fraction of white non-Hispanics in demographic category i , c_i be the minority's average value of the earnings factor (i.e., labor force participation, employment rate, etc.) within category i , and c_i' be the white non-Hispanics' average value of the earnings factor within category i . Then Fisher's ideal index of the earnings factor is $[(\sum_i w_i c_i / \sum_i w_i' c_i')(\sum_i w_i' c_i' / \sum_i w_i c_i)]^{1/2}$, Fisher's index of composition is $[(\sum_i w_i c_i' / \sum_i w_i' c_i')(\sum_i w_i c_i / \sum_i w_i' c_i)]^{1/2}$, and the unadjusted ratio is $\sum_i w_i c_i / \sum_i w_i' c_i' = (\text{Fisher index of earnings factor})(\text{Fisher index of composition})$.

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Human Ecological and Marxian Theories¹

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A comparison of two macrolevel paradigms, the human ecological and the Marxian, discloses numerous parallels and some significant differences. The exercise is useful in that it reveals a number of lacunae in human ecological theory. A selection of research problems which might close the gaps in theory is presented.

The growth of interest among sociologists in the applicability of Marx's thought to the issues of the discipline makes it advisable to engage in a comparative examination of conventional approaches and the Marxian formulation. One such juxtaposition involves human ecological theory. Comparisons have appeared in the literature, for the most part as criticisms by Marxian protagonists (e.g., Castells 1977; Tabb and Sawers 1978) of urban studies conducted under the ecological label.² That literature, however, deals with questions that are of marginal concern to the core of ecological theory. More pertinent is the work being done under the political economy rubric. Some of it is argued from Marxian premises (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn 1975; Rubinson 1976); other examples make no explicit use of the Marxian model (Roberts 1978; Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao 1979; Saunders 1981). One way or another the comparative question is raised. Nor is it merely an exercise of idle curiosity. At a minimum, comparison clarifies points of disagreement. But much more important is the positive contribution it makes by revealing omissions, underdeveloped implications, and points needing strengthening in one or the other theory. Whether theoretical synthesis might also result is much more problematical, especially in the case of the theories under discussion. In turning to the comparison we should note that human ecology, so far as I am aware, developed independently of Marx's influence, as independent, that is, as is possible where two lines of thought derive from a common intellectual tradition.

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² Marxian criticisms of urban studies have brought replies from London (1976) and Fischer (1978).

Although a great deal of use has been made of ecological concepts in urban and population research, the underlying theory has usually been left in some disarray. Why that should be need not detain us here. It is enough for the present purposes to observe that the promise of a coherent theoretical system has been recognized by a number of scholars (Gibbs and Martin 1959; Duncan and Schnore 1959; Duncan 1964; Hardesty 1977; Hawley 1968; Berry and Kasarda 1977; Seagraves 1974; Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). From their writings and general ecosystem theory (Clements and Shelford 1939; Odum 1969) one may extract what seems to be a human ecological paradigm comprising three propositions, as follows:

- (1) Adaptation to environment proceeds through the formation of a system of interdependences among the members of a population;
- (2) system development continues, *ceteris paribus*, to the maximum size and complexity afforded by the existing facilities for transportation and communication; and
- (3) system development is resumed with the introduction of new information which increases the capacity for movement of materials, people, and messages and continues until that capacity is fully utilized.

The three propositions may be described as the adaptation, the growth, and the evolution propositions, respectively.

Marx's theorizing ranged over a wide array of implications of his essential argument pertaining to the nature and development of socioeconomic structure. Here I am concerned only with the basic or essential elements of his thought, which I shall identify at considerable risk of oversimplification. They may be said to comprise three assumptions and three propositions. First, among the assumptions, Marx asserted that before men can make history there must be a production of the means for satisfying the needs for food, drink, habitation, and clothing. Second, "the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life" (1904, pp. 20-21). Third, the "forces of production," comprising tools, technical knowledge, raw materials, and transportation, tend always to accumulate. Here it should be recognized that Marx observed a distinction between the "forces of production" and the "relations of production."³ The latter consisted in the interrelationships directly involved in the use of the "forces of production."

The three propositions constitute a paradigm somewhat parallel to that of human ecology. They are:

³ The distinction between these two components of manufacturing is drawn unequivocally in the preface to *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*, as Shaw (1978, chap. 1) has pointed out. Evidently that came as a refinement in Marx's later thinking, for in *The German Ideology* (1970, p. 59) the two concepts are not so clearly separated. The distinction is blurred again in *Capital* (1906, p. 395).

- (1) The production of subsistence is achieved only through organization. "Men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production" (1904, p. 20).
- (2) The progress of accumulation eventually brings the forces of production into conflict with the relations of production. Contradictions grow more acute until a prevailing equilibrium is shattered. At that point society moves on to another evolutionary stage.
- (3) In a capitalist society the operating mechanism of change lies with the changing composition of capital. In that process the proportion of investment or constant capital grows at the expense of operating or variable capital out of which wages are paid (1906, pp. 689–92). Concurrently the "relations of production" undergo major changes, including loss of ownership of tools by workers, increasing control of production by owners of capital, and a consequent sharpening in the delineation of social classes.

The adaptation proposition of ecology and Marx's first proposition exhibit similarities and differences. The former sets forth the central ecological problem, the interaction of population and environment. Environment as treated in ecology includes more than land form, climate, and physical resources. It comprises all that is external to and potentially influential on a population under observation, not excluding other social systems and the interactions they incite. In the history of civilization the relative importance of the biophysical and the social environments has undergone a significant change. An increasing amount of the biophysical has fallen under the determination of the social environment in what John Bennett (1976) has called the "ecological transition." This has made the task of operationalizing environment for any particular purpose more than a little difficult. Nevertheless, the concept lies at the core of ecology. Perhaps the solution to the operational problem is to be found in the measurement of accessibility of a system to externalities of various kinds. But this problem held little or no interest for Marx. For him environment seemed to be regarded as nature from which raw materials for production were obtained (see Parsons 1977).

Population is also of central concern in ecological thought. It is a basic necessary condition for a social system. Its size, composition, and rate of turnover set limits on what can be realized by way of system structure. Population is not, however, a sufficient condition. A system, as it takes shape, determines the size and character of the population it can accommodate. The population of interest to ecology is that aggregate which is capable of a unit response to environment, that is, an organized population; this is a position which Marx probably would not have contested.

Marx's remarks on population were addressed in the first place to a rejection of the Malthusian assumptions and a restatement of the Malthusian problem. He argued that an excess of population, or more par-

ticularly of the working class, is relative to the available number of employment opportunities, not to a fixed supply of sustenance materials. The decline in the proportion of variable capital creates an increasing amount of redundancy in the working class. The excess in numbers in the working class is further enlarged, moreover, as a result of constant birthrates and death rates (1906, p. 706). Human ecological research has also led to the conclusion that overpopulation is relative to social structure. But ecological theory departs from Marx's view in that it regards excess population as a temporary condition, a dislocation due to unevenness of changes in population and the social system. In due course population size and composition are expected to adjust to the personnel requirements of the system. Marx's failure to comment on the possibility of a working class bringing its birthrate under control is strange in view of Malthus's later advocacy of "moral restraint." Marx may, however, have regarded the tendency toward moral restraint as being neutralized by the incentive supplied by low wages to maintain, if not to increase, an existing birthrate. To the ecological position that population is more inclusive than the working class, the Marxian rejoinder is that all but a small minority tends to be reduced to working-class status.

Before we leave Marx's treatment of population, two more observations should be made. First, he was aware of distribution as a changing condition of population. The mechanization of agriculture leads to a movement of displaced agriculturalists to towns and cities, thereby swelling the ranks of the labor reserve. Second, and of no less interest to ecologists, was Marx's recognition that the meaning of population density is contingent on the state of communication technology (1906, p. 387). In that he anticipated Durkheim by some two decades.

A point of convergence of the two theories lies in the importance attributed to the production of sustenance. The adaptation proposition of ecology puts the production of sustenance in a central position in an ecosystem or social system. More than that, it conceives an entire system as a mechanism by which a population lives. For Marx all social processes flow through the organization for production; political and legal arrangements are designed to serve the needs of the "relations of production." But it is not always clear whether the "relations of production" include only the work relationships concerned with material production or also banking, distributing, and other late-stage contributors to value added as value is now understood. In any case, both theories have been characterized as materialistic as opposed to an alternative which differs with the persuasion of the critic. But as Marx and Engels contended (1970, p. 47), if we are setting out to understand a thing, we must look at the thing itself and not at people's ideas about it.

A second implication of the adaptation proposition—actually a corol-

lary of the first—is that the exigencies of the environmental relationship generate the essential organizing principle of the ecosystem. That is, adaptation proceeds through a differentiation of the environmental relationship such that one or a few functions become responsible for mediating environmental inputs to all other functions, the latter being arrayed transitively through one or more degrees of removal from direct environmental contact. Were that not the case, were all functions directly and continuously concerned with environment, there would be no system. Marx found the organizing principle elsewhere. For him it resides in the progress of technology and its effect on the composition of capital. This difference could easily have been avoided had Marx used a broader conception of environment. On the other hand, Marx preferred a mechanistic view of change in contrast to ecology's interactional view. It is noteworthy that Marx offered no explanation for technological change. He simply assumed it would occur, perhaps out of the expansionist tendency inherent in the human organism (Shaw 1978, p. 65).

Convergence appears again in the holistic perspective of the two theories. Ecology holds adaptation to be a collective phenomenon; it occurs only through the formation of a system of relationships. Thus ecology is committed to a macrolevel treatment of the phenomena it studies. And so it was with Marx. His analysis of the economy as a whole was a departure from the prevailing 19th-century thought. In both views an individual's actions are always constrained and shaped by structural circumstances. The actions of the capitalist, for example, oppressive as they might be, derive inadvertently from his role as owner of the instruments of production. More generally, "this fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now" (1970, p. 53).

Both Marx and human ecology conceive of change as operating in two temporal dimensions, one an ontogenic process of growth or system maturation, the other a phylogenetic or evolutionary process. In the growth process a dialectic or interaction between the "forces of production" and the "relations of production" in the course of a developmental phase moves a system toward an equilibrium state, in Marx's view. "No social order is ever destroyed," he said, "before all of the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured in the framework of the old society" (1904, p. 21). Thus there is a movement toward an equilibrium state. Equilibrium occurs when the forces of production are appropriate for and in harmony

with the relations of production. But equilibrium at best is an unstable condition. "From time to time the conflict of antagonistic agencies finds vent in crises. The crises are always momentary and forcible solutions to existing contradictions. They are violent interruptions which for a time restore the disturbed equilibrium" (1967, 3:249). But for the most part Marx seemed to treat equilibrium as a heuristic device, much as does ecology. It is a point of departure for an analysis of change-inducing factors.

The second or growth proposition of ecology holds that a system will grow to the maximum size and complexity afforded by a given technology for transportation and communication. One might imagine a dialectic between the thrust of structural elaboration and the means of movement. It is possible that such an interaction underlies the succession process, a concept borrowed from bioecology. In that context the term is used to describe the development of an ecosystem. Succession involves a recurring competition among associations of species for possession of a habitat giving rise to a series of displacements of one association of species by another until a climax phase is reached, marking the end of the process. Human ecologists have used succession mainly to account for the displacement and replacement of ethnic groups within subareas of cities (Cressey 1938; Gibbard 1941; Duncan 1957). Still, whether there is a process in the growth of a human social system as a whole analogous to bioecological succession is undetermined as yet, despite an early suggestion by R. E. Park (1936) that there was such a possibility.

Both theories employ the concept of division of labor to draw the main outlines of system structure. In ecology the term denotes a basic, pervasive structural feature of a social system in its entirety and not just of its producing sector. It is the essence of sociality. Marx had the same idea. In *The German Ideology* he wrote, "By social we understand the cooperation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what matter and to what end" (1970, p. 51). But Marx drew a sharp distinction between the division of labor in society and the division of labor in the workshop. The former represents a cooperation among independent producers who engage in an exchange of finished commodities; the latter is a cooperation among laborers who are subservient to a single capitalist and produce only parts of commodities (1906, pp. 389-90). Marx recognized and rejected what is the ecological view, namely, that the two expressions of the division of labor are but different manifestations of the same thing, the one seen at a macrolevel and the other at a microlevel.

Necessary to the organization of the relations of production, that is, the division of labor, is a supervisory role, the function of which is not only to coordinate the various processes in the workplace but also to bring

to bear on the forces of production the available scientific knowledge (1906, p. 363). That role, Marx recognized, is essential in every system.⁴ It is a role not unlike that of the key function or the dominant in ecology. Although Marx also saw the supervisory role in the workplace as an instrument in the expropriation of the worker's surplus value, he left unclear the possibility that a corresponding function in the social division of labor can have a similar effect.

Both theories, then, view a hierarchic pattern of relationships as inevitable. A hierarchy is clearly a power gradient; power inherent in functions diminishes with degree of removal from the role at the apex, whether regarded as key function or as capitalist. The distributed power in any lower level can be mobilized and consolidated through the transformation of a category to quasi-corporate form, for example, a social class. By that means competition within a category is controlled, and the quasi-corporate unit, or class, becomes able to compete for larger income shares or increased power with quasi-corporate units of a class higher on the power gradient. In other words, with organization, competition shifts from within a category to between categories, and, in the process, from one resource to another—from job opportunity, to income share, to power. Human ecological theory and Marx's theory are both concerned with this phenomenon. The transformation of an amorphous category into a quasi-corporate entity capable of concerted action was central to Marx's thought. Whereas class is one of several species of categoric grouping in ecological thought,⁵ not all of which lie on the same axis, it is for Marx an all-embracing division of capitalist society. Class lines become somewhat blurred, however, as complex functions are shifted in the course of system growth to supraindividual units which acquire characteristics unlike those of individual members. Ownership of the instruments of production, for example, has passed largely into the hands of corporate entities, such as insurance companies and retirement funds, foundations, banks, brokerage houses, mutual stock funds, and conglomerates, a tendency which Marx seemed to anticipate in his rather brief remarks on centralization (1906, pp. 684–89). In this respect he was farsighted, for the transformation from entrepreneurial capitalism to financial capitalism (Chandler

⁴ In his essay on "Authority," Engels stresses the inevitability of centralized authority, particularly in an industrial system. He declares, "We have thus seen that, on the one hand, a certain authority, no matter how delegated, and, on the other hand, a certain subordination, are things which, independently of all social organization, are imposed upon us together with the material conditions under which we produce and make products circulate. . . . Hence it is absurd to speak of the principle of authority as absolutely evil and of the principle of autonomy as being absolutely good" (Elliott 1981, p. 496).

⁵ A great deal of the urban research produced by human ecologists has been concerned with the spatial distribution of socioeconomic classes.

and Daems 1980, pp. 14–23) was not to occur until after the close of the 19th century.

There is an apparent anomaly in the ecological concept of “functional dominance” which Marx’s argument helps to resolve. That is, where the producers of sustenance are subject to control by owners of means of production or entrepreneurs, the concept appears ambiguous. In the “ecological transition,” mentioned above, however, the growth of importance of the social relative to the biophysical environment puts the mediators of the social environment to the production process (i.e., the entrepreneurs) in a strategic position in an ecosystem; dominance shifts from the worker function to the mediator function.

There remain two issues involved in the analysis of system maturation, namely, limits to growth and the determination of system boundaries. These figure more prominently in ecological than in Marxian thought. The question of limits to growth is being approached currently by organizational ecologists as a function of the carrying capacity of a system for the numbers of organizations of given types (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Nielsen and Hannan 1977; Brittain and Freeman 1981; Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; McPherson 1983). Carrying capacity or limit to increase in the number of a particular organization type is fixed by the size of a niche which constitutes an upper asymptote on a growth curve. That work, however, does not come to grips with how an asymptote is set. An answer to that question lies in the increasing costs of movement incidental to the exponential growth of relationships associated with an arithmetic increase of specialized activities. But the cost curve is not monotonic with system growth. In the early phase of growth, gains in efficiency exceed increases in cost; there is a period of increasing negative entropy. In the later phase of growth, other things constant, a system approaches a mobility cost asymptote and negative entropy diminishes toward zero. Presumably at the asymptote all useful information is employed and population has acquired life-table characteristics. Any tendency to grow beyond its mobility cost limits leads a system into positive entropy. It then tends to throw off its excess and return to scale.

Insofar as a system has unit character, it has a determinable boundary. In ecology that is located in terms of functional rather than administrative criteria. The boundary falls at the isoline where the value of goods and services produced for exchange with a center approximates the costs of movement to the center. A principal component in the computation of mobility cost is the time consumed in the act of moving. Accordingly, a social system is a time-economizing mechanism, among other things. Its spatial pattern, therefore, should be regarded as a diagram of the temporal pattern in which the system operates.

The bounding of functionally delimited territorial units was not a matter of compelling interest to Marx, for his concern lay with society as a whole. He treated the town primarily as an incident in the development of manufacturing, seeing it as a place where supernumerary agriculturalists concentrate in wage employment to form one of the two great classes in the division of labor (1970, pp. 68–78; 1906, p. 387). The relation of town and country was seen as an antagonism rather than as a cooperation between two members of a territorially based system. That a society tends to be organized as a hierarchy of nested subsystems was therefore not mentioned, though many of the elements of that conception appear in various places in the writings of Marx and Engels. The territorial unit of interest to Marx was the state, in keeping with his concern for an economy in its entirety. Yet the state appears to have been of less interest as a territorial unit than as a political instrument of the capitalist class (Cole 1934, pp. 177–205).

The third or evolution proposition of ecology holds that system development is renewed with the acquisition of information which increases the capacity for mobility. That makes possible increases in the amount and variety of materials available, in the number of people supportable, in the number of specialties and technical instruments which can be employed, in the sizes of clienteles or markets for products, in the scales of subsystems, and in the extent of isomorphism among subsystems. How all of this begins is cause for disagreement between the Marxian and ecological theories. Ecology posits an external origin of change, for a thing cannot cause itself. Change is induced when an environmental input, that is, new information, impinges on and is synthesized with existing information. The dialectic of concern for ecology is the system-environment interaction. Marxian thought holds change to be internally caused; it results from internal contradictions (e.g., as in dislocations between the forces and the relations of production, or again in the incentive to reduce production costs versus the need to preserve worker buying power) generated in technological progress, the resolution of which leads to innovations in the relations of production. But while contradictions may appear to be generated internally, presumably from different rates of change, the means of resolving contradictions, that is, innovations, may have to rely on a different source. As I have noted above, Marxian theory ignores environment as an interaction field. The closed-system implication of that position seems to be one of the important theoretical weaknesses of the argument.

I have termed this third proposition an evolutionary one. The justification for that lies in the emergence of new systemic elements by virtue of the assimilation of new information by the stock of knowledge possessed in a system. Evolution, as Boulding says (1978, pp. 33–35), is the increase

of potential. That is precisely what happens with an improvement in mobility. In ecological theory evolution occurs through expansion from one scale of organization to another, first within regions and, later, over-reaching regional boundaries. Marxian theory views evolution as being manifested in the emergence of a new socioeconomic system which incidentally has implications for territorial scope. This is not to say that Marx neglected the tendency toward expansion of capitalist systems. Increasing industrial productivity eventually forces capitalist industries to look beyond state borders for markets and raw material sources. Thus the capitalists of each state tend to enter into an aggressive competition with capitalists of other states, utilizing the powers of their respective states to achieve hegemony over client states.

Expansion, in ecological as well as Marxian thought, recognizes no political boundaries. Although human ecologists have dwelt on this fact at length in their urban and regional studies, they have neglected to pursue the matter into its interregional or international scope. This despite the early interest in imperialism, shown by R. D. McKenzie (1927, 1934) and others. But those early writings seldom reached beyond the migrations of populations and the intermingling of races on the frontiers of expanding economies. Thus a large and important area of investigation has been left dormant, until recently. An unresolved question is whether the principles governing the expansion of local and regional scale systems apply to expansion on an interregional scale. Are there emergent properties, such as the monopolization of military power by the state, which obviate any transfer of generalizations from the lesser to the greater scale of organization? Or is the use of military power in expansion analogous to the feeble efforts of local governments to annex territories and in the long run no more effective? These and other questions provoked by increases of scale put the theory of human ecology to a severe test.

In sum, it is evident that the theory of human ecology as described in these remarks and the theory of Marx share certain features and are set apart from each other by others. Both adopt a holistic position and cast their arguments in macrolevel terms. In that respect they are explicitly antireductionist. They agree on the importance attributed to the material basis of social forms in all of their ramifications. Accordingly they give technology a strategic position in the shaping of the organization for production. Both are theories of societal development from simple to complex forms, and each places its argument in an evolution framework. In the analysis of that process, an equilibrium concept finds a place as an analytical tool. However, some of the similarities (e.g., technology, the division of labor) are terminological rather than substantive.

The differences that separate the two theories are important, but they are not irreconcilable. Prominent among them is the open system of ecol-

ogy as contrasted with the closed system of Marx. In ecology an ecosystem is always open to environment, social and physical; in Marx's thought environment is of incidental importance. This affects the manner in which change is treated. According to ecology, change is initiated in system-environment interaction and continues internally through a process of ingestion of environmental inputs. For Marx, change is a process of internal dialectic arising out of an unexplained movement toward technological improvement and accumulation. Again, in ecology, population in its various permutations is a fundamental necessary condition. Marx's interest in population did not reach beyond the size and, to a lesser extent, the distribution of the wage-worker aggregate, to the exclusion of the demographic mechanisms operating in the aggregate. Furthermore, his preoccupation with class fosters an overly simplified conception of social structure, whereas ecology recognizes a far more complex fabric of structural components. Setting aside other minor differences, there remains a distinction in orientation. Human ecology is a quest for knowledge; concern with application is no more proximate than in any other scientific endeavor. But Marx's conception of history would not let him separate a theoretical formulation from an application of the theory to an analysis of the problems generated in the historical process.

This brings me to what seems to be an important difference between ecological theory and Marx's thought. The problems to which the two are addressed have differed. The ecological problem, to repeat, is to explain how human systems develop under various environmental conditions. For Marx, if I read him correctly, the problem is to explicate a theory of history in terms of the production and transformation of surplus value and to demonstrate how that process gives rise to class structure. The difference between problems, however, is more a historical than a necessary outcome. Each theory could accommodate the problem with which the other is concerned. That is, a greater sensitivity to environmental effects could have enriched Marxian theory, just as a further development of the political-economic implications of its theory can raise the explanatory power of human ecology.

The foregoing argument points toward a research emphasis in human ecology rather different from the past preoccupation with spatial patterns and distributions. Some of the implications to be pursued in the shift of emphasis are in accord with Marx's theory, some are unrelated to that formulation. All arise from a view of human ecology as a macrolevel approach to human organization. Two broad and interrelated orders of problems for research are selected for illustrative purposes—one concerning the nature and development of hierarchic structure, the other the transferability of principles across levels of organization.

Marx's recognition of the inescapability of hierarchy was mentioned in

an earlier paragraph. In human ecology, hierarchy is an organizing principle with far greater ramifications than seemed to interest Marx. It is manifested within subsystems, in the relations among subsystems, and in the relations among clusters of subsystems (e.g., cities). At each level the effect of hierarchy is to economize on time in the acquisition of scarce resources and to serve as a mechanism for distributing the fruits of those resources over an active population. Conceivably the genesis of the differentiation entering into the structure of hierarchy lies in competition operating in conjunction with differentia intrinsic to the members of a population. If so, it produces forward as well as backward differentiation, that is, the entrepreneurial as well as the wage-worker function are subdivided. The multiplication of line and staff functions yields a set of strata both numerous and varied. But, in a hierarchic system, competition, together with omnipresent time constraints, fosters a grouping of functions to constitute subsystems (i.e., organizations), some corporate in form, some categoric. Thus, as scale increases, a parent system becomes a complex interweaving of strata and subsystems.

An important question arising from the observation of hierarchy is, What governs the number of units found in any given sector of the structure? In ecological parlance the solution is posed in terms of "niche width," by which is meant the systemic space available for occupancy by members of a species population. The analysis of various aspects of the question, carried on under the rubric of organizational ecology, is one of the more flourishing areas of the field. It is entirely probable that the logic of subsystem numbers applies also to individual members of a niche population. As a general proposition it may be suggested that the number of units engaged in any given function varies directly with the number of related units using the product of that function and inversely with the productivity of that function.

But competition may supply no more than an impetus to an elaboration of a system. For it is also probable that subsystem formation is a response to a general tendency for relations to increase geometrically as specialized functions increase arithmetically. Hierarchy may also have its roots in that differential in rates of change. The drift toward equilibrium at an asymptote in the function-relationship equation doubtless prepares the way for other innovations in organization, one example of which is subdivision of an administrative function. In what other ways a system might respond to increasing costs of internal exchanges needs further exploration.

The generalizability of the hierarchy principle is open to some question. Although it seems to be manifested at various levels of organization, that it operates in the same way at all levels has not been ascertained. An observation to the contrary is that, as a parent system moves toward openness, its subsystems tend toward closure. In consequence, as Simon

(1962, p. 475) has pointed out, a system of subsystems is more subject to decomposability than is the relational structure within subsystems. Yet it is possible that the rigidity of subsystems infects and reduces the openness of a parent system, particularly as the latter becomes a subsystem in a more inclusive system. This brings me back to another issue of interlevel transferability of principles. Does system expansion on an interorganizational level replicate the process that operates at an intraregional level?

Two final, closely related questions concerning hierarchy may be brought forward. They have to do with the tendency toward an equalization of power difference through the emergence of quasi-corporate organizations in occupational categories. How pervasive is the resulting attenuation of the initial properties of hierarchy? What are the implications of that tendency for the responsiveness of a system to its environment? If it brings increasing closure to the entire system, responsiveness may be narrowed to a smaller range of environmental variations at some cost to adaptability.

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Continuity and Change in Work Values among Young Adults: A Longitudinal Study¹

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Stability and change in intrinsic and extrinsic work values are modeled using data for 1972 and 1979 from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, a nationwide sample of high school seniors ($N = 9,208$). Previous findings, from a more limited sample, of the stability of work values, their effects on occupational selection, and the socializing effects of occupation are all reconfirmed. Educational attainment is affected by initial work values; it also has socializing effects on work values and affects occupational selection. Inclusion of data on gender, family socioeconomic status, and race adds considerably to the explanation, because these attributes affect initial values, educational attainment, and occupational selection.

How values, work, and education affect each other in causal processes have been perennial personal concerns and subjects of persistent debates in social science from Marx and Weber to the present. Yet it is surprising how little systematic, empirically supported closure exists on the way values operate. They have been assumed variously to be both causes and consequences of the educational process and of the work people do. A number of empirical studies have shown the process by which values affect occupational choice (Rosenberg 1957; Davis 1965; Holland 1976). However, the common sociological assumption that work experience affects values (White 1952; Hughes 1958; Moore 1969; Kanter 1977) has seldom been subjected to rigorous empirical test. Typically, work experience has been found to be correlated with values, but little could be stated confidently about the direction and strength of causation.

Notable exceptions are Mortimer and Lorence (1979) and Kohn and Schooler (1978), who clarified the occupational-selection and occupational-socialization hypotheses and provided empirical support for both

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of them. These studies used longitudinal research designs, multiple indicators of concepts, and reasonably rigorous controls. Kohn and Schooler specified the mutually dependent and differential impact of substantive complexity of work and intellectual flexibility on each other and demonstrated clearly that intellectual flexibility is very stable over time. Mortimer and Lorence, using similar methodology but different substantive content, focused on intrinsic, extrinsic, and people-oriented work values and job characteristics and showed a high degree of temporal stability of work values (value-stability hypothesis). They also demonstrated relationships between work values and occupational characteristics longitudinally, finding evidence for the effects of values on occupational choice (occupational-selection hypothesis) and for the socializing effects of work experience on values (occupational-socialization hypothesis).

We propose additional hypotheses about how education is related to values and work. First, prior existing values may play a demonstrable part in the choice of, and selection for, educational participation (educational-selection hypothesis). Second, educational experience may itself have socializing effects on values (educational-socialization hypothesis). Third, education may influence occupational placement (occupational-placement hypothesis). (This is almost a truism.) Finally, antecedent social status attributes (socioeconomic status, race, and gender) may also have an important bearing.

The otherwise elegant research of Mortimer and Lorence does not take into account the place of education in a theoretical model of these processes: their sample is limited to a highly select group of male, white college graduates. Since a number of studies have shown various effects of educational experience on values in general (Feldman and Newcomb 1969; Hyman and Wright 1979), it is reasonable to assume that educational experiences will affect work values, too. The effect of education on job placement is well documented in the status-attainment literature (e.g., Sewell and Hauser 1975, 1976; Featherman and Hauser 1979). Another related issue is the process by which individuals select, or are recruited into, postsecondary educational processes. A congeries of variables has been found to affect college plans and attendance (Sewell and Hauser 1976; Sewell and Shah 1967, 1968; Knox, Pratto, and Callahan 1974; Lindsay 1978), but little convincing evidence has been presented specifically linking prior existing values to educational attainment.

The sociological literature has stressed the effect of prior social structural variables on life chances, particularly the inculcation of values and influences on allocation to educational and occupational roles. Three status attributes are of special interest here: socioeconomic status of the family of origin, race, and gender.

Most research on work values has identified two dimensions, intrinsic and extrinsic. Mortimer and Lorence, however, divide intrinsic work values into two categories: (1) the use of abilities, expression of interests, and creativity; and (2) people-oriented concerns, such as the chance to work with people and be useful to society. The present study uses only the twofold distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values, owing to the absence of indicators of people-oriented, social betterment concerns in the present data.

The intrinsic work value involves valuing work for its own sake. It is conceived here as valuing work that is inherently interesting and important and provides autonomy. Work of extrinsic value, however, is valued as a means to attaining instrumental resources separable from the meaning of the work activities themselves, for example, income, security, and prestige. In a fashion similar to that of Mortimer and Lorence, who distinguish three job characteristic factors corresponding to their work values, we define extrinsic and intrinsic characteristics of work corresponding to the two work value factors.

One purpose of this research, then, is to investigate whether Mortimer and Lorence's model of occupational selection, socialization, and value stability can be generalized to a more representative population. The second aim is to ascertain how education impinges on these processes, thus extending and further specifying the theoretical model. In addition to the mechanisms confirmed by Mortimer and Lorence, we provide evidence for the influence of initial work values on educational selection, the effect of education on occupational placement, and the socializing impact of education on work values.

METHODS

Sample and Data Collection

Data were obtained from a nationwide survey of 1972 high school seniors sponsored by the National Center for Education Statistics (Riccobono et al. 1981). The sample, from 50 states of the United States and the District of Columbia, is stratified to represent various geographical regions, the degree of urbanization, income levels, school size, type of control (public and private), and ethnic backgrounds. Technically, it is a stratified two-stage probability sample with schools as first-stage sampling units and students as second-stage units. Data were collected initially from 16,683 students in 1,070 schools in the base year. Respondents were resurveyed in 1979, and the present analysis is based on the sample of 13,847 who responded to both 1972 and 1979 surveys. These cases are weighted so that the frequency distributions of critical background variables are pro-

portional to those of the population of high school seniors in the United States in 1972.²

The present sample ($N = 9,208$) includes only those reporting a work history during the 12 months preceding the 1979 survey and those surviving listwise deletion. In both surveys, no employment was reported by 13.4% of the respondents, and 20.1% were deleted for failure to respond to one or more of the analyzed items. Comparison of the 66.5% who survived with the original 13,847 reveals some tendency for underrepresentation of nonwhites, females, and those of lower socioeconomic status. The respective percentages for the original sample and the sample analyzed are: nonwhite, 20.6% versus 18.0%; female, 51.3% versus 47.7%; low socioeconomic quartile, 28.0% versus 25.5%. There was a slight tendency for those who were deleted (listwise) to report all 1979 work values as less important than do the survivors. For 1972, the reverse is true in four of the five work value items analyzed. On no comparison, however, is there a difference of more than five percentage points.

Variable Measurement and Data Analysis

The relationships among the variables are tested empirically using LISREL (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1978; Campbell and Mutran 1981), a technique that allows the estimation of causal relationships among unobserved constructs with multiple indicators. First, the relationships between measured indicators and unobserved constructs are estimated using confirmatory factor analysis. The parameters of this "measurement model" include errors of measurement of the constructs and correlations among these error terms. Second, the causal relations among the unobserved constructs are estimated, again taking into account correlated errors in the structural equations for the endogenous variables. A χ^2 goodness-of-fit test is used to determine if the model is a reasonable one for the observed data.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Values

Five items, measured in both 1972 and 1979, are used as indicators of the unobserved work values constructs. The constructs are based on

² The National Longitudinal Study data base provides a rich resource for research on diverse problems and represents the results of a complex process of data collection (five waves, with additional supplementary surveys). The analyst, in choosing a subset of these data for study, may use a weighting procedure provided by the National Center for Education Statistics to adjust for questionnaire nonresponse in the given subsample. The frequency distribution of various categories of students for five critical background variables (high school program, race, grades, parents' education, and sex) are adjusted so that each category in the subset analyzed has the same chance of appearing as in the original sample. The weighting procedure is described in detail by Riccobono et al. (1981).

responses to the question, "How important do you think each of the following factors is in determining the kind of work you plan to be doing for the rest of your life?" Response categories were (1) not important, (2) somewhat important, and (3) very important. Indicators of intrinsic values are responses to the items "work that seems important and interesting to me" and "freedom to make my own decisions." Responses to the items "jobs available in the occupation," "good income to start or in a few years," and "job security and permanence" are indicators of extrinsic values.

Work Characteristics

From the data available, it was possible to isolate two characteristics of the respondent's present (1979) occupation as indicators of the intrinsic characteristics, exhibiting some isomorphism with the indicators of intrinsic work values. One item deals with the amount of time spent on various activities during the average work day: "Working with ideas, thinking." The second indicator of intrinsic job characteristics is worded "degree of autonomy in making job decisions" and coded from (1) low to (5) high.

As the extrinsic job characteristic, a single indicator, reported weekly earnings, is used. Various attempts to find an adequate set of multiple indicators were unsuccessful. The self-report of the extent to which one works with things (machinery, apparatus, art materials, etc.) was considered but found to be inadequate conceptually as an indicator of extrinsic job characteristics. The self-report of the extent to which one does paperwork (administrative, clerical, computational, etc.) and the Duncan scale of socioeconomic status were rejected because they are correlated to some degree with both the intrinsic and extrinsic job characteristic indicators. Income, on the other hand, is clear conceptually and the most promising of the indicators for the extrinsic factor available in these data.

Educational Attainment

Educational attainment is measured from one questionnaire item and has been recoded as follows for this analysis: (1) high school graduate, (2) one to three years of college or vocational school, (3) college graduate, and (4) advanced degree.

Social Status Variables

Socioeconomic status is a weighted composite, a continuous variable based on mother's and father's education, father's occupation, parents' income,

and amount and kind of material possessions in the home (Riccobono et al. 1981). Gender is coded (1) male and (2) female. Race is coded (1) nonwhite and (2) white.

Modeling

Preliminary regression analyses were performed for men and women and for whites and nonwhites. Since there were no systematic differences in these results, the whole sample was analyzed using the LISREL procedures, based on an unstandardized variance-covariance matrix of all observed variables.

First, the measurement and structural relations parameters were estimated with all correlations among error terms set at zero. All possible parameters of direct causal relations between (unobserved) theoretical constructs were estimated, with the exception of effects of the three exogenous variables on 1979 work values, which were set at zero. The model was then estimated allowing for correlated errors among corresponding indicators of 1972 and 1979 work values. It is reasonable to assume that the same extraneous influences will affect the same variable measured at different times. Subsequently, models were estimated including correlated errors between equations for key theoretical constructs. Since there is not enough information to estimate all possible correlations among error terms simultaneously, other parameters of less theoretical importance for this study are set at zero. The fit of the models to the observed data is compared by examining the reduction in χ^2 and difference in degrees of freedom (*df*) among models (Campbell and Mutran 1981). By this method, a final model was chosen as the best fitting model for these data. It should be noted that the final model represents an imperfect fit ($\chi^2 = 1,383.4$ with 78 *df*). This is usually the case when large samples are analyzed with the LISREL technique. However, as Campbell and Mutran (1981) point out, this is a problem not only of this technique but endemic in the social sciences.

FINDINGS

Measurement Model

The confirmatory factor analysis identifies five unobserved constructs with two or three indicators each from the correlations among observed variables. As figure 1 shows, these are intrinsic and extrinsic work values in both 1972 and 1979 and intrinsic job characteristics. The relationship of the unobserved constructs to the observed variables is indicated by the arrows pointing left. While the proportion of unexplained variance (as

indicated by the error term) is relatively large, this procedure provides a basis for measuring the theoretical constructs that is more reliable than a single-indicator approach.

Structural Relations Model

Analysis of the structural relationships among values, work, and education produced a number of theoretically interesting findings (see fig. 2




FIG. 1.—Measurement model. All coefficients are standardized except for those in parentheses (unstandardized) (*N* = 9,208).

and table 1). While the proportion of variance explained is less than expected, these results largely replicate and extend those of Mortimer and Lorence's model. For convenience, we shall discuss the impact of antecedent conditions first on our 1979 construct of intrinsic work values and then on our construct of extrinsic work values. Our findings give some support to the occupational-socialization hypothesis. Intrinsic content of the job is strongly related to the subsequent intrinsic work value. The intrinsic job characteristic, it will be remembered, includes ideas or ideational content and degree of autonomy in making job decisions. Its effect on the 1979 intrinsic work value is .33 even when all other variables in the model are controlled. The extrinsic job characteristic, income, has a small negative but statistically insignificant influence on the extrinsic work value factor. But, as expected, there is a negative path ($-.07$) from the extrinsic job characteristic to intrinsic values. Unexpectedly, there is also a small positive "crossover" effect (.08) from intrinsic job characteristic to extrinsic work values. As the theory predicts, job characteristics can reinforce previously existing values. However, among these relationships, by far the strongest observed impact on values is that of the job's intrinsic characteristics on the intrinsic work value.

The addition of educational attainment to the model is useful and important. Educational attainment affects both intrinsic and extrinsic work values significantly. The more education, the more likely people are to value the intrinsic rewards of work and the less likely they are to value the extrinsic ones (direct paths are, respectively, .10 and $-.10$). Educational attainment not only influences work values but also affects job characteristics. What has become nearly axiomatic is confirmed here: higher education operates to allocate people into occupations with more self-direction and ideational content (coefficient of .24). This is among the strongest paths of the model. Moreover, the more education, the greater the probability of extrinsically rewarding work, for education is related to weekly earnings (.05).

The occupational-selection hypothesis posits a relationship between initial work values and subsequent job characteristics. There are statistically significant direct paths between prior work values and work characteristics: .10 from intrinsic work value to intrinsic job characteristic and .07 from extrinsic value to extrinsic job characteristic. Again Mortimer and Lorence's model is confirmed. There are, moreover, indirect paths through the process of educational attainment. There is, thus, a significant positive path of .15 between the prior intrinsic value and educational attainment and a significant inverse path of $-.17$ between the 1972 extrinsic value and subsequent educational attainment. Thus, it is also through educational attainment that prior existing values have their impact on job characteristics. This suggests an important quali-




FIG. 2.—Structural model of stability and change in work values. Coefficients are standardized. All reported coefficients are more than twice their standard error. Coefficients under .04 are omitted. R^2 and error correlations are reported in table 1; $\chi^2 = 1,383.4$, $df = 78$ ($N = 9,208$).

cation to the direct job-selection hypothesis. For the general population of high school graduates, the occupational-selection process might be characterized more adequately as partially taking place in two stages, not just one, with educational attainment providing a mediating link between initially existing values and the choice of occupation.

The value-stability or -continuity hypothesis receives powerful confirmation, for direct paths of .27 and .63 are observed between the respective intrinsic and extrinsic prior work value measures and the subsequent work values, even across a time span of seven years. Furthermore, educational attainment reinforces the continuity of values. One further significant effect of 1972 work values should be noted: a negative effect ($-.15$) of the prior intrinsic value on the later extrinsic value.

In addition, gender, SES, and race have pervasive effects on the process being modeled here. Major effects of gender on both initial work values are observed. Males are more likely to value the extrinsic rewards of work (coefficient $-.08$), whereas females are considerably more likely, initially, to value work's intrinsic rewards (coefficient $.09$). Males are slightly more

TABLE 1
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL OF STABILITY AND CHANGE IN WORK VALUES

	Gender	Race	SES	1	2	3	4	5	R ²
1. 1972 intrinsic value.....	.09 (.05)	-.05 (-.04)	.15 (.07)03
2. 1972 extrinsic value.....	-.08 (-.07)	-.09 (-.09)	-.13 (-.07)04
3. Educational attainment....	-.03 (-.05)	-.05 (-.10)	.35 (.39)	.15 (.34)	-.17 (-.33)18
4. Intrinsic work characteristic	-.06 (.07)	.05 (.08)	.06 (.05)	.10 (.18)	.02* (.03)	.24 (.19)10
5. Extrinsic work characteristic	-.32 (-.95)	.02 (.09)	.06 (.13)	-.02* (-.10)	.07 (.26)	.05 (.10)12
6. 1979 intrinsic value.....27 (.25)	-.01* (-.01)	.10 (.04)	.33 (.17)	-.07 (-.01)	.15
7. 1979 extrinsic value.....	-.15 (-.14)	.63 (.50)	-.10 (-.04)	.08 (.04)	.01* (.00)	.02

NOTE.—Coefficients are standardized. Unstandardized coefficients in parentheses. Correlations of exogenous variables: race and gender, $-.03$ ($-.01$); SES and gender, $-.03$ ($-.01$); SES and race, $.28$ ($.07$). Error correlations: 1,2 = $.35$ ($.05$); 1,6 = $-.13$ ($-.01$); 2,7 = $-.31$ ($-.04$); 4,5 = $.19$ ($.17$); 6,7 = $.45$ ($.04$).

* Coefficients are less than twice their standard error.

likely to achieve higher levels of education ($-.03$). One pronounced independent effect of gender on job characteristics is found: males tend to receive much higher levels of remuneration than females ($-.32$). In addition, there is a chain of indirect paths from gender through initial work values, educational attainment, and job characteristics to both work values at the end of the process.

Socioeconomic status of the family of origin has major consequences for educational life chances ($.35$); SES is also correlated with initial work values. Higher-status youths are considerably more likely to favor intrinsic values ($.15$) and to deemphasize extrinsic values ($-.13$). Higher-status youths are somewhat more likely to choose, or to be allocated to, occupational positions with both intrinsically and extrinsically valued characteristics (both coefficients $.06$).

The inclusion of race in the model as the third exogenous variable adds less than the other exogenous variables to our understanding. When SES is controlled, nonwhites have a slight advantage in achieving higher levels of education ($-.05$), and they are more likely to regard both intrinsic ($-.05$) and extrinsic ($-.09$) work values as important.

DISCUSSION

Evidence is advanced here that the process of occupational selection is more complex than Mortimer and Lorence could allow for, given the limitations of their sample. The characteristics of a job are direct consequences not only of prior existing values but also of educational attainment. Other things being equal, those attaining higher levels of education are not only considerably more likely than those attaining lower levels to be allocated to jobs with intrinsically rewarding characteristics, but they also are somewhat more likely to be found in extrinsically rewarding jobs. Including educational attainment in the model supplements the previous one-stage relationship between prior work values and job characteristics with a two-stage process: educational selection based on previous values and subsequent occupational selection based on education. Thus previous values have both direct and indirect effects on occupation, the latter through educational attainment.

There is also, however, some evidence for the occupational-socialization hypothesis. The effect of the intrinsic job characteristic factor on the 1979 intrinsic work value was powerful. The unexpected crossover effect perhaps is owing to the fact that those with intrinsically rewarding jobs could not be entirely uninterested in job security and income, given economic conditions in 1979. Education, again, is a powerful independent influence as well. Educational socialization operates in addition to occupational

socialization. Education enhances an emphasis on the intrinsic values of work while it causes less importance to be placed on the extrinsic values of the job. At the same time, we find strong evidence confirming the value-stability hypothesis. Here, we corroborate Mortimer and Lorence's finding of continuity. Indeed, the relative magnitudes of their paths for extrinsic and intrinsic work values are astonishingly close to ours. That the stability of extrinsic work values is so great in both pieces of research argues for the sheer importance of having a job in this society, perhaps in all industrialized societies.

As to the exogenous variables, we conclude from our research that gender is a major influence that should be included in models of work value change. It is not that gender is directly related to work value change; rather, gender is related to the initial work values, to educational attainment, and, most strongly, to the extrinsic job characteristic, income. Male preference for the extrinsic work value and female preference for the intrinsic work value reflects, perhaps, traditional gender role differentiation. It is a grim irony that women, who are more likely to value intrinsic rewards, are placed in occupations with intrinsic rewards that are significantly lower than those of males and extrinsic rewards that are much lower.

That socioeconomic status is such a strong predictor of educational attainment confirms many investigations (e.g., Sewell and Hauser 1975). The less powerful, but predicted, connection between socioeconomic status and work values also accords with a number of previous studies (namely, Kohn 1977). Many consequences that might have been attributed to race are explained in considerable measure by socioeconomic status, and race plays a smaller part than we had anticipated originally. While nonwhites are likely to attain slightly higher levels of education than whites (controlling on SES), they are also more likely than whites to regard both work values as important, for reasons difficult to ascertain. Does this reflect the fact that whites are more likely to have a greater range of occupational choices—real or imagined—with work values more salient for nonwhites owing to relative deprivation?

Several caveats must be entered at this juncture. The measures chosen are not identical with those used by Mortimer and Lorence. While we identify two items to define intrinsic job qualities (and by implication, nonintrinsic), we cannot, with these data, define meaningful independent clusters for either the extrinsic factor or for what Mortimer and Lorence call "social content" of the job. There are numerous confounding inter-correlations between work characteristics deemed intrinsic and extrinsic. That is why, in the current analysis, we use income as the only indicator of the extrinsic job characteristic. Future researchers may wish to address

themselves to the problem of conceptualizing and measuring distinctive and theoretically meaningful job characteristics.

A similar problem was encountered in developing clusters of indicators for work values, although here the task was somewhat easier. It was impossible to distinguish a "social" work value *per se*; the sample of items included in the survey did not encompass this dimension adequately. However, there is reasonable assurance that we were able to identify intrinsic and extrinsic work values as separate clusters.

We recognize, furthermore, that this analysis does not control for the length of time the respondents have been working since their education was completed. However, the length of time, in gross terms (less than one year, one to three years, three or four years, more than four years), that a respondent has been employed was not related significantly in preliminary regression analyses to change in work values, even when everything in the model was controlled. Perhaps job characteristics will, in the future, be shown to be more powerful in their effects as a function of time working in a given occupational setting; the educational socialization effects may ultimately become attenuated. However, perhaps the socialization consequences of occupation for work values decelerate after an initial immediate impact. Many studies suggest relatively low rates of adult socialization vis-à-vis values. In this regard bear in mind that work values are highly stable among young adults. Future research may afford the opportunity to address these problems and the measurement problems as well.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has several advantages over the pioneering effort of Mortimer and Lorence. Gender, socioeconomic status, and race have various major effects on initial work values, educational attainment, and occupational selection. Findings include strong evidence for the value-stability hypothesis, some evidence for the occupational-socialization hypothesis, and some evidence for the direct occupational-selection hypothesis. Hence, Mortimer and Lorence's findings appear generalizable to a wider population. In qualification of their model, education has both socializing and occupational-selection consequences, and educational selection is itself a consequence of previously existing work values. Educational attainment is a key placement mechanism in occupational selection. For the most part, the observations confirm the symmetry of the model. We have attempted with some success to clarify how status, values, education, and occupational characteristics can be built into a multivariate model accounting for value stability and change; in short, how one aspect of culture is produced, sustained, and modified.

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Commentary and Debate

To conserve space for the publication of original contributions to scholarship, the comments in this section must be limited to brief critiques. They are expected to address specific errors or flaws in articles and reviews published in the *AJS*. Comments on articles are not to exceed 1,500 words, those on reviews 750 words. Longer or less narrowly focused critiques should be submitted as articles. Authors of articles and reviews are invited to reply to comments, keeping their replies to the length of the specific comment. The *AJS* does not publish commenters' rebuttals to authors' replies. We reserve the right to reject inappropriate or excessively minor comments.

COMMENT ON "DEPENDENCY THEORY AND TAIWAN: ANALYSIS OF A DEVIANT CASE"

Barrett and Whyte's analysis of Taiwan as a deviant case (*AJS* 87 [March 1982]: 1064–89) is an in-depth study of a country that is dependent but not underdeveloped or peripheral in the world system. This case is said to be deviant because it combines foreign capital penetration, aid, and trade dependence with high growth rates and low levels of income inequality. I suggest that Taiwan is not a deviant case. Instead, it belongs to a group of dependent countries in which dynamic patterns of industrial growth combine with a close alliance between domestic and international capital in a manner predicted by dependency theory. Moreover, one cannot interpret Taiwan's entire history as an example of dependency. According to definition, Taiwan became dependent during the late 1960s. Consequently, we would not expect the long-term negative effects of dependency to be evident until the late 1970s or early 1980s.

Taiwan is described as "the most striking case" of a country whose experience seems to conflict with the tenets of dependency theory (p. 1065). Barrett and Whyte argue that none of Taiwan's three historical periods during the 20th century (Japanese rule 1895–1945, American political client status 1945–60, and post-1960 American aid and investment) displays the "presumed" negative consequences of dependency. The problem with their argument is that dependency reflects more than a bad case of external reliance. External reliance is "a condition which holds when a

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country depends on another for some crucial inputs needed to complete its economic cycle" (Caporaso 1980, p. 607). Dependency, however, is both an external and an internal condition that involves a complex intersection between domestic and international interests—a condition implemented, initially, by a willing domestic government (Caporaso 1980, p. 607).

Taiwan's first historical period is an example of foreign colonialism. Colonialism is a form of external reliance, not dependency, and involves the coercive imposition of foreign domination by an imperialist "army of occupation" (Portes 1976, p. 78). In addition, the authors suggest that Japanese colonial influence in Taiwan was unique among imperialist experiences with external reliance for three reasons: (1) heavy investment in Taiwan's infrastructure had positive effects on agricultural production, literacy, and health standards; (2) noninterference with Taiwan's social structure left patterns of land ownership relatively undisturbed, avoiding the "extraversion" of agriculture toward modern export crop production (Amin 1976, p. 20); and (3) uneven growth in manufacturing was avoided because the infrastructure allowed manufacturing to decentralize rather than concentrate in an export enclave.

Taiwan's period of massive aid inputs is similarly an example of external reliance rather than contemporary dependency. To begin with, the empirical findings on the negative effects of aid on growth and income distribution are ambiguous (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Robinson 1978). Economic dependency related to aid takes the form of debt dependence, in which foreign aid is extended as credit. The Pearson Commission Report points to the relative inflexibility of servicing fixed interest funds and the problems of meeting interest amortization payments whether or not projects funded by loans have successfully entered into production (Pearson 1969, p. 102). These problems were avoided by Taiwan because most U.S. aid was in the form of grants rather than loans (p. 1085). Moreover, nonmilitary aid to Taiwan constituted 40.7% of gross domestic capital formation between 1952 and 1960, and it is generally agreed that domestic savings or capital formation has an important influence on growth (Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao 1978; Chase-Dunn 1975; Papanek 1973; Robinson 1976; Stoneman 1975).

The third period of Taiwan's dependence on trade and investment is the most interesting empirically. Operationalizing dependency relationships requires one to differentiate between two aspects of dependency: economic and market. Market dependency is largely a question of trade structures, measured in terms of commodity and/or partner concentration and vertical integration into the world economy. Cross-national studies have observed that commodity concentration and export specialization were largely unrelated to growth or inequality (see, e.g., Vengroff 1977;

Kaufman, Chernotsky, and Geller 1975). Moreover, the standard arguments about the instability of world prices for primary products and the projected secular decline in primary commodity demand are not supported by empirical evidence (Mandel 1975, p. 58; Ragin and Delacroix 1977, p. 7). Nor do researchers find consistent evidence of negative relationships between partner concentration and growth (Tyler and Wogart 1973).

The crucial feature of trading partner concentration is the transfer of resources from exploited backward sectors of the economy to the sector linked to the market requirements of the metropole (Tyler and Wogart 1973). Japan was interested in Taiwan's agricultural sector and built an elaborate infrastructure that developed rather than distorted, and provided Taiwan with a protected and expandable market for exports (pp. 1072-74). In the context of the effects of vertical trade position, Taiwan has also led a "charmed existence." Because Taiwan is a semiperipheral country, its mutual trade links with other countries in similar positions have made it salient to the United States and yet somewhat independent in trade decisions (Snyder and Kick 1979, p. 114).

Other problems related to trade dependency include the difficulty of unraveling the effects of trade linkage from world economic and market demand cycles and the fact that the part of the international trade channeled by the multinational corporations (MNCs) bypasses the international market completely through the mechanism of intercorporate transfers. Weisskopf's assessment of the issue is that market dependency is determined largely by an interaction between nation size, natural resource endowment, and mode of incorporation into the world system (1976, p. 5). The arbitrary nature of market dependency leads Weisskopf to suggest that economic power rather than trade dependency is the focus of dependency theory.

Economic power dependency is most often conceptualized as the extent to which a country's economy is penetrated and controlled by direct private foreign capital investment (Bornschier et al. 1978, p. 653). Power dependency is connected to economic decisions via the operations of MNCs and varies considerably among investment recipients. It confers varying degrees of economic and political power on those groups whose interests are related to foreign investment (Bornschier et al. 1978, pp. 653-54), and the upshot of foreign investment power is that it has little concern for domestic interests although it can be manipulated by domestic policy (Chase-Dunn 1975; Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao 1979; Moran 1978).

But was the influx of American foreign investment during the late 1960s indicative of dependency? Most of the early foreign direct investment was in the form of contracts to an industrial infrastructure. These projects were not conducive to establishing long-term dependency structures related to reinvestment of retained earnings or "decapitalization" (see Born-

schier 1980, p. 163). Certainly, various dependencies are created or maintained by MNCs with regard to technology (Bornschier 1980, p. 159). The standard line of argument on research and development from the dependency perspective is that imported R & D is capital intensive and it comes in industry-specific packages that have few spin-off effects in terms of developing domestic R & D or integrating efforts across domestic economic sectors (Caves 1971, p. 3). That the most dynamic sectors of Taiwanese industry have been labor-intensive light industrial sectors (not capital-intensive heavy manufacturing and mineral exploitation) is definitely a predictable counterbalance to the negative effects of imported research and development (Bornschier et al. 1978, p. 663).

The most important counterbalance to the negative effects of foreign investment on growth and equality is a strong state (Cutright 1967; Jackman 1974; Robinson 1976; Robinson and Quinlan 1977; Hewitt 1977). Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao suggest two important dimensions of state strength: (1) steering power, related to income redistribution potential; and (2) the character of state intervention into the economy (1979, p. 497). Barrett and Whyte point out that Taiwan's strong state bureaucracy has been able to maintain separation from and domination over powerful economic interests (p. 1086). Although direct governmental redistribution has not had a large role, the protection of existing land distribution structures is comparable. Taiwan has an exceptional history of government support for agricultural production, overall economic incentives for growth, and a conscientious effort to pattern balanced growth among sectors (pp. 1073-74).

Will Taiwan live happily ever after? Barrett and Whyte suggest that as of the late 1960s, massive U.S. direct investment in Taiwan's special export processing zones had resulted in economic changes resembling an enclave economic structure (p. 1077). Initially, of course, we would expect the inflow of U.S. direct investment to stimulate economic growth. This follows from contributions to gross domestic capital formation and increases in employment. The crucial negative effects, however, may be evident only in the long run. Bornschier et al. (1978), Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao (1979), and Bornschier (1980) suggest 15-20 years. In an African sample I have found (Hammer 1980) preliminary evidence of negative effects for a lag of 10 years. In another paper (Hammer 1982), I present strong evidence of negative effects of U.S. direct investment on Canada's growth rate for lags of eight and nine years. If the time needed to set production in place is taken into account, the negative effects of American investment in Taiwan during the late 1960s should become evident from the late 1970s onward.

Taiwan is a test case of dependency theory, because one can "discount Taiwan" "only if one claims that one particular form of foreign influence

is . . . crucial . . ." (p. 1070). The focus of study must be dependency rather than external influence. Moreover, Barrett and Whyte have cut their analysis short and miss negative consequences of U.S. direct investment in Taiwan. Taiwan can be classified as a dependent country beginning only in the late 1960s. As predicted by dependency theory, the effects of foreign investment on growth and equality in Taiwan are positive in the short run.

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WHAT IS DEPENDENCY? REPLY TO HAMMER

Hammer's primary argument is that we have interpreted dependency too broadly: colonialism and reliance on foreign aid are actually "external reliance" and not dependency. Dependency, in her view, refers primarily to direct private foreign capital investment; even this "economic power dependency" has initially beneficial consequences for the receiving nation, and the harmful effects manifest themselves only later. Since, "according to definition," Taiwan became dependent only during the late 1960s, it is too early to see these negative consequences, and hence Taiwan is not a genuine deviant case.

We find this distinction between external reliance and dependency (borrowed from Caporaso) rather vague and highly idiosyncratic. Our article addressed an existing literature on dependency which does not use this distinction but, rather, assumes that dependency can take a wide variety of forms that have similar, and generally harmful, effects. In terms of the theory as it is represented in this literature, Taiwan remains a decidedly deviant case. Logically, our reply might end here, but we wish to clear up a number of errors and confusions raised by Hammer's comment.

First, she not only argues that Japanese colonial rule did not constitute dependency but also presents a capsule picture of Taiwan developing in a relatively undistorted way during that period. It should be stated quite clearly that Japan controlled all the key levers of the Taiwanese economy and used them to meet Japanese needs. This led to inhibition of Taiwanese industrial and entrepreneurial activities, extraction of resources and revenues for use in Japan, and trade barriers to enforce purchases of Japanese



manufactured goods. There can be little doubt that Taiwan's development was distorted from what would have occurred without Japanese control, even if some of the distortions turned out to have positive effects on subsequent development. That colonial economic domination does not constitute dependency will come as surprising news to many in the Third World, as well as to students of dependency theory.

Second, while noting the importance of foreign trade in Taiwan in recent years, we stated explicitly (p. 1065) that we would not discuss this topic but would base our case on colonial control, foreign aid reliance, and foreign investment. Therefore, whether factors like commodity concentration or partner concentration in foreign trade have harmful effects is irrelevant to the arguments we presented.

Third, contrary to what Hammer implies, we did not argue that export processing zones (EPZs) were becoming separate enclaves. We took pains to note that investment in the EPZs has led to a variety of linkages and spin-offs to the rest of the economy (pp. 1077-78).

Fourth, it is misleading for Hammer to state that the literature finds that the effects of foreign aid on growth and income distribution are ambiguous. The study she cites in making this claim (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Robinson 1978) concludes that the effect of foreign aid is the same as that produced by foreign investment: both increase income inequality, and both stimulate growth in the short run but retard it in the long run. A number of other empirical studies have found evidence of the negative effects of reliance on foreign aid, whether in the form of grants or loans.

Fifth, Taiwan may be said to benefit from its present "semiperipheral" position in the world system, but how did it get there? Clearly Taiwan in the early 1950s would have been ranked as a peripheral country. Economic development caused the shift to semiperipheral status, rather than vice versa.

Sixth, we cannot be faulted for failing to call attention to the role of the state in Taiwanese development. One of the major themes of our article was the distinctive nature of the state in Taiwan and its important role in fostering economic growth and income equity. A number of recent theoretically oriented dependency studies have pointed to the role of a strong state in modifying the effects of foreign economic penetration. However, these studies have not yet given us a coherent set of explanations and conclusions which show how such strong states can emerge and prosper in the face of the presumed opposition of powerful core interests, or what factors influence such states to promote growth or equity rather than to play a more predatory role.

However, certain features of the Taiwanese case lead us to believe that

focusing on the strong-state argument as the explanation for the island's success still leaves some problems unsolved. For example, the Taiwanese state's direct control over the economy has declined progressively since 1960, while income equality and growth have advanced (see Barrett 1980). Those who feel that state power explains the Taiwan conundrum might contemplate the case of Hong Kong, where broadly similar trends in growth and equity have occurred in something more akin to a "laissez-faire" capitalist environment (Chow and Papanek 1981).

Finally, there are a number of problems with the argument that dependence on foreign investment shows its negative consequences only after a lag of about 10–20 years. It should be noted that recent cross-national research argues that there is no empirical support for the notion of long-run harmful effects of an accumulated stock of direct foreign investment on economic growth, and that earlier studies which claimed such support (particularly Bornschier et al. 1978) were based on poorly specified models (see Jackman 1982). As for the long-run effects of foreign private investment in Taiwan during the late 1960s and 1970s, it seems a bit gratuitous for Hammer to fault us for having "cut our analysis short" by not using a crystal ball to investigate Taiwan's future. The use of prophecy for the verification of theory was a strategy which never occurred to us crass empiricists.

As we see it, dependency theory as it was originally expounded (by Frank, Amin, and others) was presented as a very general theory that suggested that almost all foreign economic influences were harmful. As subsequent research was carried out it became clear that such claims were excessive and that different forms of economic penetration could interact with domestic institutions to produce contrasting results—sometimes harmful but under other circumstances beneficial. We concluded our article by arguing (pp. 1085–86) that finer distinctions among different forms of dependency should be made and that the distinctive historical experiences and social structures of developing societies needed to be taken into account. Hammer is clearly aware of the need for greater specificity in dependency theory; while we still differ with her on certain particulars of the Taiwanese case, we stand in agreement with this particular theme.

For us, dependency theory's weakest link is its current inability to specify adequately the complex mechanisms which mediate between foreign economic influences and growth and income equity. Without a convincing specification of these linkages, we do not find the theory very satisfying. While we do not claim to have identified all the factors which linked these variables in the Taiwanese case, we hope that our discussion has stimulated interest in this topic. Yet as dependency theory is "whittled down" by empirical findings and more specific statements of testable

hypotheses, it is becoming more qualified and circumscribed. We are led to wonder whether enough will be left after this process to enable its proponents to claim that it represents a bold new explanatory approach.

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Review Symposium

The Politics of Reproductive Ritual. By Karen Ericksen Paige and Jeffery M. Paige. With the assistance of Linda Fuller and Elizabeth Magnus. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 380. \$25.00.

SEX AND POWER IN SIMPLE SOCIETIES

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I approve of the intentions behind *The Politics of Reproductive Ritual*, but my reaction to reading it is profound skepticism. Karen Paige and Jeffery Paige advance a possible new type of determinant of human reproductive rituals: female puberty and menstrual rites; birth practices, including couvade; and male circumcision. They contrast their approach with others, particularly the psychoanalytical, as represented by John and Beatrice Whiting, with the theory of the rites of transition that stems from Van Gennep (1961), and with structural-functional theories. I shall not try to deal here with these alternatives but shall evaluate the Paiges' approach in its own right.

Their argument, briefly, is that all these rituals have a political aim: to advance, in one way or another, the political interests of the individuals or groups performing them. "Ritual is not simply an alternative to politics; it is a continuation of politics by other means" (p. 4). The types of rituals performed depend on the political powers of groups in different societies.

The method the Paiges use is the now standard one of correlating coded traits from a sample of field reports of different societies. They use a sample of 108 societies taken from Murdock and White's "Standard Cross-cultural Sample" (1969). They apply a correction to the sample in order to eliminate some societies whose similarities may have arisen from cultural diffusion. They use other sophisticated statistical methods. These I am not competent to criticize, and I shall only comment on the methodology in two crude respects.

First, the Paiges limit their sample for the most part to societies whose subsistence base is no more advanced than hoe agriculture. They exclude most cases of "peasant societies," which use animals for traction in agriculture. They do so because peasant societies and those that possess still more advanced economies are usually organized in states, and the Paiges can only support their hypotheses with data from stateless societies. "In societies that lack a strong centralized state apparatus, an independent

military, and a judicial system to make binding decisions about family matters, control over women's reproductive capacity is specified by bargains that can never be completely enforced. Parties therefore resort to ritual to declare their intentions, assess each other's intentions, and influence and gauge public opinion" (p. 255). But many societies with states practice the same kinds of rituals the Paiges are interested in, and their statement implies that the states enforce them. Some states certainly do so with regard to inheritance (which the Paiges do not consider) and the procedures that make a valid marriage, but few states, I believe, enforce the couvade, women's puberty or menstrual rites, and male circumcision (unless Israel does). This means that the Paiges leave unexplained the performance and nature of reproductive rituals in societies that contain by far the largest number of persons who practice these rituals. The Paiges blithely leave this problem to further research. What all this means to me is that there must be some explanation other than theirs to account for the performance of these rites in both states and stateless societies.

Second, the chief independent variable in their correlations is the "strength" of "fraternal interest groups," which I think conventional anthropologists would call "lineages." Certainly the Paiges talk more of fathers and lineage elders than of bands of brothers. The strength of these groups is measured by a combination of variables, some of which seem a bit crude. One of them is "residence patterns." "If the dominant residence pattern was either avunculocal or patrilocal, the society received a score of 1" (p. 73) on this component of lineage strength. All others received a score of zero. Now, avunculocal and patrilocal rules of residence are the only ones that tend to keep the *men* of a lineage together "on the ground." In a book that is concerned with the control of women's sexual rituals, it is important to remember that the Paiges' "strong" groups, rather than the "weak" ones, tend to consist of geographically concentrated male agnates.

Let me now look at the ways in which the Paiges try to account for various kinds of reproductive rituals. Take circumcision. According to the Paiges' hypothesis, societies with strong lineages (fraternal interest groups) are more apt to practice circumcision than societies with weaker groups. In the latter, people acquire political power by other means than, say, the inheritance of the leadership of a lineage. In the weaker societies, persons acquire power by such means as wheeling and dealing in pigs (see Oliver 1955). The problem of power in lineage groups lies in the weakening of the group by fission. The ceremony of circumcision tends to prevent fission, the Paiges argue. True, the operation may be bungled, "no doubt at the cost of considerable bad feeling on the part of the unfortunate son's father and immediate consanguineal kin" (pp. 147-48), which I should think would increase the risk of fission. "But if the operation is successful, both sides gain a certain degree of satisfaction. The lineage elders have the satisfaction of knowing that, whatever a given father's future plans for lineage fission, he is sufficiently loyal to his kin to publicly expose the source of his future political power to danger" (p.

148). His future power lies in the reproductive capacity of his sons. I find myself in real trouble with this explanation.

First, fission is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. It varies with the level of the lineage segment at which it takes place. The Paiges quote an Arab proverb: "I against my brother; I and my brother against my cousin; I, my brother, and my cousin against the next village; all of us against the foreigner" (p. 128).

Second, the Paiges quote no statement by members of the societies concerned that resembles the Paiges' explanation. True, such members often give reasons for their rituals that anthropologists cannot accept as the "real" reasons. However, they often do give real reasons, and, on a point as important as this, the Paiges ought to have cited the natives' explanations, if they have any. The closest they come is a citation from the Bible to the effect that Yahweh ordered Abraham to circumcise his sons to show their loyalty to Yahweh, who represented the spiritual unity of the Semitic tribal confederation (p. 152).

Third, in spite of circumcision, fission still occurs in strongly lineal societies. Indeed, if a tribal elder wants to know whether the leader of a lineage segment is contemplating fission, he would do much better to look at the demography of the segments and discover which are growing fastest in numbers of men and resources. Certainly the elders of societies like the Somali (pp. 131-34), which have large lineages but still suffer from fission, are aware of this. I am not prepared to offer my own explanation, but that of the Paiges seems to me farfetched.

To take another and reverse example, menstrual restrictions and segregation practices, such as men's avoidance of women at menstruation (and women's avoidance of men), are related inversely to the strength of fraternal interest groups (lineages). Anthropologists have usually attributed these phenomena to the very common belief in the polluting effect of a woman's menstrual blood. But the Paiges will have none of this. According to them, "A wife's fertility gives a man economic and political power, but it confronts him with the dilemma of how to represent his power to others" (p. 218). Menstruation is indeed a sign of a woman's continuing fertility and thus of her continuing ability to add to the size of her husband's lineage. Nothing could be more conspicuous a sign than segregating her at menstruation in a special hut.

What, then, is the man's dilemma? Among their weak interest groups, the Paiges argue, claimants for power are in riskier positions than their opposite numbers in strong groups, where leaders are more apt to win their power effortlessly, as by inheritance. But in the weaker societies a great show of power may arouse the dangerous jealousies of rivals. Therefore a man's segregation of his wife at menstruation is a sign of his disinterest in women and thus in power. But why segregate specifically at menstruation? One would think that an avoidance of women when they were "clean" would be a much more conspicuous sign of a lack of interest in them. Yet the Paiges insist, "The elaborate pollution practices of unstable societies can be interpreted as tactics of ritual disinterest in

a wife's fertility that are part of a larger complex of ritual disinterest in wealth and power" (p. 228).

What have the Paiges to say about this "larger complex"? They claim that certain rituals in these societies, such as potlatches, are designed to show indifference to wealth and power. "Community-wide ceremonies in which property distribution is the dominant element also create social indebtedness, at least on those occasions when the exchanges between individuals are unequal. Both kinds of ceremonies [communal and individual] provide opportunities for a leader to mobilize a political coalition through demonstrations of generosity while simultaneously allowing him to gauge the current and potential strength of his coalition by observing which and how many males participate in the ceremonies" (p. 236). That is true, but no Kwakiutl, for instance, would be fooled by the notion that a potlatch was a sign of indifference to power (see Boaz 1966). On the contrary, potlatches are fierce competitions for status and power between parties, each of which seeks to prove it is the more powerful by showing it has greater resources than the other. An individual or his group does so by showing his party can afford to give away, or even destroy, more valuable resources. The Paiges cannot have it both ways: menstrual segregation and potlatches cannot be at the same time signs of power and signs of indifference to power.

I could go on in the same way with the Paiges' other hypotheses. The trouble lies not, as far as I can tell, with the variables but with the hypotheses the Paiges use to link them. I have trouble accepting all of these, largely on grounds of common sense, although I do not lack knowledge of anthropology. I do not have space here to consider possible alternative explanations of these rituals. I suspect that the trouble lies in the Paiges' sample of societies. The rituals occur in many societies not included in the sample, including the very populous societies organized in states, and the Paiges make no attempt to explain those. After all, we, too, tend to segregate women sexually at menstruation, although we do so privately, not publicly. I should look for explanations of the rituals in the still largely unknown characteristics of our common human nature.

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SEXUAL POLITICS

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The Politics of Reproductive Ritual is a book that could have been much better than it is. The basic idea, that reproductive rituals are a form of politics used in stateless societies that lack more explicit political tactics, is excellent. By "reproductive rituals" the authors mean male circumcision, female menarcheal ceremonies and genital mutilation, menstrual pollution and other sex segregation practices, the couvade and maternal childbirth restrictions. Karen Paige and Jeffery Paige argue that, in the tribal and band societies with which they are concerned, the allegiance of children is the key to adults' (or more specifically, adult males') power, wealth, and status. In the absence of a police force or other independent control agencies, male rights over the reproductive powers of women must be settled by direct bargains among the parties themselves. Reproductive rituals are political tactics for gauging the future intentions of other people in one's society and for manipulating and monitoring public opinion. The tribal ritual of sex is an extension of politics by other means.

The theory has a great deal of intuitive appeal, and it is certainly much more straightforward than the involuted Freudian explanations that have held the field in this area, and which the Paiges have little difficulty disproving. For example, menstruation gives obvious evidence of a woman's fertility, hence rituals which make it highly visible have a clear significance for those societies in which politics revolves almost entirely around negotiating kinship connections. One of the most striking applications of this approach is the Paiges' treatment of circumcision rituals. These rituals are especially important in pastoral societies, and the authors' case study of ancient Hebrew society gives convincing explanation for this. These wandering herdsmen had enough economic resources to build sizable political coalitions, resources with enough value to necessitate military protection. A patriarch's greatest political weapon was his capacity to have many sons, who might, by further reproduction, add still more men to the coalition. But such family-based coalitions were always in danger of splitting into warring factions, especially since the herding environment imposed no constraints (such as are found in more sedentary pursuits) on wandering off to found one's own lineage.¹ How was the kinship coalition to be kept together? The Paiges argue that the

¹ The Paiges think that the danger is rebellion of son against father, and this leads them into a hypothetical and rather farfetched discussion of castration as a possible political solution. The speculation is needless; it is clear that the real danger is fission among brothers. All of the empirical cases are of this sort; e.g., in the Hebrew materials, the lineages of Ishmael and Isaac, Jacob and Esau.

circumcision ritual was a key mechanism. The ceremony not only brought together the members of the coalition, so that their loyalty could be counted publicly; it also provided evidence to the group of the particular father's good faith in them because he placed his most valuable resource, his son's penis, in their hands. Given the rudimentary medical and sanitary practices of such tribes, each man was taking a risk in having his son circumcised. It was a symbolic sacrifice that bound the individual to the group. According to Biblical tradition, the circumcision practice was substituted initially for an actual human sacrifice (Abraham offering up Isaac) at the very beginning of the distinct religious tradition of the Hebrews.

The Politics of Reproductive Ritual is studded with insights of this kind. However, the authors, not content to stay with illuminating case studies, also pursue a traditional positivist method of formalizing hypotheses, operationalizing variables, drawing a sample, and applying what are considered to be the most appropriate statistical techniques. Here is where the trouble begins. For the hypotheses do not follow particularly closely from the theory, and there are a number of other possible interpretations within this general framework. The indexes used to operationalize variables do not mean so obviously what the authors say they mean. And the sampling method and statistical techniques, despite their air of conspicuous orthodoxy, seem to me to rule out, by fiat, some of the crucial mechanisms. Let me take each of these points in turn.

1. The theory-hypothesis gap: The theory involves two main causal stages. In the background there are economic/environmental conditions, which determine whether there are sufficient durable resources worth fighting about. A high-resource situation, together with residence arrangements that bring consanguineous males together, creates a strong fraternal interest group (FIG). Strong FIGs use *surveillance rituals* (i.e., circumcision) to monitor the group members' loyalty, and they *monitor contract compliance* on the part of families that have given them women (i.e., maternal restriction taboos and the like). A low-resource situation, however, especially in combination with a residence pattern that disperses related males, produces a weak fraternal interest group. In the absence of strong male support, individual males use *mobilization rituals* (couvade, menarcheal ceremonies) which temporarily mobilize an alliance to support their claims to paternal rights, as well as *ritual disinterest* (menstrual segregation, male segregation in men's houses) through which the individual appeals to the group by showing he is not being greedy about possessing fertile women.

Some of this reasoning sounds farfetched. Take, for example, the notion of *ritual disinterest*, which is supposed to be displayed in weak fraternal interest groups. An alleged version of this is the segregated men's house, where adult males in many tribal societies spend much of their time. The men's house is tabooed to women, and an offender may be punished brutally or gang raped. This is in the same societies in which women are regarded by men as extremely polluting, and in which (not surprisingly)

there is a great deal of hostility between the sexes. Now the Paiges, because the men's house contains all the men of the village instead of only men who are related consanguineously, regard this as a form of weak FIG and hence believe that these men have no recourse but to show ritual disinterest in women by staying away from them. But one could say just as plausibly that these are societies in which the male group as a whole is extremely well organized (not split up along kin lines) and therefore in a position to exercise domination over women in general, whom it terrorizes. From this point of view pollution rituals are not the showing of disinterest but simply an extreme version of the contempt that dominant classes usually show toward their inferiors. And, of course, a gang rape is hardly going to help anybody's claim to paternity.

Similarly, "ritual disinterest" is not indicated necessarily by requirements that menstruating women must be secluded (i.e., imprisoned) in a menstrual hut. The Paiges think that this means the man is publicly displaying his willingness to leave her unprotected against adulterers. But, in fact, the taboo applies to all men, not just to the woman's husband (and seclusion applies to all women, not just to married ones); so one can hardly see the element of "disinterest" in it. Showing disinterest seems a very peculiar form of political tactic in any case. If the object is to protect a man's sexual claims over a woman, in what way would this be attained by doing the opposite? The case reminds me of another (not described as ritual disinterest, however, but as a mobilization ritual): ritual defloration in Australia, where the pubescent girl is enjoyed by a series of elders of the clan before she is handed over to her husband (p. 105). Here the ritual does exactly what it is supposed to be protecting against!

The analysis of "mobilization rituals" is for the most part not very convincing. The argument is that, because strong FIGs can protect their daughters' virginity by direct use of organized force, they do not need rituals. It is where FIGs are weak that rituals are used to mobilize a temporary coalition. Hence the ordeals and ceremonies to which pubescent girls are subjected. The problem is that the Paiges overlook a major fact about such societies: the prevalence of premarital intercourse. They write as if all societies everywhere were concerned primarily with guarding potential paternity rights; in fact, of the societies they code as resource poor where mobilization rituals are allegedly most needed, only 21% require female virginity at marriage, and 35% have completely open premarital sex. (The rest are intermediate in sexual restrictiveness. Data from *World Ethnographic Atlas*, courtesy of Rae Lesser Blumberg.) Hence most of these rituals can hardly be protecting virginity. The nature of the rituals themselves makes one suspect that something else is going on, in any case. For the rituals are often very severe on the women, sometimes (in the case of genital mutilations) amounting to horrible tortures. The authors are very blasé about this, quoting descriptions of some of the worst ordeals with what strikes me as near-sadistic relish. But the thought that these have something to do with sexual domination is one that they dismiss because it is simply not their hypothesis.

2. Ambiguously operationalized variables: The Paiges claim that their statistical analysis bears out their claims. But this depends on whether one believes that their measures mean what they say they do. Take, for instance, their measure of economic resources. They create a dichotomous index, lumping together hunting, gathering, fishing, and primitive horticultural societies as resource poor; and herding, advanced horticultural, and agrarian societies as resource rich. They think that this indicates the economic basis for political organization among males. But it also separates out societies in which women, by and large, make and control the major contribution to subsistence, as opposed to societies in which women are economically marginal. As Blumberg (1974) has shown, this variable (which can, of course, be measured more directly) has a very powerful effect on the sexual privileges and restrictions of women—much the same material that the Paiges consider under the rubric of “reproductive ritual.” Underneath the labels, the Paiges’ data may be showing the effects of a quite different set of processes.

Their measure of the strength of the fraternal interest group also seems to me rather ambiguous. Their index here is a combination of the size of the largest kinship grouping acting as a political unit; the lineage ideology, with patrilineality considered as producing a stronger FIG; and bride price. Why the latter? Because the Paiges think that bride price indicates the ability to make an explicit marriage bargain; certain goods have to be delivered, payments are taken back if adultery is committed or a woman fails to bear children, etc. Dowry is ruled out as an indicator for the silly reason that dowries go to the daughter, not to her husband. In fact, dowries usually are used *de facto* by the husband; as to explicit marriage bargains, there is no better example of cold-blooded bargaining among kin groups than that which goes into arranging a marriage dowry. I think that this component of the index particularly muddies the water, because one of the main things bride price indicates is a society in which women are prime economic producers (Blumberg 1978, p. 41) and thus worth paying for. They are especially likely to be in this position, incidentally, in societies that otherwise would be labeled by the Paiges as resource poor where they would expect the FIG to be weak. It is small wonder, given this operationalization, that the authors’ correlation coefficients rarely account for more than 20% or so of the variance.²

3. The search for an uncontaminated sample: The Paiges take considerable pains to make sure that their sample is not contaminated by diffusion effects. They choose societies from widely separated geographical areas, and employ an up-to-date statistical technique designed to apply stringent criteria of significance, in order to handle “Galton’s Problem”

² The coding of the dependent variables also becomes arbitrary and sometimes absurd. The code for “circumcision” is construed in a wonderfully narrow way, to rule out subincision and superincision (i.e., which part of the penis is cut) (p. 161), as if this should make a difference for the surveillance ritual in general! Or, in coding menarcheal rituals, that of severe genital mutilation is combined with wearing a veil or tying up one’s hair in a category of low concern for sexual maturity (p. 108).

(contamination). And they exclude all peasant groups in agrarian states, because "including 'large states' in cross-cultural surveys can result in spurious correlations since the kinds of social and cultural characteristics investigated by most cross-cultural studies appear infrequently in complex societies" (p. 68).

Now all this is pretty standard in positivistic research. But the methodological defensiveness may strike many people as rather outdated in this era of historical sociology, with its emphasis on world-systems and its criticism of mythical isolated societies. The old-fashioned comparative method made a deliberate effort to exclude history, as if diffusion of cultural traits would contaminate the pure "functional" relationships inside a society. In my opinion, this is like trying to design houses in which people walk on the ceiling. Avoiding diffusion effects is silly, since every society got many of its traits in the first place by some sort of diffusion, however far back in time. Most writing systems, for instance, after the first ones in Mesopotamia, are believed to have diffused by imitation; does this mean that we can say nothing about the conditions under which writing emerged in Egypt, China, or Japan? Ironworking diffused to sub-Saharan African tribal societies, making them rather different from the stateless tribes of Oceania and Southeast Asia; does that mean we can never consider the economies of tribal Africa? (The Paiges do not think about this one, so they go ahead and do it.)

But somehow kinship systems are supposed to be more susceptible to the distorting effects of diffusion. Really? I would say that, on the contrary, kinship is not something that one can just pick up, like a new technology. It is the very center of tribal social organization, and a society is not going to adopt a new kinship practice just out of sheer random imitation. The whole dichotomy of diffusion versus indigenous causes is ridiculous; a society will not pick up a trait unless it has social reasons of its own for doing so. But there is more to it than that. The "world-system" at the level of tribal societies exists precisely in the form of other tribes. The anthropologists' search for the pure isolated society is a delusion, perpetrated by the prevailing practice of simply ignoring whatever outside contacts a group has. In fact, what gets called a "society" is highly arbitrary, depending largely on what group (a village, a larger territory, a campsite on a particular day when certain people happen to be there) the anthropologist happens to study. More realistic observation shows that tribal "societies" are usually shifting in composition and full of exchanges, alliances, and wars with neighboring groups (e.g., Strathern 1973). Moreover, one can make out a good case that these "external" relations are central in determining kinship patterns. The prevalence of warfare has a major effect on determining matrilineal residence (Ember and Ember 1971), and Lévi-Strauss pointed out (1969, p. 67) that marriage systems are ways of making a negotiated settlement to wars, much like a system of giving hostages.

The Paiges' effort to exclude peasant agrarian societies is particularly silly. This is fairly typical of anthropological research, which consequently

ends up ignoring the large societies which have contained, by far, the bulk of the people who have ever lived. In fact, the authors could have used these societies for a strong comparative test of their own theory because, if reproductive ritual is a substitute for politics, it should decline with the rise of the state. This is, by and large, what happens; the pattern will become even more distinct if one divides complex societies into social classes and hence into degrees of political participation.³ Instead of bolstering their argument, though, the Paiges opt for the conventional strategy, which they think is an advantage against "spurious" relationships. (For instance, they use this line to dismiss evidence that supports, quite properly I would say, Judith Brown's theory that residence patterns are a major determinant of female puberty rites [p. 116].) Precisely where the Paiges think they are most up-to-date is where they seem most archaic.

The main fault with the way the authors work out their theory lies, in my opinion, in an implicit sexism. This may be surprising, in view of the sex of at least one of the authors. But the actors in their scheme are always men, and women's interests, resources, and motivations are never taken into consideration. In fact, the authors go out of their way to try to disprove theories, like those of Alice Schlegel and Robert Murphy, which emphasize male domination or sexual antagonism. This shows bad grace in several respects. For one thing, the Paiges' theory comes out of this general tradition. Murphy is actually the originator of the analysis of "fraternal interest groups," and the Paiges' theory has an obvious affinity with the sexual property/alliance theories which descend from Lévi-Strauss (who, however, is not cited in this connection). The Paiges have trouble with theoretical labels; they refer to most rival nonpsychological theories as "structural-functional" ones, a designation which certainly sits ill with the actual contents of these theories of conflict and domination. Moreover, their empirical analyses generally support the sexual conflict theories more strongly than their own hypotheses (e.g., pp. 250-53). And if their key indexes, as indicated above, are really measurements of female economic resources and other aspects of female versus male mobilization, then the entire body of their findings is open to wholesale reinterpretation.

But the Paiges seem to have a mental block against admitting that women can be actors in their own right in tribal kinship politics. For all their larger intellectual kinship with theories of kinship conflict, domination, and alliance, the authors insist on making their own hypotheses

³ The authors have a concluding section in which they try to analyze reproductive rituals in our own society: circumcision in hospitals, abstention from intercourse during menstruation and pregnancy, etc. The argument here is ad hoc and unconvincing theoretically. What the Paiges do not seem to realize is that if these are full-blown reproductive rituals, as they claim they are in touting these "non-empirical [*sic*] and irrational behaviors" (p. 277), then their presence in a society in which kinship politics is nil undermines the authors' general theory. The more proper strategy is a comparative one; such rituals are really pretty mild, nonpublic, and unimportant in state societies, which bolsters the point that emphasis on their presence is indicative of kinship politics. In general, the Paiges do not seem to grasp that negative cases are just as important as positive ones in comparative analysis.

more idiosyncratic than they need to be and hiding all other interpretations behind a smoke screen of dubious technicalities.

One comes away from this book with an overwhelming impression that reproductive rituals are part of a war between the sexes. Menarcheal rituals in which a woman is tied up and unable to move for three days or in which her labia are sliced off while the bystanders chant to drown out her screams; head-hunting males who hide out in tabooed sweat houses and fear pollution by the women who control most economic production; the practice of accusing a barren woman of adultery: this kind of material comes through the lines of the Paiges' book over and over again. If only they could have seen that politics is broader than the part they pick out; if only they were less superstitious about the rituals of positivistic social science. But never mind. Their book is an addition to a messy and conflictual, but nevertheless growing, theoretical tradition.

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Review Essay: An Upbeat View of Current Sociological Theory

Sociology since Midcentury: Essays in Theory Cumulation. By Randall Collins. New York: Academic Press, 1981. Pp. x + 365. \$27.50.

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Among those intrepid few sociologists who seriously attempt to integrate micro and macro levels of sociological theory, Randall Collins is one of the most versatile. He ranges with impressive ease from the emotional niceties of dyadic interaction to the grand sweep of world history, displaying, along the way, remarkable erudition and a grasp of literatures many of us are hardly aware of. Little he writes is without stimulation and interest, and for these reasons you may well want to buy this book. I learned a great deal from it.

But it is an exasperating book. Let me list some of the reasons. First, the title: *Sociology since Midcentury*. If (presumably under a new administration) we had a truth-in-titles law, this book would be called *Some Previously Published Papers and Book Reviews of Randall Collins's: With about 90 Pages of Original Material Interspersed*. The actual title refers mainly to a nine-page introduction in which Collins gives his interesting and provocative views on the state of current sociology. This is, unfortunately, his only attempt to give coherence to the patchwork that follows. The title refers also to the 12 book reviews scattered through the book, which appraise various practicing sociologists as represented in the particular volumes under scrutiny. But these 70-odd pages are the weakest part of the book. The reviews (only one of them previously unpublished) are small fragments that detract from any coherence that might otherwise develop. This is not because Collins writes bad book reviews. It is instead—it pains me, gentle reader, to say this as I struggle to be articulate and wise in these pages—because the book review form offers little scope for the development of complex ideas or themes. Its purpose is to apprise the reader of the merits and demerits of a particular book and to put that book in the context of related work. Although an occasional review rises above this mission, there are few of us whose collected corpus of reviews would stand the scrutiny brought by republication. The non-book-review essays reprinted here vary from the very brilliant to the quirky and unfinished-looking. Finally, I was exasperated by the standard of copy-editing and proofreading exhibited in this book: without trying very hard,

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I found 42 typographical errors. This is a distraction and gives an amateurish cast to the enterprise.

Now I have that out of my system and can go on to a more serious appraisal of the work itself. Collins's strength lies in pounding away at certain powerful themes rarely brought to bear on the attempt to link micro to macro levels of analysis: (1) the importance of "cultural production," ritual, and emotion in the genesis and maintenance of systems of stratification; (2) the fundamental significance of physical bodies and spatial relations in sociological explanation; and (3) the uncovering of conflict in situations where it is latent or hidden from the view even of participants. I will elaborate on these themes in order.

1. Culture, emotions, and ritual: Collins's treatment of culture is especially suggestive. Though not uninterested in culture for its own sake, he stresses, rather, the importance of culture in facilitating organization for shared goals. Thus, in a fine critical essay entitled "Wallerstein's World System" (published for the first time in this volume), he takes Wallerstein to task for neglecting the production and distribution of culture and cultural differences as determinants of class solidarity. In discussing the modern capitalist "takeoff," he chides Wallerstein for neglecting the Church and dismissing it as "essentially ideological." "This is a mistake," Collins tells us. "What is most important about religion is not its beliefs, but its real organizational forms enacted by the body of priests and monks. The church is a material institution like any other, and its property and its economic consumption—and for the medieval period its innovative economic productivity (as well as its cultural productivity)—are key elements in the pattern that made possible the birth of capitalism" (p. 55).

Organizations that produce culture—primarily the Church and schools—thus play a dual role: they serve as the seedbeds of new organizational forms that facilitate the quest for dominance of groups that can manipulate those forms—as in the credentialling activity of schools and the economic activities of the Church—and they also exert their force in shaping the cultural matrix within which individuals decide on their political and ideological allegiances. Thus, in an essay on geopolitics, Collins lists among the organizational resources that make up the bases of military power "cultural resources in the form of religion and ethnicity" (p. 72). (In a curious lapse from his usual conflict theoretic perspective, however, he takes religious and ethnic identity throughout this essay as a given rather than as a matter open to manipulation—as in much recent literature on ethnicity that stresses its construction and mobilization for political purposes.)

Schools produce, in Collins's view, a "standardized culture . . . which is essential for creating any large-scale and permanent organizations. . . . The medieval church was a compulsory organization of the community, with discipline and doctrines upheld by military force, owning considerable property and competing for political supremacy throughout Europe. Such organization was made possible by the administrative skills

and the sense of organizational identity produced by education" (p. 192). But lest this all seem too mechanical and automatic, Collins warns that "cultural production is inherently difficult for an elite to control. . . . The prestige of a formalized culture is likely to mobilize more people than can readily translate this investment into elite occupational positions. Overproduction crises are endemic to culture-producing institutions, especially since culture is intrinsically difficult to monopolize" (p. 193). These comments are the introduction to a provocative essay entitled "Crises and Declines in Credential Systems," which argues that the recent escalation of credentialing requirements in the United States is not a sport but can be seen as part of a recurring cycle of boom and bust, over centuries and continents, in production of credentials by educational institutions. (Collins's argument about the impact of credential overproduction is similar to that of Lawrence Stone on the "inflation of titles" in Elizabethan and Stuart England [1965]. Both concern the use for political purposes of honorific titles, but by quite different political actors. An analysis that brought both into a common framework would be of considerable interest.) The essay here, however, is much less sharply focused on credentials as weapons of conflict among status groups than Collins's *The Credential Society* (1980), and consequently gives the feeling of being but a piece of a larger work.

Not only culture, but also emotions, are "produced," Collins tells us; in this context he urges the recognition that Weber's status group concerns and interest in religion are well within the conflict tradition. Collins suggests that Weber is concerned with the "*control of the means of emotional production*: the conditions in the material world whereby individuals are influenced to experience emotions, especially social solidarity, fear, awe, or a sense of purpose. The implication is that these are resources to be used in conflicts . . ." (p. 41). Later, in his 1981 *AJS* article, "On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology," reprinted here, Collins elaborates this theme. What, he asks, is the "micromechanism which can explain the repetitive actions that make up social structure"? It is "chains of microencounters," which he dubs "interaction ritual chains," that "generate the central features of social organization—authority, property and group membership—by creating and recreating mythical cultural symbols and emotional energies" (p. 262). Emotional solidarity is the "payoff" from conversations and interaction rituals.

2. Physical bodies and spatial relations: In many of these essays there is a concerted attempt to bring the body and physical space back into social theory. Collins presents this as a logical extension of Marxian materialism, though one inconsistent with idealist versions: "Motivation is to be understood in terms of the material desires of human bodies. Marx couched this primarily in terms of the need to stay alive. . . . This principle is capable of further extension, however; maneuvering for physical dominance, for emotional satisfaction, and for sexual pleasure all fall within its purview . . ." (p. 27).

In a fascinating attempt to restore the study of geopolitics to a central

position in macrosociology, Collins uses the innocent statement that the state "consists ultimately of military control over a territory" (p. 71) as a platform for a detailed examination of the effects of various geographical configurations—"heartlands," "marchlands," and "barriers"—on the determination of state boundaries. This level of detail on such matters was typical of early 20th-century global historians but has come to be shunned by sociologists as simpleminded geographical determinism. Collins's effort here should serve as a valuable corrective, reminding us that political events occur only and necessarily in physical space, and that such space is highly inhomogeneous in ways that cannot be laid aside.

At the most microscopic level as well, that of ethnomethodological research, Collins finds an unexpected importance of physical bodies and space. He comments that the

limitations on human cognition documented by the ethnomethodologists show why social order must necessarily be physical and local for all participants. Although this may seem paradoxical, in view of the philosophical and antimaterialist themes associated with this intellectual tradition, it is consonant with the main examples of indexical statements that ethnomethodologists have cited . . . : terms such as "you," "me," "here," "this" are irremediably bound to the specific context because people's activities always occur at a *particular* physical *location* and at a *particular point* in time. The inexpressible context on which everybody depends, and on which all tacit understandings rest, is the physical world, including everyone's own body, as seen from a particular place within it. [P. 273]

3. Uncovering hidden conflict: As is well known, one of Collins's strong suits is finding conflict underlying situations where it is not readily apparent. In these essays, he is especially concerned to determine whether the theoretical orientations of various sociologists might not be more related to questions of conflict than has been supposed. His treatment of Weber, in this connection, is a valuable antidote to the partial view resulting from selective translations and interpretations current even through the 1960s. Collins's view that "Weber's sociology not only accords with but also builds upon Marxian fundamentals" (p. 38) is stimulating and documented in interesting though sketchy ways.

But Collins also has an unsettling tendency to find conflict theory everywhere. In an essay on Lévi-Strauss, he describes the "center" of *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* as a theory of the stratified state (p. 114). He is able to interpret the book as mainly about conflict, partly because he stresses, to the exclusion of other themes, its discussion of the role of wife exchange in reducing intergroup frictions. In defending the alleged centrality and the current value of Lévi-Strauss's views on conflict, Collins asserts a much higher level of conflict among early hunting and gathering peoples than appears defensible to me from existing evidence, and he focuses especially on Australian aborigine examples, which are much more likely to involve this conflict than those chosen from other areas. He also neglects increasing evidence of the importance of non-

lineage-based kinship systems among non-Australian hunting peoples. The theory of the stratified state that Collins extracts from Lévi-Strauss appears to be an amalgam of Lévi-Straussian ideas held together and much amplified by Collins's ingenuity; that is, it is less the "center" of the book than an ingenious but arguable gloss on the original.

Then, in his otherwise brilliant essay on Goffman—far and away the best effort I have seen to synthesize Goffman's various stages and relate them to broader themes in sociological theory—Collins is also determined to wring a conflict-theoretic interpretation out of the materials, though he is aware that it is even harder here than for Lévi-Strauss. At one point he notes, for example, that Goffman "regrettably, . . . once again misses the implications of his analysis for a theory of stratification and hence a link to the mainstream of macrosociology" (p. 251).

More disturbing is Collins's occasional tendency to rest his evaluation of theorists and theories on their level of conflict content. He is, for example, surprisingly uncritical of technological determinist theories of social evolution if they are organized around a conflict argument and contemptuous of otherwise valuable work if there seems no way to give a conflict interpretation of it. Thus, discussing Robert Merton's work, he asserts that if "there is a central theme that underlies virtually all of Merton's work I would say it is the effort to defuse stratification issues. . . . What was weak about American sociology in the years in which Merton worked was its attempt to defuse stratification. In the process it ended up turning away from the very variables that are most fundamental to consider in any real explanatory theory" (p. 303). But what Collins means by the "effort to defuse stratification issues" is that Merton has often interpreted behavior as stemming from sources other than latent or manifest conflicts. The failure to give conflict explanations can be the "central theme" in Merton's work only if one assumes that his career has been devoted to subtly undermining conflict interpretations, an unlikely proposition. Here one is tempted to turn on Collins his own criticism of Gouldner, whom he chides for his "tendency to treat scholarship primarily for its political relevance, and to dismiss scientific objectivity as technocratic ideology. . . . Yet scholarly advances do occur apart from political trends; intellectual communities have an internal social structure as well as an externally linked one" (p. 317).

Apart from these three themes recurring through the volume, some other characteristics of the work are worth notice. Unlike many contemporary conflict theorists, Collins takes a generally positivist stance. By and large I am sympathetic to this and believe that it leads him usefully in the direction of systematic theory, a direction less available to those who insist that all theory is enmeshed in a set of political obligations and intentions. But there are places in these essays where the positivist impulse leads to an unnecessary profusion of hypotheses, some of which are premature and can hardly be supported by available data or theory. In his discussion of geopolitics, for example, he suggests that "in highly fragmented periods, there is a tone of chivalry, of warfare treated as a game"

(p. 95). The populations subjected to the Peloponnesian or the Thirty Years War would have looked in vain, however, for this chivalry. In a discussion of cruelty, he asserts that pastoralists' "habitual life of herding, prodding and killing animals fosters a similar attitude toward people" (p. 144). But this is highly inappropriate to many East African pastoralists such as the Nuer or the Turkana. Other hypotheses hover uncomfortably close to circularity: "Only the more productive economies can have highly centralized supply systems and very expensive large-scale weapons" (p. 76); the most "spectacularly expansive states usually intrude into a power vacuum" (p. 96). The difficulty, of course, is whether one can see level of "productivity" or the existence of a "power vacuum" as easily before the fact as after, and whether they have clear definitions independent of the outcomes attributed to them.

For all their strengths, some of the essays suffer, despite occasional disclaimers, from monocausalism, an intense focus on one cause in a situation where multiple causes are obviously at work. The essay on geopolitics has this tendency, as does that on credential crises, where it is asserted, for example, that the "long downturn of the cultural cycle" resulting from overexpansion of educational and credential-granting institutions in 14th- through 16th-century Europe "brought political and economic downturn with it" (p. 204).

Some of the most interesting essays are frustrating because, being mainly programmatic, they promise more than they can deliver. I felt this most acutely for "On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology," in which the concept of interaction ritual chains is developed only abstractly, without clear demonstration of its value in empirical application. One of the few examples given is upward mobility. Collins asserts that "upwardly mobile individuals are those whose cultural resources lead them through a sequence of IR (interaction ritual) experiences that builds up their emotional energies, hence their confidence and drive; when they reach IR matchups which no longer give a favorable emotional balance, this advantage disappears, and they cease to move further upward" (p. 209). But this account strikes me as an unhealthy mixture of status attainment ideas and the Law of Effect, with a dollop of Dale Carnegie thrown in for good measure. Out the window goes the subtlety that otherwise characterizes this essay's treatment of small-scale relations and their concatenation, as well as Collins's usual insistence on the structural constraints limiting and shaping behavior and outcomes of individuals.

This piece would also be stronger, I think, if it drew out more systematically the strong parallels with the social exchange/reinforcement contingency work of George Homans, on the one hand, and the social-construction-of-reality conceptions of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, on the other. To have woven an essay that meshes so well with both behaviorist and phenomenological arguments is no mean intellectual feat, and it would have illuminated this landscape considerably had Collins chosen to explicate this apparent conundrum. Where he parts from both sets of arguments is in his linkage of microscopic encounters, con-

versational and otherwise, to broader themes of power and stratification via effects on loyalty, coalition, and group membership. The obvious affinity between Collins's framework and much of the work carried out in the social network tradition is also never developed here.

Finally, I was puzzled by Collins's frequent assertions that sociology has made giant theoretical strides in recent years. I myself have searched in vain for the "quantum leap forward in our macrotheories" (p. 2) that he claims to have found and wonder whether sociology since midcentury has really "recovered the theoretical impulse that characterized the classics" (p. 7). The book is dotted with exuberant phrases: one section of essays is entitled "The Sociology of Education: The Cutting Edge" but consists mainly of Collins's demonstrations of the severe weaknesses of most work in this area. The section called "Breakthroughs in Microsociology" contains two of the book's best pieces—the one on Goffman and the "microfoundations" essay. But the word "breakthrough" seems to be premature, conveying an excessively rosy view of recent theoretical progress. In short, it is hard for me to see how so acute a critic of sociological theory can assess its current state in this Panglossian language.

To sum up, this is an uneven book, full of warts and flaws, but with more bright ideas and provocative arguments than sociologists are used to seeing between two covers. In my assigned role as reviewer, I have duly recorded all noticeable sources of irritation; this should not discourage readers with a central interest in social theory from reading this valuable book.

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Book Reviews

The Future of the Sociological Classics. Edited by Buford Rhea. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981. Pp. xii + 212. \$28.50 (cloth); \$9.95 (paper).

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The Future of the Sociological Classics is a collection of nine lectures delivered at East Carolina University in 1978. Seven of the essays—all of them laudatory (some to the point of adulation)—are devoted to nine sociologists, and two of them are addressed to the classics in general. In a graceful introduction the editor, Buford Rhea, dismisses the notion that the classics are now irrelevant and emphasizes his conviction that they have an enduring importance, a sentiment that is repeated throughout the book. The essays themselves are of nearly uniform excellence and one can only treat them seriatim.

In the first, Irving M. Zeitlin directs his attention to Marx. He treats the relationship between Hegel and Marx, credits Marx with a successful synthesis of idealistic and materialistic views of the human condition, discusses Marx's "ruling ideology," and tries to remove any taint of evolutionary doctrine from his work. It is a suggestive essay and an informative one.

The late Werner J. Cahnman regards Hobbes, Vico, and Tönnies as starting points in sociology. He begins with some penetrating observations on the present unsatisfactory state of sociological theory and warns us, especially with respect to Weber and Durkheim, that we may be "worshipping idols." Weber's work is an imposing torso in need of a head, and Durkheim's is not only enamored of itself but often "does violence to the facts on which it supposedly rests" (p. 17). Hobbes and Vico, apparent opposites, are actually complementary, and their ideas converge in Tönnies. My only objection to this splendid essay is Cahnman's unpronounceable adjective "Tönniesian." "Vichian" is not much better.

Dennis Wrong, unlike Cahnman, regards Weber as peerless. One reason he gives for our reverence for Weber is, again, the unsatisfactory state of contemporary theory. We need our ancestors to confer respectability on our enterprise. About Marx, Wrong writes that it is possible to deny that he was a sociologist (as Donald MacRae has done) but not that he was a great man. We can all, Marxists and non-Marxists alike, say amen to that. This is an altogether superior essay, and one in which Wrong claims, doubtless correctly, that the influence of Weber on sociology is much more pervasive than that of Marx and that our discipline would be seriously impoverished without his work.

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Donald Levine, writing on Simmel, asserts that sociology is the only intellectual discipline so peculiar that it tries to maintain close contacts with its classics (has he forgotten philosophy?) but contends that its practitioners need symbols to unite them and that the classics can serve this purpose. If we think that Simmel has no "system," we are wrong. Indeed, Levine argues that there is more system in Simmel than in any of the classical sociologists.

Joseph Lopreato, in a learned disquisition on Pareto, praises his *Treatise on General Sociology* and dislikes our current tendency to treat him as an "old ancestor" rather than a still relevant "genius." Lopreato's piece is a highly competent yet unsuccessful effort to restore importance to Pareto; moreover, he gives Pareto credit for some insights of his own. His strenuous effort to make sense of Pareto's residues and derivations suffers from the fact that Pareto himself failed to do so.

It is time to remonstrate with Edward Tiryakian about his extravagant regard for Durkheim. In an earlier essay (in Bottomore and Nisbet, eds., *A History of Sociological Analysis* [New York: Basic, 1978], p. 187) he told us that Durkheim was "the crucial figure in the development of sociology as an academic discipline" and that before Durkheim sociology was only a "provocative idea" but after him it became "an established social fact." Now Tiryakian knows perfectly well that George Frederick Holmes at Virginia (who sank into obscurity), William Graham Sumner at Yale, and Albion W. Small at Colby taught sociology at least as early as Durkheim did at Bordeaux; that Small founded the department at Chicago four years before Durkheim achieved his professorship at Bordeaux; and that Small founded the *American Journal of Sociology* three years before Durkheim's *l'Année sociologique* came into being. In the present essay he compares *The Elementary Forms* favorably with the Book of Revelations. Tiryakian is always stimulating, but his enthusiasm for Durkheim needs some restraint.

Herbert Blumer's long and thoughtful essay on George Herbert Mead—incidentally, the only American in this display—is nothing short of superb. Blumer is especially good in showing how, in Mead, the self interacts with itself and thus constructs a social situation. In a sense, one "listens" to one's self, observes one's own gestures, and thus enhances and enriches the self. He asks us to notice the deep sense in which "human society consists of people who have selves" (p. 143) and the manner in which these selves form ongoing social actions with other selves. There is "a conversation of gestures." One is bound to say that Blumer tells us more about Mead's ideas than Mead himself was able to do.

Lewis Coser, welcome as always, says in his essay, "The Uses of Classical Sociological Theory," that sociological theory tells us both what to look for and what not to, and serves in addition as a "toolkit" in carrying on inquiry. The latter service he illustrates ingeniously with studies of the rise of the National Socialist party in Germany.

Talcott Parsons, on revisiting the classics, in what was destined to be

one of his last lectures, is autobiographical. He tells us that he re-read *The Elementary Forms* almost every year and that he never failed to learn something new. The classical works give us a rich tradition, and we can never exhaust their meaning.

In short, *The Future of the Sociological Classics* is an intellectual treat and a book that we should all want to own.

The Right to Welfare and Other Essays. By T. H. Marshall. New York: Free Press, 1981. Pp. 184. \$15.95.

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The English sociologist T. H. Marshall is probably best known to Americans for his seminal essay "Citizenship and Social Class," first published in 1950. The essays collected in this new volume date from a later period in the author's long career. Since retiring from the London School of Economics in 1960 Marshall has devoted his energies principally to social policy and administration, a field closely related to sociology in Britain but separately organized. In 1965 he published *Social Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Hutchinson), a book that may have had as much influence on the field as the works of Richard Titmuss. *The Right to Welfare* now collects his later essays on social policy, mostly occasional pieces prepared during the 1970s and updated for this volume with new "afterthoughts" by the author.

The range of topics is quickly evident from the chapter headings: "Changing Ideas about Poverty," "Welfare in the Context of Social Development," "Welfare in the Context of Social Policy," "The Right to Welfare," "Value Problems of Welfare-Capitalism," "Reflections on Power," and "Freedom as a Factor in Social Development."

Marshall's central concern, to which several of the essays return, is to develop his notion of the "hyphenated society" which is democratic-welfare-capitalism. He intends the term not as a description of an ideal state of affairs but as the best label to attach to "a specific historical social system—the one which evolved in Britain and most of Western Europe in the first 20 years or so after the war" (p. 123). In Marshall's view neither "welfare state" nor similar terms suffice to represent the particular amalgam found in contemporary European societies.

The essays proceed by way of conceptual distinctions, closely examining and refining the different "principles" held together in balance in the hyphenated society. The format of the essays allows only brief allusions to actual policy debates or developments in Britain or elsewhere; Marshall's emphasis falls decidedly on the conceptual underpinnings of democratic-welfare-capitalism rather than on its mundane workings.

There are obviously strengths and weaknesses in this approach. Mar-

shall earned his original renown by a careful dissection of the various "aspects" contained in the full-blown modern notion of citizenship. His conceptual analysis of "civil," "political," and "social" citizenship, set in a historical framework of development over three centuries, was quickly adopted and popularized by political sociologists, notably by Reinhard Bendix. It proved serviceable because of both its lucidity and its simplicity. However, the essay "Citizenship and Social Class" was at best a historical overview and conceptual schema; it barely raised the questions how and why citizenship developed as it did. Marshall dropped several asides about the logic of this development (for instance, that each aspect of citizenship went "its separate way, travelling at its own speed under the direction of its own peculiar principles" [p. 11]), but even such asides were scant indeed.

The Right to Welfare is largely a dissection of the modern notion "welfare." It argues that what we know as the welfare state is neither simply a product of majority rule (the democratic principle) nor simply a response to social inequalities (as generated by capitalism). "Welfare" is both, but also something apart. Hence Marshall's insistence on the "hyphenated society"—democratic-welfare-capitalism. "The hyphen links two (or it can be three) different and contrasting elements together to create a new entity whose character is a product of the combination, but not the fusion of the components, whose separate identities are preserved intact and are of equal and contributory status" (p. 124). As against Titmuss, who based "welfare" on a common consensual ideal of the good society (an ideal which would subordinate market principles to overriding values of the community), Marshall tries to preserve the integrity of different institutional spheres, each organized according to a different "axial" principle. The distinctiveness—and strength—of democratic-welfare-capitalism comes precisely from this differentiation of spheres: the differences among the axial principles "strengthen the structure [of society] because they are complementary rather than divisive" (p. 125).

Marshall does not intend *The Right to Welfare* to be an ethical argument on behalf of or in defense of welfare. In his view, that argument was successful long ago. Nonetheless, a clear normative slant implicit in the notion of the "hyphenated society" preserves within that notion the right to welfare. Marshall not only describes but advocates a "balance" among the different institutional spheres. He has perceptive things to say about how this balance was struck in the postwar period. But the great weakness of the essays is that they lack a political sociology; they provide no account of how the balance is actually maintained. In the face of conflicts between welfare and market forces, what sustains or defends the part of welfare—what political actors, coalitions, institutional forces, and so on? At a time when "crisis of the welfare state" has long been a commonplace phrase, *The Right to Welfare* offers little guide to the nature of the crisis or to whether and how it might be resolved. Marshall's approach is to offer instead, well above the heads of contending political forces, a philosophy of social welfare.

Political Tolerance and American Democracy. By John L. Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. x + 278. \$25.00.

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In the past 10 years or so, there has been a renewed attempt to address the question of political tolerance as Samuel Stouffer did in the early 1950s in his study *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (Magnolia, Mass.: Smith). Otis Dudley Duncan, Howard Schuman, and Beverly Duncan repeated several of their own questions from 1958 in the 1971 Detroit Area Studies survey, and James A. Davis and Clyde Nunn, Harry Crockett, and J. Allen Williams repeated some or all of Stouffer's questions in national surveys in the 1970s; I have compared the United States and West Germany in the 1970s; and John L. Sullivan and his associates have published at least half a dozen articles on the subject in an attempt to develop a more adequate approach to it. In *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*, John L. Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus bring their previous work together and give it a unified presentation.

Sullivan and his associates address three central aspects of the question: first, the proper conceptualization and measurement of political tolerance; second, whether tolerance has in fact increased since the 1950s; and third, what factors affect levels of tolerance in the general population. In all three areas, they significantly challenge the work of past investigators and, I think, help generate fruitful debate. Whether they are right or have advanced our understanding of the problem is another matter; as will become clear, I have mixed feelings.

Sullivan et al. claim that most previous empirical studies have conceptualized and measured tolerance incorrectly, and they offer instead British political philosopher Bernard Crick's definition of tolerance "as the degree to which we accept things of which we disapprove" (p. 2; quotation taken from Crick, "Toleration and Tolerance in Theory and Practice," *Government and Opposition* 6 [1971]: 144). Thus, studies that assess "tolerance" of some object without first asking whether the respondent in fact favors it—which is a common practice—may not be measuring tolerance at all but partly measuring preference: one cannot "tolerate" what one likes, one can only favor it. This is a very important point and entirely correct, and it does lessen the value of previous studies which have not accounted for it.

A correct measurement strategy should flow directly from this critique; but having come safely halfway, the authors seem to treat the solution as unproblematical and, in my view, proceed to confuse the issue. Clearly, a measure of tolerance must include both disapproval and acceptance; but should the investigator impose his own choice of an object of tolerance on the respondent? Sullivan et al. argue, reasonably, that an object of

tolerance imposed by the investigator may not be salient to the respondent (p. 48); therefore they encourage the respondent to name the most unpalatable group he can think of (p. 81), which then becomes the object group for a series of questions on tolerance. But does this solve the measurement problem? A further consideration of the concept of tolerance will help us decide. Crick's article was one of two major papers which emerged from the Morrell Studies in Toleration and were published in *Government and Opposition* (cited above; the authors do not cite the other papers and draw Crick's from a later collection of his papers); the other major paper, by Preston King, gives a somewhat different emphasis. King stresses above all the idea that the decision to tolerate emerges from an assessment of the intensity of disapproval relative to the costs and benefits of acceptance. Thus, it should be possible in principle (leaving aside an evaluation of actual threat) to find anyone's "threshold" of tolerance and obtain an intolerant response by referring to a sufficiently odious object (e.g., legalizing a group whose policy concerning a respondent's ascriptive group is genocide).

From this perspective, it becomes clear that Sullivan et al.'s measurement strategy is not "neutral," as against one that would impose the posited object of tolerance, but instead has certain definite characteristics of which the authors seem unaware—at least they do not discuss them. First, of course, their approach tends to keep measured tolerance at a minimum by raising the level of disapproval as high as possible. This is the authors' intention: they want to measure a kind of pure, underlying dimension of tolerance. However, they must not appreciate the extent to which the phenomenon they are measuring is abstract; they intend it to be concrete and criticize other investigators for abstraction (pp. 33–44). The reason their formulation is abstract is that it subtly shifts the focus of the question from the group to be tolerated to the extent of disapproval: the respondent who understands the question is asked to seek his own threshold of tolerance, or that of his country, and is bound to give an intolerant response. As to the rest, they presumably respond according to their abstract libertarian commitments, or their resolution of this near-contradiction simply reflects their psychological makeup. The second implication of this measurement strategy is one of basic survey methodology. How can one use such a variable, whose referent is permitted to vary, to compare levels of tolerance across time or place? This is not to say that Sullivan et al. have not developed a measurement of tolerance, rightly understood; they have, but it contains problems which they do not seem to appreciate. In my view, these problems of abstraction and ahistoricity outweigh potential problems of saliency inherent in the alternative method: saliency is a routine practical problem in survey research and, in my opinion, easier to reduce.

The second question which Sullivan and his associates address is whether tolerance has increased in America since the 1950s, as most investigators claim to have found. In one of their early articles, the authors raised the problem of conceptualization and asserted, correctly, that it was impossible to assess change with a measure which refers only to objects of the

Left—especially since there has undoubtedly been an increase in sympathy for the Left since the 1950s—but then speculated that, since they had found as low a level of tolerance with their measure as was found in the 1950s with the faulty measure, tolerance may not have risen at all. The authors were justifiably criticized in the literature for attempting to assess change with varying measures and for going beyond their own evidence, and they beat a rather hasty retreat; but they reemerge in the book with the rump of the argument. Thus, they write, “Claims that the public is now more tolerant than in the 1950s are either untrue or greatly exaggerated. In the 1950s there was probably greater agreement that communists were a threat. In the 1970s, there was more diversity of targets for intolerance” (p. 250). But they present no direct evidence for the first or last sentence, and the second is saved only by the qualifier, “probably.” On the contrary, I think it is probable that tolerance has in fact increased since the 1950s. Thus, in the Detroit area from 1958 to 1971, while readiness to permit a Communist to speak rose from 35% to 44%, willingness to “tolerate” a speaker in favor of fascism or dictatorship *also rose* from 37% to 48% (O. D. Duncan et al., *Social Change in a Metropolitan Community* [New York: Russell Sage, 1973], p. 90). Although these questions would have to be recoded to measure true tolerance, it is already clear that the almost identical rise in apparent tolerance for both the Left and Right cannot be accounted for simply by a drift of public sympathies to the Left. (The authors also present a quite elegant reanalysis of the Stouffer variables replication which they hint may bear on changing levels of tolerance [pp. 59–60]. It does reveal very interesting changing patterns of attitudes, but it still does not allow an assessment of the question posed by the authors.)

The third issue discussed by the authors, to which they devote the bulk of the book, is the causes of tolerance. Three chapters review the bivariate effects of sociodemographic, psychological, and political factors on tolerance, and a fourth chapter presents a unified multivariate model. (Their use of multiple indicators and LISREL is generally quite effective, although, as is usual with such methods, an occasional result at variance with standard findings produces muddy interpretations and, in turn, ambiguity in the new scales [see p. 222].) The biggest surprise in their multivariate model is the lack of effect of age and education on tolerance once psychological security, in particular, has been taken into account; the effects of democratic norms and perception of threat are not unexpected (although I have found for Germany that the impact of democratic norms may be mediated by a liberal understanding of social conflict). I would, however, question whether the authors’ conceptualization of the dependent variable itself reduced the effects of age and education: it could be that the young and well educated (who in this model are the most liberal) have simply sought their own threshold of tolerance. If this is so, the authors’ findings would be consistent with the interpretation that their dependent variable is a psychological measure more than a political one. I do not by any means think that age (or cohort) and education have a universal effect on tolerance, but I do suspect that if the latter is a more

purely political variable, the effect of the former will be more historically than psychologically conditioned. This is not to say that Sullivan and his associates ignore historical and macrosocial factors; in fact, one of the most valuable features of their book is their attempt to relate tolerance to different theories of democracy and social change. In a fine exposition, they summarize liberal democratic theory in the tradition of J. S. Mill, conservative democratic theory in the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter, and federalist democratic theory in the tradition of James Madison's *Federalist* 10; and they develop a set of cogent hypotheses regarding the relationship of each to political tolerance. Thus, for instance, liberal democratic theory expects that education and participation increase tolerance, and that as these attributes increase in the population over time, so should tolerance; and federalist democratic theory does not rely on tolerance in the population per se but only on the diversity of the targets of intolerance and on constitutional arrangements. Unfortunately, the authors' study design strongly biases the results in favor of federalist theory by giving respondents free choice of targets (although two-thirds of those with opinions still picked either the traditional Left or the traditional Right) and against liberal democratic theory by raising the threshold of tolerance. Thus, one remains a little skeptical when they announce at the end, "We think our findings are more consistent with a federalist interpretation" (p. 261).

The work of Sullivan and his associates has been of the greatest value in clearing the ground for a more adequate study of political tolerance, and they have presented us with an improved instrument which measures tolerance, rightly understood, and a set of analyses which clearly demonstrate its properties. However, their new instrument is by no means the only possible one, and, if my interpretation is correct, it seems excessively abstract, psychologically rather than sociopolitically oriented, and useless for a comparative and historical examination of political tolerance; moreover, an unusually large number of their findings are either certainly or probably artifacts of this instrument design. In my view, this work presents us with a legitimate approach to the study of political tolerance, useful for some purposes, but one which social scientists interested in comparative and historical phenomena should be careful to avoid.

Class Crystallization. By Werner S. Landecker. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 255. \$22.00.

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Although the study of stratification has always been a focal concern for sociologists, there is much dissatisfaction with its conceptual ambiguities,

ideological intrusions, failure to pursue significant issues, and even limitations in its data base. These criticisms are perhaps most appropriate to the treatment of stratification in our multifarious introductory textbooks. But few analyses in the periodical and monographic literature fare much better in offering adequate responses to these repeated defects. In my opinion, Werner Landecker has added a much needed measure of clarity and intellectual responsibility to the study of stratification. I should add that the present work, *Class Crystallization*, is a result of about 30 years of careful thought and of a series of trial formulations that both underlay and derived from empirical studies.

Landecker's strategy is not to develop a magisterial analysis of stratification. Instead, he plots a reasoned entry point into that crucial but cluttered area, starting with the Weberian recognition that (1) social inequalities tend to be multidimensional in complex societies and (2) multidimensionality (crystallization) is an unavoidable structural aspect that inherently affects the functioning of stratification systems. In addition, it is strongly implied that crystallization provides a leverage point for formulating questions about several empirical correlates or consequences of stratification (e.g., mobility, conflict, strain, social distance).

Consequently, Landecker assembles a conceptual framework that enables him to manipulate "class crystallization" broadly and fruitfully. The basic term is *rank system* or dimension of social inequality (e.g., occupation, wealth, education). A stratification system refers to a particular constellation of rank systems. *Class crystallization* is a concept designed to summarize the intercorrelation among rank systems. In addition, *class system* crystallization refers to the degree of intercorrelation of ranking systems for a population, while *class level* crystallization refers to such intercorrelations for a given stratum or class. Finally, Landecker requires a concept that deals with the participants' shared responses to an enviroing system of social rankings: *class consciousness*. The latter term, which has been variously interpreted by several generations of sociologists, is refined further into three aspects: *class-status* consciousness (self-placement and identification with a given class); *class-structure* consciousness (recognition of differences among classes); and *class-interest* consciousness (a translation of class identification with a given class into active attempts to affect other classes—by criticism, resistance, political manipulation).

The heart of this work is chapters 4, 6, and 7, in which Landecker formulates, rationalizes, illustrates, and initially validates with empirical materials a series of highly significant hypotheses. These deal with the preconditions that produce either strong or weak crystallization and the social and cultural effects of variations in crystallization. The following is a bare summary of a rich discussion.

1. (a) Low horizontal differentiation (i.e., relatively few ranking systems) leads to weak class crystallization, while high differentiation tends to favor strong crystallization. (b) Low vertical differentiation (i.e., few

gradations within a ranking system) tends to impede the development of strong crystallization.

2. (a) Pace of social change is related inversely to degree of crystallization. Thus, rapid social change tends to produce weak crystallization. (b) A combination of high differentiation in ranking systems and a low rate of social change tends to produce strong crystallization.

3. Crystallization tends to be strongest at upper and lower class levels, with weaker crystallization in middle strata, because of differential degrees of mobility. (However, Landecker notes that empirical evidence now supports strong crystallization only at the top level.)

4. (a) Class crystallization promotes differential association patterns and social distances. (b) Low class crystallization allows for association across status levels and for development of structural-personal linkages among strata. (c) Class crystallization promotes cultural differentiation among strata, primarily as a result of segregated forms of interaction. (d) Class crystallization sharpens the differential distribution of rewards and deprivations and thus tends to concentrate conservative values in upper strata and egalitarian values in lower strata.

5. Class crystallization tends to encourage class consciousness in each of its three aspects.

6. (a) Strong class crystallization tends to develop strong barriers and increases the probability of class conflicts. (b) Both heightened crystallization and recent decrease in crystallization promote conditions favorable to class conflict.

7. Although past inequalities underlie strong crystallization, the latter tends to accentuate existing social inequalities.

One of the dividends of this book is a number of scattered but provocative insights and interpretations of such theorists as Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel. However, its major contributions lie in Landecker's analytical skill and modesty and in a few essential (though somewhat implicit) suggestions. First, Landecker distinguishes between analysis of stratification systems and study of specific strata (though these are necessarily interrelated themes). Second, he underscores the need for genuine comparative studies—in different historical periods and in different kinds of societies—to discover and account for variability and to translate our intellectual affinity for concepts into the use of theoretically relevant variables. Third, he shows a necessary catholic concern for a range of intermediary or intervening variables—particularly those that deal with structured opportunities or restrictions on interaction and those that influence and reflect patterned motivations and perceptions among social participants. Finally, Landecker persuasively reinforces two traditional but often superficially accepted notions: that stratification and crystallization are central to an understanding of complex societies and that dynamic processes are inseparable from the investigation of social structures.

Social Mobility: A Study of Social Control and Insatiability. By Earl Hopper. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. Pp. x+335. \$35.00.

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In *Social Mobility: A Study of Social Control and Insatiability*, Earl Hopper, a sociologist who has trained as a psychotherapist, set himself an important task: to construct a theory that specifies the conditions under which intergenerational social mobility generates feelings of anxiety. The main thesis, summarized in the first two chapters, states that upward or downward social mobility, by itself, does not cause anxiety or other pathologies. Instead, it is the interplay of the mobility experience with a variety of psychological, social psychological, and sociological factors that generates feelings of relative deprivation and other types of anxiety.

There is not much that is new in chapters 3–5, where Hopper presents the psychological phase of the argument. The relationships between individuals' levels of "normative expectations" and levels of achievement, he notes, determine whether their resulting "goal orientations" are likely to be "pathogenic," that is, to cause anxiety. The author concludes this section with a hypothesis that appears to be the familiar definition of relative deprivation: "The greater the relative discrepancy between the level of normative expectation and the level of achievement with respect to a highly evaluated goal, the greater the feelings of relative deprivation with respect to that goal" (p. 73).

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are more interesting. Here Hopper advances the argument that the sources of pathogenic goal orientations are social psychological: individuals' positions within the structure of social networks ("interpersonal communities") determine the degree to which they are constrained by social sanctions. Occupying positions in which deviant behavior is not effectively sanctioned may induce three types of processes—"anomogenic," "blocking," and "comparative reference group." These processes, Hopper explains, indirectly generate feelings of relative deprivation by preventing actors from forming "satisfiable" levels of normative expectation or by raising their expectation levels beyond their achievement levels. In addition, these processes directly cause other types of anxiety—feelings of isolation, self-estrangement, anomie, normlessness, and powerlessness.

The rest of the book consists of the sociological phase of the argument. Here Hopper maintains that "patterns of mobility" determine "an actor's exposure to the constraints of anomogenic, blocking, comparative reference group factors, and hence, the development of his feeling of relative deprivation and other types of anxiety" (p. 186). "Patterns of mobility" are defined primarily by the particular educational routes through which specific mobility distances are achieved. For example, joining the upper class through attending prestigious private educational institutions is distinguished from similar upward mobility that has not been lubricated by

an elite educational institution. These two mobility experiences constitute two different mobility patterns which are not equally pathogenic.

Hopper—an American who encountered the peculiarities of the English class structure through teaching in Cambridge and Leicester Universities—emphasizes that similar mobility patterns are not equally pathogenic across industrial societies. The pathogenic nature of mobility patterns depends, in part, on the rigidity of the status hierarchy. The more rigid a status hierarchy is, the more likely the mobility experience is to generate anxiety. Such being the case, Hopper expects “upward and downward mobility in general to be less pathogenic in the U.S. than in England” (p. 194), because the American status hierarchy is not as rigid as its English counterpart. He also notes that educational systems are not equally structured to provide a student with the skills (“career training”) and social manners (“status and mobility training”) required for entry into the status groups which “his educational experience has encouraged him to expect” (p. 24). British elite universities, Hopper observes, are better socialization agents for upper-class positions than their American counterparts. Therefore, he expects English working-class boys who achieved upper-class positions after attending Cambridge or Oxford to find their mobility less pathogenic than their American counterparts who graduated from, say, Harvard. Using these macro characteristics of education and stratification systems, Hopper specifies many other hypotheses regarding the probabilities of certain mobility patterns to be pathogenic.

Throughout the text, and in 74 pages of technical appendixes, the author presents empirical results that are compatible with some of his hypotheses. The data, however, are based on a nonrepresentative sample of 183 Englishmen under 40 years of age, only 10 of whom experienced downward mobility. As a consequence of the small sample size and its confinement to Englishmen, many hypotheses are not tested here, and some that are tested are based on fewer than six observations (e.g., table 23, pp. 319–20). The author is right, then, not to consider the empirical findings a rigorous test of the theory.

Lacking an appropriate sample for testing most of the propositions, Hopper emphasizes that the empirical findings are of only secondary importance while “the theory gives this book its shape and coherence, and confers meanings to each component proposition” (p. 1). Judged by this standard, however, *Social Mobility* has not accomplished its purpose. The definitions, typologies, propositions, and discussions regarding patterns of anxiety, achievement orientations, goal orientations, patterns of mobility, educational systems, and stratification systems, while insightful at times, do not constitute a coherent theory of “social control and insatiability.” The relationships between the sociological and social psychological sections are unclear because concepts that are developed in the first part of the book are dropped later. For example, the role of “interpersonal communities” in generating anxiety—central to the social psychological process—disappears once patterns of mobility and educational systems are introduced.

A final underlying problem of the book is Hopper's unclear writing style. He uses an unnecessary private jargon and tends toward excessive abstractions—for example, "The focus of this study is the demands of structural and societal blocking factors for technical and diffuse skills and for ascribed and achieved qualities, that are linked directly or indirectly to economic and status positions as their structural objects or goals" (p. 98).

Despite these problems, *Social Mobility* is important, primarily because it raises the possibility that mobility affects individuals in a more complicated way than has been assumed by past research. Those who expect mobility per se to affect mental disorder and such human behavior as fertility, yet obtain mixed empirical findings, might benefit from some of Hopper's insights and propositions.

The Petite Bourgeoisie: Comparative Studies of the Uneasy Stratum. Edited by Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliott. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. Pp. xiii + 206. \$25.00.

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In *The Petite Bourgeoisie*, Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliott, previous collaborators on several studies of the petite bourgeoisie in Britain, have collected several reports of research on both urban and agrarian small-property owners in a number of countries. They themselves contribute a general concluding discussion of the ambiguous social and cultural position of "petty property" in contemporary industrial societies.

Marx gave the name "petite bourgeoisie" to the heterogeneous stratum of small-scale producers who earned their livelihood from the ownership of income-producing property, including marketable skills, without employing the labor of others to any significant extent. Traditional Marxists have always treated the petite bourgeoisie as a doomed class, destined to be driven out of business by larger capitalist enterprises and pushed down into the ranks of the expanding proletariat. But non-Marxists, including sociologists, have also regarded small businessmen with condescension and even contempt, often seeing them as the political shock troops not only of established conservative parties but also of reactionary and proto-Fascist movements trying to roll back the alleged movement of history. A few contributors to the present book echo this outlook, but others confirm the editors' observation that "a more thorough and a more humane understanding is beginning to emerge, and it becomes apparent that in studying these minor property holders we can gain considerable insight into the workings of contemporary societies" (p. 184). Surprisingly, in this period of fashionable linguistic self-consciousness, nobody comments on the rendering of "petit" or "petite" as "petty" in English. Though phonetically similar, "petty" has an invidious meaning unlike the correct

translation of the French word as "little" or "small." Even the editors seem unconscious of this negative labeling.

The contributions, inevitably, are uneven in quality. Two are outstanding: the comprehensive and craftsman-like account of small farmers in Britain by Howard Newby and three collaborators, and the report (from a larger study in progress) of French artisanal bakeries by a husband and wife team, Daniel Bertaux and Isabelle Bertaux-Wiame.

The Newby study provides a thorough and detailed social and economic analysis of small farming as an occupation in contemporary Britain. A valuable feature of most of the research in the present book is that it does not, like so many previous sociological commentaries on small-property owners, confine itself to their political outlook and allegiances, usually branded as nostalgic and anachronistic. The Newby team does not neglect its subjects' politics, which are traditionally Conservative. Moreover, it draws some useful contrasts between the different occupational grounding of their traditionalism and that of other, urban members of the petite bourgeoisie in Britain.

Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame provide a rich and vivid qualitative description of French bakeries, which combine artisanship with shopkeeping because all bread is baked on the premises and sold fresh to a local clientele. They also draw on historical sources to try to explain why France is alone among industrial countries in relying on these tiny enterprises for 90% of the bread it consumes. Their tentative answer is that the survival of the peasantry and of peasant values in France to a greater extent than elsewhere has until now sustained the artisanal bakeries even though they were originally an urban phenomenon. Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame tell us just about everything we ever wanted to know about French bread production and raise a few additional interesting questions that undoubtedly never occurred to most of us. They include an admirable appendix justifying their primary reliance on intensive interviews and life histories on the grounds that, unlike the standard research methods, theirs provides a concrete picture comprehensible to the subjects themselves.

The remaining papers are more limited in focus. Suzanne Berger provides an impressively thorough analysis of how in Italy large industrial firms, labor unions, and the state together preserve the "small-scale traditional sector" of little shops, artisans, home workers and small subcontracting firms as a kind of dumping ground "to cushion the impact of economic fluctuations and change and to distribute their consequences in a way that shifts the burden off the modern sector" (p. 86). Bronislaw Misztal presents a historical-statistical account of small tradesmen in Poland, underlining the roles of both the destruction of the Jews, once concentrated in these occupations, and state socialism in reducing small tradesmen to "a vestigial social group." Yet little food shops, cafés, and repair businesses survive, he reports, literally on back streets, tolerated by the state. Because Misztal wrote before Solidarity, which has favored the expansion of a small-scale private sector in retail trade, his writing off of this stratum may have been premature, even for a "socialist" coun-

try. Franz U. Pappi applies a theoretical schema combining Marx and Weber to the differentiation of the middle classes (*Mittelstand*) in West Germany into petit-bourgeois and salaried employee segments. His excerpt is too brief and abstract to be very enlightening. Chris Gerry and Chris Birkbeck apply the ossified and scholastic vocabulary of "structural" Marxism to the "petty commodity producer [PCP] in Third World cities," devoting solemn attention to the "confused" ideology of PCP workers which, in contrast to Frantz Fanon, they see as irredeemably nonrevolutionary owing to its roots in a "contradictory class location." Nevertheless, along the way they give a good deal of useful information about street vending, garbage picking, and other "self-employed" activities of the shantytown poor in West Africa and Latin America.

The first and longest paper, by J. F. Conway on farmers' protest movements in Western Canada, is the only one in the book that is of little value, lacking even new information. The author announces that he is going to apply to the Canadian Prairie Provinces Lenin's theory of Russian populism as the expression of a peasant class doomed to extinction by industrial capitalism. He even makes a preposterous claim to originality for subjecting Western Canadian politics to a class analysis as distinct from the "regional focus" of such scholars as S. M. Lipset, C. B. Macpherson, and W. L. Morton. The most limited acquaintance with the work of these men suffices to dispose of this pretension. Lipset's *Agrarian Socialism* (1950) drew on Marx, Weber, Michels, and other theorists to interpret the rise of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in Saskatchewan; Lipset's very interest in the subject stemmed from his own youthful socialist and Marxist allegiances. Macpherson's *Democracy in Alberta* (1953) was a subtle and ingenious Marxist interpretation of the Social Credit movement. Lipset and Macpherson, in fact, debated the relation between classes and parties in *The Canadian Forum* in 1954 after Lipset had reviewed Macpherson's book critically for ignoring political divisions that were not rooted in class.

In any case, Conway's idea of a Leninist analysis, which might at least have been provocative, is confined to calling Western wheat farmers "the agrarian petite bourgeoisie" whenever he needs to refer to them collectively. This practice and his opening "theoretical" claims apart, his paper consists of no more than a familiar economic and political history of Western Canada in the first half of this century, summarizing the standard works by well-known Canadian scholars (especially Morton's *The Progressive Party in Canada* [1950]). He throws in a few tables drawn from a 1940 Royal Commission report showing that the Depression was hard on Western farmers, not exactly news then or now. In contrast to all the other contributors, he says nothing at all about events or conditions since the 1940s. The reader might conclude that the agrarian petite bourgeoisie had finally disappeared, confirming Lenin and Marx by actually "sinking into the proletariat." Conway presumably knows this has not happened, so his silence is probably explained by the lack of much published research and analysis concerning the past three decades. Canadian historians and

social scientists have written little about the recent politics of prairie wheat farmers, partly because they have aroused less interest since reverting to electoral support of the two major political parties, partly because much of the available scholarship was the result of a Rockefeller special grant in the 1950s to study the Social Credit movement and its origins. Conway adds exactly nothing except a few Leninist turns of phrase to these earlier studies, which included the books by Morton and Macpherson.

This book's charming dust jacket drawing of a little *pâtisserie-boulangerie* (a tribute to the excellence of the study by Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame) evoked a Proustian memory of my schooldays in Switzerland when we used to walk after an institutional school lunch to "the pât" on a nearby Geneva street to gorge ourselves on pastries. A Proustian memory in a double sense, actually, for we often ate *madeleines*.

Organized for Action: Commitment in Voluntary Associations. By David Knoke and James R. Wood. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981. Pp. xviii + 263. \$19.50.

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Organized for Action is a fine example of how to take organizational theory and use it to understand better the structure, process, and effectiveness of political action groups. In this monograph, David Knoke and James R. Wood outline a set of hypotheses drawn from the organizational literature which have membership commitment, involvement, and tolerance as well as budget size and effectiveness as dependent variables. These hypotheses were tested on a sample of 32 social action associations in the Indianapolis metropolitan area. Primary data on the organizations, their elites, and their members were collected by the authors and their staff. Thanks to their careful attention to the canons of social research and very careful editing, the monograph is a model to behold. It integrates theory and research, presents results, and evaluates hypotheses clearly, quickly, and without fluff. You get the message, and you remember it.

What is the authors' message? To paraphrase the last chapter, there are three general findings. First, organizational control structures, in particular, opportunities to participate in decision making, are critical in raising the level of members' affectual commitment to the organization. Second, this commitment can be tapped to procure resources from the membership and as a resource to procure funds from the environment. Third, financial assets, environmental conditions, and membership commitment were associated with various measures of organizational effectiveness. Size of assets, the degree of environmental uncertainty, and centrality in interorganizational resource networks were all strong predictors of effectiveness when reputational measures of organizational suc-

cess were used. However, size of assets and membership commitment were better predictors of organizational success when members' evaluation of the association's performance was used.

It is difficult to find fault with the book, since the authors accomplished what they set out to do. However, I think that the reader, as well as the authors, would feel I had shunned my duty if I did not raise at least one or two points for debate and discussion.

In my opinion, Knoke and Wood fail to capitalize on their findings, for they fail to put them back into a political context. While the formal organizations literature is enriched by their results and discussion, I do not know whether our understanding of politics has been increased. Let me take one example to illustrate my point. "Organizational effectiveness" is pretty vague stuff. It can mean anything from winning World War II to completing a successful ad campaign for Granola Bars to saving souls. In contrast, winning and losing in interest group politics are pretty specific. The authors' strategy was to take winning and losing out of its political context and treat it as just another example of organizational effectiveness. Once the translation had been made, the logical next step was to measure variables which have been found to be effective predictors of other forms of organizational success. Amazingly, our authors came up with some results. The problem is that they sat on their laurels and did not explore the implications of their findings.

I had hoped that they would take one more step and put their findings back into the political context. Is it true that winning and losing in the lobbying game can be explained by a few organizational variables such as size and commitment of members? Their results suggest that they can—and also that strategists and political scientists have been reading the wrong literature for all these years. Winning and losing in the political arena are really not very different from winning and losing customers, souls, or Super Bowl rings. I wish the authors had wrestled with these implications. An extended debate would show us, once and for all, whether their efforts really do allow us to cut through all the "noise" in the political process or whether our authors are just terribly naive.

Let me conclude on a more upbeat note. Knoke and Wood have unearthed a few gems which should be on the agenda for future research. First, they found remarkable differences between social action associations which employed professional staff and those which did not. I believe that professionalization means something very different in a voluntary association than in a corporation or government bureaucracy, but we know very little about it. Second, the authors also found that outside funders prefer organizations that are more professionalized and administratively centralized. The authors are not quite sure why this is true; nor am I. I imagine the preference is related to special social processes at work in economies of donative transfers. Finally, the size and position of organizations in interorganizational networks was a very strong predictor of organizational effectiveness. This has been found elsewhere, but again we do not really

know why it happens. These little gaps in our understanding do not reflect on the monograph. They are simply the by-products of the creative and challenging grafting and splicing which Knoke and Wood attempt in *Organized for Action*.

The New Science of Organizations: A Reconceptualization of the Wealth of Nations. By Alberto Guerreiro Ramos. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1981. Pp. xiv + 210. \$25.00.

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The late Alberto Guerreiro Ramos formulated a persuasive critique of organization theories and the beginnings of a promising alternative based on the concept of substantive rationality. He criticized contemporary organization theory primarily for its failure to maintain a distinction between functional and substantive rationality. It is based almost entirely on functional or formal rationality, concerned with effectiveness in the pursuit of goals. The economizing organization is the model; and market society is the context assumed by this approach.

Because of its narrow vision, organization theory contributes to a rationalizing trend that extends throughout the industrial societies and into the Third World. Furthermore, in its dominant, economizing mode, organization theory contributes to a narrowing of possibilities for social life.

In *The New Science of Organizations*, published before his death, Ramos proposed a theory based on substantive rationality. Because judgments informed by substantive rationality have a more enduring and fundamental basis in human values, considerations broader and more important than market-oriented efficiency could guide our thinking about organizations. We could consider the impact of various organizational arrangements on the direction of societal development, on self-actualization of individuals, and on human relationships. For developing societies, Ramos argued, substantive rationality entails the political control and guidance of the economy, not the free play of market forces.

Ramos did not propose to humanize production organizations caught up in the economizing logic. Functional rationality is necessary and useful in these settings. It must be limited, however, to the narrow slice of social life where it is necessary, not extended into other spheres. The scope of functional rationality must be governed by substantively rational judgments.

A substantive theory of organizations is concerned with specifying a range of application for differing organizational logics. Such a theory must deal with the development of societies and the historically limited place of economizing organizations. It must deal with symbolic interaction and meaning as important aspects of social life. The free flow of com-

munication and meaning construction is restricted by the purposive rationality of the economizing organization. The spread and extension of such organizations threatens to narrow meanings and communication processes and to destroy in particular their spontaneity, so altering the natural character of human communities.

A substantive theory must also revive the distinction between labor and work, getting beyond the modern equation of leisure with "idleness, hobby, and relaxation." "Labor is an exertion of effort subordinated to the objective necessities inherent in the process of production itself. Work is the exertion of efforts freely elicited by the individual in pursuit of . . . self-actualization" (p. 113).

Delimiting distinct sectors or spheres of social life and defining appropriate organizational arrangements for each are important tasks of a substantive theory of organizations. By cross-classifying prescription versus normlessness and community versus personal orientation, Ramos generated a "para-economic paradigm" delineating types of social settings. One of these is the sphere of the economy. The purpose of the scheme is to combat the tendency to reduce social life to that dimension only. He formulates a "law of requisite adequacy" which asserts that "a variety of social systems is an essential qualification of any society" (p. 136): In analyzing and designing social systems, we must take account of a number of factors including size, cognition, space, and time.

Ramos was essentially correct in his assertion that organization theory is based on functional rationality and lacks a more encompassing sense of rationality. He began also to develop a normative model for organizations in a society that has somehow contained the formal rationality of market-oriented organizations and prevented their domination of other sectors. His hope that Third World societies might avoid the pervasive rationalization of social life characteristic of the market-dominated societies is certainly commendable.

As often happens in normative theorizing, however, Ramos failed to connect the proposed forms of organization to the real social relations that determine the possibility of realizing them. Third World societies, for example, may find their organizational options restricted by their entanglement in a world economic order. The possibilities of realizing alternative organizational patterns in advanced capitalist societies appear to be restricted by integration of state and corporate organizations. Furthermore, it may not be possible to challenge effectively the dominance of functional rationality if we leave its hegemony in production organizations unchallenged. Even the theoretical alternatives may be restricted. Organization theory, as a discipline, may be so wedded to market organizations that substantive rationality cannot get a foothold. Although Ramos did not address these questions, *The New Science of Organizations* shows the importance of theorizing alternatives to the present order of things.

The Organizational Life Cycle: Issues in the Creation, Transformation and Decline of Organizations. Edited by John R. Kimberly, Robert H. Miles, and Associates. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1980. Pp. xxii + 492. \$19.95.

Brian Rowan

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The Organizational Life Cycle is an ambitious attempt by John Kimberly and Robert Miles to "provide new directions in organizational theory and research" (p. 448). The edited volume consists of 11 papers by 14 different authors, as well as an opening chapter by Kimberly on the utility of the life-cycle concept and a closing chapter by Miles placing the book in the context of current research on organizations. The tone of the book is set in the strong opening chapter. Dissatisfied with the prevailing "static" mode of organizations research, Kimberly believes that longitudinal research on organizational creations, transformations, and declines is needed. To guide this research, he argues for the application of a biological metaphor—the life cycle—to organizations.

The ensuing papers are organized into three separate sections corresponding to what the principal authors see as the three major stages of the organizational life cycle: creation, transformation, and decline. By and large, the papers are strong, and I will single out only my favorites. In the first section, there are innovative and engaging papers by Miles and W. Alan Randolph and by Andrew Van de Ven that demonstrate the effects of initial organizing efforts on later organizational performance. In the section on transformations, Richard Walton's discussion of high-commitment work systems is a theoretically elegant and fascinating discussion of the development and stabilization of organic work structures in four factories in the United States. Also, in the same section, Jack Brittain and John Freeman make a contribution to the growing literature on organizational ecology by describing the process of density-dependent selection of firms in the semiconductor industry. Finally, there is David Whetten's review of the literature on organizational decline, which should provide readers interested in this topic with a number of good ideas for future research.

Clearly, however, Kimberly and Miles see this book as more than a collection of good papers. They invoke the life-cycle metaphor, not simply as an editorial device, but as an attempt to prod organizations researchers into taking a more dynamic approach to organizational processes. Yet the development of the life-cycle approach, as well as the substantive examples of longitudinal research in the volume, is somewhat disappointing. For example, although the main authors repeatedly assert that this collection of papers is an exploration of the life-cycle metaphor, competing models of organizational dynamics that emerge over the course of the book are nowhere integrated with or compared with the life-cycle metaphor that organizes the book. As a result, the metaphor fails to rise

above the status of an editorial device. At the same time, the separation of papers into sections that address only one stage of the life cycle discourages an examination of some of the most important and fascinating questions raised in Kimberly's introductory chapter, questions concerning the differences between organizations in different stages of the life cycle or differences in life-cycle dynamics between different types of organizations. Only Brittain and Freeman's paper manages to trace organizations from birth to decline and to discuss the ways in which life cycles differ among different types of organizations.

The types of longitudinal research appearing in the book are also disappointing. While most readers will agree with Kimberly that static research on organizations has reached a point of diminishing returns, it seems to me that the type of longitudinal research undertaken here will quickly reach the same point. Most of the authors acted as consultants or participants in the organizations they studied, and most of their longitudinal research lasted only a few years. As a result, the research in this volume makes a strong contribution to the analysis of problems related to the routinization of *new* organizational forms, but for the most part it fails to come to grips with the unfolding of organizational processes over the long run. The reader is left to ponder whether, for example, the effects of early organizing processes on initial organizational performance persist or become irrelevant as organizations mature.

Another problem is the lack of attention given to quantitative modes of analysis. In the opening chapter, Kimberly lists a number of reasons why organizations researchers prefer to do cross-sectional research. One reason not mentioned is the prestige associated with doing quantitative analysis and the lack of knowledge most researchers have about how to do longitudinal, quantitative research. In my view, this volume could have made a valuable contribution by including a chapter that explored the relevance to its central themes of available quantitative techniques for modeling time-series data. Instead, the predominant mode of analysis used by the authors was the case study. This is unfortunate, for while case studies can offer rich detail about organizational processes, there are other issues relevant to the idea of life cycles that are perhaps best addressed through quantitative analysis. As just one example, the estimation of hazard functions and the construction of life tables seem particularly appropriate to the study of life-cycle dynamics.

Nevertheless, the book was not intended to be a definitive work on the longitudinal analysis of organizational life cycles, and its modest goal of suggesting the life-cycle metaphor as a means of encouraging longitudinal studies of organizations is met. In fact, the strength of the approach is amply demonstrated in the studies by Kimberly, Van de Ven, Walton, and Thomas Lodahl and Stephen Mitchell. Collectively, these papers demonstrate a pervasive problem faced by growing organizations. Structural growth can apparently exacerbate problems arising from strategic choices made at the time of creation, lead organizations away from their initially innovative ideological commitments, and isolate charismatic lead-

ers from their followers. The result is that organizations often face what Kimberly calls "the paradox of success" (p. 30). The very success and growth of new organizations bring about new operational problems which are often accompanied by disillusionment and cynicism among participants. This idea alone, demonstrated as it is across a broad variety of settings, indicates the potential utility of the life-cycle approach.

Thus, while much more work is needed before the promise of a developmental approach to organizations is realized, this book meets its limited goal of raising some issues related to organizational creations, transformations, and declines, and it should stimulate further research on the organizational life cycle.

Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies. By Robert H. Miles, in collaboration with Kim S. Cameron. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982. Pp. xii + 291. \$18.95.

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Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies provides a qualitatively rich comparative case description of how the Big Six tobacco companies reacted to the antismoking campaign triggered by the 1953 Sloan-Kettering report linking smoking to cancer. By taking a 25-year historical view of the events involved in the smoking and health controversy, Robert Miles in collaboration with Kim Cameron examines the range of strategic options used by the Big Six tobacco firms for adapting to this externally imposed crisis, and the relative effectiveness of different adaptation strategies used by the six companies: R. J. Reynolds, Liggett and Myers, American Brands, Lorillard, Brown and Williamson, and Philip Morris.

The three parts of the book describe the context of the study, discuss the strategies employed by the firms, and provide an assessment and interpretation of the findings.

Part 1 begins with a useful synthesis and interpretation of the literature on organization design and management strategy as it applies to the study. In particular, Miles frames the exploratory study conceptually with an emphasis on strategic managerial choice as opposed to the natural selection perspective, and on institutional criteria of organizational legitimacy and values. He does so without excluding the predominant concern of organizational efficiency that characterizes much of contemporary management literature. The remainder of part 1 reviews the major developments in the market and institutional environments of the U.S. tobacco industry over the past quarter century. Archival data are relied on in the presentation of the major environmental events and trends that constituted a fundamental threat to the legitimacy of the tobacco business.

Part 2 describes the Big Six tobacco companies' struggle to adapt to

the economic and political implications of the smoking and health threat. Three major kinds of adaptation strategies were employed: domain defense, domain offense, and domain creation.

The most immediate response of the Big Six to the smoking and health controversy was one of domain defense. The primary goal of this response was to restore and preserve the legitimacy of the cigarette business in its traditional market. The response to threat was the formation of industry-wide, joint political ventures, which employed two primary strategies: the creation and control of vital information about the health consequences of cigarette consumption and the lobbying and cooptation of influential politicians and interest groups. This response required a major departure from the traditional rivalry among the tobacco firms, which began to coalesce around the issues in order to influence or overpower the antismoking forces.

Simultaneously, the Big Six also engaged in unprecedented competitive rivalry for a share of the contracting market. This response set off a new wave of performance efficiency, involving major redeployments of capital toward product innovation and market segmentation. Thus, the Big Six were able to partition their traditional domain into political and market arenas and simultaneously engage in collaborative domain defense strategies and competitive domain offense strategies. Moreover, these cooperative and competitive strategies were found to be mutually reinforcing. Successful domain defense provided nearly a decade of precious time for the firms to operate in their traditional markets, and the legitimacy threat spurred on competitive innovations that led to the development and market acceptance of new cigarette brands that were lower in harmful "tar" and nicotine content; the new brands reduced some of the intensity of demands placed on the industry by antismoking forces.

But domain defense and domain offense strategies were not sufficient to permit the Big Six to continue to enjoy their traditional prosperity and growth; also employed were a set of domain creation strategies. The traditional industry was stagnating, so the firms also used the decade of time obtained from successful domain defense to create new domains in which to employ excess cash which could not be reinvested profitably in the domestic tobacco business. It was not long after the initial publicity about the smoking and health controversy, therefore, that the tobacco firms initiated a pattern of domain creation strategies that offered a greater growth potential and less economic and political risk. Among the strategies all six firms seized on were overseas expansion of their tobacco business and diversification into entirely new businesses. These strategies brought them into contact with new rivals and were conducted relatively independently of their historical domestic tobacco competitors. As a result of these domain creation strategies, all six firms were transformed from single-business tobacco companies to global, multibusiness corporations by 1975.

The relative effectiveness of different patterns of adaptation among the

six firms is also examined. On the basis of archival data plus interviews with top managers a number of important learning experiences are developed.

1. There is a dynamic interdependence among the domain offense, defense, and creation strategies used by the tobacco companies. In terms of product innovation, the most successful firms were those that timed the nature and intensity of their product innovations successfully in relation to the changing environmental conditions. Both tardiness and eagerness in the introduction of new products were penalized by the market that was moving, slowly at first but later rapidly, toward the "safer" cigarettes demanded by smokers and antismoking forces.

2. The classification of firms by the kinds of strategies they used—"analyzer," "prospector," "defender," and "reactor," as developed by Raymond E. Miles and Charles C. Snow in *Organizational Strategy* [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978])—was found to predict correctly the overall financial performance of the tobacco companies. The Analyzer (R. J. Reynolds) outperformed the Prospector (Philip Morris) and the Defender (American Brands), which, in turn, outperformed the Reactor (Liggett & Myers). The Defender, with its focus on the maintenance of the status quo, was less profitable than the innovative Prospector in the dynamic and uncertain environment the firms experienced.

3. Current perspectives on corporate strategy would lead us to expect that the tobacco firms would use different kinds of strategies for dealing with different kinds of environments. However, they consistently used the same kinds of strategies to diversify and expand into different international markets as they did in their common U.S. domestic tobacco market. Thus, the management of the tobacco firms appeared to use the same kind of strategy regardless of the environments they entered. However, the firms that were successful in domestic product innovation remained wedded to the traditional tobacco business, whereas those that failed in this domain offense strategy engaged more quickly and actively than others in domain creation strategies abroad.

4. The firms that diversified into "related businesses" were more successful than those that acquired "unrelated businesses." "Related" acquisitions were more easily assimilated than "unrelated" ones. However, the meaning of business "relatedness" became clear only after experience in new business domains. More accurate knowledge of "other" and of "self" came with experience in new businesses. Thus, through 15–20 years of trial and error with a diversification strategy, the senior executives of these companies acquired a substantial base of knowledge that became firmly established in the culture and formal planning systems of each organization to guide its future development.

Part 3 presents an extensive economic and sociopolitical assessment of the Big Six and their industry, develops a framework for studying organizational adaptation, and discusses the implications of the study for both senior executives and public policymakers.

According to the framework, the ability of an organization to adapt to

environmental threats depends on two boundary conditions: the degree of domain choice flexibility and the degree of organizational slack. Within these boundary conditions lies a set of relatively enduring organizational features or character-defining elements—strategic predisposition, distinctive competence, and dominant values and beliefs—and a range of strategic choices or adaptive modes—domain defense, domain offense, and domain creation—whose development and alignment are shaped by the process of executive leadership.

The developmental framework is innovative in that it is one of the first recent attempts to integrate the concerns of institutional legitimacy emphasized by Philip Selznick in 1957 (in *Leadership in Administration* [New York: Holt & Rinehart]) with the current preoccupation with organizational efficiency, using them as joint criteria for assessing strategic managerial behavior. Furthermore, the framework is important not only for linking the concepts of corporate culture or character with strategy formation and implementation but also for introducing degrees of environmental determinism and strategic choice into the corporate character and strategy development process. Unfortunately, although the framework moves in an innovative direction, these concepts are not adequately defined, and their relationships remain unspecified. As a result, we are offered only a limited explanation of how organizational character formation and strategy formation interact with executive leadership to achieve organizational legitimacy and efficiency. This interaction is a central theme underlying the very rich quantitative and qualitative data provided in this quarter-century history of the tobacco firms and their industry. It was therefore disappointing to find only a general and short theory-building section (pp. 251–56) devoted to the developmental framework. Its further development was prematurely terminated and deferred as an area for “future research.”

The concluding chapter on implications for public policy draws out the limits of public authority to control corporate behavior. Significant societal and global paradoxes have emerged as a result of almost every well-intentioned initiative taken by public policymakers during the smoking-and-health controversy. For example, public policymakers’ efforts to constrain the growth of the U.S. cigarette market have unwittingly resulted in the “exportation of America’s ‘smoking epidemic’ to other parts of the world, especially to developing nations in the Third World” (p. 266), as a result of the Big Six expanding their domestic cigarette market into the global arena.

These paradoxes also raise serious doubts about contemporary U.S. antitrust law (which is based on economists’ single-business model of the firm) in effectively controlling the negative side effects for society resulting from the adaptation strategies that these firms used (including cross-subsidizations, aggregate concentrations, and domain dominance in large, far-flung markets). Existing U.S. antitrust law appears ill equipped to handle these new corporate tactics of “internalizing benefits and externalizing costs.”

Overall, *Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies* is an important contribution to understanding the strategies organizations use to adapt to external crises. Readers will obtain many qualitative insights from this rich and detailed 25-year historical tracking of the Big Six tobacco corporations. The data base, created with a multidisciplinary framework in mind, could be used productively to examine a wide variety of corporate strategy and public policy issues beyond those that the authors address. Indeed, the book provides a positive demonstration of how an understanding of complex organizational behavior can be enhanced by means of a more holistic perspective than that provided by a given discipline or subspeciality.

Does Mass Communication Change Public Opinion after All? A New Approach to Effects Analysis. By James B. Lemert. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Inc., 1981. Pp. x + 253. \$17.95 (cloth); \$8.95 (paper).

David L. Paletz
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In the Winter 1977 issue of *Journalism Quarterly* (54:721-26), James Lemert and coauthors published an illuminating article entitled "Journalists and Mobilizing Information." It explained why most news stories fail to contain the kind of information that might inspire political participation by the public. It was one of several they produced on this general topic. Therefore I have looked forward to publication of Lemert's book, assuming it would develop and systematize the original insights and ideas. The provocative title, with its claim of providing a new approach to effects analysis, greatly enhanced such anticipation.

My expectation of an innovative and original book, lucidly argued and clearly organized, is only partly realized. In *Does Mass Communication Change Public Opinion after All?* numerous topics are raised, many of them significant, but the subsequent discussion is at best erratic.

According to Lemert, mass communication researchers have "tended toward a simple reductionist position that public opinion is a more-or-less straightforward sum of everybody's attitudes" (p. 2). Corollaries of this view are: "First, if mass communication does produce massive attitude change toward an issue, that change is *sufficient* to have produced a change in public opinion. Second . . . attitude change is *necessary* for public opinion change. . . . Third, the attitudes of all members of media audiences count the same . . ." (p. 2). Lemert is out to repudiate this model—neither a demanding nor a particularly original undertaking. He also proposes to establish a new and better model of public opinion—no easy task.

Public opinion, for Lemert, "is a perception imposed by the perceiver on information about citizen attitudes toward a publicly debated issue, personality, candidate, practice, or outcome" (p. 12). As for attitudes,

they are, essentially, states of affect (p. 20). The perceptions are imposed, usually by policymakers, on information about citizen attitudes with respect to elections and what he calls "influence frameworks" (meaning all other issues). Power in the public opinion process is defined as "the relative ability of political actors (a) to block or initiate public discussion of potential issues, (b) to influence perceptions of public opinion held by key decision-makers once an issue 'goes public,' (c) to define issues and options under discussion, (d) to influence participation by others, and (e) to induce decision-makers to adopt a given policy" (p. 35).

Having outlined his model, Lemert turns to how the news media help construct the facts to which people react and on which they act. He discusses the conditions and circumstances determining whether or not a potential issue is actually defined as such by the media; how that definition is determined; and then how the media go about defining public opinion itself. He next examines attitude change and formation, finding dramatic attitude effects among respondents in his case study of the 1976 New Hampshire and Massachusetts presidential primaries. This leads him to a chapter directly on the mass media and participation in which he identifies three types of media audience along dimensions of relevant issue attitudes, participation skills, and efficacy feelings. He shows how media content is varyingly able to move or not to move each type to participation. Lemert documents some dramatic increases that have occurred in "influence framework" participation when the mass media have contained "mobilizing information" but indicates that such occasions are rare (p. 116). He explains why.

Tying journalists to power discrepancies among participants, Lemert looks at the contribution of the media to several aspects of power, including access to experts, money, and decision makers. He concludes "that journalistic practices generally and systematically tend to support existing power discrepancies, whether or not journalists realize it" (p. 176).

The final two substantive chapters attempt to relate public opinion, political decision makers, and journalists. Lemert details some of the ways the media transmit information about public reactions. A major argument, convincingly made, is that policymakers are far more responsive to public opinion than has been conceived. The assets and limitations of polls as public opinion are then briefly considered.

To put it plainly, the book is an infuriating muddle. It contains several different, sometimes clashing approaches to the subject, with merit and misadventure in each. Thus, a typical chapter contains a plethora of observations—some shrewd, others banal; an array of questions—some thoughtful, others vacuous; and a flock of suggestions for research—some heuristic, others arid. Simultaneously, the book surveys much of the relevant literature. But it does so rather peculiarly: each paragraph will be devoted to outlining briefly a single study, some aspect of which (assumptions, methodology, conclusions) causes Lemert to cavil, quibble, or

quarrel (e.g., pp. 98–99). And too often topics are alluded to instead of being developed in depth. (Chapter 7 covers nine key power advantages in 12 pages.)

Lemert does have a controversial and disputable argument to make: that the media change public opinion through the changes they generate in participation and power. But the argument is never cogently and coherently presented in detail. Instead it disappears, and the book's undoubted originality is dissipated, amid the proliferation of studies cited, disconnected observations, questions posed in no apparent logical order, and ad hoc research proposals.

It is gratifying to have Lemert's research (some of it conducted with the aid of talented students) rescued from relative obscurity and preserved in book form. But he has not yet advanced beyond his original ideas. As he writes, "We are still so busy identifying and naming the things in which we should be interested that we haven't gotten much beyond that stage" (p. 211).

Communication Networks: Toward a New Paradigm for Research. By Everett M. Rogers and D. Lawrence Kincaid. New York: Free Press, 1981. Pp. xiv + 386. \$19.95.

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According to the authors the purpose of this book "is to present what is currently known about communication networks and to illustrate methods of network analysis. *Communication network analysis* is a method of research for identifying the communication structure in a system, in which relational data about communication flows are analyzed by using some type of interpersonal relationship as the unit of analysis. This distinctive emphasis of network analysis upon communication links, rather than on isolated individuals, as the units of analysis, enables the researcher to explore the influence of other individuals on human behavior" (p. xi; author's italics).

In *Communication Networks*, Everett Rogers and Lawrence Kincaid argue that communication research in the past has been hampered by a research paradigm that, like that of most surveys, uses only the individual as the unit of analysis. The result is theory unable to deal effectively with human communication as a "*process of mutual information exchange*" (p. xi; author's italics). In a nutshell, then, they seek to upgrade communication theory by bringing social network concepts into it, together with the related methodology.

This is an ambitious task, but they succeed well at it; and, in doing so, they have put together a readable review of those facets of the now rapidly proliferating social network literature that are most relevant for their specific interests.

The authors object to much of the social network literature as "over-mathematized, confusing in terminology and concepts, and devoid of much application that would aid the understanding of human behavior" (p. xii). They then set out to present social network concepts relevant to communication theory entirely without mathematics.

There are seven major chapters and a summing-up chapter. The first presents a detailed ethnology of the South Korean village of Oryu Li, the site of an extensive family planning study carried out by the authors. The task of understanding the dynamics of the diffusion of family planning technology motivated the use of network concepts. The data from this village are used extensively throughout the book as a vehicle for illustrating propositions in communication theory and for illustrating the various uses of social network methods, their advantages, and their limitations.

A second chapter develops the authors' "convergence model" of communication (p. 31). Concepts from systems theory are brought together with earlier communications theory and social-psychological constructs.

The third chapter presents "the general philosophy of network analysis as an approach to research on human communication and behavior change" (p. 79). Data and data structures are discussed, problems of measurement of network attributes are reviewed, and a fairly extended discussion of multiple levels of analysis in social science research is presented.

The fourth chapter gets to the nuts-and-bolts part of network research. Measures of proximity in a network, methods of analyzing communication network data, an extended analysis of the Korean village, and a comparison of five network analysis techniques all applied to the village data are the topics of the chapter. The methods compared include direct factor analysis, factor analysis of correlations between connectedness patterns, smallest-space analysis, enumeration of maximally complete subgraphs (the SOCK and COMPLT algorithms), blockmodeling with CONCOR, and the use of the NEGOPY algorithm.

The following chapter explores the use of social network variables as predictors of the behavior of individuals. Structural variables from several levels are used. Characteristics of egocentric networks are used to explain ego's behavior; the effects of cliques and even attributes of larger social groupings are reviewed. A considerable amount of effort is given to assessing the ways in which weak ties influence behavior.

Chapter 6 turns the perspective around. The characteristics of communication networks are viewed from the perspective of their impact on group and system performance. Stepwise regression is used to analyze variation in family planning knowledge and attitudes, and variation in adoption rates, aggregated up to the village level. Communications network variables, village characteristics, mothers' club variables, and characteristics of mothers' club leaders are the four types of attributes that were used as predictors at the village level ($N = 24$). This is perhaps the weakest part of the book.

The final chapter explores the factors that seem always to account heavily for who tends to be linked to whom—physical proximity and

homophilous social characteristics. The ultimate objective is to identify "how the spatial and social structures of a system influence the communication structure" (p. 298). The unit is the dyad. In addition, the literature on the stability of network links is reviewed.

It is useful to ask three questions in reviewing a work: (1) Are the stated goals worth pursuing? (2) To what extent does the author succeed in achieving those goals? (3) Is anything else useful accomplished along the way even if the author's particular goal is low priority on one's own list?

With regard to *Communication Networks*, my answers are: (1) Yes, their chosen tasks are worthwhile. (2) Yes, the authors succeed in infusing communications theory with a healthy dose of rich network concepts in their convergence model. They succeed in presenting an overview of network analysis in such a way that one who is put off by mathematics can get an intuitive understanding of it and perhaps see its relevance to one's own pursuits. (3) What is in the book for those of us that are of another stripe than nonmathematical communications theorists? Plenty! First, everyone's theory can be honed by rubbing it on a social network stone. Communications theory is, in my view, relevant to practically everything in the social sciences, and it takes only a little sociological imagination to apply the wealth of ideas in this book to one's own area. Second, this is one of the most readable books about social science that I have ever encountered. Third, it really does convey very clearly what social network analysis is all about. Almost all the important concepts, issues, and problems receive some attention. Of paramount importance is the attention given to the use of different levels of analysis in studying the same social phenomenon.

However, there are some really serious flaws. I would have preferred a controlled ordering of variables into a step regression program, an ordering which was consistent with the best available theoretical and commonsense specification of the equations being estimated. The "data cube" concept (pp. 80–81) was made obsolete by the very development of social network techniques. There is not a sufficient discussion of the concept of network boundary and the often portentous impact of the usual arbitrary choice on the research findings. The comparison of network structural analysis algorithms lacks a precise definition of what it means to produce similar results. I would have liked a clearer elaboration of the distinction between network analysis algorithms based on local density or connectedness (like SOCK) and the structural equivalence models (like CONCOR).

But perhaps the book's worst fault is that its objectives assume what I believe to be a fallacy—that you can gain an adequate understanding of social network analysis without knowing some mathematics. My own experience is that you do not need to be able to prove theorems, but you really do need to know at least some graph theory and some matrix algebra.

Nonetheless, in one area the authors have surpassed every other book on network analysis that I have seen—they have somehow succeeded in putting the people back into the analysis.

Polls Apart: A Report from the Kettering Foundation. By John P. Robinson and Robert Meadow. Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1982. Pp. xvii + 183. \$14.95.

Tom Smith
National Opinion Research Center

Polls Apart by John P. Robinson and Robert Meadow is the latest in a small but excellent series of books on public opinion polls published by Seven Locks Press. (Its forerunners are Charles W. Roll and Albert H. Cantril, *Polls: Their Use and Misuse in Politics* [expanded edition; originally New York: Basic, 1972] and Albert H. Cantril, ed., *Polling on the Issues* [1980].) This book started as a report on the "10-city" study. In 1976-77 the State Department conducted a series of foreign affairs seminars in a number of cities. To compare the input received from these public discussions with the attitudes of the general public on foreign affairs the Kettering Foundation funded local polls in each of the cities. From this starting point the authors expanded into an evaluation of foreign policy polling in general and focused on the weaknesses of current polling practices and how these shortcomings could be ameliorated.

This broadening of perspectives is both fortunate and unfortunate. It is fortunate in that the authors have carried out an insightful review of public opinion polling on foreign affairs. Examining polls in four areas (SALT II, the Panama Canal treaty, U.S.-Soviet relations, and the United Nations), they find a "disturbing lack of convergence" (p. 61). Strict and rigorous comparisons are difficult. The authors must simultaneously juggle sampling error, diverse wordings, differences in timing, and other variants. Given so many uncontrolled variables, one might wonder how a coherent comparison can be made among the disparate polls, but Robinson and Meadow are able to demonstrate several discrepancies in levels of support and trends. Drawing on recent work in survey methodology as well as their own analysis of the four case studies, they offer both specific suggestions for improving polls on foreign affairs (e.g., including an explicit "no opinion" option and using some open-ended questions) and general recommendations on the design and analysis of polls.

Unfortunately, the analysis of the 10-city study takes second place to this main course. Although the analysis is informative, we are left like Oliver Twist saying, "Please, sir, I want some more." Much of the analysis has been shunted away to appendixes; other areas are omitted completely. It would have been better if Robinson and Meadow had written two books, one covering their main theme on polling discrepancies and another giving greater depth to the 10-city study.

It would also have been better if more errors and oversights had been gleaned from the text. For example, (a) the National Opinion Research Center and the Opinion Research Corporation are continually mixed up and intertwined (pp. 51, 53, 62); (b) the 10-city study actually consists of 11 surveys in nine cities, with one survey inexplicably ignored (pp. 69, 71); and (c) certain questions cited as having identical wordings actually

employ variant wordings (e.g., p. 58, table 6A). But like dermatopathy these errors, while irritating, are never fatal.

Who should read *Polls Apart*? Survey researchers who want to improve their art; journalists and other poll watchers who have to interpret the delphic messages of the polls; foreign policy specialists who need to understand the interaction of uninformed, informed, and elite opinion on international issues; and social scientists who are interested in the nature and measurement of attitudes—*Polls Apart* should be a welcome addition to the bookshelves of all of these groups.

The French Press: Class, State, and Ideology. By J. W. Freiberg. With a Foreword by Ernest Mandel. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981. Pp. xxvii + 320. \$31.95.

Robert O. Paxton
Columbia University

J. W. Freiberg's aim in *The French Press* is a complete "political economy" of the French newspaper press since 1945. Writing from a point of view that is both Marxist and structuralist, he sets out to map the whole universe of social, political, and ideological forces that shape the French press.

The owners are the most salient force, of course. Collaboration with the Nazi occupation having discredited the prewar owners, the French press emerged at the Liberation in 1945 a mass of small, politically oriented papers controlled by their journalists and rooted in Resistance experience. Despite proposals to codify journalists' control, the press shifted back under the Fourth and Fifth Republics to the prewar pattern: a few industrialists owning and controlling large-circulation papers that provide depoliticized and sensationalized information. This return of a "press bourgeoisie" to dominance over the French press is Freiberg's starting point.

The state is another force, particularly the interventionist French state. Freiberg analyzes the various ways in which the French state influences newspapers. He assumes, a bit willfully, that the return to oligarchic, mass journalism in France was an instance of "class-based state intervention" (p. 168), in this case the negative act of refusing to block the process. But he avoids the simplistic view that the state is merely an agent of the possessing classes, admitting instances in which entrepreneurs quarrel among themselves and in which the administration opposes them in the interest of longer-range stability.

The content of newspapers also has a place in Freiberg's political economy. Rejecting a crude intentionalist view that the press-owning oligarchy deliberately debases public taste with sports and sensationalism, Freiberg advances a subtler "two-tier" intentionalism by which the press upholds class divisions by offering something for the elite (e.g., *Le Monde*) as well

as for the uncultivated majority. He offers good pages on the inherently conservative import of sensationalist press coverage.

Freiberg includes labor relations within newspaper production in his study, showing that the trend, here too, is toward greater owner control over both printers and journalists.

Whether or not one accepts Freiberg's efforts to develop a "critical theory" of the newspaper medium, the book offers a wealth of information about the French press since 1945. The sections on the collapse of the old Prouvost empire and the rise of the new Hersant empire are particularly rich, as are discussions of the peculiar semicollective administration of *Le Monde*, the powerful Hachette monopoly, the professional organizations of both printers and journalists, and "the longest strike in French labor history," at the *Parisien libéré* in 1975-77. There are interesting reflections on the particularities of the French press as compared with that of other nations: its relative diversity, the relatively low volume of advertising, the greater role of the state, the survival of some party papers, and the absence of investigative journalism, which Freiberg attributes to overt state repression through stringent libel and privacy laws. There are some acid remarks about *l'Humanité* which, as a good man of the left, Freiberg finds authoritarian and sensationalist, a mirror image of its enemy.

Some readers will not warm to Freiberg's long theoretical sections. He strives for an enclosed, all-encompassing model which fits every aspect of the capitalist press into one system of class defense and reproduction. There is no room for mere greed or vanity or amusement to explain why a businessman might buy a newspaper. For Freiberg, the "free press" (his quotation marks) is an astute cover for what is really a power relationship. Nevertheless, he strives to rise above some of the cruder determinisms of this genre, and he knows the world of French journalism very well. His book is a valuable complement to the last volume of the great Bellanger history of the French press.

Media and the American Mind: From Morse to McLuhan. By Daniel Czitrom. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 254. \$19.95.

Michael Schudson
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Henry James wrote, near the end of the 19th century, that people "may have been great fools to develop the post office, to invent the newspaper and the railway; but the harm is done—it will be our children who will see it; we have created a Frankenstein monster at whom our simplicity can only gape." It was typical of American thinkers in the 19th century and the early part of this century to take media of communication and transportation as the emblems of the age and, for good or ill, the chief

agents of modernity. The mainstream of thought in the social sciences in the past several generations, however, has turned away from the elements of society at which 19th-century Americans gaped and stared. With a passion for the great tradition of European social thought, American sociology after Robert Park turned from communication to work and class as the issues defining the scope of sociology. There is, of course, a sociology of mass communication, just as there is a sociology of medicine or religion or any other institutional sector of society. But communication has not been a central theoretical concept in sociology for more than 50 years.

Daniel Czitrom's book will not change that, but it gives us an opportunity to consider what role the idea of communication once played in American thought. The time is ripe, as some sociologists (following Daniel Bell) discuss "information" as the organizing principle on which power rests in a postindustrial era or as Marxist sociologists reevaluate the role of "culture" in the political process and the symbolic means employed to establish legitimacy and maintain authority in our time.

Media and the American Mind combines two intentions. First, Czitrom reviews the popular and intellectual responses to three new media in America, the telegraph, the movies, and radio. Second, he presents the development of "theories of modern communication," recounting the works of Charles Cooley, John Dewey, Robert Park, Paul Lazarsfeld, and finally Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan. All of this is managed with both brevity and clarity and with a judicious frame of mind. If Czitrom has any axes to grind, he has kept them in his knapsack.

In the section on the telegraph, movies, and radio, Czitrom is very interesting. This is especially so with the telegraph, a technology generally neglected in media studies. His chapters on the movies and radio, while good, cover more familiar territory without adding notably to received wisdom. He focuses on the telegraph because, as he says, it was the first medium to "split communication (of information, thought) from transportation (of people, materials)" (p. 11). While many of us are aware of Henry David Thoreau's skepticism about the value of the telegraph, Czitrom reminds us that he was in a distinct minority. Most observers were nearer the astonishment and hopefulness of Samuel Morse himself in his famous first message, "What hath God wrought?"

But the telegraph "developed as a private monopoly rather than a shared resource; though a common carrier, it was not a truly public means of communication" (p. 29). This was a model that the next developments in communication would also follow (though Czitrom's view here would have to be modified if he had examined the telephone rather than movies and radio).

In the second half of the book, Czitrom moves from cultural history (a history of responses to new technologies) to intellectual history (an account of the works of theorists). I do not think this shift well justified, and the book seems an uneasy splicing of two distinct monographs. Nonetheless, the second part, too, is a work of some distinction. The field of communication usually traces its origins to the rise of propaganda, public relations, and radio in the 1920s and to empirical social research in the

1930s responding to those changes. Czitrom recalls, however, the earlier progressive vision of communication in the work of Charles Cooley, John Dewey, and Robert Park, who "expressed great hope for the potential of the new media to reconstitute neighborhood community values in a complex industrial society" (p. 112). They believed the media would promote "a democratically achieved consensus in American public life" (p. 119). None of them, however, examined closely the growing institutions of the media and their "darker side" of leveling, not raising, cultural attainments.

Czitrom moves on to consider the rise of empirical media research. Here he rightly emphasizes the work of Paul Lazarsfeld. He notes that film study split off as a separate field, especially psychoanalytic interpretations of film and its effects, and that the Frankfurt School sociologists, Robert Lynd, C. Wright Mills, and others essayed alternative approaches but that none successfully challenged the Lazarsfeld tradition in the center of sociology. Instead, the most successful break with the empirical tradition came from Canada in the work of Marshall McLuhan and, through him, the work of his mentor, Harold Innis. Czitrom is especially lucid in this chapter as explicator of two often obscure thinkers. He shows how McLuhan moved from traditional literary studies, partly under the influence of Innis and partly as chair in 1953–55 of a Ford Foundation-sponsored interdisciplinary seminar at Toronto on culture and communication. While Innis worked on the impact of media technology on social institutions, McLuhan concerned himself with the impact of media on the individual. Czitrom suggests that McLuhan reinvented the Christian myth in his work, with an Eden of oral culture, a Fall of the phonetic alphabet and print, and a paradise regained of the electronic media. The emphasis on mythology is important, as Czitrom judges McLuhan to have "substituted mythology for history by ignoring or distorting the real historical and sociological factors that shaped media institutions" (p. 180). He writes aptly, "His technological naturalism made media biological rather than social extensions of man."

The volume is useful, the first half as the most compact and readable account I know of the reception of three new media, the second half as a fair-minded summary of key 20th-century thinkers on the media.

What the book lacks is an argument. There is no drama here, no *point* Czitrom insists on. The tone is that of Alistaire Cooke on "Masterpiece Theater," admirably intelligent and gentle, a host introducing us to a subject but at the same time detached, perceptive but unpenetrating, almost too gentlemanly.

The discontinuity between the 19th century's conviction that the media of communication are at the center of the human story and 20th century social science's assumption that communication is just one institutional complex among others is reproduced in the discontinuity between the two halves of Czitrom's book. Why he did not continue the good work of part 1 with chapters on TV and computers, I do not know; it would have made a much more important volume. As it is, the book will be a useful and readable reference and a very accessible reminder that the question of the centrality of the concept of communication is returning once more.

Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change. By Sharon Zukin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 212. \$16.95.

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During the 1950s and 1960s, a substantial number of New York artists moved into lofts in Soho and other sections of Lower Manhattan, setting up their easels alongside button factories, underwear manufacturers, and other light industry. Although these pioneers were heralded by the media and, in some instances, protected by law, within only a few years they, along with their industrial neighbors, were gone, exiled to Hoboken and Carroll Gardens, their loft apartments subdivided into luxury co-ops. The artists were an unwitting avant-garde—for a new form of domestic culture and for an invading army of real estate developers. The result of the invasion, according to Sharon Zukin in *Loft Living*, is redevelopment without social or fiscal benefits: large-scale service industries remaking the city in their own image and displacing waves of manufacturers, artists, and upper-middle-class professionals in the process.

Zukin weaves together adroitly the many strands of her complex story. Following Castells, she analyzes the transformation of the city as the outcome of class struggle mediated by the actions of the state—or, more precisely, of conflict among factions of the dominant class: industrial manufacture, artists, the professional-managerial class, real estate developers, patrician elites, and bankers. (Pluralists might call these interest groups but would be discomfited by the regularity with which the three latter groups get their way.)

Loft living, according to Zukin, resulted from the conjuncture of three related developments: long-term efforts by New York's "patrician elite" to drive light manufacturing out of Manhattan; short cycles in the real estate market, such as the office-space surplus of the early 1970s; and the emergence of "bourgeois chic" (an amalgam of eco-consciousness, historic preservationism, and high-tech domesticity best captured in the pages of *New York* magazine). Stymied by middle-class opposition in their efforts to raze what became Soho, elites and bankers seized on artistic and commercial use of manufacturing lofts as an alternative to slash-and-burn development at about the same time that developers sought alternatives to lagging markets for new office buildings and suburban shopping malls, and upper-middle-class renters and small investors came (or were pushed by the price of alternatives) to embrace an aesthetic conducive to loft conversion.

Zukin highlights the role of the state (usually in the guise of city agencies) in facilitating the achievement of the developer/patrician/banker coalition's aims. Through zoning, the state closed off areas to light manufacture and legitimated, first, the artists' and, eventually, the middle class's use of loft space. Through tax breaks and subsidies, developers were subsidized to gut loft buildings into multiunit sardine-can apartment complexes. Through aid to artists and support for artists' housing projects,

the state both subsidized the opening wedge of the loft market and legitimated the artist as a cultural ideal.

Loft Living is not just about cities. It is about markets as well, and Zukin argues compellingly that such convenient reifications as supply and demand make little sense in politically turbulent markets like real estate. "Demand" for industrial use remained stable throughout the 1960s, contrary to the claims of urban planners. It fell off only when bank investment policies and government plans made continued occupancy appear untenable. Demand for residential use was stimulated by public support for artists' domestic R & D. The demand of investors for places in which to invest and of developers for projects elicited government actions to ensure supply. Markets for housing were powerful stimulants to Soho's transformation, but these markets were politically and socially constructed.

Loft Living is also about culture and government policy toward the arts, and here Zukin's arguments are less compelling. She perceptively identifies affinities among elements of the new "cult of domesticity" but fails to locate the changes in status competition engendered by the coming of age of a college-educated baby-boom generation. More important, her instrumentalist version of the state's entry into the arts attributes to public arts policy a coherence and potency that it has never had, even in New York, where the arts receive unparalleled levels of public support. In positing the existence of a new "artistic mode of production," she comes perilously close to mistaking a curious footnote to economic change—the temporary coincidence of cultural and economic interest—for the change itself and, in so doing, dilutes the force of her structural analysis.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, *Loft Living* is an impressive book. Zukin entered the tangled world of zoning law, development politics, and real estate markets, analyzed documents and conducted interviews until she understood that world and was able to make us understand it, and emerged with a persuasive analysis of what may be the fundamental model for urban change in the second half of this century. One cannot understand Soho—or Ghirardelli Square or Faneuil Hall or the ubiquitous variations and clones—without reading it.

New York: The Politics of Urban Regional Development. By Michael N. Danielson and Jameson W. Doig. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982. Pp. xxiv + 376. \$27.50.

Mark Baldassare
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New York is the fourth in a series of case studies concerning regional government published by the University of California Press. The previous works involving London, Stockholm, and Toronto provide an interesting contrast with the American context. In this latest book, we are given a detailed account of the intricate relationships among governmental en-

tities in a region composed of enormously varying development issues. Given the qualities of the American political and economic system, the challenges of coordinating regional development seem uniquely difficult. While the New York area undoubtedly offers an extreme example of development, the authors provide a framework for understanding urban issues which is clearly applicable to other regions of the United States.

The book will be best remembered for refuting a common belief that government has little independent influence on development. In fact, Michael Danielson and Jameson Doig document convincingly the fact that government organization, decisions, and actions have made a difference in the New York region. This claim will surely be out of favor in both conservative and Marxist academic circles. Yet, the fact is that the authors have gathered overwhelming evidence to support their views, while those with more extreme political positions have done little but cite their own dogma. It is important to note that the authors are rather modest in their views about government's influence, fully recognizing the limitations and constraints, and are cautious in overstepping the bounds of their data.

The study of the New York region offers a challenge of staggering proportions. Three states are involved; 31 counties and over 700 municipalities are included. And, of course, each government has its own bureaucracy and special arrangements with the federal system. How to analyze the relationships, both formal and informal, and chart their influences over time is the major problem that faced the researchers in communicating their knowledge.

The success of this work has several sources. First, the authors limited their inquiry to the distribution of population, jobs, and transportation facilities. They ignore the placement and functioning of education, police, health, and social services. Admittedly a disappointment for many sociologists, this is a necessity in keeping the analysis manageable. Another important organizing force is a clear-cut analytical focus. In examining government's role in urban development, Danielson and Doig consider two principles foremost: the degree to which governments act independently and the degree to which governments' actions have real effects. Both factors are on a continuum, since governments' independence and effects can vary widely. The plotting of specific government actions along these dimensions provides more general statements about urban development. For example, some less affluent suburban areas may be rather dependent on economic forces but still able to affect development, while more wealthy suburban enclaves act relatively independently and can have a strong influence on development. One can then build from these statements to see the larger picture of development in the New York region. A final factor in successfully sorting through the New York data is the authors' apparent hands-on experience with the region. The study has an important qualitative element of familiarity with events, geography, and people. This is evident in the numerous maps, pictures, and diagrams scattered throughout the text. Such are the detail and memorabilia that "New Yorkophiles," irrespective of intellectual interests, can

find this book enjoyable and informative. One has the sense that the authors know their study site intimately, almost in an anthropological style, and are immensely successful in bringing their personal and academic knowledge to our attention.

The book begins with an interesting foreword which reviews the New York case study and places it in comparative perspective. Of the 10 chapters that follow, the first two introduce the authors' theoretical perspectives on governmental relations and summarize the development of the New York region. The next two chapters are concerned with suburban governments' attempts to control the movement of people and industry. We learn how and why government seeks to regulate land use and the reasons suburban municipalities vary in their degree of success. The three subsequent chapters present the basic evidence regarding regional government. The regional agencies are introduced, and case studies of highway development and mass transit operation in the New York area are provided. Perhaps the planning needed to move people from home to workplace best represents the existence of and need for regional coordination in major metropolitan areas. The next two chapters review the planning initiatives in the region's urban core, citing the problems of resource allocation and urban renewal. The evidence in these instances offers a sobering perspective on the failures and complicated tasks associated with reviving older cities. The final chapter presents an overview and a look forward. Danielson and Doig do not present unrealistic solutions, and, perhaps correctly for this era, they predict little change in the patterns of government influence.

New York is an important addition to knowledge in urban sociology, political science, and regional science. It is an unusually thorough and carefully presented case study. It has few equals in examining the role of government influence on urban trends. It should inspire similar studies of other regions and complementary research focusing on topics other than urban development.

Regionalism and the South: Selected Papers of Rupert Vance. Edited by John Shelton Reed and Daniel Joseph Singal. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xxii + 353. \$26.00.

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Rupert Vance was a lifelong resident of the South and a sociologist who for a half-century helped to document and interpret the changes in that region. He is remembered for several major books, most notably *Human Geography of the South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932), and for more than 100 articles contributed to journals, including this one.

From Vance's works, John Shelton Reed and Daniel Joseph Singal have selected 23 papers originally published from 1928 to 1971. The topics of

Regionalism in the South range from the study of a specific southern community (McRae, Ga.) to more general analyses of the region or aspects of it, such as family or economic and educational institutions, with emphasis on demographic changes and urbanization of the South, including Vance's suggestions for public policy and planning. Alternating with the empirical material are articles reflecting Vance's efforts to construct a sound theoretical basis for the specialty of regional sociology, an enterprise initiated by his department chairman and mentor, Howard Odum, who had come to Chapel Hill in 1920.

Today hardly any sociologists identify themselves as regional sociologists. Since the regional approach has thrived in other social sciences, the apparent fate of regional sociology is puzzling. Reed addresses this mystery in the introduction to this book and elsewhere (*One South* [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982]). For example, here it is suggested that regional sociology, considered as a response to what is today termed "underdevelopment," was perceived as somehow less appropriate as the South modernized and that as a theoretical area, it probably became submerged in the development of human ecology.

Regionalism and the South conveys successfully the breadth of Vance's interests. Here is pithy detail from a man who knew his home region well and had a sincere desire (based partly on his own parents' fate in the cotton culture) to attack its major problems. One sees the reason for his conviction that all social sciences have to be brought to bear for full comprehension of a region. Although Vance was better at documenting problems than at spelling out solutions, he was still more skilled at the latter than most academic sociologists would be. He is also most readable. After enjoying his papers on the Brothers Taylor of Tennessee and "Jeff Davis the Little" of Arkansas, one wishes that Vance could have completed a study of political leadership that had been projected under the title *Spellbinders of the Old South*.

Anyone interested in the concept of the region as a social entity and in the need for scientific theory and methodology for regional research should read this book. Anyone interested in the history of American sociology, or in the history of the South, or simply in the intellectual development of one gifted scholar of the 20th century, also will find this a rewarding book, meticulously edited and handsomely produced.

A Deplorable Scarcity: The Failure of Industrialization in the Slave Economy. By Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981. Pp. xiii + 237. \$19.00.

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Ohio State University

Since the antebellum period ended, scholars and observers have argued widely that the economy of the South before the Civil War was traditional

and backward. The Industrial Revolution that was under way in the Northeast and emerging in the Northwest was bypassing the South. *A Deplorable Scarcity* investigates the major hypotheses that have been advanced to explain the region's industrial backwardness. Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss combine data from the 1850 and 1860 census manuscript schedules of manufacturing with economic analysis to sift through arguments and to construct a plausible explanation for the South's failure to industrialize.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the southern industrial economy from the colonial period to the Civil War. This section discusses the evolution of industry within an economy dominated by export staples. The available statistical evidence generally supports the view that the South's manufacturing economy was relatively small, undiversified, and dominated by traditional processing industries.

Chapter 2 presents the major hypotheses that have been proposed to explain southern industrial backwardness. The most straightforward explanation is that the region's endowment of factors of production and the prices of staples led the South to emphasize agriculture. Other possible explanations are that the planter class imposed legal and social obstacles to industrialization; that slavery retarded development through effects on capital accumulation, the unsuitability of slave labor for industrial work, the work values of the white population, immigration of white workers to the South, and fear of slave rebellions; that southerners lacked entrepreneurial and managerial ability; and that limited market size restricted southern industrial development.

Subsequent chapters evaluate the hypotheses. The authors' examination of production and cost functions by industry and region indicates that the potential for economies of scale was limited. This finding suggests that limited market size would not have impeded industrialization. The slavery hypotheses blame the peculiar institution for restricting the supply of inputs to industry, but Bateman and Weiss argue that supplies were adequate. Commercial conventions, newspaper reports, magazine articles, and other qualitative evidence suggest that many planters supported industrialization. The most interesting and intriguing result presented, however, is that the rate of return was nearly three times higher in southern manufacturing than in agriculture during the late antebellum period. Discrepancies in favor of manufacturing were almost as great in other regions. Using an intuitive approach, Bateman and Weiss argue that capital gains, information costs, and risk cannot explain the high return to manufacturing. Because the South was relatively slow to expand manufacturing capacity in this environment, the authors find support for the hypothesis of entrepreneurial failure. The picture that emerges from their analysis "lies somewhere between that suggested by the proponents of the comparative advantage explanation and that of believers in southern irrationality" (p. 163).

While the authors contend skillfully with many explanations for southern industrial backwardness, several of which required translation into

testable statements, I was disappointed by the lack of attention given to the possible underlying role of education. There is evidence that high levels of education promoted rapid industrialization elsewhere (Lars G. Sandberg, "The Case of the Impoverished Sophisticate: Human Capital and Swedish Economic Growth before World War I," *Journal of Economic History* 39 [March 1979]: 225-41). Although the data on education available in the 1850 and 1860 census manuscript schedules and the published census are limited, some analysis of the effect of education on regional differences in the pace of industrialization is possible with these data.

A Deplorable Scarcity makes a significant contribution to our understanding of an important era of American economic development. The work will be widely cited and used for its treatment of several long-standing economic and historical questions. The methodology emphasizes lines of economic causation, but the implications will appeal to anyone with an interest in the antebellum American economy and society. In areas involving technical issues, Bateman and Weiss state conclusions in terms that are accessible to a wide audience.

The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry. By Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison. New York: Basic Books, 1982. Pp. x + 323. \$19.95.

Arne L. Kalleberg
Indiana University

The Deindustrialization of America addresses the extent, causes, and consequences of a major social problem of the 1980s: *deindustrialization*, the widespread and systematic disinvestment in "sunset" manufacturing industries such as autos, steel, and machinery. In contrast to the rapid expansion and growth that fueled the predominance of American firms in these industries in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1970s were characterized by increased foreign competition and declining growth. In response to these changing conditions, American corporations have preferred to acquire new plants, diversify into "sunrise" industries, and invest abroad rather than upgrade American plants and workers in these basic industries. Capital mobility accelerated in the latter half of the 1970s and, according to Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, has now become unacceptably rapid.

This research project was commissioned in 1979 by a coalition of trade unions and community organizations concerned about plant closings in the United States. Its concern is well founded, and Bluestone and Harrison document well the social and personal costs associated with industrial change. Large numbers of jobs are lost, resulting in long-term unemployment for many who cannot find jobs in expanding industries and insecurity about continued employment prospects for others. Unemployment has a profound impact on physical and mental health: each

1% increase in the unemployment rate is estimated to result in an additional 37,000 deaths. These dislocations have ripple effects and produce conditions that often break up communities.

Bluestone and Harrison provide a neo-Marxist interpretation of *why* and *how* the American economy is undergoing deindustrialization. The centralization of capital makes possible the conglomerate, currently the dominant form of business organization. Conglomerates depend on cash for their flexibility and are committed ultimately to cash management rather than particular product lines. Hence, when faced with declining profits, the "new managerialists" responded by selling plants that were not productive "enough" even if they were still viable businesses of importance to their communities. Jobs were exported during the 1950–80 period: the direct foreign investments of U.S. firms increased markedly compared with their domestic investments. Pressures to increase profits also make conglomerates less willing to honor the "social contract" with labor, as they move in search of good "business climates."

The final part of the book discusses various policy options raised by the "Great Reindustrialization Debate," which focuses on how to build stable, equitable, and humane communities and still have economic growth. Bluestone and Harrison point out limitations of many current proposals: the "conservative" strategy of reducing the "welfare state" by eliminating "social safety nets" and relying on the private market to determine winners and losers (the major policies here involve tax cuts); the "liberal" strategy of relying mainly on the market but depending on the government to alleviate its imperfections by means of the "political business cycle"; and the new "corporatist" strategy of using tripartite industrial committees (consisting of leaders from business, labor, and the government) to direct investments toward "sunrise" industries.

Bluestone and Harrison generally feel that these policies are limited and that, in order to organize production with a "human face," a broader program that emphasizes "democratic socialist reindustrialization" is necessary. Their policy recommendations are aimed mainly at preserving American jobs in "sunset" industries by slowing down and alleviating the consequences of "hypermobility." These include: rebuilding the social safety net to provide workers and their families with more, not less, security; plant-closing legislation (e.g., advance notification, income maintenance, job replacement); and the development of public-private partnerships to make decisions about the structuring of sunrise and sunset industries. Their political program goes beyond the issue of capital mobility, however, and calls for a restructuring of the values and practices of American business. This includes a democratic participatory approach to the management of business firms and the recognition that social costs must be balanced with private profits as a basis for industrial planning.

By raising the consciousness of social scientists and others regarding the nature and costs of capital mobility, Bluestone and Harrison have done us all an important service. Nevertheless, their book has its limitations. Their explanations tend to be simplistic; in particular, they over-

emphasize the role of capital mobility. It is clear that capital flight leaves in its wake high social and personal costs, but it is also clear that capital mobility is not the fundamental problem. Mobility of firms and jobs is only a reaction to changes in the nature of international trade in a world economy. Such factors as declining economic growth in all major industrial nations create unemployment and community disruption, regardless of the rate of capital mobility. Slowing the rate of capital mobility may in fact *increase* unemployment and slow rates of job creation. The book's arguments could be stronger if they were subjected to more systematic empirical analyses designed to assess the relative determinants of unemployment and other consequences of deindustrialization. Such evidence is essential for informed policy decisions concerning the management of industrial change and its consequences. These gaps in the argument will undoubtedly spur others to gather data that would permit the kinds of empirical analyses required to resolve some of the questions raised.

The "reindustrialization/deindustrialization" debate is more political than economic. Bluestone and Harrison's policy recommendations, many of which are not well grounded empirically, will create considerable controversy among those who favor other courses of action. Nevertheless, they have pointed to what is perhaps the fundamental economic problem of the 1980s: the need for business, labor, and the state to develop institutions and strategies that will facilitate the necessary transition from "sunset" to "sunrise" industries. By pointing to the inadequacies of our existing institutions for dealing with these industrial transformations, *The Deindustrialization of America* makes an important contribution.

America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall of the Politics of Growth. By Alan Wolfe. New York: Pantheon Books, 1981. Pp. 293. \$16.50.

Harvey L. Molotch
University of California, Santa Barbara

Alan Wolfe's book was written in response to the claim that "no adequate treatment of the postwar experience in foreign and domestic policy existed." While some might argue the point, it served well enough to stimulate what is indeed an ambitious (and very timely) project. Wolfe's thesis in *America's Impasse* is that both domestic and foreign policy have been plagued by a sort of schizoid inconsistency—a pathology not due, however, to personality quirks of the American leadership or disturbances in the national character. Rather, the troubles arise from very concrete aspects of U.S. political and economic processes.

The more progressive of our policymakers, Wolfe argues, must constantly compromise the content of their programs. Thereby counterproductive results are assured; there is a goal-displacement process at work over the course of history. That liberal Democrats and Republican moderates occupied positions of power throughout the postwar era counted

for little when they adopted conservative policies to get their programs enacted. After the dust settles, only the symbolic reality of the various "national commitments" (e.g., a decent home for every American) remains.

On the domestic front, Wolfe goes through some of the familiar scandals like urban renewal, showing how the hard-fought battle to win the program gave away the great benefits to land-based entrepreneurs, while it provided the poor with massive dislocations. He gives close attention also to federal macroeconomic policies which, internally inconsistent (and anti-Keynesian, at that), also had the continuous effect of robbing Peter to pay the Rockefellers. In terms of foreign policy, the Democrats had to out-hawk the conservatives with massive defense expenditures and an anticommunist rhetoric to justify them. Activist national government, on both the domestic and the foreign fronts, was used to defeat both isolationism from the old right and humanitarianism from the proximate left.

Wolfe's new twist is to observe that all of this craziness was made possible by extraordinary rates of economic growth and almost total domination of the world's economies. This meant that, however wasteful our domestic and foreign policies, it did not matter too much: the heady climate of growth could both mask and justify the destructive stupidity of the government's activities. An ethic of growth, Wolfe goes to some lengths to show, was needed for just this reason: to obscure unjust distributive effects of policy, to blunt criticism of waste, and to provide an ideology so vacuously inclusive that it would be taken as an end of ideology itself. A bigger pie at home, stuffed with the fruits of international expansion, would keep all Americans happy.

The current national predicament, one that brought down Jimmy Carter (and will plague all his successors), derives from the fact that, with growth no longer a reality, strategies based on it cannot possibly work. The game is more clearly zero sum, and the competitive struggle for resources is intense and raw. As a great irony, the rich now use the failure of what they portray as the *Left's* policies to justify new initiatives which are both meanspirited and enthusiastically ignorant of rudimentary principles of productive management. Only momentarily does this permit political success; the basic contradictions persist, even under the clear eyes and superior diction of a Reagan.

Wolfe dwells constantly on inconsistencies and contradictions of U.S. policies, and he does make a case. But just as one can doubt that ordinary lives are conducted in a very coherent manner (at least compared with the formal standard), one can also ask whether the policies of nations are not also primarily a matter of ignoble muddling through. How often are symbolic gestures consistent with distributive effects? How often do governments "stay the course"? There can no doubt be good muddling and bad muddling, effective hypocrisy and screwing up. Wolfe's basic arguments might stand in any event, but I was bothered by his unexamined premise that nations (like individuals) have "values" (his term) that guide policy and that postwar America was an exception to this standard arrangement. I was similarly distressed by Wolfe's sometimes breezy char-

acterizations of historical events and personages, with little supporting evidence provided.

Perhaps my complaint is that the book does not pretend to be sociological but instead trades on descriptive metaphor with pregnant ironies at every turn, revealed, for example, in the chapter titles (e.g., "Reform without Reform," "Nationalistic Internationalism," "Developing Development," "Carter's Conundrum"). This lends a sort of graceful tedium to the writing which required me to fight my way past all the profundities to the more simple substance (but feel guilty for the difficulty). In the end, Wolfe's program seems to me entirely worthy and his analysis is a plausible basis for thinking through "the postwar experience." I wish the manner of exposition provided better access to these useful beginnings.

Power, Property and Corporatism: The Political Sociology of Planning. By James Simmie. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981. Pp. xi + 351. \$30.00 (cloth); \$15.00 (paper).

Peter A. Hall
Harvard University

University towns have been at risk ever since the community power debate in urban studies began. As the hometowns of the academic protagonists, they became immediate candidates for study. At long last, Oxford, the most ancient of such towns, has fallen prey to the genre. It provides the venue for James Simmie's examination of community power.

Simmie's objects are both theoretical and empirical. The first half of *Power, Property and Corporatism* is devoted to a theoretical review of the relationship between social structure and political power with some, but not exclusive, reference to the urban setting. That is a broad topic, and the principles that delimit the author's analysis are not entirely clear. He moves from a useful review of existing studies of urban political power through a sweeping account of the social changes associated with urbanization to a critique of Marxist theories of the state.

Part 2 concludes with a review of neocorporatist theory, the terrain on which Simmie wants to stake his own claim. He argues that neocorporatist models, construed as a kind of "imperfect pluralism," provide the best portrait of postwar urban politics. In this case, *corporatism* is defined as "a politico-economic system characterized by the exercise of power through functionally differentiated organizations seeking to achieve compromises in economically and politically approved actions which are as favorable to their particular interests as possible and which are often legitimated by their incorporation in the objectives of the state" (p. 105). The emphasis in this analysis is on organizations. It is organizational resources that confer power and contending organizations that determine policy outcomes.

Parts 3 and 4 move on to an empirical examination of the major decisions associated with municipal development in Oxford between 1950

and 1973. The author's object is "to illustrate the use of power in conditions of corporatism" (p. 132). He considers several cases, including a rejected inner relief road, the commercial development of St. Ebbe's, the demolition of the Cutteslowe Walls, and the construction of university housing in North Oxford. In addition, he examines the disposition of over 2,000 development applications in three Oxford wards of varying social composition. However, he devotes only one chapter to the process of local decision making. In order to avoid the pitfalls of a decisional approach, Simmie equates the power of a group with its share of the benefits that arise from policy outcomes (p. 21). Accordingly, to assess the distribution of power in Oxford, he examines the distribution of benefits that follow from planning decisions.

In principle, such a technique is defensible; in practice, it is difficult. As a result, some of the volume's conclusions are more solid than others. The university did very well in almost all cases throughout this period. Given that its representatives held the balance of power on the city council, this is not surprising. But who benefits from the placement of shops and commerce in South Oxford, the poorer part of the city, or of houses in wealthier North Oxford? Simmie tends to regard these as cases in which the wealthy protect their interests by avoiding commerce while the poor cannot. However, many people in South Oxford might welcome the jobs and facilities that commerce brings, and some in the North might object to further housing there, especially public housing. What are we to make of this or of the cases in which the benefits or costs of a development are widely distributed, as in the case of the St. Ebbe's development? It is apparent, even from this careful study, that it is just as hard to know who benefits as it is to know who decides. Therefore, those who are looking for a magic solution to the methodological dilemmas raised by the community power debate will not find it here. One leaves this book still uncertain about who holds power in Oxford and for whom the state acts.

The author's central contention, however, that the characteristics of large organizations are important determinants of the structure of power and its outcomes is a significant insight. This idea links Simmie's work to an important line of analysis, initially explored by Samuel Beer (in *Modern British Politics*, 3d ed. [New York: Norton, 1982]), which emphasizes the role of powerful organizations in modern political life. Simmie describes a kind of "collectivist politics" at the urban level, in which individual residents often find that they cannot prevail against the large organizations of the city. Many questions remain unanswered in his work. On whose behalf do these organizations operate? What confers power on one organization but not on another? Is the state simply another organization? How responsive to local interests can we expect such organizations to be? Given his emphasis on the role of organizations, Simmie might have given us more of an analysis of the characteristics that differentiate one organization from another and affect the relative power of the principal corporate bodies. Some conceptual clarification and further

empirical work remains to be done before this approach can be fully validated. Nevertheless, *Power, Property and Corporatism* is a suggestive study that points in a potentially fruitful direction.

Old Values in a New Town: The Politics of Race and Class in Columbia, Maryland. By Lynne C. Burkhart. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981. Pp. xviii + 165. \$21.95.

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University of Missouri—Saint Louis

Columbia, Maryland, one of our country's earliest new towns, represents a conscious attempt on the part of a developer to create a physical and social environment that would integrate a racially and economically diverse population. As reported by Lynne Burkhart, a social anthropologist who, with her husband and three children, lived in Columbia between 1971 and 1975, this new town has not evolved into a "truly integrated" community. Her fieldwork indicates that social and political relations in Columbia as in the larger society are ordered along racial and economic lines.

Old Values in a New Town is a welcome addition to the literature of urban and political sociology, but potential readers should be cautioned that it offers neither a detailed description of life in Columbia nor a microscopic view of intergroup relations. The author is concerned primarily with investigating "the relationship between cultural symbols and politics" (p. 11); within this context, she provides "a chronicle of how a stable, plural community has developed within the confines of a social experiment that included . . . the deliberate inclusion of persons who are poor as well as persons who are black" (p. xvii).

The overriding theme of this chronicle is that commonly understood symbols and "covers" enable residents and competing groups to publicly debate and negotiate racial and class issues without formally acknowledging their existence. More overt debate or negotiation is unacceptable, if for no other reason than that it would publicly acknowledge basic cleavages that are antithetical to the egalitarian ideology on which Columbia was founded. This ideology stresses the importance of racial and socioeconomic mixing, as well as the importance of equal access and equal participation by all groups in the allocation of community resources. While this shared system of beliefs tends to magnify and draw attention to deviant situations and behavior, it also "tends to keep issues surrounding race and class as hidden agendas because of the constraints on categorizing either part of the population freely" (p. 29). Consequently, when publicly discussing racial or, to a lesser extent, class issues, Columbians use semantic guises in order to "mediate the lack of fit between the set of values and beliefs that guide their lives and the situation in which they in fact live" (p. 72).

These so-called symbols and covers are not particularly cryptic. New-comers to Columbia need not buy glossaries; the covert meanings of residents' argot are easily understood within their situational frameworks. For example, socially acceptable references to a categorical distinction between renters and property owners are frequently used in the public arena to symbolize differences between lower-class and middle-class residents, as well as differences between blacks and whites. In turn, middle-class, white residents use conceptual guises such as personal property rights and territoriality to legitimize their actions when competing with other groups for increased control over community resources and social space. This "cover" allows interclass competition and negotiations for power to remain largely covert but nonetheless makes possible a public airing of controversies pertaining to the differential distribution of rank and privilege. Similarly, protection of property values and fear of crime are other acceptable concerns that are frequently manipulated in ways that permit covert public debate about a wide range of issues that would otherwise be taboo.

Burkhart's discussion and analysis of symbols, covers, and power negotiations are based on several case studies, the most detailed of which documents the acquisition of informal power by the lower-class group. This social change was precipitated largely by an adept political entrepreneur who not only organized renters but also gained control of the agency that administers subsidized housing in Columbia. From this position, he functioned as a power broker whose politicizing of class and manipulation of the Columbia ideology resulted in a partial redistribution of rights and privileges. Given virtually no evidence of prior lower-class political mobilization, one might conclude that the development of what the author refers to as a stable, plural community was dependent on the emergence of such an actor—one who could tap the potential, but previously dormant, power of this group.

While Burkhart presents a well-documented analysis of the politics of class in a new town, her treatment of race is, in comparison, somewhat disjointed and superficial. She reports that middle-class, as well as lower-class, blacks rarely run for political office, even though the few exceptions have won easily. Furthermore, those blacks who do participate in the political arena attempt to constrain virtually all public debate about issues pertaining to race. Why do so few blacks run for public office? Why do they adamantly support a system of symbols and covers that denies the existence of racial ordering and racial problems? Burkhart poses these questions but does not answer them adequately. Her explanations seem to be educated guesses based on observation rather than on in-depth interviews (which, in this particular case, seem necessary). Nevertheless, as a whole, *Old Values in a New Town* represents a serious and fruitful effort to understand more fully the structure and ordering of intergroup power relations in Columbia and elsewhere.

The Uses of Social Research: Social Investigation in Public Policy-Making. By Martin Bulmer. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982. Pp. xiv + 184. \$28.50 (cloth); \$12.50 (paper).

Duncan MacRae, Jr.

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

This volume analyzes and criticizes the uses of social research in Britain. Martin Bulmer shows their continuity with the past, including the surveys of poverty by Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree at the turn of the century. He places them in a conceptual framework that draws extensively on American work, including Morris Janowitz's notion of the "enlightenment model" as contrasted with the "engineering model" for applied social research. His book is intended for British students, researchers, and nonspecialists interested in social research.

For an American reader *The Uses of Social Research* has special value in illuminating the contrasts between applied social research in Britain and the United States. To see these contrasts, however, we must examine the precise ways in which terms are used. For example, this volume is one of a series in the methodology of social research, but its treatment of its subject is far from the technical one we would expect from *Sociological Methodology*; Bulmer is recommending relatively basic canons of method. In addition, he distinguishes sharply between social *research* and social *science*; the former is exemplified by the earlier poverty surveys as well as by modern administrative studies, and can be purely descriptive work. Its function can be to attract public attention to problems, in the manner of Raymond Bauer's and Mancur Olson's approach to social indicators. Once we understand the terminology, we can see that Bulmer is posing issues that are significant in American work on applied social research and social indicators as well.

Many of the examples in the book relate to the field of social administration, which corresponds in its general goals to social work in the United States but has a broader policy concern associated with the administration of the welfare state. It is in this field more than elsewhere that "the tradition of Booth and Rowntree lives on" (p. 34). Applied social research, in this tradition, is concerned in large measure with assessing the magnitude of problems—poverty in the 19th century and various sorts of deprivation and disadvantage in the present. Some of these surveys resemble "needs assessments" that are conducted in the United States by groups planning social or health services. In the 19th century, both the terms "sociology" and "social science" were closely associated with reform and with an empiricist notion that the collection of facts would point the direction for reform.

Bulmer criticizes the separation between this tradition and academic sociology which has developed since 1960 and has led to an excessive empiricism and neglect of theory on the part of social administration and

to the fact that "today sociology does not play a pre-eminent role in the study of social policy" (p. 41). Using examples concerned with deprivation, disadvantage, handicaps, health, and illness, he argues for more careful conceptualizations and for more research on models of causation to supplement the descriptive approach. He reviews the institutionalization of social research and suggests that it be continued through professional training in universities, especially in research methodology, and through recognition of roles for long-term careers in applied research as distinct from university teaching. He criticizes the specificity of those applied studies that are directly supported by particular government departments, arguing that they push social researchers "toward an inappropriate engineering model" (p. 145).

In this last criticism he expresses a persistent theme of the book—that the engineering model of applied social research is inappropriate. This model corresponds to solving a problem through a single study that will allow policymakers to choose among alternative solutions. He cites not only Janowitz's criticism of this model, but also Carol Weiss's work showing that the uses of research involve gradual and indirect processes of assimilation into decision makers' patterns of thinking, and Edward Shils's notion that sociology contributes to public opinion (pp. 48–49). He also illustrates these processes of influence through analysis of the influence exerted by British royal commissions and American presidential commissions.

This advocacy of "enlightenment," however, can risk lulling us into a complacent pursuit of our accustomed scientific activities. As long as we do not try to distinguish better from worse means of enlightenment or to ask what audiences we should try to enlighten, we may well be content to pursue basic disciplinary theory at the expense of policy relevance and to relegate the dissemination of information to unspecified others, such as journalists, whose activity is deemed to be none of our concern. In a democracy it is of special significance that leaders and all other citizens, not merely administrators, be enlightened. The specific nature of their enlightenment should include their capacity to articulate their criteria for policy choice in terms of more specific definitions of such notions as the good life or justice— notions to which social indicators can contribute. It should include also their capacity to debate the merits of particular policy proposals; the expression of that debate in terms of causal models that connect alternative policies with citizens' valuative criteria; and recognition of the conditions of political feasibility that surround these choices. With this type of enlightenment, leaders and other citizens would become more nearly citizen policy analysts such as we are trying to educate in the growing number of undergraduate programs in public policy analysis.

Health Care in the U.S.: Equitable for Whom? By Lu Ann Aday, Ronald Andersen, and Gretchen V. Fleming. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980. Pp. 415. \$25.00.

Mary L. Fennell
University of Illinois at Chicago

This volume reports results from a very important, very large study supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the National Center for Health Services Research. Lu Ann Aday, Ronald Andersen, and Gretchen Fleming focus on an examination of access to medical care in the United States from the consumer's point of view. Using a national survey of nearly 8,000 people carried out in 1975-76, these researchers (from the Center for Health Administration Studies of the University of Chicago) asked a multitude of questions about the respondents' regular sources of care; the availability of doctors for appointments and emergency care; the extent of third-party coverage of medical services; waiting time for appointments and care; travel time to physicians' offices; number of visits to doctors, dentists, and hospitals; and perceptions of physicians' competence and humaneness. Health researchers and medical sociologists will find this an essential reference volume on health care access and utilization rates. In addition, the authors have provided us with important baseline data on consumer perception of the health care delivery system.

In addition to providing breakdowns of access and utilization by population demographics in the late seventies, *Health Care in the U.S.* also helps develop a larger overview of the effect of recent federal intervention on health care delivery. The comparisons of 1963, 1970, and 1976 data that are presented for a number of variables help establish the nature of trends in access and utilization. Apparently the general picture has been improving: most nonmajority groups and low-SES groups had better access to medical services in 1976 than in the 1960s, and at levels of use that seem appropriate relative to need. A particularly important contribution of this study is its measurement of actual medical care needs. Two measures were examined for various population subgroups: a use-disability ratio based on the mean number of physician visits per disability day, and a symptoms-response ratio which compares the number of actual physician contacts with physician estimates of the number of persons who should contact a doctor for a given mix of symptoms. Both measures do much to move us away from previously vague, unsatisfactory notions of medical care need.

The authors should also be congratulated for their attempts to develop a fairly comprehensive conceptual model for explaining access and utilization. In the first chapter they present a theoretical framework for the study of access which incorporates both structural variables (availability, distribution, and organization of the health delivery system) and process variables (characteristics of the population-at-risk which might affect the process of seeking and obtaining care). Among process variables, distinctions are made between mutable and immutable barriers to access,

and the framework also distinguishes potential access from actual use. All of these distinctions help organize the many factors considered important in explaining access and use. Unfortunately, the model promises more than this particular volume delivers. The following comments are not meant to detract from the obvious value of *Health Care in the U.S.* but are intended to point out what else could be done and, I hope, will be done with these data.

The model as presented is not very fully developed or tested. I was particularly disappointed by the authors' neglect of the structural variables in their analyses. Data were collected on the availability and distribution of medical personnel and facilities for the counties represented in the sample, and then attached to the record of each sampled individual. However, these data are used in only one table (out of more than 80 in this book) showing satisfaction with the availability of care by level of supply available in the respondent's area. Examining the relationships between actual supply levels and (1) perceptions of availability, (2) potential access characteristics, and (3) actual utilization rates would have contributed significantly to the specification of the access framework. Furthermore, conclusions in the summary chapter concerning the supply of health resources are not directly attributable to any analyses presented in this volume.

There is also room for both more careful conceptualization of some key variables and more powerful forms of data analysis. For example, analyses of consumers' subjective views of care quality are described in the chapter on realized (as opposed to potential) access to care. Included as dimensions of realized access are both perceptions of service convenience, cost, and availability, and subjective evaluations of care quality and physician "humaneness." Several analyses indicate that these two types of indicators in fact constitute different conceptual variables affecting satisfaction with care: personal cost considerations and perceptions of physician behavior (pp. 158, 168). Finally, statistical analyses throughout the book rely primarily on bivariate percentage comparisons and multiple classification analysis. Although these techniques are relatively easy to interpret (and thus a boon to the nontechnical reader), they do not fully exploit the potential of this study's data. Despite these shortcomings, however, this book makes an important contribution to the fields of medical sociology and health services research.

Heroin, Deviance and Morality. By Charles W. Lidz and Andrew L. Walker. With the assistance of Leroy C. Gould. Sage Library of Social Research, vol. 112. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981. Pp. 274. \$25.00 (cloth); \$12.50 (paper).

Nachman Ben-Yehuda
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The field of drug abuse has been flooded with books, newsletters, journals, and magazines. A recent international survey indicated that there are

currently about 55 different journals and newsletters on drug abuse in the world, most of them quite disappointing. However, this field has also been blessed with some outstanding works.

Charles Lidz and Andrew Walker's book is certainly an outstanding one. *Heroin, Deviance and Morality* is unusual in providing a *sociological* analysis of the drug abuse problem. The authors examine drug abuse within a moral-ideological matrix and argue that the problem is a result of inconsistencies and contradictions among various ideologies and moral systems in contemporary American society. They analyze questions of social power and the ways and means through which ideological-moral struggles are manifested among different interest groups and via social policy. They provide both a provocative macrosociological analysis of such concepts as morality and ideology and a detailed analysis of how such concepts can be applied and expressed through the everyday functioning of a specific treatment system (the Narcotics Addiction Treatment of the Riverdale Mental Health Center).

Several points in the book are especially interesting. These include, first, a detailed Durkheimian analysis dealing with such concepts as ideology and morality on a macro level. The concept of "doing morality" in everyday life is dealt with on a micro level. Second, Lidz and Walker present a provocative analysis of the moral and political context of the drug crisis in America in the 1960s and 1970s (pp. 59-84). They conclude that "the Drug Crisis was a smoke screen for the repression of political and cultural groups" (p. 252). Third, their detailed mapping of the "meeting areas" between law enforcement systems and the treatment systems is fully integrated in the chapter on therapeutic control. This detailed mapping, unprecedented in the literature of drug abuse in its scope and depth, is one of the best parts of the book. Fourth, the older term "accommodation" is introduced in a fashion which provides a clear analytical focus for understanding the interaction of different and sometimes conflicting ideological-moral systems. Furthermore, the authors trace the origins of the heroin crisis (pp. 37-60), pointing out that it peaked between 1969 and the early 1970s and declined from then on. While this dating is not consistent with many contemporary accepted views, it is intriguing. If validated, it gives strong credence to the authors' claim that the drug crisis was a smoke screen for the repression of political and cultural groups.

The book also has a few drawbacks. First, while it analyzes deviance from a moralistic point of view, it fails to take notice of some important works in the same area. For example, even though Lidz and Walker use the term "moral panics," they neither mention nor use Stanley Cohen's important and fascinating work *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1972). Second, when they trace the origin of the drug panic, they disregard survey data collected by the National Institute of Drug Abuse. Third, they do not devote enough attention to etiological theories of drug abuse and their relation to their own theory (e.g., were some theories "contrived" by control agencies? who used what theory for

what purposes?). Fourth, the most disappointing part of the book consists of its policy recommendations. After reading such a provocative analysis, one expects some innovative social policy suggestions. The authors state, "Just what are the ramifications of the existence of accommodations is not clear. We would need to experiment with various options for producing change before realistically suggesting specific policy options" (p. 253), which is a somewhat pale conclusion. The reader should remember, however, that the book was not written for social policy decision makers, nor was it intended to change policies.

The book's advantages far outweigh its relatively minor shortcomings. This type of sociological analysis is probably the only one that will eventually enable us really to understand the drug abuse problem. Thus this book illuminates that problem from a unique angle.

It is quite possible to take this type of analysis and apply it to other types of deviance as well. *Heroin, Deviance and Morality* demonstrates that the sociological study of drug abuse in particular, and deviance in general, is not a marginal sociological issue but an important and central one. By studying deviance, one can better understand "nondeviant" society. Professionals in the drug abuse area—whether clinicians, researchers, administrators, or others—should also find this book important. The analysis presented is not of the type that usually appears in journals covering this area, and it provides a new, refreshing look at an old problem. As one of the most interesting sociological studies of drug abuse currently available, this book is highly and strongly recommended.

Becoming Psychiatrists: The Professional Transformation of Self. By Donald Light. W. W. Norton & Co., 1980. Pp. xiv + 429. \$18.95.

Andrew Scull

University of California, San Diego

Donald Light's new book presents an extensive study of the impact of the residency on psychiatric trainees. The major source of data is Light's year of participant observation at the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, studying first-, second-, and third-year Harvard residents. In addition to his own observations, Light draws on other studies of the psychiatric residency in order to "obtain as comprehensive a picture as possible of how psychiatrists at leading schools are trained" (p. 22). Unfortunately, this laudable goal is somewhat undermined by his failure to acknowledge and take into account the variable quality and reliability of the studies he depends on (a segment of CBS's "Sixty Minutes," for example, is cited as a reliable source of information at a number of points in the analysis and there is repeated reliance on data drawn from unpublished studies).

A peculiar feature of Light's own data is that they were gathered well over a decade ago, in the late 1960s. Portions of his findings have appeared previously as journal articles, in the *American Journal of Sociology* and

elsewhere, over the past decade, but no explanation is offered for the belated appearance of the larger study. Yet the delay in publication is significant for a study of psychiatry since, as Light acknowledges, there has been a massive shift over the past 15 years in the profession's dominant orientation. Whereas, at the time of his fieldwork, psychoanalytic perspectives clearly occupied the commanding heights of the profession, they have now lost much of their preeminence. Since the late 1960s, "department after major department [has] replaced a chairman trained in psychoanalysis with a biopsychiatrist. . . . Biopsychiatry now has control of major power centers in academic psychiatry" (p. 338). In consequence, a number of Light's findings are of largely historical interest.

Becoming Psychiatrists begins with a cursory review of the structure of the psychiatric profession, the nature of the psychiatric domain, and the organization of the training process, before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the residency program itself. Like many students of professional socialization, Light is concerned as much with the transmission of "values" as with the acquisition of technical skills and knowledge. Such values are assumed to have a major effect on subsequent professional careers and even on the structure of professional practice itself, so that it is claimed that "if we want to know, for example, why psychiatrists abandoned the community mental health movement, we must look to the values instilled in psychiatric residency programs" (p. x). At best, this is surely a gross overstatement, ignoring a whole host of structural and political determinants of professional behavior. But if one ignores such overblown claims, Light's research does illuminate some intriguing features of the process of becoming a psychiatrist.

The most important developments, he argues, occur in the first year of the residency, where much effort is devoted to stripping away the orientations the neophyte has just spent several years learning in medical school. Beginning residents are expected to cope immediately with the most chronic, hopeless patients and only gradually are allowed to work with less disturbed, more "treatable" cases. Initially, this arrangement produces feelings of futility and therapeutic impotence and challenges the resident's still fragile professional identity. Gradually, however, he (Light's subjects were all male) learns to replace the concern with "cure" inculcated during medical training with a focus on therapeutic technique and interpretation. Ideologically, the concept of "rescue fantasies" plays a key role here, for it allows—indeed encourages—the residents to dismiss a fixation on the goal of curing patients (which in most cases is out of reach) as a sign of professional immaturity. Both the neophyte professionals and their preceptors are thus protected from a potentially devastating confrontation with their own incapacities. Instead, the first-year experience and the behavior of their superiors encourages residents to abandon "the medical edict that one treats anyone in need" (p. 101), to view certain patients as undesirable, and to find ways to avoid treating them.

Careful selection of patients, allowing the accumulation over time of a highly selective set of success stories; the learned ability to dismiss

failures as the result of the patient's deficiencies, not those of psychotherapy; and lowered expectations, reflected in the shift of goals from cure to "understanding," all contribute in time to the development of a renewed sense of mastery. Throughout this period, there is intense competition among residents—to avoid "catastrophes," to obtain "good" patients, to make clever comments and interpretations of case material in meeting with supervisors. But ironically, neither the sense of mastery nor the competition has any connection with seeing "who could get more patients better" (p. 125). Instead, there is a general retreat from the sick to the well. Tongue firmly *not* in cheek, a fourth-year resident confided to Light, "I'm not sure psychiatry can do that much for the mentally ill patient, but after watching a lot I'm convinced it can really help healthy patients. With healthy neurotics, it can make them *really* healthy people" (p. 126).

Light seems less than convinced. His account emphasizes repeatedly the uncritical nature of the training provided for the residents. He describes the haphazard way psychiatrists learn about treating suicide as "appalling" and "irresponsible" (pp. 208–9). And in the course of demonstrating that psychiatric diagnosis is generally based on anecdotal evidence allied to a strong predisposition to discover illness, he comments that "psychiatrists seem irresponsibly naïve about the impact of what they are doing, in part because they do not take these [diagnostic] labels seriously themselves and forget that others do" (p. 163).



The length of time that has elapsed since Light completed his fieldwork raises some question about whether these generalizations still hold (though one suspects that they probably do). Still, given that *Becoming Psychiatrists* provides the first detailed sociological examination of psychiatric training, its appearance is welcome. It is too bad, however, that during its long gestation, the manuscript was not pruned of much of the repetition and redundancy that make reading it rather a chore.

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
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In Defense of Modernity: Talcott Parsons and the Utilitarian Tradition¹

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Parsonian thought, often labeled conservative, is more accurately characterized as liberal. Despite Parsons's well-known critique of early modern liberalism in its utilitarian form, his own thought progressively incorporated the utilitarian image of a modern social order. Early liberal thought sought to establish that social solidarity could rest on free communication and consent. Late Parsonian theory came to criticize attacks on the alleged utilitarian atomism of modern society as destructive of the special forms of solidarity on which modern community is based.

Talcott Parsons's social thought represents a brilliant and original defense of the modern liberal tradition.² Despite his efforts to establish distance between himself and the 17th-century roots of liberal thought—with its apparently utilitarian and asociological premises—he nonetheless shared the earlier utilitarians' positive view of modernity and sought to rebuild their social philosophy on adequate sociological foundations. Parsons, like the 17th-century liberals, was, at heart, a defender of modernity. He saw modern technology and modern forms of organization as essentially liberating and progressive instead of dehumanizing and disruptive.

¹ An earlier version of this paper was prepared for delivery at a meeting sponsored by the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago. I should like to thank Edward O. Laumann, Chairman of the Department, for providing this opportunity. Terry Nichols Clark, Donald N. Levine, Gary G. Hamilton, Jean Cohen, Bruce Hackett, and Thomas G. Barnes have provided valuable advice and comments, for which I am most grateful. Requests for reprints should be sent to Leon Mayhew, Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis, California 95616.

² The present paper does not attempt a full exegesis of Talcott Parsons's sociological contributions; instead, it seeks to place his social thought in a historical and ideological context. For a more complete account of my views of Parsonian sociology, its development, and its treatment by social critics, see Mayhew (1982). For a sampling of the large literature that seeks to locate Parsons's political stance, mostly placing him as a "conservative," see Lockwood (1956), Dahrendorf (1958), Mills (1959), Foss (1963), and Gouldner (1970).

THE IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETY

Identification of the fundamental political platform on which Parsonian thought stands is a difficult and slippery task, for labeling the political implications of sociological theories is difficult at best and, in the case of Talcott Parsons, notoriously controversial. In order to clarify Parsons's basic ideological position, this paper employs an approach to identification of the ideological standpoint of sociological theories that begins with examination of the rhetoric of sociological argument.

Sociological Theory as Rhetoric

Sociological theories may be viewed as systems of rhetoric, designed to influence and persuade as well as to explain. The rhetorical element goes beyond the use of literary modes of persuasion (Gusfield 1976) to the ultimate terms on which sociological discourse is founded. Within each sociological theory the key rhetorical term is "society."³ Our first question, then, is, How does the term "society" function in sociological discourse? Sociological theory, when used as a rhetorical strategy, employs the concept of society as a means of founding values and policies. "Society" might be referred to metaphorically as a "God term," that is, it functions in sociological discourse in the same way that the term "God" functions in systems of religious thought—as the ultimate guarantor of value and validity. To say that "society" functions as a God term is not to say that every society postulated by a theorist always has all the characteristics normally attributed to a divine being; it is only to say that the theorist implicitly appeals to society as an ultimate moral force.

Kenneth Burke's (1945) dramatistic approach to rhetoric provides precedent for this usage of the phrase "God term." For Burke, whose five key terms of dramatism are act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose, a God term is an ultimate scene term, which grounds dramatic action by "calling for" it. For example, "polytheistic divinities . . . represent . . . scenic kinds of motivation . . . we may even think of local divinities as theological prototypes of contemporary environmentalist, or geographic motives. For to say that a river is a different 'god' than a mountain is to say, within the rules of polytheistic nomenclature, that a river calls for a different set of actions than a mountain" (Burke 1945, p. 43). Similarly,

³ Sociological rhetoric may use terms other than "society" in a similar manner. "Community" or "nation," e.g., can also be used to refer to a collective foundation for values, or such terms as "history" may be used to imply or to insinuate collective standards. In all these forms, the rhetorical logic is similar, and the present approach is intended to be inclusive of all forms of the sociological mode, whether "society" or other parallel terms are employed.

different concepts and metaphors of society "call for" and "ground" different sets of actions.

The notion that the term "society" stands for God—is an ultimate scene term—in sociological thought is, of course, readily apparent in such thinkers as Comte, who portrays the course of intellectual development as the triumphant replacement of divine beings by social realities as first premises for moral thought, or Durkheim, who, making the reverse identification, asserts the literal identity of God and society. It is less obvious that other social theorists make a parallel argument, establishing Society as a source of right and value, of real, empirically founded norms, or of legitimate constraints on particular and private interests. Nevertheless, when Marx speaks of the solidarity of the working class, or when Sumner claims that the folkways can make anything right, they are, each in his own way, making alleged social realities take the place of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition: ultimate mover and guarantor of order in history. In this paper I contend that even the most atomistic of social theorists—the utilitarians—asserted a valued and constraining social solidarity, the reasonable public, as the ultimate source of legitimate social order.

Sociological thought as rhetoric can best be appreciated by considering sociological statements as they occur in ordinary discourse. When, in daily parlance, conduct is condemned as disloyal, unpatriotic, or anti-social, the existence and value of a group is implied, and the accuser asserts implicitly that blameworthy conduct in some way threatens or disrupts the solidarity, common interests, or general welfare of this group. Some form of sociological argument is always embedded in this sort of discourse; that is, to condemn conduct in the name of a group interest ultimately requires, by way of proof, a body of evidence for the existence of common interests as well as arguments demonstrating that the conduct in question has known or predictable consequences because of laws or generalizations about group life.

A second form of sociological argument—also well represented in everyday discourse—asserts that objectionable conduct is impractical in the real social world, or "behind the times"; or, in more sophisticated terms, "against the tide of history." Again, a real collectivity is either asserted or assumed to be governed by constraining laws or regularities. One common form of this argument asserts that existing customs and institutions are essential to the welfare of the group. The established order is said to embody the wisdom of time or to represent a fragile adaptation to the conditions of group survival. However, since one can assert that the existing order is changing in an inexorable manner and direction, it is clearly possible to put the idea of a constraining social order to other than conservative uses.

Existing social reality is not always highly valued. Daily discourse includes variations on the theme of the oppressiveness of society, which

is said to be inhumane or to fail to provide adequate individual opportunity or to be founded on false premises. In this view, society has somehow spoiled the individual. At first glance this usage appears to contradict the notion that sociological discourse treats society as a source of value. Society constrains, to be sure, but not always for the better. Nevertheless, this more critical stance toward existing society does not necessarily contradict the ethical concept of society, for such theories normally criticize current conditions (whether real or imagined) as over against what the good society is supposed to do. Society remains the source of standards; it is just that an ideal liberating society, not corrupt and oppressive existing social arrangements, provides standards.⁴ To extend the theological metaphor, God is, in principle, the source of all value; it is just that there are both true and false Gods, and some people are caught up in the worship of idols.

The foregoing preliminary analysis suggests three principal analytical species of sociological thought based on three forms of argumentative rhetoric: first, an argument from common interest, which creates theories of solidarity; second, an argument from constraint, which creates theories of social control; finally an argument from oppression, which creates critical theories.

The permeability of the boundaries between these categories of theory should not be underestimated. In particular, critical theory usually has undercurrents of the other two forms of rhetoric, for it advocates new forms of solidarity or constraint that would liberate from existing oppression. Moreover, since such theory often alleges that a new liberating institution—for example, working-class consciousness or the democratic public—will ultimately do its work, critical theory tends to employ a rhetoric of dynamic constraint and emergent solidarity.

Solidarity in Modern Society

Although particular sociological theories usually employ various forms of

⁴ This idea may be clarified by reference to Rousseau, the prototypical example of a theorist who views existing *society* (rather than original sin) as corrupting and yet insists that only society, properly conceived, can liberate human potential. Referring to human entry from a natural to a civil state, Rousseau stresses that "his faculties are exercised and developed; his ideas are expanded; his feelings are ennobled; his whole soul is exalted to such a degree that, *if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him below that from which he has emerged*, he ought to bless without ceasing the happy moment that released him from it for ever, and transformed him from a stupid and ignorant animal into an intelligent being and a man" (Rousseau [1762] 1967 bk. 1, chap. 8 [emphasis added]). If society is what robs us of our pristine innocence, it is also the only means by which we become capable of human, moral action.

rhetoric in different combinations and thereby mix the species, we might expect one or another of the forms to shape some theories and to establish their particular ideological cast. It is my contention that Parsonian theory, especially late Parsonian theory, considered as ideology, is primarily a theory of solidarity. I also contend that early utilitarian theory, too, was a theory of solidarity and that, in fact, social theories in defense of modernity tend to employ and to emphasize the rhetoric of solidarity. Early utilitarian theory was, of course, also a critical theory, and there are clearly strong elements of the rhetoric of constraint in Parsonian sociology, especially in its early formulations; nevertheless, both theories defend modernity by asserting that modern forms of social life create new and especially valuable social bonds. These new bonds are highly regarded because they are freely chosen by individuals and groups and because the social fabric created by their choices is more open, flexible, and adaptive.

Defenders of modernity are in a somewhat defensive position; they are obliged to demonstrate that opportunities for forming social bonds are created by the forces of modernization and that these bonds are in fact solidary. Since by definition these bonds lack traditional legitimation, they are vulnerable to attack as fragile, merely instrumental, and unsatisfying. The modernist must erect a theory of solidarity to encompass and legitimate a new solidarity, and it is for this reason that modernists tend toward a rhetoric of solidarity.

The assertion that Parsonian theory and utilitarian theory are closely related might seem strange and paradoxical, for Parsons launched his career with an attack on utilitarian positivism, an attack that continued to form a central thesis of his work for five decades. After all, the famous resounding opening of *The Structure of Social Action* seems utterly to renounce the utilitarian tradition. Quoting Crane Brinton, Parsons writes, "Who now reads Spencer?" and goes on to affirm, "We must agree with the verdict, Spencer is dead." And of the positivistic utilitarian tradition, he writes, "What has happened to it? Why has it died?" (Parsons 1937, p. 3). The remaining 771 pages of the book are in the nature of an extended coroner's report. Nevertheless, by 1961, Parsons, in his introduction to a reissue of Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*, could say of that work that it contained "much that is surprisingly modern and relevant to our own time" (Parsons 1961, p. v). By the early 1960s, following a line of development beginning with the publication of *Economy and Society* (Parsons and Smelser 1956), the neo-utilitarian elements of Parsons's own thought had emerged to the point that Spencer could no longer be dismissed or used as straw man after the fashion of Durkheim.

The emergent Spencerian affinities that Parsons's work was coming to have were not limited to the increasing prominence of evolutionary ideas in Parsonian thinking. I contend that his ideological stance was becoming

more firmly planted in the utilitarian tradition, properly conceived, and will support this view with four arguments: first, that Parsons failed fully to appreciate utilitarian thought (in its historical context) as an assertion of new solidarities; second, that the utilitarian strain in Parsons's own thought became stronger in the later stages of his work; third, that advocacy of utilitarian ideas can be viewed within the framework of later Parsonian theory as a species of what he called "influence"; and fourth, that criticism of utilitarian theory as empirically unsound and anticomunal is a species of what Parsons himself referred to negatively as "deflationary criticism" or "fundamentalism" (Parsons 1967, pp. 355–82; Parsons 1977, pp. 49–50). In short, Parsons came to espouse elements of the utilitarian tradition, and he did so in order to defend and sustain the solidarity of a social order founded on liberal premises.

UTILITARIAN THOUGHT

Knowing, as we do, that modern sociological ideas are founded on critiques of the excessive rationalism and atomism of utilitarian theory, we easily overlook the fact that utilitarian theory is, after all, a theory of society and uses the concept of society as a rhetorical term. Supposing that utilitarian thought cannot account for order and stability, sociologists are inclined to dismiss much of 17th- and 18th-century thought as pre-sociological and look to developments in 19th- and 20th-century thought for the building blocks of the sociological perspective, accepting Comte's allegation that the thought of the enlightenment was "organically imbecilic." In consequence, the meaning of utilitarian thought has become obscure. We have forgotten what it meant to those who founded its premises and developed its logic. Or, if we do remember its history, we remember it as a critical theory. We see it as a solvent, as (to quote Gouldner) a "polemic against the feudal norms and aristocratic claims of the old regimes, on which the rights of men were held to be derived from and limited by their estate, class, birth or lineage." As such, the utilitarian philosophy was a weapon of the new middle class who wanted to be free of traditional constraints and to be judged by their utility rather than their birth (Gouldner 1970, pp. 62–63). There is, of course, truth in this account of the utilitarian ideal, but there is intellectual substance in the utilitarian tradition beyond criticism of *l'ancien régime*, and it had social consequences beyond legitimation of the new middle class.

Utilitarian thought made a strong positive thrust in its affirmation of a new foundation for society and solidarity. Moreover, it set forth a new standard of value—a standard outside the special interests of either particular status groups or private individuals. In positing the existence of a "public," the utilitarians forged both a new tool of sociological analysis

and a new term of sociological rhetoric. They played an important role in stimulating newly differentiated social structures and ideologies, and in so doing they posited a new status for the intellectual in society. Talcott Parsons, despite his critique of aspects of the utilitarian scheme, was clearly its heir, for his schemes appropriate much of the spirit and substance of 17th-century liberal doctrine.

The Communal Context of Early Liberal Thought

We are now beginning to understand that utilitarian social theory did not come about as an attempt to develop an atomistic model of society, the better to release bourgeois self-interest from the unnecessary constraints of community. Macpherson's (1962) reduction of early English liberal theory to "possessive individualism" with its connotations of exclusive focus on a free rein for property rights has been brilliantly criticized by Dunn (1969) and Tully (1980). Dunn, seeking to locate Locke properly in his time and place, shows that Locke's theories can be best understood in the framework of his adherence to a Puritan conception of calling.

Other Whig liberals went further than Locke—or were at least more explicit—in emphasizing that liberal society is grounded in a solidary public that is conceived as virtuous. Americans tend not to remember the importance of civic virtue in the liberal tradition because we trace the origins of democratic theory to Locke rather than to such once equally influential writers as Molesworth, Burgh, and Trenchard (Bailyn 1967, pp. 1–93; see also Robbins 1959; Pocock 1974).

Hanson (1970, pp. 1–40) has argued that the development of liberal constitutionalism in 17th-century England required and developed in conjunction with the emergence of "civic consciousness." Pocock (1974) has sought to trace the course of various modes of civic consciousness, including the ideas of (1) the nation as possessor of its ancient liberties (Pocock 1957), (2) the nation as the elect New Israel of God (Haller 1963), and (3) the nation as repository of civic virtue.

In the present paper I argue that another mode of civic consciousness—a mode with strongly utilitarian elements—emerged with the development of public opinion as a constituent component of the social order. When the older ideal of a "community of counsel" (Ferguson 1965) came effectively to include the entire public, conceived as a rational body engaged in discussion through printed media, the communal context of early utilitarian thought was established.

What Is Utilitarian Thought?

The term "utilitarian" can be misleading. Parsons used it in an almost

pejorative way to refer to the radically atomistic and rationalistic first premises of Hobbes and Locke and to Spencer's account of the regime of contract in industrial societies (Parsons 1937, pp. 87–125 and 311–17). Camic (1979) has correctly pointed out that the social philosophers normally regarded as utilitarians, who worked from the premise that the highest social value is the “greatest good for the greatest number,” were not, by Parsons's definition, utilitarians at all. Hume, Adam Smith and other Scottish moralists, Bentham, and Mill developed social theories with strong collective elements and cannot fairly be tarred by Parsons's rather bold brushstrokes. Nevertheless, for our present purpose—that is, to clarify Parsons's ideological position—Parsons's more generic usage of the term “utilitarian” to denote a certain form of individualistic and rationalistic approach to social thought is appropriate.⁵

The utilitarian method purports to found order in society on reason in the individual. The individual is presumed to have agreed to the social order (or to civil government) by virtue of the protection and opportunities it provides, that is, because of its calculable benefits or utilities. Such doctrine often takes the form of supposing an original social contract whereby humankind emerged from a presocial or prepolitical state, but the metaphor of contract should not be allowed to obscure the analytical logic of the utilitarian position. When a political writer alleges that the sovereign has, by some extravagant act, overstepped the bounds of the social contract, the writer is saying that the limits of sovereignty can be deduced using a rational test, namely, What terms would a rational person accept as a part of the social contract? Such a person would not, for example, grant the sovereign absolute power over life and liberty, for the benefits of civil government are not an adequate reward for such a quid pro quo. At any rate, such would be the calculus of rewards and costs for a political liberal. The underlying premise of the contract doctrine is that the ultimate terms and foundations of society and civil government can be derived from understanding how rational individuals make decisions. The doctrine is well and forcefully summarized in Milton's famous words to the effect that among men “who are born to command, and not to obey” utility alone can explain the origin of public authority: “And to him that shall consider well, why among free persons one man by civil

⁵ Parsons's usage is designed to set up a straw man to be knocked down by the sociological perspective (Camic 1979). The theories of the Scottish moralists and related views expressed in the French Enlightenment present problems of classification. I term “quasi-utilitarian” theories that posit a moral sense or *sensibilité* in addition to and distinct from utilitarian reason. The moral sense is the source of the impulse to association and allows human groups to establish the superordinate moral goals of society. Instrumental reason, through such devices as contract, establishes efficient means of achieving these goals. The classification of the various forms and variants of utilitarian and quasi-utilitarian theories is beyond the scope of this paper.

right should bear authority and jurisdiction over another, no other end or reason can be imaginable" (Milton [*On the Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* 1649] 1957, p. 754).

It is important to stress that in using the metaphor of contract for the origin of civil government, Milton was not trying to convey an image of a casual, nonsolidary, merely commercial sort of bond. On the contrary, Milton (as well as other 17th-century writers) specifically likened the contract of civil government to the contract of marriage, deliberately using an image of primary solidarity. It is possible to argue that Milton was, in effect, reducing marriage from a solidary to a contractual status rather than pointing to the solidary character of the contract of government. Given our current proclivity for treating contractual and communal images as polar opposites (Nisbet 1966, pp. 47–106), some might find this interpretation appealing. Walzer (1965, pp. 193–94), for example, views the new Puritan contractual image of marriage as a species of atomization—as the reduction of a sacramental, permanent, status arrangement to mere spiritual union (Hill 1977, pp. 126, 375–76); but to insist on this polarity is ahistorical and anachronistic, for Puritan ideology sought not to deny community but to reconstitute it on more spiritual and horizontal terms. By "spiritual" in this context I mean *inward*; vertical, strictly hierarchical community can be sustained by traditional norms and by authoritarian constraints, but horizontal community must come voluntarily from something inside the individual. It was for this reason that Weber insisted that voluntary association and freedom of conscience were defining characteristics of sect organization (Weber 1968, pp. 1207–10). Thus, the voluntarism of 17th-century thought must be seen as an element in a communal theory, not as an attack on communal values in the name of unbridled individualism.

Milton's rhetorical device—his metaphorical allusion to the state as a form of marriage—is to be taken at face value as a metaphor of solidarity. Moreover, it provides a clue to further study of early utilitarian doctrine on the solidary foundation of the state. If the contractual state is communal, where are its solidary bonds to be found?

The Communion of the Saints

Bellah (1975) has remarked that "Calvinist individualism only made sense within the collective context" (p. 18). English utilitarian doctrine does have deep, if not always easily visible, roots in Puritan doctrine, and in order to understand the communal component of early liberal theory one must start with the doctrine of the communion of the saints.

"Communion of the saints" is an ancient formula: it is professed in the Apostles' Creed and, in pre-Reformation Christianity, had come to have

other-worldly, sacramental, and passive meanings, referring to the Eucharist and to intercessory prayers to and for the dead. Calvin gave the doctrine of communion of the saints active significance, claiming that the phrase requires that among the gathered saints (i.e., a living congregation), "whatever [spiritual] benefits God confers upon them, they should in turn share with one another" (Calvin [1536] 1960, p. 1014). During the course of the 16th century, the concrete, specific obligations of communion were set forth by Puritan writers, who stressed the centrality of communication as the means to build communion. Preaching, admonition, and exhortation are the means to achieve the bonding of the godly in "society and togetherness," fellow feeling, and compassion (Perkins 1595). The communion of the saints also requires each individual to labor in a calling for the common good (Perkins 1595, p. 515; Perkins ca. 1600). Among the legitimate callings, the one most highly valued is the vocation of the preacher who calls the community together by his voice.⁶ To still that voice is to hinder the communion of the saints and thus to battle God (Spencer 1641; Goodwin 1654). Hence, the Puritan doctrine of liberty derives from its doctrine of community. There must be liberty of communication, for it is the free flow of the Spirit through preaching, exhortation, and consolation that creates community.

The Public as a Solidary Group

The English Puritan revolutionaries of the 1640s sought to give public, political expression to the communion of the saints. In calling on their countrymen to create a new and more solidary political community—the New Jerusalem (Wilson 1969)—Puritan publicists created an enormous pamphlet literature; the number of pamphlets published in England rose from 22 in 1640 to 1,916 in 1642 (Hill 1977, p. 65), suggesting the substantial development of public opinion as a factor in political life during those years (Zagorin 1970, pp. 106–8, 203–6, 228–29). This literature, as well as the literature of the postwar interregnum, constitutes a vast reservoir of utilitarian argument and imagery and provides an important resource for study and understanding of the development of utilitarian social theory.⁷ Gunn (1969, pp. 1–35) has shown that the English civil war transformed the terms of political rhetoric by establishing the requirement that parties identify their cause with that of the public. Publicists began to assert that this cause—the public interest—was amenable

⁶ Puritan divines actually defined the church as a company professing Christ called together by the voice of a preacher (Seaver 1970, p. 24; see also Haller 1955, pp. 3–31).

⁷ For detailed accounts of the political theory of this era, see Zagorin (1954), Macpherson (1962).

to ascertainment by reasonable and communally responsible private individuals: the public is capable of determining what is best for itself. The English revolutionaries, seeking to establish a principle by which royal authority can be limited, asserted that there is a society outside the state which gave rise to the state and provides a standard by which the state can be evaluated. This society is referred to in metaphorical terms as that body of persons—a commonwealth—that came together to establish the contract⁶ of civil government; but this body of persons is decidedly a solidary group—a nation, a public.

The term "public" is the key to understanding utilitarian thought. The public is a solidary group, bound by their common reason and united by a process of dialogue through which the principle of socially limited state power is stated forcefully. The utilitarians' sense of faith in an emergent public becomes most clear not when they discuss the social contract in analytical terms but when they identify the social foundations of the public in the process of free communication. The utilitarian argument asserts that in any free exchange of ideas among rational thinkers, truth will emerge victorious. This idea provides utilitarian thought a less abstract form of expression because it leaves aside the question of the ultimate origin or foundation of society and proposes a concrete policy: freedom of debate, preaching, speaking, writing, petitioning, and, most important of all, freedom of publication (for it was in the printed word that these early utilitarians placed most trust). Public dialogue provides a means for founding order in society on reason in the individual. Let each person be free to argue as reason guides. If all have reason, and if reason is capable of discerning truth, all will ultimately come to truth. There can hardly be—or so the utilitarian thinker supposes—a better foundation for social life than universal acceptance of truth.

I have schematized this argument, but the components and the spirit of this mode of reasoning are abundantly evident in Puritan thought of the revolutionary era. Even before the English civil war, writers had come to refer to publication as the embodiment of labor in a calling and to argue that the public should not be denied the benefits of the labor of its members (see, e.g., Wither 1625). This strikingly utilitarian metaphor became the centerpiece of Milton's renowned defense of liberty of the

* This is not to say that utilitarian contract theory *originated* among English puritan intellectuals, for the tools of this argument have biblical, classical, and medieval roots and had been expressed in radical form in various prior political situations, e.g., by the French Protestants in the 16th century in *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*, and by Buchanan in defense of Calvinism in Scotland (Skinner 1978, 2:239ff.). The social contract is by no means a bourgeois concept and cannot possibly be attributed to the rise of a commercial mentality. As Skinner (1978) has shown, even the most radical advocates of contract theory (during the emergent bourgeois era) found their ammunition in Scholastic sources.

press in the *Areopagitica*. When Milton ([1644] 1957, p. 720) complains that "to destroy a good book is to destroy reason itself," he is asserting that books embody the labors of reasoning individuals. "We should be wary, therefore, what persecution we raise against the living labors of public men . . ."; moreover, "truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized"⁹ (pp. 736–37), for to do so is to deprive the community of the gifts exercised by writers.

One Puritan defender of freedom of the press presented the utilitarian argument in clear and explicit form:

Is not the granting of such a power over the press, as [the advocates of censorship], in the great heat of their devotion and zeal, solicit the parliament to invest in a certain number of men, ill consistent with the interest and benefit of a free commonwealth and of like nature and consideration with the granting of monopolies? Or may not the Commonwealth deeply suffer by the exercise of such a power in being thereby deprived of the use and benefit of the gifts, parts, experiments, diligence and labours of many of her worthy members? [Goodwin 1654, p. 6]

The force of this argument rests on the sometimes unstated assumption that truth will emerge triumphant in the marketplace of ideas; ideas produced by reasoning individuals will be sorted out by a process of public discussion, which is a form, as it were, of collective reason. This assumption was not always left unstated: according to Milton, "Let her and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?" (Milton [*Areopagitica* 1644] 1957, p. 746).

Milton by no means stood alone on these optimistic assumptions. Many pamphleteers came to view reason and the printed word as working synergistically to propel the course of public discussion toward truth. Disputation is, after all, the very method of reason: "Reason works by elevating or vanquishing the grounds of doubt through discourse," wrote Henry Hammond (1648). A. Warren (1647) went so far as to claim that "right reason . . . hath no better judge than the sensible computation of the Vulgar."¹⁰

Alongside growing faith in the power of printed discussion there developed a belief in the efficacy of parliamentary discussion. Early in the decade of the war, Henry Parker, principal spokesman for the parliamentary cause, argued that Parliament, as a deliberative, representative body, was not capable of advising the king against the public interest.

⁹ Lest the reader suppose that Milton was here merely making light of the commercial spirit, recall that Milton, in the same essay, referred to truth as "our richest merchandise" (p. 741). Truth deserves as free a market as any other commodity.

¹⁰ See also Goodwin (1644), Robinson (1643), and Rous (1645) for a sampling of tracts exhibiting utilitarian faith in the efficacy of public argument. For an account of the rise of Protestant faith in the power of print, see Eisenstein (1979, pp. 303–13).

Private advisers might give partial advice reflecting their private interests, but public bodies necessarily express the public interest (Parker 1640, 1642). This line of thought reached a climax in the writings of James Harrington, for whom "rationality was a civic process in which two parties discovered their interconnectedness" (Pocock 1977, p. 87). The body politic discovers what is good for it—defines the public interest—through dialogue.


In short, these writers are thoroughly utilitarian: they suppose that the foundation of order in society is reason in individuals. But reasonable individuals create that order through a collective process of communication. For the early utilitarians, communication creates community. Individualistic as these writers might seem, their image of the search for truth was intended as an account of how a community can forge a rational consensus. Moreover, this process is socially organized, for it implies both a public oriented to organs of communication (which operate within a normative framework, i.e., "the rights of Englishmen") and intellectuals whose special role is to educate public opinion.

The Intellectual and the Public: The Vocation of the Publicist

One of the deep wellsprings of utilitarian thought was an emergent sense of the vocation of the publicist: the intellectual was able during those critical years to find a calling in pamphleteering. Such a calling seems plausible to one who supposes that a free, rational, and responsive public is emerging.¹¹

The Puritan founders of utilitarian theory were not fully secular; they did not think of themselves as mere salesmen of truth in the marketplace of ideas but as instruments of God's will, who, knowing truth and being able to disseminate it, were under a holy obligation to do so, for to preach truth is to enter into communion with one's fellows. Indeed, the concept of liberty of preaching and writing was derived directly from the obligations inherent in communion. "The spirit bloweth where it listeth," and, according to any Puritan divine, "we must preach what we know" (Saltmarsh 1645). According to John Spencer (1641, p. 1), "The gifts of the spirit are in everyone for the good of the whole body and there is no private gifts nor private Christians that we read of in scripture." Quoting Calvin, Spencer goes on to insist that the saints are gathered in the fellowship of Christ on condition that "whatever benefit God bestows

¹¹ For a classic account of the rise of the concept of public opinion, see Palmer (1953, pp. 3–13). Zagorin (1970) discusses the growth of the force of public opinion during the Puritan revolution. Habermas, who appears interested in reviving 17th-century faith in rational dialogue, has written perceptively on the rise of the public as a mediating solidary force between society and the state (Habermas 1962, 1974; Cohen 1979).



upon them, they should continually communicate one to another" (pp. 7-8).

Writers with this particular sense of the meaning of communion can easily find a calling in pamphleteering, and such sentiments are commonplace in the pamphlet literature of the day, especially in the various "epistles dedicatory" wherein each writer justifies his sacred entry into print by the omnipresent standard of usefulness.

Discussion of the emergence of the profession of letters is easily distorted by overemphasis on the development of a mass public of sufficient size to support a cadre of writers who live by writing for it, an 18th-century development.¹² English utilitarian theory emerged in the 17th century, when intellectuals came to see writing for the public not as a living but as a vocation whereby in publishing truth they created communion. Such a view in turn requires a conception of an audience capable of finding truth in the printed word by the exercise of impersonal reason.

This utilitarian conception reached its clearest and most secular expression during the 18th-century Enlightenment. As Voltaire put it, "Opinion is the Queen of the World, but the *philosophes* govern this queen" (Palmer 1953, p. 4). The most explicit and enthusiastic account of the *philosophes'* faith in public opinion as the regulatory organ of society and in intellectuals as the molders of this guiding force is found in the eighth and ninth parts of Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*. Condorcet explicitly identified printing as the ultimate source of utilitarian commerce in ideas which created "a new kind of tribunal . . . a tribunal difficult to avoid and impossible to evade . . . independent of coercion and favoring reason and justice: the public" (Condorcet [1793] 1933, pp. 116-19, 149 [my translation]).¹³ Nevertheless, it is clear that this conception of the public was not an invention of the Enlightenment. The Puritan pamphleteers were well on their way to an optimistic, fully utilitarian conception of the public. Their writings exhibit substantial use of the arguments, sentiments, and images of the intellectual market and of the public-creating role of intellectuals who write for this market.¹⁴

According to utilitarians, be they puritanical or enlightened, intellectuals should be optimistic and proud of their role in the new society. As educator of public opinion, the intellectual brings truths to their test in

¹² Saunders (1964) has shown that true professionalization of the writer's role did not begin to accelerate until after the civil wars; see also Coser (1965).

¹³ For an account of Condorcet's conception of public opinion in the social order, see Shapiro (1963, pp. 136-55).

¹⁴ I am not arguing that the conception of the vocation of the publicist actually created the emergent public; the public was created by a number of social and economic forces. The present argument concerns the *interpretation* of the emergent public by the publicists and their rhetorical use of this concept to justify themselves and their programs.

the marketplace of ideas and so creates the moral forces that dominate and guide the "mass" society. Although these ideas were widespread in the 1640s, Milton will again provide a striking illustration. He was the most illustrious if not the most widely read Puritan advocate of liberty of printing. The idea of writing for the public as meaningful vocation is manifest in his career. He was an early transitional figure in the long-term movement from patronage to writing for the public. On the eve of the civil wars he made the traditional Italian journey common in the training of young men who aspired to careers as Latin scholars and men of the Renaissance. While in Italy he met John Baptista Manso, Marquis of Villa, the former patron of Tasso. Milton was overjoyed that the sponsor of Tasso held him, too, in high regard. He could easily attune himself to the notion that sponsorship was a noble form of support for the artist. "O, if my fate would grant me such a friend, who knows well how to honour the devotees of Apollo," he wrote in a poem addressed to Manso (Daiches 1959, p. 97). Milton harbored the ambition of writing a great Christian epic in the classical tradition. And yet, on returning home to the impending political struggles, he began two decades of composing pamphlets on behalf of the republican cause, putting off his ambitions as epic poet until the restoration.¹⁵

Utilitarian Doctrine and the Theory of Persuasion

In sum, utilitarian theory was conceived as a theory of solidarity—as an account of new bonds between people, bonds created through rational free discussion within a public led by persons of influence. Print frees opinion from ascriptive ties to traditional solidarities, liberates individual reason, and, ultimately, creates a solidary public united in its common possession of truth.

This account of society is in the grand classical tradition of democratic thought. The idea that persuasion rather than force constitutes the legitimate foundation of the polity was a staple of Greek political thought. Although the theory of persuasion is closely related to the theory of the social contract, Cicero (in *De Oratore*) presents an alternative to the myth of the original formation of civil society by a compact. Perhaps a great orator had sufficient skill to persuade the group to live together under the law in a civilized manner. The myth of the orator presents a somewhat different image of society: reason and individual interests are still elements of the social order, just as they are in the contract theory, but, whereas the contract theory is quite clear in its demarcation of the elementary categories of Parsonian action theory—reason, order, and norms; disorder,

¹⁵ See also Hanford (1949, pp. 85–89). Christopher Hill's account of Milton's notion of the "true poet" is also apposite (Hill 1977, pp. 54–60, 159).

force, and fraud—the idea of persuasion is ambiguously located somewhere between reason and fraud. It is not clear (especially to Plato!) that rhetoric appeals solely to reason. Nevertheless, the theory of society as founded on a process of persuasion is still strongly utilitarian in that it presumes that order rests ultimately on individual perceptions of prudent self-interest. Such perceptions are formed by a (more or less) rational process of mutual persuasion which provides a solid foundation for ongoing social solidarity, especially when individual freedom allows reason to reign over the process. With the rise of the printed word, the ancient notion that discussion is the stuff of society is raised from the level of face-to-face persuasion to the level of the organs of communication—the press or “mass” media. Utilitarian intellectuals, from Milton to Condorcet, supposed that the rule of reason is greatly enhanced by print, a cool and impersonal medium with its wide range and its susceptibility to dispassionate study.¹⁶ Printed communication became the bearer of the solidarity of the public.

CONSTRAINT AND SOLIDARITY IN PARSONIAN THOUGHT

Parsons, by using such extreme, atypical exemplars as Hobbes and Spencer, was able to clarify the exposition of the fundamental dimensions of *his* argument, but his expository strategy does not fully capture the thematics of the broad range of utilitarian thought, which as conceived by the Puritan intellectuals and developed by the Scottish moralists and the Utilitarians proper (Camic 1979) asserted a “communitarian morality” (Wills 1978, pp. 187–92). This is not to deny that the utilitarian tradition is individualistic and rationalistic in its premises and imagery; nonetheless, its rhetoric, like the rhetoric of other sociological theories, was intended to provide metaphors of social solidarity.

Writing after a revolution in sociological thought, Parsons could hardly build a defense of modernity directly on the classical utilitarian foundations. He must start with the premise that individual reason is socially formed and not the prior and original source of society. He must properly insist that classical utilitarian thought is positivistic in its supposition that reason can find the prescription for the good and true society in nature. Nevertheless, he did provide a sociological justification for free institutions—institutions that allow a relatively large measure of individual choice and permit adaptation of both conduct and social bonds to circumstance: hence, the utilitarians’ respect for the marketplace and market-like institutions remains deeply embedded in his rhetoric.

¹⁶ Condorcet’s faith in print is foreshadowed in Milton’s comment that “writing is more public than preaching; and more easy to refutation, if need be, there being so many whose business and profession merely it is, to be the champions of truth . . .” (Milton [*Areopagitica* 1644] 1957, p. 741).

Social Institutions and Constraint

Parsons's position required him to develop a new rhetorical program. It was necessary to show that behind utilitarian markets stands an authentic society, a society that is prior to and regulates utilitarian contracts between individuals. Because this society exists and because it is closely articulated with the institutional forms within which utilitarian conduct is carried on, participation in utilitarian institutions is participation in society, not just participation in isolated, bilateral, expedient arrangements. The social arrangements behind utilitarian agreements justify criticizing and limiting—that is, constraining—private contracts in the name and in the interests of a larger society. By the same token, this line of argument also proclaims the existence of that larger society and its daily recreation through the free participation of individuals in the institutions of modern society on substantially utilitarian terms.

In developing this approach, Parsons was clearly indebted to Durkheim's prior development of the argument that the "organic" solidarity of modern society is no less social than the "mechanical" solidarity of premodern communities. This line of influence is well spelled out both in *The Structure of Social Action* (1937) and, much later, in "Durkheim's Contribution to the Theory of Integration of Social Systems" (Parsons 1967, pp. 3–34). But Parsons went beyond Durkheim in formulating a more analytical account of organic solidarity, specifying various levels of normative order and the relations between these levels and developing the concept of "institutionalization."¹⁷ A well-formulated concept of institutionalization justifies the claim that the members of society form, sustain, and interpret commitments and attachments to the normative order by their participation in its established institutions. Such institutions are said to embody, in functionally relevant ways, the values of the larger society. In this connection, it is crucial to note that Parsons regularly employed the term "freedom" in describing the basic normative principles governing the institutions of modern American society; "freedom of association" governs the institutional framework of association just as freedom of contract governs the institutions of the market (Parsons 1967, p. 368); institutionalized media of exchange or "interchange" increase the "degrees of freedom" for actors;¹⁸ institutional differentiation frees re-

¹⁷ For an account of the development of the concept of institutionalization in Parsonian thought, see Mayhew (1982).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Parsons's extensive account of the functions of the symbolic media in "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process" (Parsons 1967, pp. 271–86). Parsons and White in "Mass Media and American Society" (Parsons 1969, pp. 241–51) give a clear account of the relation between differentiation and increase in the degrees of freedom. This paper is one of Parsons's most clear defenses of free choice in the utilitarian tradition of the ideal modern society as consisting in free communication.

sources and conduct from ascriptive ties (Parsons 1977, pp. 182–83, 190–91); “academic freedom” supports the functions of the American university (Parsons and Platt 1973, pp. 148–49, 153–57, 199, 293, 364–65). Thus, the utilitarian defenses of differentiation, of individual emancipation, and of the decay of proscriptive norms—all justifications of modernity—are reinterpreted as socially valued normative frameworks for modern society rather than (as 17th-century positivist utilitarians implied) demonstrable elements of the order of nature.

Utilitarian Theory and Institutionalized Individualism

One effective way to emphasize the differences between classical utilitarian doctrine and Parsonian quasi-utilitarian theory is to distinguish between the theory of natural law on the one hand and Parsons’s account of “institutionalized individualism” on the other. Bourricaud (1981) takes “institutionalized individualism” to be the key concept for depicting Parsons’s sociological theory.¹⁹ Bourricaud notes correctly that strictly utilitarian theory is both individualistic and rationalistic, whereas Parsonian theory, though it remains “profoundly individualistic” (p. 247), also insists that individuals act as members of organized systems, which both shape their personalities and guide their ongoing conduct. Systematically organized institutions allow the activities of interdependent actors to cohere (pp. 14–15). According to Bourricaud, the meaning of Parsons’s notion of institutionalized individualism lies in reckoning with the constraints imposed by the exigencies of working cooperatively with others.

Atomistic individualism is taken to Hobbesian extremes when other actors are viewed as mere means or obstacles, leaving the individual socially isolated. As one 17th-century writer (not John Donne) put it, “Every man is an island” (Gunn 1969, p. 11). Parsons, like Donne, supposes the contrary: all persons are inextricably linked at the core of their human (socialized) being. Utilitarian theory did not, however, always assume an extreme Hobbesian stance. In early liberalism, the inherent interdependence of human beings is recognized and incorporated into the theoretical scheme by reference to a law of nature, knowable by each and every individual’s “right reason.” The law of nature, which calls for mutual respect and individual contribution to the common good, constitutes a normative order that is prior to all contracts. It provides, so to speak, the noncontractual elements of the social contract as well as of the order of economic exchange. From a sociological point of view, the weakness

¹⁹ The original French title of Bourricaud’s *The Sociology of Talcott Parsons* was *L’Individualisme institutionnel*. It is interesting to note that Parsons brought a copy of *L’Individualisme institutionnel*, then newly published, to his 1978 seminar in Berkeley (which I attended) and warmly praised and recommended the book.

of this approach is that a normative order is merely assumed rather than taken as a problematic, human construction. The law of nature is, in Parsonian terms, a "metaphysical prop" (Parsons 1937, pp. 95–102).

Parsons's strong opposition to the atomistic fallacy led him strongly to criticize references to "the individual": social systems, he insisted, are made up not of "individuals" but of actors in roles. Similarly, when speaking at the institutional level about social systems, he preferred to speak of "interchanges" between subsystems rather than of "exchanges." In the economic realm, Parsons often refers to money as a medium of "exchange," but in analyzing other media he usually speaks of media of "interchange" or of "interaction." This language allows the analyst to remember that system theory is analytical and therefore abstract; the relations between the subsystems of society are not, properly speaking, concrete "exchanges" between concrete, isolated "individuals" but aspects of social processes, analytically decomposed, the better to understand systematic interdependencies underlying the dynamics of social life.

Nevertheless, because of the ideological thrust of his conceptions, he also employs images with concrete implications. In particular, his evolutionary theory posits the movement of societies toward correspondence between concrete constellations of events and analytical categories: institutional differentiation occurs along functional lines, and structural differentiation also leads to the emancipation of the individual. Value systems come to support individuation, to call for instrumental activity in various institutional contexts, and to support and regulate contractual activity. As Alexander (1978) has noted, despite Parsons's rejection of the notion of a concrete individual in his formal theory, his substantive theory posits the concrete emergence of autonomous individuals.

It is not surprising, then, that the idea of institutionalized individualism tends toward ambiguity. Bourricaud (1981) uses the phrase as a description of Parsons's general theoretical stance, but Parsons sometimes uses the phrase to describe the value systems of particular highly differentiated societies in which a great deal of individuation has emerged—American society, for example. In "The Link between Character and Society," Parsons and White write, "What may be called instrumental or institutionalized individualism is therefore a very important keynote of the American value system" (Parsons 1970b, p. 197). They go on to distinguish institutionalized individualism from utilitarian individualism, indicating that the former implies a regulating, institutional framework requiring that individual activity make a social contribution (pp. 197–98).²⁰

²⁰ We see here, of course, an echo of the Puritan theory of the calling, which allowed an individual's activities to be reckoned a true vocation only if they contributed to the common good. This view was taken over into all early liberal utilitarian theories, except for Hobbes's extreme version.

In sum, Parsons always emphasizes that freedom, individuation, and instrumental social organization emerge in a value-regulated, normative context; but, that said, he also viewed concrete modern societies, particularly American society, as exhibiting sufficient freedom, rationality, and exchange to be analyzed profitably with conceptual tools derived from the utilitarian heritage of economic analysis. In the framework of the technical language of his theory of evolution, Parsons is more likely to claim that "subunits under such [modern] normative orders have greater autonomy in pursuing their own interests and in serving others instrumentally" (1964, pp. 356–57) than to speak directly of the emergence of a free and rational (though normatively regulated) social order, but the ideological burden of the theory seems clear. Moreover, his appropriation of utilitarian ideas goes beyond the panoply of exchange and contract: the utilitarian theory of communication must be included among the early liberal theories that Parsons adapted for contemporary use.

Exchange and Solidarity: The Influence Paradigm

Parsons's rehabilitation of utilitarian theory goes well beyond reemphasis of the social and normative foundations of the order of exchange. The foregoing analysis has shown us Parsons only as a constraint theorist; from a rhetorical point of view, this form of argument merely reasserts the existence of constraining, stabilizing society outside the private interests of the marketplace. Parsons as a theorist of solidarity develops a much more important and subtle defense of the modern order, one which makes a more creative use of the utilitarian rhetoric, extending utilitarian thinking beyond the realm of economic markets, political contracts, and metaphorical "marketplaces of ideas" to the very concept of solidarity itself.

The theoretical framework for Parsons's assertions of social solidarity in modern society is provided by the "influence paradigm." Using an extended analogy to the phenomenon of money, Parsons developed the concept of "generalized media of interchange," including power, influence, and generalized value commitments. These media facilitate transactions between the differentiated subsystems of society. According to standard utilitarian theory, society is held together by interdependencies that (1) reflect the division of labor, (2) are expressed in exchanges, and (3) are facilitated and mediated by money. The classic utilitarian account of mediated exchange is limited to exchange of goods and services, but Parsons, armed with a set of metaphors of money-like media, extends the analysis to interdependencies and exchanges²¹ of other functional products

²¹ Technically it is more correct to speak of "interchanges." The term "exchange," however, more clearly exposes the utilitarian roots of an approach that takes money

and contributions. For example, he refers to an exchange between the public (an aspect of the integrative system of the society) and the polity: the public exchanges "support" (by voting officials into power) for "decisions" (Parsons 1967, pp. 223-63, 347-54). These decisions are valuable to the public because they bring organized political capacity to bear on the public's collective political goals. Parsons views such an exchange as an exchange of power, because both the votes of the public and the policy decisions of the polity are binding on the exchange partners. *This particular exchange constitutes Parsons's reformulation of the utilitarian contract doctrine without the explicit metaphor of a contract.* Political authority is viewed as a withdrawable delegation of sovereign political power ultimately held by the public but delegated to officials because of their capacity to achieve public ends (Parsons 1967, pp. 227-38); but Parsons goes on to extend the utilitarian doctrine by viewing the implicit contract of government as implemented through a mediated exchange, with influence playing a role in the political process analogous to the role of money in the economy. Mediating the "real" exchange of support and decision is a relatively symbolic exchange of "advocacy of policies" by the public for "effective leadership" by the polity (Parsons 1967, pp. 349-52).

"Leadership" and "advocacy" are categories of influence. As symbolic media they represent a generalized capacity to persuade. Persuasion, according to Parsons, operates through convincing alter that what ego requests is in alter's own interest. Ego, in persuading alter, is then asserting a solidarity; ego is saying, "Look what is in *our* interest"—asserting a we. In granting generalized influence to one who asserts a mutual solidarity, we are expressing a willingness to trust a leader or an advocate on the basis of presumptions, without demanding proof of every assertion (Parsons 1967, pp. 366-71). The process of advocacy includes claims to speak on behalf of groups, asserting solidarities that are subject to denial both by those who resist advocacy and by those who refuse to be counted among those claimed by an advocate as a support group (i.e., the advocate's solidary base). When the influence process works, claimed solidarities are ratified by those who are willing to embrace the persons who claim them; hence, the process of influence creates solidarity.

Parsons's use of the concept of influence as a medium for the political process permits him to assert another layer of society beyond the social contract, a social solidarity deriving from mutual influence. In classical

as its paradigm and goes on to analyze media in the economic language of supply, demand, inflation, and deflation. Moreover, Parsons himself sometimes refers to interchange as an exchange: e.g., "At the more general level, the support that is *exchanged* with and contingent upon leadership . . ." (Parsons 1967, p. 228 [emphasis added]). Orthodox explicators also slip into this language: Baum (1976), in his excellent summary of the media, refers to influence as a "medium of exchange" (p. 464).

terms, the ancient conception of society by contract is thereby integrated with Cicero's oratorical conception of society by persuasion; rhetorical society supplements political society.

Baum (1976) refers to the developments of late Parsonian theory as "efforts to generalize economics beyond the utilitarian realm" (p. 454). This phrase can stand as an excellent synopsis of the Parsonian program, for the whole burden of Parsons's institutional theory was to demonstrate that all action, even utilitarian, instrumental action in the economic sphere, embodies values and is normatively regulated. However, the choice of economic theory as model allows the construction of concepts that allow what utilitarians value—the free, rational, adaptive creation of bonds—to be incorporated into social theory. As Baum shows, influence as medium allows individuals to allocate loyalties rationally (pp. 464–65) without actually creating an experienced *gemeinschaft*; but such loyalty is no less loyalty for having been freely and rationally chosen according to market values, for influence is an institutionalized medium. Persuasion rests not solely on appeal to the self-interest of the individual but also on the grounding of the individual's interests in the community, its values, and its normative order. The neo-utilitarian element of the theory lies in insisting that community is not fixed in tradition and personal ties: it can be extended by rational processes of choice, which must be conceived as creating new solidarities instead of destroying old ones.

Parsons does not, then, portray the social order as consisting entirely in normative constraints. Alexander, despite the accuracy and sensitivity of his portrayal of Parsons's ideological position (1979) and despite his understanding of the importance of categories of solidarity in Parsonian thought (1980), ultimately falls into a normative interpretation, arguing that Parsons "defines the voluntarist theory of action in an exclusively normative sense" (Alexander 1982, p. 112). I find this interpretation inconsistent with Parsons's insistence that the fund of solidarity, and hence of authentic collectivity, is actively created in the influence market, as actors allocate their loyalties in a quasi-utilitarian manner.

Antimodern Distrust of Media

All generalized media are subject to deflation, for they rest on trust, and if that trust is undermined, people will withdraw their "deposits" of media from the individuals and institutions to which they have been entrusted. A run on the bank (in the case of money) is the prototypical case in point. Moreover, there is a characteristic form of deflationary criticism that can be directed against each medium; when people deny the validity of symbolic representations of media, claiming that the only reliable medium is the real thing that is or ought to be behind it—gold, in the case of money—

we have "fundamentalism." Force plays the same role in power and, in the case of "influence," the "real" things stressed by the fundamentalist critic are primary affective ties: *gemeinschaft* is the only gold.²² Fundamentalist criticism refuses to credit the influence process with a capacity for creating real solidarity. For Parsons, such criticism is essentially a regressive attack on modern social institutions; it asserts that only relatively undifferentiated social arrangements are real or stable.²³

Generalized value commitments are said by Parsons to be another form of circulating medium, and similar neo-utilitarian arguments apply. We can trust others to guide us in courses of conduct that will accord with our fundamental values, relying on them for interpretation, reassurance, and creative means of implementation. Persons who hold "deposits" of value commitments are called moral leaders. Again, such generalized commitments may be undermined and deflated by antimodern, fundamentalist ideology, which in this case asserts that fixed rules and established interpretations provide the only real foundation for personal integrity. Society is sustained by leadership in the moral arena as well as leadership in the political arena (Parsons 1969, pp. 439–72), and both rest on processes of mutual investment.

More generally, in the Parsonian view, society is sustained by the willingness of people to deposit with others their capacity to do things for themselves—that is, their willingness to make delegations. Such deposits or delegations vastly increase the capacity of the collectivity to function in the interests of its membership. It is just this theory of delegation that has always provided utilitarian theory with its concept of society. The contract theory is but a prototypical form of a theory that Parsons has substantially extended to an enormously ramified panoply of modern social arrangements, all operating through exchange but resting on trust.

One might rightly ask whether this theory, resting as it does on a concept of trust, can be properly designated utilitarian; what has happened to calculation? In a society organized by the media of exchange, a tendency

²² Baum (1976) points out that at one point Parsons apparently changed his mind about the security base of influence, saying that the base consists in "knowledge" rather than primary affective ties. According to Baum, Parsons's argument for this change is not clear or well developed, and Baum prefers the earlier formulation. In referring to knowledge as the security base for influence, Parsons has in mind demonstrable knowledge that influential people can rely on to convince others without having to rely on their prestige. Since prestige is grounded in solidarity, the two conceptions of the security base of influence are closely related; this technical problem does not affect Parsons's characterization of romantic emphasis on *gemeinschaft* as fundamentalist.

²³ Fundamentalist criticism tends to "deflate" media (Parsons 1967, pp. 355–82; 1977, pp. 49–50). On the notion that the quantities of media are not fixed but subject to inflation and deflation see, e.g., Parsons (1967), pp. 337–45, 378–82; and Parsons and Platt (1973), pp. 310–13, 320–45.

to calculate is still presumed; it lurks beneath the surface of social arrangements. People who "trust" have, in effect, made decisions to suspend deep and continuous calculation and to accept apparently satisfactory arrangements on a measure of faith. However, the very freedom and flexibility provided by generalized media (and required by modern society) provide opportunities for intermittent calculation and withdrawals of deposits. This is an ever-present possibility in a modern society, which relies on trust among an extended and remote array of partners. The institutionalization of the media subjects interaction to normative controls but, at the same time, it allows actors new ranges of calculated choice. The potential for withdrawal of this trust to the lesser, small society of kin and primary ties is never far from the surface of modern social life. Such tendencies are fueled by the pervasive modern tendency to rational, critical analysis.

Fundamentalist Theory and the Modern Intellectual

Critical analysis easily identifies the exposed overextensions of credit that are endemic in a modern society, and such critical analysis is in turn stimulated by fundamentalism. Intellectuals who advocate utilitarian theories are the opposite of fundamentalists; they must defend the reality—or at least the functional adequacy—of the matrix of bonds of nonprimary trust and solidarity that sustain modern society. From a Parsonian perspective, such bonds must be defended despite the fact that the trust on which they rest is vulnerable to rational criticism.

A brief sampling of what Parsons would apparently take to be examples of "delegation" in modern society will immediately convey both the commonplace, indeed pervasive, institutionalization of trust in everyday life and the vulnerability of such bonds of trust to attacks by critical intelligence: when parents believe that their children's teachers care about these children and that the school's programs are worthwhile and founded on values that parents and teachers share, the parents are trusting the influence and value commitments of the school; when a citizen presumes that the information given by a newscaster bears some firm relation to reality and is not merely what the newscaster wants the public to hear, there is an implicit grant of influence to the organs of communication; when one neighbor seeks to persuade another that a particular candidate for city office will be good for the neighborhood, he or she is asserting that the neighborhood has a common interest; when a black citizen credits a spokesman for a black organization as a voice of the black community, a solidarity founded on trust has been created; when a troubled person takes advice from someone who by training, experience, and position is presumed to have insight into how to sustain personal identity or achieve

personal goals, that person is "allocating value commitments."

These few examples should indicate how problematic and fragile trust is in everyday conduct. If exposed to the scrutiny of critical intellect (especially by a sociologist), each of these examples of trust is subject to doubt. One can doubt alter's sincerity by pointing to his or her own inescapable self-interest or by questioning the consequences of the embedding of alter's good intentions in organizations that have strong imperatives of their own. Alter's capacities and competencies are also subject to examination. Many of these arrangements can be eliminated easily by one or the other party's free (calculating) choice. Some sociologists (Goldner, Ritti, and Ference 1977) even argue that the truth that emerges from free communication is the cynical knowledge that the real world is not what is idealistically proclaimed. Nevertheless, "neo-utilitarian" thought must claim that such weak, even tenuous, bonds, cumulatively and in their crosscutting patterns, form a tough social fabric.²⁴

This claim is particularly difficult to sustain in the contemporary intellectual world. The utilitarian intellectual in the 17th and 18th centuries felt a profound interest in affirming the nascent existence of a solidary public, indeed in creating that public by acts of publication. Intellectuals have long since lost the faith in the public that emerged in intellectual life with the dawn of modernity. On the contrary, intellectuals feel betrayed by a public which turns its back on intellect and pays, in the marketplace of ideas, only for cant and kitsch (Lowenthal 1961, pp. 52-108). The intellectual has become alienated, and critical intellect that once was directed against the traditional order is now directed against the modern order. Modern critical intellect has developed a formidable arsenal of weapons for unmasking and debunking. We have learned to search for hidden, sinister motives and functions which, once unmasked, make manifest and noble motives appear hollow, ineffectual, and unreal. The romantic movement, the realist movement, and such seminal individual figures as Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud have provided adequate tools. The exercise of "influence" and of "value commitment" as conceived by Parsons are sitting ducks, for they are, in principle, founded on claims that cannot fully bear critical scrutiny.

Fundamentalism is also attractive to many intellectuals because it is, ironically, itself a theory with liberal origins. Fear that modern society tends toward totalitarian forms has led to concern about the monopoli-

²⁴ Cf. Peter Berger's analysis of "signals of transcendence," the sometimes minimal everyday gestures that imply a transcendental order even in a secular age, as, e.g., when a mother comforts her child, saying, "Everything is all right" (Berger 1969, pp. 65-70). Similarly, everyday life displays a large vocabulary of "signals of trust"—gestures that imply involvement and faith in ramified networks of solidarity, even in a society characterized by mobility, rational calculation, and dissolvable social bonds.

zation of institutional life by the state. Since the state monopolizes the basis of power—force—it has at one time or another seemed important to liberals of various persuasions to avoid state monopolization of other arenas. Thus, in the classic formulation, to tie money to gold is to protect the economy from manipulation by the state. By analogy, we should be equally concerned about penetration of associational life, and we should therefore sustain primary solidarities which are less vulnerable to penetration by the state. We should combat ideologies of the unified political community which devalue particular loyalties to primary, intermediate social groups (Nisbet 1952). Finally, we should avoid capture by the state of the process by which norms and values are interpreted, if necessary by establishing fixed, unmanipulable standards.

Parsons's Counterattack

Modern social organization depends on intensive differentiation, which implies delegation of functions to others. Delegation requires trust, which in turn requires reassurance. Reassurance is provided by ideological definitions and justifications, which, insofar as they work, are in a sense true, as long as people credit them. Social criticism tends to undermine such credit and to deflate influence and value commitment; social solidarity is thereby eroded. Therefore, Parsonian sociology, in defense of modernity, counterattacks the social critics, using the time-honored method of sociological critique. Parsons asserts solidarities—the “fund” of influence, for example—by which conduct is to be evaluated. The conduct of the critics falls short because it is destructive of the solidarities on which a free society is founded. Turning the tables, so to speak, he accuses the intellectuals themselves of unconscious and ulterior motives. Their vision has become clouded by “role-strain.” They suffer from the relegation of their role to mere cognitive clarification of issues of meaning instead of literal discovery of controlling moral truths (Parsons and Platt 1973, pp. 267–303; Parsons 1970a, pp. 22–26). Persons placed in highly differentiated roles often experience a feeling of loss of function and consequently find it difficult to upgrade their capacities to the level required by their new role. Parsons would gladly give them lessons. He incorporated and relativized the standard critiques of modern society by making them a predictable aspect of the process of differentiation and modernization itself. They are, as it were, “growing pains,” and whether they are pains in the left or the right leg, they are of the same ilk. Romantic Marxism and McCarthyism are two examples of the same species of problem.²⁵

²⁵ The logic of Parsons's attribution of ideologies to strains attendant on upgrading expectations is well illustrated in his interpretation of McCarthyism (Parsons 1960, pp. 226–47); see also Parsons (1967), pp. 139–65.

The metaphor of "growing pains" is apt for it conveys a connotation of immaturity. For Parsons, the prototypical growing pain is brought on by the incest taboo, which frustrates direct libidinal attachment within the family. This turns the individual's energies outside the home and into the larger society, but not without emotional torment (Parsons 1970*b*, pp. 15–111). A parallel dynamic occurs each time the larger society becomes more remote and requires yet further extensions of trust and solidarity. Parsons's ideological role was to assert the reality of this larger society; he defined our endemic emotional misgivings as irrational and pled for commitment to new solidarities. He, like the Puritan intellectuals, saw himself as a moral leader, and he sought to lead by presenting utilitarian images of solidarity.

Parsonian Critiques of Contemporary Society

Parsons's celebration of the potential of modernity does not imply that the existing social order is beyond criticism or that any attack on it is a destruction of necessary solidarities. In the first place, like his utilitarian predecessors, Parsons is quite willing to argue against regressive traditional solidarities when such ties stand in the way of progressive change, that is, change in the direction of greater differentiation, the consolidation of such differentiation, and greater freedom. In this respect, barriers to societal community or ascriptive exclusions from participation in the larger social order are particularly subject to criticism from a Parsonian standpoint (Parsons 1977, pp. 182–214; Parsons 1967, pp. 422–65).

Second, it is possible for generalized media to become excessively inflated, so inflated that deposits of trust ought to be withdrawn. What Parsons denies is that demonstrable inflation shows that the whole system is inherently corrupt. For example, in *The American University*, Parsons and Platt (1973) argue that, because of excessively rapid growth, the university system became overextended and required some deflation of its product. Nevertheless, they take great pains to point out that the virulent criticism that inevitably accompanies such a deflationary process is not to be taken at face value. Such criticism is ideologically exaggerated; the institutional underpinnings of the American university are inherently sound, and we can expect people to continue to make "deposits" of influence and intelligence in this institution. For Parsons, the framework of modernity is sound; moreover, the framework is worthy, for it provides for an order based on individual choice. It is not a purely utilitarian framework, for Parsons will not take its institutionalization—its social character—for granted; but the social anchoring of the utilitarian framework does not detract from its essentially liberal character. Markets mediated by influence and value commitments are, like markets mediated

by money, social structures that provide for free, creative social action.

The early modern utilitarians sought to found order in the society on reason in the individual. For Parsons, "intelligent choice" became the equivalent of individual reason. As a sociological neo-utilitarian, he could not follow the classic utilitarian doctrine that individual reason can merely be presumed as a feature of nature. On the contrary, complex social organization is required in order to nurture the capacity to make intelligent choices. Nevertheless, Parsons thought that modernization had progressively increased the realm of social action open to intelligent choice. For this reason, modern society sustains and protects institutions that develop human intelligence. Faith in these institutions increases the individual's capacity to participate in the modern utilitarian order and its manifold free markets.

Parsons's analysis of the functions of undergraduate university education are particularly revealing in this respect (Parsons and Platt 1973, pp. 163–224), especially the discussions therein of the educated citizenry in a modern society, which thrusts on us the burden of choice. General education allows participation in highly differentiated, pluralized social systems by developing the capacity for intelligent choice.

Ambivalence in Parsons's Approach: Structure and Exchange

Despite his gradual acceptance of free exchange as a foundation of order in modern society, Parsons remained ambivalent about pressing his emerging argument to the point of possible inconsistencies with his previously stated positions. One might suppose that, given the fluidity of normative systems that provide only frameworks of exchange instead of setting the terms of exchange, processes of exchange might become creative—possibly leading to renegotiation of the normative frameworks themselves. Recognition of such a process might have led to new insights into how normative frameworks are themselves created through a process of exchange, which would have added new depth to the Parsonian account of the process of institutionalization. Had Parsons fully developed this line of argument, he might have been recognized as an exchange theorist. He clearly recognized the centrality of paradigms of exchange in his analysis, despite his insistence on the embedding of exchange in institutionalized, stabilizing systems. Note, for example, his complaint in response to Clark (1972): "I have often wondered why I have never been identified with exchange theory. Going back to *Toward a General Theory of Action*, certainly the analysis of interaction presented there dealt most conspicuously with exchanges and in another phase which began with the book *Economy and Society*, which I co-authored with Neil Smelser, exchange is the very center of the analytical picture. Yet Homans and Blau are

exchange theorists and apparently Smelser and I are not. This seems a bit illogical" (Parsons 1972, p. 229). However, a lifetime habit of viewing normative regulation as constraint did not predispose him to view regulation and creation as two sides of the same coin. The "hierarchy of control" presumes that normative regulation occurs at one level of structure and constrains the regulated action at a level below it. Accordingly, his accounts of process seldom break fully free of the structuralist boundaries of constraint theory. His concept of value commitment as a generalized medium might have made it possible for him to conceptualize changes in the normative framework as bargained processes of exchange, but the possibility of opening this line of argument seems to have escaped him.²⁶ In writing of concrete changes in the normative order attendant on new exchanges of value commitments, he refers most often to major one-time historical changes, such as the emergence of the Protestant ethic, rather than to everyday life in modern society.

CONCLUSION

Talcott Parsons originally established his reputation with a brilliant extension of the sociological attack on the utilitarian approach. To the end of his career he remained faithful to his original position in one respect: he consistently maintained that processes of utilitarian exchange must be stabilized by constraining normative structures external to the exchange partners. Nevertheless, within this framework, Parsons did not, in the last analysis, reject either the utilitarian order of exchange or utilitarian approaches to the analysis of social solidarity. There is an ethical imperative embedded in his scheme; over the course of his career, that ethical imperative—the need to justify modern forms of social organization—caused him to adapt utilitarian themes to his own purposes. He sought to extend the tools of utilitarian theory beyond economic markets to the whole panoply of means by which citizens freely make rational investments in each other. His efforts must be seen as a defense of modern forms of social organization—as reassurance that modernity does not destroy communal life. Rather he claims that modernity creates the forms of solidarity that utilitarians have long stressed—solidarities founded on mutual influence, discussion, and persuasion. These solidarities create a society, and that society, though founded on rational exchange, is nevertheless a source of value and constraint.

²⁶ The referenced exchange with Clark provides a good example of Parsons's ambivalence about relaxing the structuralist assumptions of his thought. To identify this ineradicable structuralism is not to concede that Parsons held, as some critics have maintained, an "over-socialized conception of man" (Wrong 1961; Lockwood 1956; Wentworth 1980). Application of the idea of oversocialization to Parsons's approach leads to an absurd, unrecognizable caricature.

Parsons sought to steer a middle course between ideologies to the left and right of his own centrist liberalism (Parsons and Platt 1973, pp. 282–94). He argued against fundamentalist individualism, which does not recognize the social regulation built into individual human conduct, and against fundamentalist collectivism, which claims that modern individuation has created a society without collectivity. He had faith that political democracy could be “bound up with structural pluralism in the society” and that diverse economic interests and solidary ties “can be integrated into a system of order not inherently repressive or exploitative” (Parsons and Platt 1973, p. 290). The romantic tradition had denied this possibility, said Parsons, but he was convinced that “institutionalized individualism” within a “differentiated societal community” creates free actors who can intelligently pursue interests within a complex array of systems of loyalty which, for all its diversity and voluntarism, is nonetheless a community.

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Rule Enforcement without Visible Means: Christmas Gift Giving in Middletown¹

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As part of a much larger study of social change in Middletown (Muncie, Ind.), a random sample of adult residents was interviewed early in 1979 about celebrations of the previous Christmas. This paper describes the unwritten and largely unrecognized rules that regulate Christmas gift giving and associated rituals in this community and the effective enforcement of those rules without visible means. A theoretical explanation is proposed.

The Middletown III study is a systematic replication of the well-known study of a midwestern industrial city conducted by Robert and Helen Lynd in the 1920s (Lynd and Lynd [1929] 1959) and partially replicated by them in the 1930s (Lynd and Lynd [1937] 1963). The fieldwork for Middletown III was conducted in 1976–79;² its results have been reported in *Middletown Families* (Caplow et al. 1982) and in 38 published papers³ by various authors; additional volumes and papers are in preparation. Nearly all this material is an assessment of the social changes that occurred between the 1920s and the 1970s in this one community, which is, so far, the only place in the United States that provides such long-term comprehensive sociological data. The Middletown III research focused on those aspects of social structure described by the Lynds in order to utilize the opportunities for longitudinal comparison their data afforded, but there was one important exception. The Lynds had given little attention to the annual cycle of religious-civic-family festivals (there were only two inconsequential references to Christmas in *Middletown* and none at all to Thanksgiving or Easter), but we found this cycle too important to ignore. The celebration of Christmas, the high point of the cycle, mobilizes

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³ A complete list of these publications is available on request from any of the investigators.

almost the entire population for several weeks, accounts for about 4% of its total annual expenditures, and takes precedence over ordinary forms of work and leisure. In order to include this large phenomenon, we interviewed a random sample of 110 Middletown adults early in 1979 to discover how they and their families had celebrated Christmas in 1978. The survey included an inventory of all Christmas gifts given and received by these respondents. Although the sample included a few very isolated individuals, all of these had participated in Christmas giving in the previous year. The total number of gifts inventoried was 4,347, a mean of 39.5 per respondent. The distribution of this sample of gifts by type and value, by the age and sex of givers and receivers, and by gift-giving configurations has been reported elsewhere (Caplow 1982).

The following were among the findings: (1) Four out of five Christmas gifts went to kin, and four out of five of these to close kin. (2) Fifty-seven percent of all gifts were a part of a multiple gift, that is, two or more gifts from the same giver(s) to the same receiver(s), and 59% of all gifts were joint, that is, from more than one giver or to more than one receiver. (3) The proportion of each class of kin relationships marked by Christmas gifts and the value of those gifts were roughly proportionate to the closeness of the kin relationship. (4) Women were much more active as gift givers than men; they selected most of the gifts given jointly by couples, gave more gifts singly than men, and did nearly all of the gift wrapping. (5) Although married women were largely responsible for Christmas gift giving, they did not favor their own relatives over their husbands'. Gifts to maternal relatives did not differ significantly in number or value from gifts to paternal relatives. (6) In gift giving, close affinal relatives were equated with the linking consanguineous relative. For example, gifts to daughters-in-law were as numerous and valuable as gifts to married sons. (7) The flow of gifts between adults and children was heavily unbalanced. The respondents, all adult, gave about seven times as many gifts to children as they received in return. (8) Residential distance, which has a major effect on most forms of contact between kin, has only a minor influence on Christmas gift giving.

In an earlier paper I undertook to account for those features of Middletown's Christmas gift-giving system that seemed most distinctive: the heavily unbalanced gift giving from parents to children, which does not change when the children are grown; the equal treatment of affinal and consanguineous relatives; and the lack of interest in exact reciprocity in gift giving between kin. Drawing on the ethnographic literature, I suggested that ritualized gift giving, in any society, is a method of dealing with important but insecure relationships, whereby gifts are offered to persons or collectivities whose goodwill is needed but cannot be taken for granted; and I showed how this formula seems to explain the features mentioned above.

In this paper, I discuss a quite different problem: How are the rules that appear to govern Christmas gift giving in Middletown communicated and enforced? There are no enforcement agents and little indignation against violators. Nevertheless, the level of participation is very high.

Here are some typical gift-giving rules that are enforced effectively in Middletown without visible means of enforcement and indeed without any widespread awareness of their existence:

THE TREE RULE

Married couples with children of any age should put up Christmas trees in their homes. Unmarried persons with no living children should not put up Christmas trees. Unmarried parents (widowed, divorced, or adoptive) may put up trees but are not required to do so.

Conformity with the Tree Rule in our survey sample may be fairly described as spectacular. Table 1 shows the distribution of Christmas trees by family situation in our respondents' households. Of the 45 married respondents with children under 18, only two had no tree. One was a newly married woman who had spent the entire Christmas season with her husband's parents in another state. The other was a recent immigrant from Venezuela who omitted the tree to demonstrate her refusal to be assimilated: "We try to keep our own culture," she told the interviewer in explaining why she and her husband had set up a nativity scene instead.

Of the 36 married respondents with children who were adults, only three lacked a tree. Two were away from home for the entire Christmas season; the third, a 69-year-old woman whose husband had been hospitalized recently, had broken up house-keeping and was living with a married daughter who had her own tree.

Two of the six married and childless respondents had trees. They were a 23-year-old man and woman, each recently married, and presumably planning to have children. The other four married and childless respondents were much older, and in each case, the wives were beyond child-bearing age. They had no trees.

Of the 13 unmarried parents in the sample (one was raising two adopted grandchildren, another had an illegitimate child, and the others were widowed or divorced), eight had trees, five did not.

Of the nine unmarried and childless respondents in the sample, *none* had individual trees, although most had put up Christmas decorations, and one young woman had decorated a potted begonia with Christmas lights. The two unmarried childless respondents who reported trees at home were young people still living with their parents; these apparent exceptions support the rule.

TABLE 1

CHRISTMAS TREES BY FAMILY SITUATION
(In a Middletown Sample, 1978)

RESPONDENT'S FAMILY SITUATION	TYPE OF TREE					TOTAL
	None	Ceramic	Artificial	Real	Multiple	
Married, children under 18	2 (4)	...	9	32	2	45
Married, children over 18	3 (8)	4	4	24	1	36
Unmarried, children	5 (45)	2	2	4	...	13
Married, childless	4 (67)	2	...	6
Unmarried, childless	7 (78)	2	...	9
Subtotal	21	6	15	64	3	109
Uncodable						1
Total						110

NOTE.—None = no Christmas tree; ceramic = a ceramic Christmas tree, sometimes lighted, always of tabletop size; artificial = an imitation evergreen tree, three to five feet tall, made of durable plastic and intended for repeated use; real = a real evergreen tree, spruce, fir, pine, or (rarely) cedar, about four to 12 feet in height, cut just before Christmas or (occasionally) dug up and placed in a tub; multiple = two or more, real or artificial, trees. Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

Nobody in Middletown seems to be consciously aware of the norm that requires married couples with children of any age to put up a Christmas tree, yet the obligation is so compelling that, of the 77 respondents in this category who were at home for Christmas 1978, only one—the Venezuelan woman previously mentioned—failed to do so. Few of the written laws that agents of the state attempt to enforce with endless paperwork and threats of violence are so well obeyed as this unwritten rule that is promulgated by no identifiable authority and backed by no evident threat. Indeed, the existence of the rule goes unnoticed. People in Middletown think that putting up a Christmas tree is an entirely voluntary act. They know that it has some connection with children, but they do not understand that married couples with children of any age are effectively required to have trees and that childless unmarried people are somehow prevented from having them. Middletown people do not consciously perceive the Christmas tree as a symbol of the complete nuclear family (father, mother, and one or more children). Those to whom we suggested that possibility seemed to resent it.

Ethnographers have debated at some length whether the symbolic connections they detect in tribal cultures need to be verified by the testimony of participants (Foster and Brandes 1980). In this exceptionally clear instance, we infer that Middletown people sense the symbolic meaning of the Christmas tree because, otherwise, the consistency of their behavior with respect to it would be inexplicable, but there is direct evidence that they themselves do not translate the symbol.

THE WRAPPING RULE

Christmas gifts must be wrapped before they are presented.

A subsidiary rule requires that the wrapping be appropriate, that is, emblematic, and another subsidiary rule says that wrapped gifts are appropriately displayed as a set but that unwrapped gifts should not be so displayed. Conformity with these rules is exceedingly high.

An unwrapped object is so clearly excluded as a Christmas gift that Middletown people who wish to give something at that season without defining it as a Christmas gift have only to leave the object unwrapped. Difficult-to-wrap Christmas gifts, like a pony or a piano, are wrapped symbolically by adding a ribbon or bow or card and are hidden until presentation. Nowadays, in Middletown, it is not sufficient to wrap a Christmas gift in ordinary paper. Nearly all gifts are wrapped in special paper, most emblematically colored red, green, or white with graphic emblems that include Santa Claus, the Christmas tree, bells, candles, holly, mistletoe, wreaths, or carolers—a whole lexicon of familiar images. Christmas packages are decorated further with ribbons, bows, and stick-

ers. Many of these packages are made up in the stores, but a greater number are wrapped at home. Women wrap far more gifts than men. Almost half the male respondents had someone else wrap their gifts, and wives were much more likely to wrap their husbands' gifts than were the husbands. Of the women in the sample, 57% wrapped all their gifts without help, compared with 16% of the men.

In nearly every Middletown household, the wrapped presents are displayed under or around the Christmas tree as a glittering monument to the family's affluence and mutual affection. Picture taking at Christmas gatherings is clearly a part of the ritual; photographs were taken at 65% of the recorded gatherings. In nearly all instances, the pile of wrapped gifts was photographed; and individual participants were photographed opening a gift, ideally at the moment of "surprise." Although the pile of wrapped gifts is almost invariably photographed, a heap of unwrapped gifts is not a suitable subject for the Christmas photographer. Among the 366 gatherings we recorded, there was a single instance in which a participant, a small boy, was photographed with all his unwrapped gifts. To display unwrapped gifts as a set seems to invite the invidious comparison of gifts—and of the relationships they represent.

THE DECORATION RULE

Any room where Christmas gifts are distributed should be decorated by affixing Christmas emblems to the walls, the ceiling, or the furniture.

This is done even in nondomestic places, like offices or restaurant dining rooms, if gifts are to be distributed there. Conformity to this rule was perfect in our sample of 366 gatherings at which gifts were distributed, although, once again, the existence of the rule was not recognized by the people who obeyed it.

The same lack of recognition applies to the interesting subsidiary rule that a Christmas tree should not be put up in an undecorated place, although a decorated place need not have a tree. Unmarried, childless persons normally decorate their homes, although they have no trees, and decorations without a tree are common in public places, but a Christmas tree in an undecorated room would be unseemly. The decorations are often elaborate:

We had lights outside and around the front door. There was a wreath on the front door and over the fireplace, candles' around, the large and the small Christmas angel, a mistletoe ball, Christmas salt and pepper shakers, and Christmas plates for cookies, the creche on the television, card holders for the Christmas cards.

Every room in the house had Christmas decorations. I have outside lights on the outdoor tree and on the garage door, electric candles in the window,

we decorate the outdoor pole lamp. On the mantel in the family room I have two latch hook stockings for my granddaughters. The mantel is decorated with angels and Rudolph. I decorate the bulletin board to look like a package. There is a wreath on the door, and the nativity scene my mother made. A Holly Hobby ball in the master bath, mistletoe in the entry way, an artificial tree and lights around the mirror in the bathroom. My Christmas angel collection was out.

It goes without saying that Christmas decorations must be temporary, installed for the season and removed afterward (with the partial exception of outdoor wreaths, which are sometimes left to wither on the door.) A room painted in red and green, or with a frieze of plaster wreaths, would not be decorated within the meaning of the rule.

THE GATHERING RULE

Christmas gifts should be distributed at gatherings where every person gives and receives gifts.

Compliance with this rule is very high. More than nine-tenths of the 1,378 gifts our respondents received, and of the 2,969 they gave, were distributed in gatherings, more than three-quarters of which were family gatherings. Most gifts mailed or shipped by friends and relatives living at a distance were double wrapped, so that the outer unceremonious wrappings could be removed and the inner packages could be placed with other gifts to be opened at a gathering. In the typical family gathering, a number of related persons assemble by prearrangement at the home of one of them where a feast is served; the adults engage in conversation; the children play; someone takes photographs; gifts are distributed, opened, and admired; and the company then disperses. The average Middletown adult fits more than three of these occasions into a 24-hour period beginning at Christmas Eve, often driving long distances and eating several large dinners during that time.

THE DINNER RULE

Family gatherings at which gifts are distributed include a "traditional Christmas dinner."

This is a rule that participants in Middletown's Christmas ritual may disregard if they wish, but it is no less interesting because compliance is only partial. Presumably, this rule acquired its elective character because the pattern of multiple gatherings described above requires many gatherings to be scheduled at odd hours when dinner either would be inappropriate or, if the dinner rule were inflexible, would require participants to overeat beyond the normal expectations of the season. However, 65% of the survey respondents had eaten at least one traditional Christmas dinner the previous year.

The term "traditional Christmas dinner" was used by respondents themselves to describe a meal pattern with all or most of the following elements: (1) turkey or ham, preferably turkey and ham; (2) dressing; (3) white potatoes, preferably mashed; (4) sweet potatoes in some form; (5) cranberry sauce or salad; (6) green beans, baked beans, or bean salad; and (7) pumpkin pie and other pies.

There appears to be a subsidiary rule that traditional Christmas dinners served in homes should be prepared exclusively by women. There was not a single reported instance in this survey of a traditional Christmas dinner prepared by a man.

THE GIFT SELECTION RULES

A Christmas gift should (a) demonstrate the giver's familiarity with the receiver's preferences; (b) surprise the receiver, either by expressing more affection—measured by the aesthetic or practical value of the gift—than the receiver might reasonably anticipate or more knowledge than the giver might reasonably be expected to have; (c) be scaled in economic value to the emotional value of the relationship.

The economic values of any giver's gifts are supposed to be sufficiently scaled to the emotional values of relationships that, when they are opened in the bright glare of the family circle, the donor will not appear to have disregarded either the legitimate inequality of some relationships by, for example, giving a more valuable gift to a nephew than to a son, or the legitimate equality of other relationships by, for example, giving conspicuously unequal gifts to two sons.

Individuals participating in these rituals are not free to improvise their own scales of emotional value for relationships. The scale they are supposed to use, together with its permissible variations, is not written down anywhere but is thoroughly familiar to participants. From analysis of the gifts given and received by our survey respondents, we infer the following rules for scaling the emotional value of relationships.

THE SCALING RULES

(a) A spousal relationship should be more valuable than any other for both husband and wife, but the husband may set a higher value on it than the wife. (b) A parent-child relationship should be less valuable than a spousal relationship but more valuable than any other relationship. The parent may set a higher value on it than the child does. (c) The spouse of a married close relative should be valued as much as the linking relative. (d) Parents with several children should value them equally throughout their lives. (e) Children with both parents still living, and still married to each other, may value them equally or may value their mothers somewhat more than their fathers. A married couple with two pairs of living, still-married parents

should value each pair equally. Children of any age with divorced, separated, or remarried parents may value them unequally. (f) Siblings should be valued equally in childhood but not later. Adult siblings who live close by and are part of one's active network should be equally valued, along with their respective spouses, but siblings who live farther away may be valued unequally. (g) Friends of either sex, aside from sexual partners treated as quasi-spouses, may be valued as much as siblings but should not be valued as much as spouses, parents, or children. (h) More distant relatives—like aunts or cousins—may be valued as much as siblings but should not be valued as much as spouses, parents, or children.

It is a formidable task to balance these ratios every year and to come up with a set of Christmas gifts that satisfies them. Small wonder that Middletown people complain that Christmas shopping is difficult and fatiguing. But although they complain, they persist in it year after year without interruption. People who are away from home for Christmas arrange in advance to have their gifts distributed to the usual receivers and to open their own gifts ceremoniously. People confined by severe illness delegate others to do shopping and wrapping. Although our random sample of Middletown adults included several socially isolated persons, even the single most isolated respondent happened to have an old friend with whom he exchanged expensive gifts.

Given the complexity of the rules, errors and failures in gift selection can be expected to occur, and they frequently do. Indeed, the four or five shopping days immediately after Christmas are set aside in Middletown stores for return or exchange of badly selected gifts. A number of respondents described relatives who make a point of being impossible to please, like the grandfather in Renata Adler's story:

The grandfather, who pretended not to care about the holiday, every year, until the precise moment when the door to the study, where the piano stood, was opened and the presents were revealed, became every year, at that moment, hopeful, eager, even zealous and then dejected utterly. No one had ever found a present that actually pleased him. "Very nice," he would say, in a tight voice, as he unwrapped one thing after another. "Very nice. Now I'll just put that away." The year his sons gave him an electric razor, he said, "Very nice. Of course I'll never use it. I'm too old to change the way I shave." When they asked him at least to try it, he said "No, I'm sorry. It's very nice. No I'll just put that away." [Adler 1978, pp. 136–37]

The standard disappointing gift is an article of clothing in the wrong size. Women are particularly resentful of oversized items that seem to say the giver perceives them as "fat." Children are often insulted by inattentive relatives who give them toys that are too "young." The spouse's or lover's gift that is disliked by the receiver is a sign of alienation. Two of the five couples in our sample for whom such gifts were reported at Christmas 1978 had separated by the time of the interview several weeks later.

The rigor of the Selection Rules is softened by several devices—joint

gifts from and to married couples, from children to parents, and from two or three siblings to another are common. Such arrangements make it difficult to determine whether the comparative value of relationships has been correctly translated into gifts, and that is the more or less conscious intention. Two families in our sample drew lots for their gifts. That practice is nearly standard at nonfamilial Christmas gatherings, like ward parties for hospitalized children, where presents are distributed without any attempt to particularize relationships.

FITNESS RULES

Rules about the fitness of gifts (e.g., women should not give cut flowers to men) are too numerous to specify, but one deserves passing attention. Money is an appropriate gift from senior to junior kin, but an inappropriate gift from junior to senior kin, regardless of the relative affluence of the parties. This is another rule which appears to be unknown to the people who obey it. Of 144 gifts of money given by persons in our sample to those in other generations, 94% went to junior kin, and of the 73 money gifts respondents received from persons in other generations, 93% were from senior kin. A gift certificate may be given to a parent or grandparent to whom an outright gift of money would be improper, but we did not record a single instance of a gift certificate having been given to a child or a grandchild, no substitution being called for.

THE RECIPROCITY RULE

Participants in this gift system should give (individually or jointly) at least one Christmas gift every year to their mothers, fathers, sons, daughters; to the current spouses of these persons; and to their own spouses.

By the operation of this rule, participants expect to receive at least one gift in return from each of these persons excepting infants. Conformity runs about 90% for each relationship separately and for the aggregate of all such relationships. Gifts to grandparents and grandchildren seem to be equally obligatory if these live in the same community or nearby, but not at greater distances (see Caplow 1982, table 6). Christmas gifts to siblings are not required. Only about one-third of the 274 sibling relationships reported by the sample were marked by Christmas gifts. The proportion was no higher for siblings living close than for those farther away. However, gifts to siblings do call for a return gift; this obligation is seldom scanted. Gift giving to siblings' children, and parents' siblings and their respective spouses, appears to be entirely elective; fewer than half of these are reciprocated. We have no way of knowing whether such gifts may be reciprocated at another Christmas, but there were no references to deferred reciprocation in the interviews.

The Reciprocity Rule does not require reciprocated gifts to be of equal value. Parents expect to give more valuable and more numerous gifts to their minor children and to their adult children living at home than they receive in return. This imbalance is central to the entire ritual. The iconography of Middletown's secular Christmas emphasizes unreciprocated giving to children by the emblematic figure of Santa Claus, and the theme of unreciprocated giving provides one of the few connections between the secular and religious iconography of the festival—the Three Wise Men coming from a distant land to bring unreciprocated gifts to a child.

Equivalence of value tends to be disregarded in gift giving between husbands and wives and between parents and their adult children. Husbands often give more valuable gifts to wives than they receive from them. The gifts of parents to adult children are approximately balanced in the aggregate—about the same number of substantial gifts are given in each direction—but there is no insistence on equivalence in particular cases, and when we examine such relationships one by one, we discover many unbalanced exchanges, which seem to be taken for granted.

Only in the relationship between siblings and sibling couples do we find any active concern that the gifts exchanged be of approximately equal value, and even there it is more important to give gifts of approximately equal value to several siblings than to exchange gifts of equal value with each of them.

Empirically, the gift giving between adults and children in our sample was highly unbalanced, in both quantity and value. Respondents gave 946 gifts to persons under 18 and received 145 in return; 89 of these were of substantial value and six of the return gifts were. In about one-third of these relationships, no gift was returned to the adult either by the child or in the child's name. In most of the remaining relationships, the child returned a single gift of token or modest value.

There is little reciprocity in the gift giving between non-kin. A large number of the gifts in this category are addressed to persons who provide minor services; reciprocation in those cases would be bizarre. Gifts from employers to employees, from grateful patients to physicians, and from pupils to teachers do not call for reciprocation. The Christmas gifts exchanged en masse at club meetings and office parties are reciprocal to the extent that each participant gives and receives some small gift, but there is no direct exchange between giver and receiver.

DISCUSSION

Since the problem is to account for the uniformities of gift-giving behavior revealed by the data, speaking of rules begs the question to some extent.

Although we infer from the uniformities observed in Middletown's Christmas gift giving that, somewhere in the culture, there must be statements to which the observed behavior is a response, the crucial point is that we cannot find those statements in any explicit form. Indeed, they are not recognized by participants in the system. In effect, the rules of the game are unfamiliar to the players, even though they can be observed to play meticulously by the rules. Instructions for Christmas gift giving are not found in administrative regulations or popular maxims or books of etiquette; they are not *promulgated*. Neither do they seem to be enforced by what Durkheim called "the public conscience" (Durkheim [1895] 1964, pp. 2-3). People who scanted their Christmas obligations would not be disapproved of by the public conscience in Middletown because Christmas gift giving is visualized there as both a private and a voluntary activity. We never heard anyone make an even indirect reference to community opinion in connection with Christmas gift giving. As far as we can tell, there are no customary forms of moral disapproval reserved for persons who neglect their Christmas duties (which are not, of course, considered to be duties). The moral drift goes the other way. Among Middletown's Protestant fundamentalists there are still vestiges of the violent Puritan objection to the celebration of Christmas as a "wanton Bacchanalian feast" (Barnett 1954, pp. 1-23), which is commonly expressed in sermons about the "degradation" and "commercialization" of the festival.

Since the rules of Christmas gift giving have no explicit form or institutional backing or moral support, they seem to escape the dichotomous classification of "summary rules" and "rules of practice" proposed by

TABLE 2
GIFT GIVING IN MIDDLETOWN BY RELATIONSHIP AND RESIDENTIAL
DISTANCE, CHRISTMAS, 1978

RELATIONSHIP	RELATIONSHIPS MARKED BY GIFTS (%)	
	Within 50 Miles	Beyond 50 Miles
Fathers	100 (29)	85 (26)
Mothers	98 (41)	90 (29)
Children	96 (191)	95 (61)
Childrens' spouses	92 (52)	94 (38)
Grandparents	96 (25)	50 (26)
Grandchildren	90 (95)	77 (63)
Siblings	32 (122)	35 (152)
Siblings' spouses	24 (84)	24 (113)
Siblings' children	19 (254)	15 (384)
Parents' siblings	15 (86)	10 (200)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are *N*'s.

Rawls (1967) and elaborated subsequently by Giddens (1976) and Mulligan and Lederman (1977). They cannot be summary rules because they are not formulated on the basis of past decisions, and they cannot be rules of practice because they do not refer exclusively to a closed situation created by the rules themselves. It is tempting to abandon the concept of rules altogether, but if we do that, how are we to explain the extraordinary uniformity of behavior demonstrated, for example, in tables 1 and 2? Substituting another word like "custom" or "norm" would merely introduce additional complications. What are we to make of unrecognized customs and amoral norms? As Collins remarked,

Why do people repay a gift? Self-interest is not a sufficient explanation, as an exchange is rewarding only to the extent that individuals already know there will be reciprocity. Hence theorists have felt it necessary to fall back on such claims as "what is customary becomes obligatory" (Blau 1964), or to invoke an alleged "norm of reciprocity" (Gouldner 1960; see also Heath 1976). Both formulations beg the explanatory question: in both cases, the customariness of the behavior is just what remains to be explained, and to call this customariness a "norm" is merely to describe it. [1981, p. 1006]

Both functionalist and social exchange theories provide convincing accounts of this gift-giving system (or any other) taken as a whole. Functionalism, with its realist conception of society, looks to the contribution that a given system of activity makes to the maintenance of some larger and more durable system: the institution, the culture, the society. Exchange theory, implicitly nominalist, looks to identities in human nature to account for observed uniformities in social behavior. Some recent investigators, notably in ethnomethodology, have modified this view without attenuating its nominalism by asserting that exchange transactions seldom involve rational calculations of self-interest but are typically based on tacit understandings rooted in previous experience (see Cicourel 1973; Deutscher 1973; Cancian 1975).

Ekeh (1974) distinguishes between "collectivistic orientations" in social exchange theory, exemplified by Durkheim, Mauss, and particularly Lévi-Strauss, and "individualistic orientations," whose principal spokesmen he identifies as Homans and Blau, although very similar positions were articulated much earlier by Frazer (1919) and by the forgotten American sociologist Albert Chavannes, who was rediscovered by Knox (1963). The collectivistic orientations emphasize *systems* of exchange and their contributions to social solidarity. The individualistic orientations propose that the self-interest of individual participants provides sufficient explanation for particular transactions and ipso facto accounts for any similarities displayed by a plurality of transactions. But the two approaches, when applied to particular cases, are not as contradictory as their protagonists claim, since the collectivists cannot demonstrate that individual trans-

actions do not satisfy the self-interest of participants in an exchange system, while the individualists have never, to my knowledge, attempted to show that the repetition of similar transactions does not contribute to social solidarity. Indeed, it is very easy to cross from one side of this street to the other when working with empirical material. An earlier report of this study proposed a functional explanation of Christmas gift giving in Middletown as serving to reinforce group solidarity (Caplow and Williamson 1980), and another report of the same study suggests that individuals are persuaded by self-interest to concentrate their gift giving on persons whose goodwill is wanted but cannot be taken for granted (Caplow 1982)—an individualistic account with no reference to group solidarity.

But while it may be possible, if not prudent, to use opposing theories of social exchange to illuminate different facets of the same data, it must be admitted, nevertheless, that neither theory directly explains cultural uniformities in gift giving. In the collectivist perspective, any type of exchange transaction, whether it is cross-cousin marriage in New Guinea or Christmas giving in Middletown, binds the entire community together. But what invisible hand accomplishes this result? It cannot be the community as a whole, because that is incapable of such concerted action, or any of its components, since none of those takes particular cognizance of the uniformities we are trying to explain.

The individualistic account is incomplete in a different way. Rational self-interest may explain why Middletown people give their affinal relatives so many Christmas gifts, but the explanation is plausible only because of other uniformities in the relationships of Middletown people with their affines. If the uniformity of gift-giving behavior is attributed to these other uniformities, these will then, in turn, call for explanation, and we will not have made much progress with the problem. At some point in the sequence, we must face the fact that Christmas gift giving in Middletown is a customary pattern of ritual behavior. "The customariness of the behavior" to quote Collins again, "is just what remains to be explained."

Recent work by ethnographers has carried the analysis of gift exchange in simple societies beyond the classic formulation of Marcel Mauss ([1925] 1967). Schieffelin (1980), summarizing the research of other ethnographers working in New Guinea (Wagner 1969; Kapferer 1976; Rubel and Rosman 1978; Ernst 1978) together with his own, concludes that "all these studies contain the idea that exchange, as a system of meanings, is involved in the shaping or construction of particular cultural realities. They do this by focusing on the act of prestation as a rhetorical gesture of social communication, stressing the symbolism of the objects exchanged, and viewing transactions as expressive statements or movements in the management of meaning" (p. 503).

Gift exchange, in effect, is a language that employs objects instead of words as its lexical elements. In this perspective, every culture (there may be exotic exceptions, but I am unaware of them) has a language of prestation to express important interpersonal relationships on special occasions, just as it has a verbal language to create and manage meaning for other purposes. The language of prestation, like the verbal language, begins to be learned in early childhood and is used with increasing assurance as the individual matures and acquires social understanding. These "natal" languages are seldom completely forgotten, although new languages may be learned by translation and practice. The problem of accounting for the enforcement of gift-giving rules without visible means is simplified if we take them to be linguistic rules, or at least as similar to them, because linguistic rules, for the most part, are enforced among native speakers of a language without visible means and without being recognized explicitly. It may be objected that school teachers do make linguistic rules explicit and then enforce them by reward and punishment, but that is a rather special case of learning a new language or relearning a natal language in more elegant form. The acquisition of language does not depend on schooling, and the grammatical rules that are made explicit in school are only a small fraction of the rules that native speakers obey without being aware of their existence. The process whereby grammatical rules acquire consensual support is partly instinctual, partly cultural, and partly social. The tendency to follow linguistic rules without explicit awareness appears to be innate in the construction of new verbal combinations: young children acquire the language of the people who raise them along with other elements of the ambient culture; and linguistic rules are self-enforcing insofar as the effective transmission of messages rewards both senders and receivers.

Visualizing Christmas gift giving as a language—or, more precisely, as a dialect or code (Douglas 1972, 1979)—helps to explain, among other matters, the insistence on wrapping and other signs to identify the objects designated for lexical use and the preference for the simultaneous exchange of gifts at family gatherings rather than in private.

In most cases such a gathering is composed of a parent-child unit containing one or two parents and one or more children together with other persons who are tied to that unit by shared membership in another parent-child unit, such as children's children, children's spouses, parents' siblings, or parents' parents. Although there is room at a family gathering for a friend or distant relative who otherwise might be solitary at Christmas, there is no convenient way of including any large number of persons to whom no gift messages are owed.

Under the Scaling Rules, gift messages are due from every person in a parent-child relationship to every other. The individual message says "I value you according to the degree of our relationship" and anticipates

the response "I value you in the same way." But the compound message that emerges from the unwrapping of gifts in the presence of the whole gathering allows more subtle meanings to be conveyed. It permits the husband to say to the wife "I value you more than my parents" or the mother to say to the daughter-in-law "I value you as much as my son so long as you are married to him" or the brother to say to the brother "I value you more than our absent brothers, but less than our parents and much less than my children." These statements, taken together, would define and sustain a social structure, if only because, by their gift messages, both parties to each dyadic relationship confirm that they have the same understanding of the relationship and the bystanders, who are interested parties, endorse that understanding by tacit approval. The compound messages would have a powerful influence even if they were idiosyncratic and each parent-child unit had its own method of scaling relationships. In fact, there are some observable differences in scaling from one Middletown family to another and from one subcultural group to another, but the similarities are much more striking than the differences. We attribute this commonality to the shared dialect of Christmas gift giving, hyperdeveloped in Middletown and elsewhere in the United States in response to commercial promotion, stresses in the family institution, and constant reiteration by the mass media. Once the dialect is reasonably well known, these factors continue to enlarge its vocabulary and its domain.

Another circumstance facilitating the standardization of the dialect is that nearly every individual in this population belongs to more than one parent-child unit for Christmas gift-giving purposes. Because these units are linked and cross-linked to other units in a network that ultimately includes the larger part of the community, they would probably tend to develop a common set of understandings about appropriate kinship behavior, even without the reinforcement provided by domestic rituals.

The most powerful reinforcement remains to be mentioned. In the dialect of Christmas gift giving, the absence of a gift is also a lexical sign, signifying either the absence of a close relationship, as in the Christmas contact of cousins, or the desire to terminate a close relationship, as when a husband gives no gift to his wife. People who have once learned the dialect cannot choose to forget it, nor can they pretend to ignore messages they understand. Thus, without any complicated normative machinery, Middletown people find themselves compelled to give Christmas gifts to their close relatives, lest they inadvertently send them messages of hostility. In this community, where most people depend on their relatives for emotional and social support, the consequences of accidentally sending them a hostile message are too serious to contemplate, and few are willing to run the risk.

In sum, we discover that the participants in this gift-giving system are

themselves the agents who enforce its complex rules, although they do so unknowingly and without conscious reference to a system. The dialect, once learned, imposes itself by linguistic necessity, and the enforcement of its rules is the more effective for being unplanned.

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Modes of Production and Demographic Patterns in Nineteenth-Century France¹

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This research focuses on the relationship between modes of production and demographic patterns. Specifically, it attempts to discover whether the large and enduring regional variations in fertility and nuptiality which characterized 19th-century France can be accounted for by variations in modes of production. The findings indicate that differences in modes of production were associated with variations in population patterns, though not always in the ways originally predicted. The data show that areas of capitalist production were characterized by markedly higher levels of non-marital fertility and, under certain conditions, higher total fertility and earlier marriage as well. The implications of these findings for some major theories of demographic change are discussed.

Few areas of research have yielded as many new and exciting discoveries in recent years as has historical demography. The proliferation of small- and large-scale studies in a variety of countries and time periods has forced demographers to rethink some long-held ideas and to develop new theories more in accord with the historical record. In doing so, they have turned to some traditional sociological sources generally neglected in the field of population studies. The purpose of this paper is to examine some of these new developments and to assess their ability to explain a problem which continues to perplex historical demographers, the persistence of large regional variations in population patterns in 19th-century France.

THEORIES OF DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOR

Until recently, the most widely accepted explanation of demographic behavior was contained in the theory of the demographic transition (Notestein 1945; Davis 1945; Coale 1973). Transition theory argues that the

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process of modernization effects major changes in the population patterns of societies. The initial impact of modernization is on mortality levels. An increasing standard of living, better levels of nutrition, and improvements in health and sanitary facilities bring about a steady decline in death rates, particularly for infants and children. As a result, societies experience an increase in the rate of population growth. However, continued low mortality and further progress toward high levels of modernization eventually begin to affect the birthrate as well. Couples begin to realize, it is argued, that with low mortality fewer births are required to produce the same number of surviving children, and they adjust their fertility accordingly. Moreover, the transition from premodern to highly modernized societies alters the costs and benefits associated with childbearing and child rearing, making smaller families economically advantageous. Finally, modernization makes available to couples effective means to control their fertility and undermines traditional and religious proscriptions against their use. The inevitable result, transition theorists claim, is that modernized societies are uniformly characterized by low mortality and low fertility.

Transition theory has proved useful as a description of the major demographic differences between premodern and modern societies. However, when its specifics are examined, a number of difficulties arise. First, while fertility in premodern societies was certainly higher than in most modern societies, it is also true that premodern societies differed widely in their levels of fertility (Coale 1973). Second, mortality rates in premodern societies appear to have been only weakly correlated with fertility rates, thereby calling into question the central causal mechanism specified by the theory (Matthiessen and McCann 1978). Finally, the transition process in many European societies did not follow the scenario outlined by exponents of the theory. Despite the importance attributed to declining infant mortality as a stimulus to a decline in fertility, a number of countries experienced significant declines in fertility before any apparent decline in infant mortality (Matthiessen and McCann 1978; Knodel and van de Walle 1979). Moreover, fertility rates began to decline in some countries before any real progress toward modernization was achieved (Coale 1973; Knodel and van de Walle 1979).

The discovery of these shortcomings in transition theory has stimulated attempts to produce new explanations of demographic development (Easterlin 1978; Wrigley 1978; Caldwell 1978; Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Lesthaeghe 1980). In this paper I focus on one such approach which argues that the mode of production plays a primary role in shaping demographic patterns. After outlining the basis of this approach, I assess its ability to account for the existence of large regional differentials in fertility among the regions of 19th-century France.

MODES OF PRODUCTION AND POPULATION PATTERNS

Marx was the first to point to the significance of the mode of production in determining population patterns. He argued that "every special historic mode of production has its own special laws of population, historically valid within its own limits" (Marx 1906, p. 693). In his analysis of capitalist society, he attempted to show how the operation of the capitalist system necessarily produced a relative surplus population (Marx 1906, pp. 689-711). He did not, however, specify how the mode of production affected the components of population growth.

In recent years, a number of attempts have been made to build on the ideas of Marx in constructing new theories of demographic behavior (Caldwell 1976, 1978; Macfarlane 1978; C. Tilly 1978, 1979; Meillassoux 1981). These works have focused on the contrast between capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. Their common argument is that the emergence of capitalism was associated with a profound change in demographic patterns.

The growth of a capitalist system of production based on the use of wage labor is said to affect demographic patterns in a number of ways. First, the availability of wage-paying jobs offered new incentives for high fertility. Families under precapitalist modes of production often found it in their interest to limit family size. Peasants living on small plots of land could not make productive use of the labor that large numbers of children would provide. Moreover, large families demanded the subdivision of small plots of land already barely sufficient to support a family. But the growth of opportunities for wage labor allowed families to place children in jobs where they could begin earning income and contributing to the family from an early age. In addition, it provided more or less permanent positions for children who could not possibly have survived on their share of the family holdings.

Of course, such incentives for high fertility existed only so long as children could begin earning wages at an early age. As capitalism matured and small rural industries gave way to large-scale production centered in factories, the benefits to be gained from high fertility declined. The restriction of opportunities for child labor and increasing pressure to place children in school raised the costs of children and contributed to the beginnings of the long-term decline in fertility. But in the early stages of capitalist development, the growth of wage labor can be seen as contributing to higher fertility.

The second way in which the growth of capitalism affected demographic patterns was through its impact on the family. In precapitalist systems, young people depended on their families to secure their economic futures through marriage, inheritance, or other means. As a result, they

remained in a position of economic dependence for an extended period of time and were not at liberty to make decisions on their own about such matters as the timing of marriage or the choice of marital partner.² In contrast, under capitalism, young people gained a measure of economic independence by working for wages in a nonfamily enterprise. This independence allowed them greater freedom to make decisions about their own lives and to make them in accord with what they perceived to be their individual interests.

This decline in the power of the family and the corresponding increase in the autonomy of younger family members were associated with two significant demographic developments. The first was a decline in average age at first marriage. Marriage is thought to have occurred later in such precapitalist systems as peasant agriculture because the right to marry was frequently linked to control over property or parental approval (Flandrin 1979). Children were forced to wait to marry until their parents were prepared to transfer control over the family property to them or until they gained control through inheritance. With the emergence of capitalism, children were presented with an alternative. Once they were in a position to earn a relatively steady wage, they could afford to ignore the wishes of their parents and marry when they pleased. The result, it is argued, was a younger age at first marriage in areas where capitalism developed (C. Tilly 1979).

The second demographic change thought to be associated with the declining power of the family under capitalism concerned the level of nonmarital fertility. Precisely because marriage was a matter of economic importance for families in precapitalist societies, dating and courtship were issues of considerable concern to both the family and the community at large. Therefore they went to considerable effort to supervise and control the process, hoping thereby to limit the possibilities of inappropriate marriages occurring (Shorter 1975; Flandrin 1979). This greater control over the lives of young people is thought to have been associated with a lower level of premarital sexuality and illegitimacy. Similarly, in the absence of effective contraception, the greater degree of independence of young wage earners under capitalism and the reduced power of their families to regulate their behavior would be likely to result in higher levels of nonmarital fertility.

Before I review the evidence on these issues, let me summarize the

² Caldwell emphasizes that the peasant household was the locus of considerable internal conflict. He argues that older male members typically occupied positions of power and were able to ensure that other members complied with their wishes. Why this is so and how they came to hold such positions in the first place is discussed in detail in Caldwell (1979). For a complementary analysis of contemporary families, see Hartmann (1981).

argument to this point. The development of a capitalist mode of production in areas previously dominated by precapitalist systems transformed the social and economic context within which demographic behavior occurred. By weakening the role of the family in demographic decision making and altering the costs and benefits associated with different demographic strategies, the growth of capitalism affected the population patterns of all groups in the population; even those not directly involved in the capitalist sector. Specifically, it is argued that the growth of capitalist production in a given area would be associated with (1) an earlier age at first marriage; (2) a higher level of nonmarital fertility; and, (3) in areas where small-scale capitalism developed (requiring the extensive use of child labor), a higher level of marital fertility as well.

CAPITALISM AND POPULATION CHANGE IN 19TH-CENTURY EUROPE

Relatively little direct evidence is available concerning the impact of capitalist development on population change. Much of the research that has been undertaken has focused instead on the effects of industrialization or modernization. Nevertheless, the burgeoning historical demographic literature does contain some intriguing findings regarding the role of capitalism. This is particularly so in the case of nuptiality patterns. A number of studies have shown that in areas which experienced small-scale capitalist industrial development, or what has been termed "proto-industrialization," first marriages occurred at an earlier age than in largely peasant regions (Mendels 1972, 1975; Hasquin 1971; Lesthaeghe 1977; Levine 1977; Braun 1978). Such aggregate-level studies do not, of course, imply that peasants necessarily married later than wage workers. On the contrary, a number of individual-level inquiries have found either no significant difference in age at marriage between laborers and peasants (Charbonneau 1970; Knodel 1979; Smith 1977) or a *higher* age at first marriage among laborers (Eriksson and Rogers 1978; Winberg 1978; Smith 1977). Instead, these findings suggest that the emergence of capitalism constituted a structural change which affected the demographic behavior of the population as a whole. The growth of capitalism, by weakening the power of the family and providing new economic opportunities, allowed both peasants and wagedworkers to marry earlier.

Little direct evidence exists concerning the impact of capitalism on levels of nonmarital fertility. Shorter (1975) has argued that the rise of capitalism was responsible for the shift in values which lay behind the marked increase in nonmarital fertility in Europe in the century from 1750 to 1850 (Shorter, Knodel, and van de Walle 1971; Laslett 1980). But the evidence to support this contention is far from conclusive. Moreover,

such an argument is of little help in explaining the French case since France did not experience any significant rise in nonmarital fertility during this period (van de Walle 1980). There is, however, one piece of evidence which leads us to suspect that the development of capitalism may have been associated with regional variations in nonmarital fertility rates. Van de Walle (1980) found that urbanization was the strongest predictor of levels of nonmarital fertility in 19th-century France. And, as will be shown later, urbanized departments had higher proportions of waged workers than did rural departments.

The last issue, the problem of marital fertility, is the most difficult. Studies of the pretransition period in Europe have found that in most regions populations followed a pattern of natural fertility (Smith 1977; Knodel and van de Walle 1979). Although substantial differences in levels of marital fertility have been observed during this period, it is assumed they resulted from differences in customs and practices surrounding sexual relations and childbearing and were not the result of conscious control. During the 19th century, however, significant differences among regions existed which were almost certainly the result of differences in the extent of use of contraception. What role variations in modes of production played in accounting for these differences is not yet known. Haines (1979) has discovered that areas of heavy industrial production experienced very high levels of marital fertility, but he did not address specifically the issue of the impact of capitalism. On the individual level, Knodel (1979) has found that laborers lagged behind other groups in the population in the speed with which they adopted fertility control. This may have reflected the greater economic value of children in laboring families. For the most part, though, the hypothesis remains largely untested.

THE CASE OF 19TH-CENTURY FRANCE

Few cases have attracted as much attention from historical demographers as 19th-century France. While most of the attention has centered on the reasons for the extraordinarily early start of the French fertility decline, equally remarkable is the persistence of large regional variations in fertility and nuptiality. In most European countries, the decline of fertility was concentrated in time (Knodel and van de Walle 1979). In France, however, some regions experienced significant declines in marital fertility as early as the late 18th century, while in others fertility remained at pretransition levels until the end of the 19th century (Dupaquier 1979). Crude birthrates in the period 1901–5 ranged from a low of 14.5 per thousand to a high of 30.3 per thousand (van de Walle 1974). In the same period, average age at first marriage for females varied from 21.5 to 27.5 years of age (van de Walle 1974).

A variety of explanations have been suggested to account for these large and enduring variations. Some have argued that only backward or peripheral areas lagged behind the rest of the country in moving toward a "modern" demographic regime based on low marital fertility and early marriage (Armengaud 1976; Dupaquier 1979; Lesthaeghe 1980). There is some evidence to support such a contention. Departments in Brittany and the Massif Central, regions considered slow in modernizing, were among the last to make the transition to controlled fertility. But some areas in the heavily industrialized North and Northeast also experienced high fertility until the end of the century. A simple modern/backward dichotomy does not capture the complexity of French demographic patterns during this period.

A second approach has focused on the socioeconomic correlates of fertility and nuptiality (van de Walle 1974; Lesthaeghe and van de Walle 1976; Hermalin and van de Walle 1977; van de Walle 1978). The most striking finding which has emerged from this line of research centers on the role of income. Per capita income was found to be negatively correlated with *both* age at marriage and marital fertility. Precisely how income affects fertility is not made clear, but the relationship cannot be reduced to a simple association between industrialization or modernization and these demographic rates: controlling for the proportion of the labor force in agriculture, the proportion literate, and the proportion living in urban areas does not eliminate the correlation between income and fertility (van de Walle 1980).

Thus far, little attention has been paid to variations in modes of production. Yet the tremendous diversity of the French economy suggests that this factor be examined. Historians disagree about the performance of the French economy in the 19th century. Some claim that France lagged behind other industrializing societies (Kindleberger 1964; Landes 1970; Kemp 1971); others argue that France simply followed a path to development better suited to her inherent strengths and weaknesses (Roehl 1976; Crafts 1977; Leet and Shaw 1978). Nevertheless, all agree that both the agricultural and industrial sectors were marked by great variation in methods of production and forms of labor control. This was particularly so in agriculture. Most significant for our purposes were regional variations in the use of wage labor. In some regions, particularly in the North, wage laborers constituted more than half of the agricultural labor force (Laurent 1976); in other regions the use of domestic servants to supplement family labor was more common. In addition, in some regions sharecropping continued to be widely practiced (Agulhon, Desert, and Specklin 1976; Clout 1977), even in the last years of the century.

In the industrial sector as well, both capitalist and noncapitalist forms of production and employment continued to coexist. Production organized

along household lines could still be found in some industries and regions into the early part of the 20th century (Weber 1976; Caron 1979). There is little doubt, however, that such forms of industrial production were declining throughout the second half of the 19th century (Caron 1979; O'Brien and Keyder 1978; Hohenberg 1972). The growth of modern factory production brought about a steady decline of rural industries, whether they were organized along capitalist or noncapitalist lines. As a result, the final decades of the 19th century saw a steady deproletarianization of the countryside and helped sharpen the split between rural and urban areas (Laurent 1976; Grantham 1975). In the sections which follow I attempt to determine whether these variations in economic organization were associated with the observed regional variations in population patterns.

DATA AND METHODS

The central feature of the capitalist mode of production is the use of wage labor. Thus, in testing the hypotheses outlined above I have used a measure of the proportion of wageworkers in the labor force of each department.³ However, the conditions of life for wageworkers in various sectors of the economy differed markedly. Agricultural wage laborers, for example, often owned small plots of land and spent part of their time working their own land. In addition to the general measure, then, I have added variables which measure separately the proportion of agricultural and industrial proletarians in each department.

The data for these measures were drawn from the French censuses and agricultural inquiries. The detail given in the census was not sufficient to determine the exact number of wageworkers in agriculture, and it was necessary to make use of the data from the agricultural inquiries conducted in 1862 and 1892. These data were used to compute the proportion of wageworkers in the agricultural sector. This proportion was then applied to the census total for the agricultural labor force to produce an estimate of the number of proletarians in agriculture in the census years. The fact that these inquiries do not coincide with the general censuses introduces an element of inaccuracy into the measurement but less than would result from use of the census classification.

To distinguish between areas characterized by small-scale capitalist

³ The number of wageworkers in fact includes only those in the agricultural and industrial sectors; the status of those listed as workers in other sectors is unclear. The definitions of the other sectors also changed over time. Since in all the departments studied here the overwhelming majority of the labor force was involved in these two sectors, the exclusion of the small number of wageworkers in other sectors should not affect the results.

enterprises and those where large-scale factory production had taken root, I used a measure of the average number of wageworkers employed in industrial establishments. These data were taken from two industrial surveys, one conducted in the period 1861–65, the other in 1896. The earlier survey was selective in its coverage of industrial establishments, and, because smaller establishments were more likely to be missed, it may overstate the average number of workers. The analysis which follows uses the natural logarithm of this measure because it is proportional rather than absolute increases in size of firm, which we would expect to be associated with variations in demographic behavior. (See Appendix for further details concerning data.)

Historically, the growth of capitalism in Europe was associated with other forms of social change such as industrialization and urbanization. To determine whether the use of wage labor had an independent effect on population patterns, two control variables were included in the analysis: the proportion of the population living in urban areas and a measure of per capita income. The proportion urban was highly correlated with several other factors, such as the proportion of the labor force in agriculture or industry, and thus only this one indicator of what might be termed modernization was included.⁴ Given the important role attributed to variations in per capita income by previous analyses of this problem, it was considered essential to include this factor in the present study.

The data for these variables were drawn from both primary and secondary sources. The urbanization measure was based on Tugault's (1975) reanalysis of French census data. The income data for the earlier period were taken from a study of departmental revenues in 1864 (Delefortrie and Morice 1954), whereas the data for 1901 are based on a survey of wages conducted by the French government (France, *Statistique Générale de la France*, 1907). Thus the measure for the earlier year is roughly equivalent to the gross departmental production per capita, whereas the measure for 1901 is based on average daily wages for workers in selected trades. Unfortunately, the figures available for the latter measure refer only to wage rates in the *chef-lieu* or administrative center of the department and thus provide a less satisfactory measure than that for 1864.

Measuring the dependent variables was an easier task. More accurate measures and data of better quality were readily available. Although French censuses and vital statistics for this period were plagued by problems of inaccuracy and underenumeration, van de Walle's (1974) reconstruction of the female population of France has provided us with accurate measures of fertility and nuptiality for the 19th century. This paper makes

⁴ Substituting other measures in the analysis, such as the proportion of the population in agriculture or the proportion literate, produced no significant changes in the findings.

use of his measures of total fertility (I_T), marital fertility (I_M), nonmarital fertility (I_N), and age at first marriage.⁵ The three measures of fertility are proportional measures in that they express the observed level of fertility as a proportion of a hypothetical maximum. They are particularly useful in comparative analyses because they are standardized measures which eliminate the effects of differences in population composition on fertility.

Two final points about the analysis should be made. The first concerns the use of departments as the units of analysis.⁶ A proper test of the hypotheses presented requires aggregate-level data. Thus, using departmental-level data should not be seen as a poor substitute for individual-level data. Nevertheless, the French departments are less than ideal for our purposes. They are large, heterogeneous units containing widely different communities within them. Second, the choice of dates for the analysis was dictated in large part by the availability of data. Major agricultural and industrial inquiries in addition to the regular censuses were conducted during these periods and provide the information necessary for performance of the analyses. However, these years are also well chosen from a substantive point of view. The last four decades of the 19th century saw a major transformation in the French economy and the gradual decline of rural industry. Our two vantage points allow us to examine regional variations in demographic patterns at a time when the countryside was still marked by a mixture of agricultural and industrial activity and again when industry had, for the most part, left the rural areas.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the correlations among the independent and control variables to be included in the analysis. The findings reveal several important relationships. First, the increasing strength of the association between the proportion of wageworkers and the proportion of industrial wageworkers reflects the decline of the rural, agricultural proletariat dur-

⁵ Full details on the computation of these indexes can be found in Lesthaeghe and van de Walle (1976). It was decided to use the measure of age at first marriage rather than the measure of proportion married (I_m) because the meaning of the former is intuitively clearer and the majority of the theoretical literature refers specifically to age at first marriage. Substituting the I_m measure in the analysis produced similar results. For the measure of age at first marriage used, see Hajnal (1953).

⁶ Because of difficulties with the primary data, van de Walle (1974) was unable to estimate demographic measures for several of the most highly urbanized departments, including the regions containing the cities of Paris and its suburbs, Marseilles, and Lyons. Also the departments whose boundaries changed as a result of the Franco-Prussian War were excluded from the analysis. It is hard to judge the effect of these deletions on the analysis, though it is interesting to note that using the net reproduction rate (Tugault 1975), which was available for all departments, in place of I_T did not produce significant differences in the results.

TABLE 1

CORRELATION MATRIX SHOWING ZERO-ORDER RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE
INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES, FRANCE, 1861 AND 1901

	Income	Proportion Urban	Proportion of Wage- workers	Proportion of Agricultural Wage- workers	Proportion of Industrial Wage- workers
1861 (<i>N</i> = 77):					
Proportion urban30*				
Proportion of wageworkers19	.54*			
Proportion of agricultural wageworkers	-.07	.13	.56*		
Proportion of industrial wageworkers29*	.48*	.59*	-.34*	
Average size of workplace (natural log)13	.34*	.42*	-.26*	.72*
1901 (<i>N</i> = 76):					
Proportion urban38*				
Proportion of wage- workers49*	.61*			
Proportion of agricultural wageworkers07	.11	.52*		
Proportion of industrial wageworkers53*	.64*	.81*	-.08	
Average size of workplace (natural log)46*	.60*	.85*	.12	.92*

* $P \leq .05$.

ing the last four decades of the century. Similarly, the growing strength of the correlation between the proportion of wageworkers and both the proportion urban and the average size of workplace illustrates the growing importance of an urban-based proletariat concentrated in large industrial settings. Finally, the positive association between income and the proportion of industrial wageworkers, an association which also grows in strength over time, should be noted. Given the important role attributed to variations in income by previous analyses, this finding underlines the importance of controlling for income in order to assess the effects of capitalist development on demographic patterns.

Table 2 presents the correlations among the demographic measures used in the analysis. The most striking fact which emerges is the very strong *positive* association between age at first marriage and marital fertility. As van de Walle (1974, 1978) has noted, the spread of deliberate control over fertility was associated with a transition to a pattern of earlier and more

TABLE 2

CORRELATION MATRIX SHOWING ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS AMONG THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES, 1861 AND 1901

	Total Fertility (I_f)	Marital Fertility (I_g)	Nonmarital Fertility (I_h)
1861 ($N = 78$):			
Marital fertility79*		
Nonmarital fertility15	-.18	
Age at first marriage24*	.72*	-.24*
1901 ($N = 78$):			
Marital fertility90*		
Nonmarital fertility12	-.17	
Age at first marriage54*	.81*	-.30*

* $P \leq .05$.

nearly universal marriage. Equally remarkable is the negative correlation between age at first marriage and nonmarital fertility. Apparently, the shift to a pattern of earlier marriage was part of a more general transition in behavior which also involved an increase in nonmarital fertility and, no doubt, an increase in the extent of premarital sexual activity.

Table 3 presents the results of the first set of multiple regression analyses used to test the hypotheses.⁷ In each case, the variable proportion of wageworkers in the labor force was entered into the equations after the two control variables, income and proportion urban. These results confirm the strong role played by per capita income. Regions characterized by higher levels of per capita income manifest what could be termed a "modern" demographic pattern: earlier marriage, lower marital fertility, and higher illegitimate fertility. The association between income and the measures of fertility and nuptiality weakens by the later time. The proportion of variance explained by variations in income levels declines, particularly in the case of marital fertility. It should be remembered that the income measure used in the analysis for 1901 was less satisfactory and may account in part for the decrease in the strength of the associations.

In general, the second control variable included in the analysis, the proportion urban, plays a less significant role. Surprisingly, it is positively associated with the total and marital fertility measures in 1861. However, it is not significantly related to either of the other demographic variables, and the association with total and marital fertility is no longer significant in 1901.

⁷ I also attempted to do the analysis after categorizing the independent variable. The results were similar to those presented, though they varied considerably depending on the cutoff points used in categorization.

TABLE 3

UNSTANDARDIZED AND STANDARDIZED PARTIAL COEFFICIENTS FROM REGRESSIONS OF
DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES ON INCOME, PROPORTION URBAN, AND PROPORTION OF
WAGeworkERS IN LABOR FORCE, FRANCE, 1861 AND 1901

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES			
	Total Fertility (I_f)	Marital Fertility (I_p)	Nonmarital Fertility (I_k)	Age at First Marriage
1861 ($N = 77$):				
Income.....	-.020* (-.53)	-.077* (-.73)	.004* (.25)	-.723* (-.53)
Proportion urban.....	.169* (.42)	.293* (.27)	.003 (.02)	-.869 (-.06)
Proportion of wageworkers in labor force.....	-.027 (-.04)	-.010 (.01)	.094* (.41)	3.528 (.16)
R^2 (adjusted).....	.29	.47	.26	.25
F	11.13*	23.42*	9.92*	9.47*
1901 ($N = 76$):				
Income.....	-.012 (-.20)	-.055* (-.30)	.006* (.21)	-.482 (-.22)
Proportion urban.....	-.042 (-.13)	-.030 (-.03)	-.005 (-.04)	1.082 (.10)
Proportion of wageworkers in labor force.....	.099 (.24)	.027 (.02)	.100* (.56)	-2.687 (-.18)
R^2 (adjusted).....	.01	.05	.41	.09
F	1.22	2.39	18.66*	2.44

NOTE.—Standardized coefficients are in parentheses.

* $P \leq .05$.

Finally, let us turn to the variable in which we are primarily interested, the proportion of wageworkers in the labor force. This variable is a global measure which includes wageworkers in agriculture and in industry, those in small enterprises as well as those in large factories and mines. As such, it does not permit a full test of the hypotheses. For example, I have argued that different forms of capitalist development would have different effects on marital fertility. Clearly, the measure used here does not allow evaluation of this contention. We should, however, expect to find that the proportion of wage laborers is positively associated with nonmarital fertility and negatively related to age at first marriage.

The findings indicate that the proportion of wageworkers is indeed positively associated with the rate of nonmarital fertility in both 1861 and 1901. This is so even after the proportion urban is controlled for, that factor having previously been found to be strongly correlated with ille-

gitimacy. Contrary to the hypothesis presented above, however, the proportion of wage earners is not significantly associated with age at first marriage at either time. Although wide variations in average age at first marriage existed in France in both 1861 and 1901, these variations were apparently not linked to regional variations in the proportion of workers employed by capitalist enterprises. Finally, the proportion of wageworkers is not significantly associated with the rate of marital fertility or the rate of total fertility. On the whole, this is not surprising. My initial argument was that marital fertility rates would be higher only in regions where primitive forms of capitalism had developed. Evaluation of this contention requires differentiating between various forms of capitalist development.

TABLE 4

UNSTANDARDIZED AND STANDARDIZED PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR MEASURES OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIANIZATION, WITH INCOME AND PROPORTION URBAN CONTROLLED, 1861 AND 1901

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES			
	Total Fertility (I_p)	Marital Fertility (I_m)	Nonmarital Fertility (I_n)	Age at First Marriage
1861 ($N = 77$):				
Proportion of agricultural wageworkers.022 (.03)	-.108 (-.06)	-.071* (-.30)	-5.565* (-.24)
R^2 (adjusted)29	.47	.23	.29
F	11.12*	23.75*	8.38*	11.37*
Proportion of industrial wageworkers.	-.026 (-.04)	-.007 (-.01)	.095* (.41)	4.044 (.18)
R^229	.47	.27	.26
F	11.13*	23.42*	10.26*	9.79*
1901 ($N = 76$):				
Proportion of agricultural wageworkers.	-.083 (-.12)	-.399 (-.19)	.013 (.04)	-7.121* (-.29)
R^2 (adjusted)00	.09	.24	.12
F76	3.49*	8.82*	4.41*
Proportion of industrial wageworkers.229* (.47)	.419 (.29)	.140* (.66)	2.705 (.16)
R^2 (adjusted)09	.10	.46	.05
F	3.48*	3.68*	22.61*	2.26

NOTE.— R^2 and F statistics refer to the equations containing both the independent and control variables. Standardized coefficients are in parentheses.

* $P \leq .05$.

The first attempt to accomplish this task involved distinguishing between proletarians in agriculture and those in industry. Thus, for the analysis presented in table 4, separate regression equations were constructed, including, first, a measure of the proportion of agricultural wageworkers in the labor force and, second, a measure of the proportion of industrial wageworkers in the labor force. The results confirm that the agricultural and industrial measures are indeed associated with the demographic variables in different ways. Only the proportion of industrial workers is positively associated with the rate of nonmarital fertility. Similarly, though the industrial measure is not significantly related to age at first marriage, a significant negative relationship between the proportion of agricultural wage earners and age at first marriage emerges, a finding which supports the original hypothesis. And for the first time, a significant association is uncovered between one of the independent variables and total fertility. The proportion of industrial wage earners is positively associated with total fertility for the year 1901.

These findings underline the importance of considering separately different forms of proletarianization but they still neglect the importance of variations in the *scale* of capitalist development. To remedy this omission, I introduced one last variable into the analysis, a measure of the average number of wageworkers employed in industrial establishments. The results are presented in table 5.

TABLE 5
UNSTANDARDIZED AND STANDARDIZED PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR
AVERAGE SIZE OF INDUSTRIAL WORKPLACE, WITH INCOME AND PROPORTION URBAN
CONTROLLED, 1861 AND 1901

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES			
	Total Fertility (I_f)	Marital Fertility (I_p)	Nonmarital Fertility (I_k)	Age at First Marriage
1861 ($N = 77$):				
Average size of industrial workplace003 (-.07)	.010 (-.08)	.004 (.27*)	.189 (.12)
R^2 (adjusted)29	.48	.20	.25
F	11.29*	23.95*	7.37*	9.23*
1901 ($N = 76$):				
Average size of industrial workplace131 (.62*)	.228 (.37*)	.069 (.76*)	.446 (.06)
R^2 (adjusted)21	.13	.58	.04
F	7.49*	4.85*	35.03*	1.97

NOTE.— R^2 and F statistics refer to regression equations containing both the control and independent variables. Standardized coefficients are in parentheses.

* $P \leq .05$.

Given the strong correlation between the average size measure and the proportion of industrial workers, it is not surprising that the findings presented in table 5 are similar to those in table 4. The average size measure is positively associated with nonmarital fertility in 1861 and positively related to all three measures of fertility in 1901. The finding that nonmarital fertility was higher in regions of large-scale capitalist industry fits well with our original argument. However, the positive association between average size of workplace and marital fertility not only constitutes a rejection of our hypothesis but also runs counter to most explanations for the decline of fertility in Europe during the period of industrialization. In the following section, I discuss this finding further.

DISCUSSION

The findings of this paper indicate that differences in modes of production were associated with differences in population patterns, though not always in the ways suggested by proponents of such an approach. As such they do not lead to a simple explanation of demographic differentials but instead raise new issues for investigation. Above all, they testify to the complexity of the French case and help account for the attention it has received from students of population change. In this discussion of the findings, I consider briefly each of the demographic variables.

Nonmarital Fertility

Although from a purely demographic point of view the rate of nonmarital fertility is the least important of the variables, it may well be that this variable is a good indicator of variations in courtship patterns and in the social lives of young people. The strong relationship between the proportion of industrial wagedworkers and nonmarital fertility makes clear that the development of industrial capitalism was associated with higher levels of nonmarital fertility. It is particularly interesting that the relationship persists even after one controls for the proportion urban, a factor previously found to be associated with nonmarital fertility. It is clear that something more than city life contributed to the high levels of illegitimate fertility which characterized some French departments. While we cannot be sure, it seems reasonable to assume that these higher levels of illegitimate births were associated with a greater frequency of sexual activity among the young and unmarried. What remains to be known is whether these higher rates reflect the emergence of a new attitude toward sexuality and interpersonal relations (Shorter 1975) or whether they were the simple result of a breakdown of parental supervision and control over the activities of young people.

Age at Marriage

Although a number of previous studies have found that first marriages occurred earlier in regions of capitalist development, the situation in the French case is not so simple. Only one of the measures used, the proportion of agricultural wageworkers, was associated with a lower age at first marriage. Indeed we find that in some regions which were centers of heavy capitalist industrial development the average age at first marriage exceeded the national average. This makes the negative association between the proportion of agricultural wageworkers and age at first marriage all the more intriguing. Since the former measure was not positively related to total fertility, it is difficult to conclude that the lower age at marriage reflected a desire for larger families. What it may point to is an alternative response on the part of young people to their new-found independence. Whereas those in centers of industrial proletarianization delayed marriage while at the same time entering into premarital sexual relationships, in agricultural settings young people opted instead for earlier marriage. Evaluation of this conjecture will require more information on the conditions of life and the behavior of young people in these different types of communities.

Marital Fertility

The findings were weak in the case of marital fertility. Only the average size of workplace in 1901 was clearly linked to marital fertility. However, in this case the negative findings are just as interesting. The fact that predominantly peasant areas did not experience higher marital fertility runs counter to some widely held ideas. In pursuing this problem it will be important to focus not only on the factors leading to high fertility in areas where large factories were located but also on the factors which encouraged restraint in other regions. It is important to remember that even the highest levels of marital fertility in France at this time were relatively low in comparison with those of other European nations (Knodel 1974; Lesthaeghe 1977; Livi-Bacci 1977). Indeed, what is remarkable is how low marital fertility rates were in some parts of the country. Future research will have to approach systematically the issue of the costs and benefits of raising children in different settings. The persistence of child labor until the 20th century may have served as an inducement to families in some areas to have a large number of children (L. Tilly 1979; Tilly and Scott 1978). At the same time, the decline of rural industry and the scarcity and high cost of good farmland may have encouraged the spread of contraception and reduced marital fertility in areas lacking large capitalist enterprises. While the findings presented here do not bear directly

on these issues, they do suggest that this is the direction future work should follow.

Total Fertility

The rate of total fertility is determined largely by the level of marital fertility and the average age at first marriage.⁸ The fact that these two major components of total fertility were positively correlated during the period under study tended to reduce the variance in total fertility. The greater length of the childbearing period in areas where marriages occurred earlier was compensated for by lower marital fertility. Therefore the focus of attention should be on the factors affecting the principal components of total fertility and on the relations among these components.

CONCLUSION

The case of 19th-century France provides a severe test for theories of demographic behavior. In the past, it has been used to disprove the hypotheses of widely accepted theories. This analysis has raised some new issues for current theories to address. The persistence of high levels of total and marital fertility in areas of large-scale capitalist industry poses a problem for those who emphasize the importance of the diffusion of knowledge about and attitudes favorable to the practice of contraception. It is difficult to see why some of these regions should have lagged behind in the spread of contraceptive knowledge or in the development of attitudes favorable to its use. On the contrary, these areas were on the main lines of French communication networks and were themselves important centers of diffusion for new products and new methods of production. They were also recipients of migrants from all over the country. It seems likely that the reasons for the above-average levels of fertility will be found in structural factors which encouraged couples to continue in a pattern of high fertility.

If the findings of this paper raise problems for cultural theories of demographic behavior, they also provide little support for the model with which this paper began. Proponents of such models have argued that specific modes of production are associated with particular demographic patterns. However, the evidence presented here suggests the situation is more complex. Modes of production provide the structure within which historically significant factors operate. Specific economic and social developments will have varying effects under different modes of production

⁸ Precisely, $I_T = (I_M \times I_m) + [I_M \times (1 - I_m)]$, where I_m stands for proportion married (see also n. 5). Since I_M is a very small component of I_T , I_T is largely determined by I_M and I_m . In turn, I_m is determined largely by age at first marriage.

and will therefore induce different demographic responses. Future research should seek to identify the relevant factors in particular historical circumstances and to assess their effects on population under different modes of production.

Pursuit of these questions will require further developments and refinements in methodology. The frustrations of dealing with highly aggregated data have often led researchers to argue for a shift to individual-level analysis (van de Walle 1978).⁹ However, such a shift would not solve the problems encountered in this study. A better approach would involve focusing on smaller, more homogeneous units. This change would allow for a more accurate classification of areas on the basis of their dominant mode of production and a richer analysis of the determinants of demographic variables.

Finally, further advances in our knowledge will require longitudinal analyses of demographic change. The findings presented here have demonstrated important differences in the relationship between modes of production and population patterns at two times 40 years apart. The next step must be to locate the factors responsible for these changes.

⁹ Interestingly, Ryder (1980), having used the most modern survey data on individual fertility intentions and behavior, has argued for a shift in the other direction.

APPENDIX

MEASUREMENT AND SOURCES OF DATA FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
USED IN THE ANALYSIS

Variable	Description	Source
1861:		
Proportion of agricultural wageworkers.....	Proportion of male population employed as "journaliers" in agriculture	France, Statistique de la France 1864, pp. 126-29; 1868, pp. 194-97
Proportion of industrial wageworkers.....	Proportion of male population employed as "ouvriers" in industry	France, Statistique de la France 1864, pp. 126-29, 132-67
Proportion of wageworkers.....	Sum of the agricultural and industrial measures	Same as above
Average size of industrial workplace.....	Average number of male wageworkers in industrial establishments	France, Statistique de la France 1873, pp. 850-52
1901:		
Proportion of agricultural wageworkers.....	Proportion of male population employed as "journaliers" in agriculture	France, Ministère de l'Agriculture 1897, pp. 246-49; France, Statistique Générale de la France 1906, 4:862-65
Proportion of industrial wageworkers.....	Proportion of male population employed as "ouvriers" in industry	France, Statistique Générale de la France 1906, 4:862-65
Proportion of wageworkers.....	Sum of the agricultural and industrial measures	Same as above
Average size of industrial workplace.....	Average number of male wageworkers in industrial establishments	France, Ministère du Commerce 1901, 4:194-97

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A Structuralist Critique of the IQ-Delinquency Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence¹

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The hypothesis that IQ is an important variable in explaining delinquent behavior among juveniles is examined theoretically and empirically. From a structuralist perspective, delinquent behavior is a consequence of social institutional practices, rather than of individual characteristics. The correlation of IQ with delinquency is not because IQ exerts any casual influence on delinquent behavior but because, in certain institutional settings (the schools), it may be selected by the institution as a criterion for differential treatment. Changes in institutional practices produce a change in the relationship between IQ and delinquency. Empirically, the variables in the structuralist model developed by the Office of Youth Development explain over 20% of the variance in serious and nonserious delinquency. The variables used in the IQ-delinquency hypothesis, a model based on individual characteristics instead of on institutional practices, explain less than 5% of the variation in serious and non-serious delinquent behavior. The conclusion is that the IQ-delinquency hypothesis contributes nothing to existing delinquency theory.

INTRODUCTION

Research by Hirschi and Hindelang (1977) posits that IQ may be an important, although repeatedly ignored, variable in theories of delinquency. They argue that the IQ-delinquency relationship is independent of social class and race and that IQ is at least as strongly related as either

¹ Authorship is alphabetical; both authors contributed equally to this paper. We wish to thank Delbert Elliott and the staff of the Behavioral Research Institute for making the data from their San Diego study available, Finn Esbensen for his involvement in setting up the data file and his advice concerning the quality of various indicators in the data, Robert Hunter for his continued support and guidance, and several anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Requests for reprints should be sent to Scott Menard, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Eastern New Mexico University, Portales, New Mexico 88130.

class or race to delinquency.² They argue further that the assertion that IQ affects the likelihood of delinquent behavior is consistent with many contemporary sociological theories of delinquency.

Establishing the fact that a negative, zero-order correlation exists between IQ and both officially recorded and self-reported delinquency (SRD), they infer that an indirect, negative causal influence exists between IQ and delinquency.³ The effect of IQ on delinquency is mediated through a number of school variables, particularly school performance and attitudes toward school. With success in, and attachment to, school as intervening variables, IQ exerts a negative causal influence on delinquency. Thus, high IQ leads to success in and attachment to school, which in turn lead to conformity; low IQ leads to failure in and estrangement from school, which lead to delinquency.

While we do not attempt to deny the existence of a zero-order correlation between IQ and delinquency, our purpose here is to examine the question whether individual characteristics or institutional practices contribute more substantially to delinquent behavior. Contrary to Hirschi and Hindelang's revisionist argument that IQ is necessarily associated with delinquency by way of academic performance in, and attitudes toward, school, we will attempt to demonstrate that both IQ and academic performance are linked to delinquent behavior only as a result of specific institutional responses to differential levels of each. We suggest that negative attitudes toward school and possible resulting delinquent behavior

² On the importance of race, see Chambliss and Nagasawa (1969), Gold (1970), and Elliott and Voss (1974). The important conclusion is that Orientals report much lower rates of delinquency than either blacks or Anglos. On socioeconomic status, see Hirschi (1969) and Gold (1970), who find statistical significance but substantive insignificance in its relationship with delinquency. Others (Chambliss and Nagasawa 1969; Farrington 1973; Elliott and Voss 1974; Polk and Halferty 1966; Schafer and Polk 1967) find neither statistical nor substantive significance. Elliott and Ageton (1980), however, find differences by race and class on the most serious, predatory offenses in what is probably the best use of self-reports to date.

³ The use of arrest statistics is at best questionable. They vary in accuracy across jurisdictions (Cressey 1970) and are biased by race and social class (Erickson 1972; Garrett and Short 1972), both of which are correlated with IQ (Polk and Schafer 1972). They reflect a nonrandom sample of 5%–10% of all serious (index) crimes, as measured by either victimization surveys (Ennis 1967; Skogan 1976) or self-report (Elliott and Voss 1974) and an undetermined but certainly smaller sample of less serious and "victimless" crimes. Self-reported delinquency, in comparison, has a test-retest reliability of about 90% (Hardt and Bodine 1965; Farrington 1973) and a construct validity of about 80% whether third-party reports, polygraph tests, or known (official) behavior is used (Clark and Tiff 1966; Dentler and Monroe 1961; Gold 1970; Hardt and Peterson-Hardt 1977). These figures are higher for crude categories than for specific offenses, possibly indicating some difference in the perception of the delinquent act by the actor and others. See, however, Elliott and Ageton (1980), who suggest that, in some respects at least, official statistics and self-reports may yield similar results.

are generated by the institutional structure through its response to individual low levels of school performance and IQ.

Theoretical Discussion

Clearly, the issue whether individual characteristics such as IQ or structural characteristics such as institutional practices are most appropriate for theory construction in the study of delinquency deserves further examination. In particular, two questions about Hirschi and Hindelang's IQ-delinquency hypothesis need to be answered. First, to what extent does the IQ-delinquency hypothesis supplant or supplement current delinquency theory? Can IQ be used to explain some of the variance in delinquent behavior left unexplained by strain, control, and labeling theories; or is IQ merely an extraneous variable, correlated with, but having no influence on, delinquency? Second, to what extent does this hypothesis receive empirical support?


For purposes of comparison with current theory, the model of delinquency developed by the Office of Youth Development (OYD), as detailed by Gemignani (1972) and Elliott, Blanchard, and Dunford (1976), is utilized here. This model incorporates elements of strain, control, and labeling theories and focuses on institutional practices rather than on individual characteristics as the cause of delinquency.⁴ Briefly, the OYD model states that access to desirable social roles and positive labeling in the school, the home, and society in general mutually reinforce one another and lead to commitment to the legal and social norms of society. Commitment, in turn, leads to nondelinquent, conforming, or prosocial behavior. Negatively, the absence of access to desirable social roles plus premature and/or inappropriate negative labeling mutually reinforce one another and lead to alienation, a rejection of the rejectors. Alienation, in turn, leads to delinquent behavior. The behavior generated by institutional structures through opportunity and labeling may then feed back into the institutional structure, generating responses which reinforce that behavior.

Figure 1 presents the two basic causal models schematically. In addition to the common dependent variable (delinquent behavior), they share a concern for attitudes toward school.⁵ This intermediate variable is in-

⁴ It has since been modified to also include aspects of differential association and subcultural theories; see, e.g., Elliott, Ageton, and Canter (1979). This modification is incorporated in fig. 1.

⁵ As a result of the extensive similarities between Hirschi and Hindelang's discussion of intelligence and delinquency and Hirschi's earlier work on the causes of delinquency (1969), references to the latter will be made where considered appropriate. Thus, Hirschi and Hindelang's measure of attitudes toward school, lacking specific delinquency, may be interpreted to be one measure of attachment to school; other measures

Hirschi and Hindelang's Model:



The OYD Model:




FIG. 1.—Alternative models of delinquent behavior. Solid lines = positive causal influence, broken lines = negative causal influence. The influence from school performance to attitudes toward school in Hirschi and Hindelang's model is inferred from Hirschi's earlier work (Hirschi 1969, pp. 120–22).

cluded explicitly in Hirschi and Hindelang's model and is implicitly included in the OYD model as one or more aspects of alienation (Elliott and Voss 1974). Insofar as IQ or school performance is used to negatively label individuals or to deny them access to desirable social roles, they should be correlated with, but *not* causally related to, delinquency.

What do the IQ–delinquency hypothesis and the OYD model suggest about the relationship between IQ and delinquency in the general population? According to Hirschi and Hindelang, with school performance and attitudes toward school as intervening variables, IQ exerts a negative, indirect causal influence on delinquency. High IQ leads to favorable academic performance and attachment to school, which in turn lead to conformity; low IQ leads to poor performance and attitudes toward school, which in turn lead to delinquency. By contrast, the OYD model suggests that both differences in and absolute levels of IQ lead to delinquency only if institutions respond to those levels or differences by denying opportunity to and/or negatively labeling those with low IQs.

Note that the correlation between IQ and delinquency is adequately accounted for by the OYD model even though IQ is not included explicitly in the model. Differences in IQ may lead to differences in institutional responses, and some of those responses may stimulate delinquency. The

are attitudes toward teachers and support for school authority (Hirschi 1969, pp. 120–30).

implication in the OYD theory is that IQ itself need not have any causal relationship with delinquency. That IQ is correlated with delinquency is an artifact of institutional selection of IQ as something to which to respond. It is the institutional practice of selectively denying access to desirable social roles and attaching negative labels to juveniles with low IQs that leads to more delinquent behavior among such individuals. If we eliminate the institutional reaction to IQ, the relationship between IQ and delinquency will also be eliminated. It is this relationship, and not the causal relationship suggested by Hirschi and Hindelang, that contemporary theories of delinquency tend to emphasize.

To what extent are the IQ-delinquency hypothesis and the OYD model, respectively, verified empirically? Hirschi and Hindelang have established two facts about their model. One is that there exists a negative, zero-order correlation between IQ and delinquency. Others (Elliott and Voss 1974; Farrington 1973; Gold 1970; Slocum and Stone 1963) have found the same negative relationship between delinquency and conceptually similar measures of academic aptitude or achievement, including IQ and school grades. Hirschi and Hindelang's second finding is that the relationship between IQ and official delinquency virtually disappears when school performance is controlled. They suggest that this points to school performance as an intervening variable in the IQ-delinquency relationship. Given this information, Hirschi and Hindelang conclude that (a) IQ explains or is causally related to delinquency, and (b) IQ operates through the intervening variables of school performance and attitudes toward school.

Unfortunately, the second intervening variable, attitudes toward school, is mentioned only once, never elaborated or explained, and never given empirical support.⁶ Furthermore, the argument that school performance

⁶ Again, Hirschi (1969, pp. 120–23) elaborates on the assumption that the link between ability and performance, on the one hand, and delinquency, on the other, is the bond to the school. More important, however, is the impression that Hirschi and Hindelang's contention that IQ operates through the intervening variables of school performance and attitudes toward school is founded on Hirschi's (1969) earlier argument that academic incompetence leads to poor school performance to disliking of school to rejection of the school's authority to the commission of delinquent acts. First, Hirschi's concepts are single-item indicators and thus have less validity and reliability than multiple-item constructs (see section below entitled Construct Formation). Second, although seemingly harmless, Hirschi's use of "academic competence" rather than "intelligence" is significant. The test scores Hirschi uses in his study (Differential Aptitude Test verbal scores) are not, strictly speaking, intelligence tests. While measures of academic competence or aptitude and general intelligence have been found to be somewhat highly correlated, they are formally and conceptually distinct (Mehrens and Lehmann 1975). Thus, if Hirschi and Hindelang are indeed building their IQ-delinquency argument on Hirschi's earlier work, their interpretation of "academic competence" to mean "intelligence" is both careless and inaccurate.

is an intervening rather than a control variable has serious problems. First, the relationship between academic performance and IQ is confounded by the practice of tracking. Polk and Schafer (1972) and Rosenbaum (1976) have indicated that the assignment of students to "noncollege" rather than "college" tracks has a negative effect on academic performance, independent of IQ. Second, there is evidence that grading, tracking, and other similar school practices tend to produce fairly constant rates of failure, both academic and nonacademic, despite differences in ability levels of the populations of different schools (Rhodes ca. 1970, pp. 15-18).⁷

Correspondingly, the relative strengths of the relationships between school performance and delinquency, and between IQ and school performance, may render the influence of IQ on delinquency substantively inconsequential. In addition to tracking, the use of grades as a means of social control in the classroom (Rhodes ca. 1970, p. 15) may attenuate the correlation between IQ and school performance.⁸

The OYD model, however, has strong empirical support. A cross-sectional study (Brennan and Huizinga 1975) found that nearly one-third of the variance in SRD was accounted for by the OYD model. A longitudinal study by Elliott et al. (1976) found that nearly one-half ($R^2 = .45$) of the variance in changes in SRD could be explained using the OYD model. Research on dropouts leads to similar results. If the relationship

⁷ Rhodes suggests that the more general sense of failure, of not belonging because one is a "troublesome" student, may be even more important than academic failure. He finds that the rate of troublemakers as seen by the school administration is virtually constant over all schools, regardless of actual rates of misbehavior. The suggestion that rates of academic failure across schools with different ability levels in their populations are constant is also supported by Bloom (1976, pp. 155-71). Simons (1978) suggests that IQ can change in response to environmental factors and is therefore unstable over time. Simons's argument is a good one, but he did not carry it far enough. Rosenbaum's (1976) data specify that curriculum tracking may actually depress IQ in the lower tracks—those that receive the mandatory quota of failures described by Rhodes. The central point here is that the institutional practices of generating failure and tracking may (a) affect IQ itself and (b) confound the relationship between IQ and academic performance.

⁸ Bloom (1976, p. 52) cites evidence that "tests of general intelligence correlated about $+.50 (\pm .10)$ with achievement over a great variety of courses and subjects." Most of the variance in school performance, then, is unexplained by IQ. Related to this is the finding by Elliott and Voss (1974) of beta weights of less than .10 between school performance (grades) and delinquency when a variety of other variables were statistically controlled. If we make the generous assumptions that (a) IQ is as highly correlated with delinquency as it is with school performance and, (b) even with other variables controlled, the standardized regression coefficient of IQ on school performance is equal to the correlation between IQ and school performance, IQ explains (indirectly) only $(.5) \times (.5) \times (.1) = 2.5\%$ of the variance in delinquency. In the absence of empirical figures to dispute these estimates, the IQ-delinquency hypothesis looks rather unpromising.

between IQ and delinquency applies only to those in school, the theoretically interesting point is not that IQ is related to delinquency but that the relationship occurs only within a certain institutional framework. This latter would again lead one to a focus on institutional practices instead of on individual characteristics. Elliott and Voss (1974) find no significant differences between delinquency rates of dropouts who are intellectually capable and those less intellectually capable. As predicted by both theories, school failures are somewhat more delinquent while still in school than their more capable peers. In terms of officially recorded delinquency, dropouts are actually less delinquent after they drop out than persons with similar characteristics who remain in school (Elliott 1966; Elliott and Voss 1974). This is consistent with the structural approach to delinquency embodied in the OYD model but is unexplained by the IQ-delinquency hypothesis. Those who drop out shed their institutional failure roles and have the opportunity to acquire adult (desirable) roles.




FIG. 2.—Integrated model: a preliminary causal graph. Solid lines = positive causal influence, broken lines = negative causal influence.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: A CAUSAL MODEL OF
DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR

The two delinquency models examined in the previous section focus on diverse explanations for delinquent behavior. In this section, the two competing models are tested empirically by (1) comparing the two models independently and (2) constructing a theoretical model incorporating elements of both. Figure 2 displays the theoretical variable linkages implied in the literature and derived from the two models in causal form (i.e., it is a path-analytic model).⁹ The model posits the following: (1) The greater the IQ, the greater the academic aptitude. (2) The greater the academic aptitude, the greater the academic performance. (3) The greater the academic performance, the lower the perceived negative labeling. (4) The greater the perceived negative labeling, the lower the perceived access to desirable goals. (5) The greater the perceived negative labeling, the greater the alienation. (6) The lower the perceived access to desirable goals, the greater the alienation. (7) The greater the alienation, the greater the delinquent peer group association. (8) The greater the delinquent peer group association, the greater the frequency of delinquent behavior. (9) The greater the alienation, the greater the frequency of delinquent behavior.

Integrating the Delinquency Models

It should be readily apparent that propositions 4–7 constitute the OYD model presented in figure 1. Propositions 1–3 are the links between the IQ-delinquency hypothesis and the OYD model. While including IQ in the causal model is actually theoretically inconsistent with the OYD model, it allows us to test the influence of IQ on delinquency in the presence of

⁹ As Nie et al. (1975, p. 358) note, "Path analysis is primarily a method of decomposing and interpreting linear relationships among a set of variables by assuming that 1) a (weak) causal order among these variables is known, and 2) the relationships among these variables are causally closed." Path analysis is not a procedure for demonstrating causality; it is a method for tracing out the implications of a set of causal assumptions imposed on a system of relationships (Nie et al. 1975). Although attempts were made to include most of the prior causes that could lead to spurious associations in the model, the comprehensiveness of the list of variables is ultimately unknown. Similarly, while it is fair to assume that the recursive (one-way) causal model occurs more often and with greater effect than the possible feedback alternatives, and carefully designed measures serve to minimize the confounding of the causal ordering, with cross-sectional data such as are utilized here it is not possible to test with total accuracy the assumed causal ordering. We recognize that causal orderings other than the one proposed here may be selected in conjunction with a different theory. Glueck and Glueck (1950), for instance, would argue that delinquent behavior leads to association with delinquent peers. Our selection of the OYD model as a theoretically coherent, empirically justified model dictates the causal ordering of the variables. Ideally, the question of order would be eliminated (and the potential feedback relationships examined) with longitudinal data; however, such data are currently unavailable to us.

the variables in the OYD model. In order to integrate completely the IQ-delinquency hypothesis with the OYD model, however, a distinction must be made between academic aptitude, or ability, and academic performance. Academic aptitude is measured by a variety of general academic aptitude tests including the Differential Aptitude Test (DAT), the Academic Promise Test (APT), and the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB), all of which have been widely used as multifactor aptitude tests (Mehrens and Lehmann 1975). Academic performance is indicated by grade point average (GPA), a system response measure. A second distinction must be made between academic ability, hereafter called academic aptitude, and general intelligence. General intelligence may be measured, for the present purposes, by IQ.

Finally, some measure of attitudes toward school is necessary to include all components of the IQ-delinquency hypothesis. While the conceptual meaning of attitudes toward school is never specified by Hirschi and Hindelang, review of Hirschi's early work (1969) suggests that this concept is one aspect of the overall attachment or bond to school. Similarly, the model proposed here incorporates attitudes toward school as one aspect of alienation from, or lack of attachment to, school (see the section below entitled Multiple-Indicator Constructs for further details on this particular concept). In particular, the model we propose suggests that institutional practices will distort the relationships between academic aptitude and academic performance and between IQ and academic performance. Furthermore, owing to the institutional practice of negative labeling, academic performance should be ultimately more predictive of delinquent behavior than either IQ or academic aptitude.

Other Correlates of Delinquency

Two other variables are included in the present analysis because of their consistent and well-supported relationship to SRD: sex and age. Males consistently commit more delinquent acts than females whether self-reports or official statistics are used (e.g., Elliott and Voss 1974; Gold and Reimer 1975), and males also tend to commit more serious crimes (Gold and Reimer 1975). Age appears to have a weak positive relationship with delinquency (e.g., Dentler and Monroe 1961; Elliot and Voss 1974; Gold and Reimer 1975). These variables are included for statistical control; we advance no hypotheses here concerning their relationship to delinquency, in spite of the zero-order associations reported above, since it is possible (and in fact likely) that what association actually exists is a result of institutional responses to age and sex.

While race and socioeconomic status were considered for inclusion in the proposed model, they are rejected for two reasons. First, we wish to

allow IQ to explain as much of the variance in delinquency as it can. If race and socioeconomic status are unrelated to delinquency, they will drop out of the model naturally in the analysis. If they are related to delinquency, however, the well-known association between IQ and race and socioeconomic status will tend to weaken the apparent influence of IQ on other variables in the model. (This is not a problem with age or sex.) Our first reason for excluding race and socioeconomic status, then, is to enhance the apparent influence of IQ. Second, the relationship of race and socioeconomic status to delinquency is not so clearly established as that of age or sex (see, e.g., Elliott and Voss 1974; Dentler and Monroe 1961; Gold 1970; Hirschi 1969; Tittle, Villemez, and Smith 1978; Voss 1966).

METHODS AND MEASURES

Data and Sampling

Data for the study were taken from a longitudinal, random subsample of San Diego high school youths (Elliot and Voss 1974). The study employed a purposive sampling technique,¹⁰ whereby a target population of 2,721 ninth-grade students was selected from seven junior high schools and one four-year high school. The cohort, except for dropouts and transfers, progressed through the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades and remained essentially intact throughout the study period. The investigation data were obtained annually throughout the four-year period from official records and through questionnaire administration (Elliot and Voss 1974, pp. 41–52). For the subsample used here, items were available pertaining specifically to the ninth-grade youth. Of the 665 cases, 257 had complete data on all of the indicators needed for this analysis.

¹⁰ For justification of purposive sampling in this particular study, see Elliott and Voss (1974, pp. 39–41, 59–60). At the time we were writing this paper, we had access to a randomly selected 25% subsample of the first wave (ninth grade) of Elliott and Voss's original sample. Of the 665 cases to which we had access, 257 had complete data on all the variables used in our analysis. The variance ($F = 1.264$, $P \leq .05$) and mean ($t = 4.981$, $P \leq .001$) for serious SRD were statistically significantly smaller for the 257 cases, reflecting a greater tendency among serious delinquents toward selective nonresponse. There is little substantive significance in this difference, however; the respective means are 0.87 and 1.05, and the variances 1.88 and 2.37, for the 257 and 665 cases. Minor SRD, IQ, DAT, GPA, sex, age, and socioeconomic status show no significant differences in variance and, although some show statistically significant differences in mean values, the differences are quite small and not substantively significant. In particular, IQ and minor SRD show neither statistical nor substantive differences between the 257 and 665 case samples. Overall, our results should be generalizable to the entire sample.

Construct formation.—All of the composite measures discussed in the following section were constructed from items measured on ordinal or dichotomous rather than interval scales. Factor analysis was used to construct multiple-indicator measures. Since factor analysis is, like regression and analysis of variance, a variant on the general linear model, considerations that apply to regression analysis apply similarly to factor analysis.¹¹

Single-indicator variables.—Age, sex, and (in accordance with Hirschi and Hindelang [1978], p. 611) IQ are treated as exogenous variables in this model. The IQ percentile rank serves as a measure of intelligence. Other categorical, single-indicator variables are academic performance, measured by GPA, and academic aptitude, measured by scores on the DAT (see Mehrens and Lehmann [1975], pp. 142–47 for a description of this test).

Multiple-indicator constructs.—The remaining variables in the model are multiple-indicator composite variables constructed from standardized items by using either principal components factor analysis¹² or (in the case of measures of academic access and delinquency) additive scaling. (See the Appendix for variable composition and table 1 for scale properties.) Briefly, the use of initial factor analysis, a method whereby all the variables are concurrently analyzed for intercorrelations, produced specific item aggregates. These item aggregates were subsequently introduced to repeated factor analyses to determine the extent of their intercorrelations and their factor loadings and factor score coefficients, that is, the relative importance of each indicator in terms of the overall concept.

Validity.—In order to create constructs which reflected accurately the theoretical concepts in the model proposed here, we used conceptual as well as empirical methods of interpretation. Initial methods of variable construction utilized face or content validity as well as formally established criteria; that is, concept indicators noted repeatedly in the literature and used successfully in previous research, specifically that of Elliott and Voss (1974) and Elliott et al. (1976). From these theoretical guidelines, factor analysis was used to create the composites and assess the validity (as well as reliability) of the empirical measures. Carmines and Zeller

¹¹ See, e.g., Bohrnstedt and Carter (1971) on the robustness of regression analysis. See also, e.g., Gaito (1980), who indicates that scale properties are not a requirement for the use of various statistical procedures. The use of ordinal rather than interval data should have no effect on direction and little (if any) on magnitude of relationships in this study.

¹² For a discussion of principal components analysis with iterations (PA2) and orthogonal (varimax) rotation as well as details on scale construction as discussed below, i.e., through factor analysis and the creation of composite or complex variables utilizing factor loadings and factor score coefficients, or weights, see Kerlinger (1979), Nie et al. (1975), and Zeller and Carmines (1980).



(1979) discuss in detail the uses and limitations of assessing construct validity through factor analysis; for present purposes, construct validity was evaluated by the formulation and reformulation of measures by factor analysis to the extent that the relationships between measures were consistent with the theoretical propositions mentioned previously.

Official versus self-reported delinquency.—The decision to use self-report data stems from the increasing recognition that official statistics on juvenile delinquency have serious limitations. Briefly, not all delinquent acts are officially recorded—for example, Williams and Gold's (1972) national sample reveals that less than 3% of admitted juvenile offenses are known to police—and the recorded acts are not a random sample of acts that occur (Gold 1970). While critics question the validity of self-report inquiries in relation to concealment, exaggeration, forgetfulness, and so on, research indicates that self-reports seem to be the best available data source for delinquent behavior and that measurement errors do not appear to be correlated sufficiently with other variables to bias interpretations (Hardt and Peterson-Hardt 1977; see also n. 2 above). Specific validity checks used by Elliott and Voss (1974) for the data used in this study included comparisons of self-report data with police and court records, and internal comparisons by grade level, sex, social class, and ethnicity, as well as teachers' nominations of "potential" delinquents; see Elliott and Voss (1974, pp. 71–88) for a complete discussion of their validation procedures.¹³

Reliability.—While inquiries into the overall reliability of self-report measures have not received the attention given to validity, several studies have obtained evidence (from e.g., test-retest data) indicating that self-report responses are generally internally consistent and stable (Clark and Tifft 1966; Dentler and Monroe 1961; Hardt and Bodine 1965). In par-

¹³ Problems of conceptualization, definition, and measurement in both self-report and official measures of delinquency continue to emerge. More recent research has attempted to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between official and self-reported findings. One approach challenges the strength of the empirical evidence for the class differential in official data (Tittle and Villemez 1977; Tittle et al. 1978; Hindelang 1979), while the other challenges the methodological adequacy of self-report research (Elliott and Ageton 1980). Elliott and Ageton have found that results of self-report studies which are contrary to those produced by official delinquency may be the consequence of self-report instrument construction, specifically, (1) the items selected may be unrepresentative, (2) the items included may overlap, and (3) the type of response sets typically employed with self-report measures (i.e., numerical estimation based on imprecise categories) may severely truncate the true distribution of responses. The implications of the research above are critical in assessing the theoretical model of the present paper. As the self-report measures utilized in the empirical analyses are characterized by methodological problems similar to those cited by Elliott and Ageton (1980), they may not have been sensitive enough to capture the theoretical differences in delinquency involvement. Thus, it is possible that the inclusion of either socioeconomic status or official delinquency measures would not have yielded valid results.

ticular, Elliott and Voss (1974) attempted to reduce the possibility of response set, or unreliable respondents, by reversing the order of responses to both the delinquency items and other conceptual items in the questionnaire.

Furthermore, Zeller and Carmines (1980) note that the reduction of random error and increased reliability are among the more important arguments for the use of multiple-indicators in research. The reliability, or internal consistency, of additive scales may be assessed using Cronbach's α , a conservative estimate of scale reliability that is dependent on the length of the scale; in a scale consisting of relatively few items it is likely to be low (Zeller and Carmines 1980). The reliability of factor-constructed scales can be assessed by using θ , a special case of α (Zeller and Carmines 1980). Reliability coefficients were computed here for all the composite, multiple-indicator variables, and estimates, when available, were obtained for the other, single-indicator variables. Table 1 presents the composite reliabilities, factor loadings, and factor score coefficients for each component, as well as the percentage of variance explained by each factor (R^2).

Finally, one use of reliability coefficients is to correct correlations for attenuation (Zeller and Carmines 1980). This has not been done for the present analysis primarily because it would work to the disadvantage of the IQ-delinquency hypothesis. Measures of IQ and academic aptitude have the highest reliability coefficients, and, therefore, their relationships with other variables would be least strengthened by correcting for attenuation. In particular, the correlations of other variables with the delinquency measures would increase, relative to those of IQ and academic aptitude. By not correcting for attenuation, therefore, we allow IQ and academic aptitude to exert the maximum possible influence on delinquency, relative to the influence exerted by the other variables. If the IQ-delinquency hypothesis proves substantively unimportant under these circumstances, it is likely to prove unimportant under others as well.¹⁴

AN EMPIRICAL TEST

Respecification of the Causal Model

The initial causal ordering of the variables is indicated by the propositions used to represent the proposed model of delinquent behavior. However, because labeling, access, and alienation each split into two constructs as

¹⁴ Although this *may* serve to decrease the total influence of IQ on delinquency, there is no guarantee that correction for attenuation would increase that total influence; e.g., those variables least influenced by IQ might determine a relatively larger share of the variance in delinquency after all variables were corrected for attenuation.

TABLE 1

CONSTRUCT RELIABILITIES (α), FACTOR LOADINGS, FACTOR SCORE COEFFICIENTS, AND PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE EXPLAINED (R^2)

Composite Variable and Components	Reliability Coefficient*	Factor Loading	Factor Score Coefficient	R^2
Perceived academic labeling:	.861			.706
X8 How you rate your ability....		.77	.26	
X9 How your friends rate your ability83	.36	
X10 How other students rate your ability76	.23	
X11 How teachers rate your ability76	.25	
Perceived social labeling:	.831			.541
X6 Teachers think you are a problem child49	.12	
X7 Teachers think you will be in trouble with the law67	.20	
X12 Friends think you will be in trouble with the law67	.17	
X23 Father thinks you will be in trouble with the law83	.28	
X24 Mother thinks you will be in trouble with the law84	.36	
X25 Parents think you are a problem child49	.06	
Perceived academic access:†	.727			...
X15 How far you would like to go in school	
X16 How far you think you will go in school	
Perceived employment access:	.577			.703
X13 Chance of getting job you want as adult64	.41	
X14 Chance, compared with others in United States, of getting the job you want64	.41	
School alienation:	.656			.744
X5 Do you like school?		-.69	-.47	
X32 Never cared for school69	.47	
Home alienation:	.633			.476
X21 Agree with father on right and wrong77	.50	
X22 Agree with mother on right and wrong70	.37	
X28 Parents never understood me		-.40	-.14	
X33 Family members were always close32	.10	

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Composite Variable and Components	Reliability Coefficient*	Factor Loading	Factor Score Coefficient	R ²
Delinquent peer group association:	.870			.703
X17 Friends I am with most often ever in trouble with the law . .		.79	.26	
X18 Friends I have known for the longest time ever in trouble with the law84	.36	
X19 Best friends ever in trouble with the law86	.42	
Nonserious delinquency:‡	N.A.			...
X45 Petty theft (less than \$2.00)	
Liquor violations.	
Vandalism.	
Truancy	
Runaway	
Serious delinquency:‡	N.A.			...
X46 Gang fights.	
Petty theft (\$2.00–50.00)	
Auto theft.	
Grand theft (over \$50.00)	
Robbery	
Serious and nonserious (combined):§	.87			...
X45 + X46.	
Intelligence:	.92			...
X41 IQ 	
Academic aptitude:	.79–.97			...
X38 DAT#	
Academic performance:	N.A.			N.A.
X39 GPA**	
Age**	N.A.	N.A.
Sex**	N.A.	N.A.

* Reliability coefficient is θ unless otherwise noted.

† Additive scale; reliability coefficient is Cronbach's α .

‡ Additive scale based on Elliott and Voss (1974).

§ Additive scale based on Elliott and Voss (1974); reliability coefficient is α for total delinquency (nonserious and serious); reliability coefficient not reported for separate scales.

|| Reliability coefficient is α based on test-retest; reported in Mehrens and Lehmann (1975, p. 112). Notice that this figure is for ages 11–17 and probably understates IQ reliability; therefore, the relationships between IQ and other variables in this study are less attenuated than any other set of relationships. The result is that the estimates of correlations involving IQ are generous compared with the estimates of correlations involving other variables.

Reliability coefficient is split-half reliability coefficient reported in Mehrens and Lehmann (1975, p. 143).

** No estimates of reliability for these are available here.

a result of factor analysis, it is necessary to incorporate the separate composites into the causal ordering.

Both home alienation and school alienation may be affected by the different types of negative labeling and access. In accordance with the literature, it is argued that school alienation is more likely to generate a dislike for the home environment (e.g., responses by parents to negative attitudes toward school) than vice versa. Hence, school alienation is placed causally prior to home alienation. Similarly, it is hypothesized here that academic, or school alienation, is influenced directly by academic labeling and access, while nonacademic, or home alienation, is influenced directly by nonacademic or social labeling and employment access.

Furthermore, since it is proposed that perceived negative labeling will diminish perceived access, academic labeling precedes academic access




FIG. 3.—Integrated model: a final causal graph

and social labeling precedes employment access. A question emerges whether academic access is necessarily prior or subsequent to negative social labeling. The belief that one is perceived as unintelligent, or that he or she cannot go as far in school as is desired, may readily result in a sense of being, or at least being regarded as, less worthy. In contrast, the perception that others have a negative general image of oneself is unlikely to affect one's beliefs in his or her chances of obtaining as much education as desired. Thus, perceived academic chances are far more likely to be affected by academic labeling and demonstrated academic ability. Perceived academic labeling and access are therefore causally prior to perceived negative social labeling and access. The resulting proposed causal ordering is diagrammed in figure 3.

Method of Analysis

The tenability of the proposed causal or path models of delinquency was examined and evaluated through the use of multiple regression techniques. Following the assumption of one-way causation, the regression of each variable in the model on every other prior variable was determined. The regression was performed in a stepwise manner with forward inclusion. The stepwise process was discontinued as soon as a regression coefficient failed to have an *F*-level significance of .05, a tolerance of .10 or greater, or a standardized beta greater than .100. These procedures eliminated insignificant causal paths from the analysis; paths which were retained may be said to have been empirically "verified" through the regression analysis. The magnitudes above were set fairly low in recognition of the probability of deflated values of some of the correlation coefficients (based on moderate though not high reliability estimates for some variables). Any such limits are somewhat arbitrary but, given both the reliability levels and sample size involved, the limits proposed here are generally reasonable.

Furthermore, arguments presented in reference to the construction and use of the ordinal-level composite variables may be applied here. Specifically, regression analysis appears to be quite robust (Bohrnstedt and Carter 1971); violation of other assumptions (e.g., normality, linearity, homoscedasticity) is equally unlikely to affect the substantive results (Boyle 1971).

Results

Tables 2 and 3 present means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables used in this study. Figure 4 and table 4 present the results

of testing the relationship between IQ and delinquency with academic aptitude, GPA, and school alienation (attitudes toward school) as intervening variables.¹⁵ As predicted by Hirschi and Hindelang, the influence of IQ on delinquency is indirect. The model as a whole explains 4.5% of the variance in both serious and nonserious delinquent behavior, and the total influence (all of it indirect) of IQ explains less than 2% of the variation in delinquency in both models. Notice that DAT, perhaps a more objective measure of actual academic ability, has a direct influence on serious delinquency, whereas GPA, a measure which reflects institutional reaction and, in part, may reflect labeling, has a direct influence on nonserious delinquency.

Figure 5 and table 5 present the results of testing the OYD model of delinquency. The model as a whole explains 28.6% of the variance in nonserious delinquent behavior and 20.4% of the variance in serious delinquent behavior. Notice that the explained variance is over four times that of the IQ-delinquency hypothesis in spite of the fact that in figure 5A there are the same number of direct influences on delinquency as in

TABLE 2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Code
Sex (female)	1.4981	.5010	X2
Age	13.9767	.5149	X3
DAT score (decile)	5.9027	2.5683	X38
GPA (decile)	5.3619	1.3160	X39
IQ (decile)	6.2062	2.5218	X41
Nonserious SRD	3.1829	2.7001	X45
Serious SRD8716	1.8758	X46
Perceived employment access	-.0007	.7832	JOB DIF
Perceived academic access	-.3463	1.2409	SCH DIF
Perceived positive academic labeling0646	.8644	F1
Perceived negative social labeling	-.0547	.8661	F2
School alienation	-.0208	.8130	F3
Home alienation	-.0614	.8196	F4
Delinquent peer group association	-.0706	.8555	F5

¹⁵ DAT is included here to maintain the distinction between general intelligence and academic ability. If DAT is excluded from the model, explained variance is .045 for nonserious delinquency and .042 for serious delinquency, and IQ continues to have no direct effect.

TABLE 3

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (Pearson's r)^{*}

Code	X2	X3	X38	X39	X41	X45	X46	JOBDF	SCHDIF
X2	1.00000								
X3	-.06076	1.00000							
X38	-.05328	-.32077	1.00000						
X3906921	-.14891	.52246	1.00000					
X41	-.06925	-.35129	.77631	.48591	1.00000				
X45	-.11092	.07333	-.05037	-.15721	-.07670	1.00000			
X46	-.16030	.08182	-.15991	-.15675	-.15541	.39953	1.00000		
JOBDF	-.04212	-.08459	.14670	.20935	.16381	-.04407	.05816	1.00000	
SCHDIF10888	-.00048	.00287	.04116	.02666	-.02999	-.07959	.18696	1.00000
F102713	-.18761	.51833	.45400	.42997	-.02955	-.11920	.19550	.08732
F2	-.08387	-.03281	-.10530	-.28044	-.16841	.46149	.30230	-.17524	-.12899
F304192	-.03611	-.11897	-.19358	-.16019	.17046	.15847	-.16497	.05534
F408221	-.05032	-.02401	-.10385	.00517	.16088	.00379	-.17311	-.08632
F5	-.11430	.07999	-.09733	-.11675	-.00951	.45635	.42147	-.00576	-.06414
Code	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5				
F1	1.00000								
F2	-.08389	1.00000							
F3	-.12142	.25901	1.00000						
F4	-.00423	.27546	.07924	1.00000					
F5	-.04756	.47452	.26028	.21321	1.00000				

^{*} For variable names associated with codes, see table 2.




FIG. 4.—Causal model: the IQ-delinquency hypothesis. A, Nonserious SRD. B, Serious SRD.

TABLE 4

SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLE INFLUENCES ON NONSERIOUS AND SERIOUS SRD: IQ-DELINQUENCY HYPOTHESIS

Dependent Variable and Independent Variable	Zero-Order Correlation	Beta Coefficient*	Total Influence†	Directly Explained Variance‡	Indirectly Explained Variance§	Total Explained Variance	R ²
Nonserious SRD:							.045
IQ.....	-.077	0	-.076	0	.006	.006	
DAT.....	-.050	0	-.057	0	.003	.003	
GPA.....	-.157	-.129	-.157	.020	.005	.025	
School alienation	.170	.145	.145	.025	0	.025	
Serious SRD:							.045
IQ.....	-.155	0	-.124	0	.019	.019	
DAT.....	-.160	-.143	-.153	.023	.001	.024	
GPA.....	-.157	0	-.027	0	.004	.004	
School alienation	.158	.141	.141	.022	.000	.022	

* Direct influence on dependent variable.

† See Heise (1975) for computation of total influence.

‡ Directly explained variance = (beta coefficient) × (zero-order correlation) and refers only to the variance attributable to a variable without considering indirect causal paths. The sum of the directly explained variance over all the independent variables is equal to the explained variance— R^2 or coefficient of determination—in the dependent variable.

§ Variance in the dependent variable attributable to the independent variable by other than direct causal paths. This was computed by subtracting the directly explained variance from the total explained variance (see n. †).

|| Total amount of variance in the dependent variable attributable to the independent variable, through both direct and indirect causal paths. Total explained variance = (directly explained variance) + (indirectly explained variance). This should not be confused with the total explained variance in the dependent variable, the coefficient of determination, or R^2 .




FIG. 5.—Causal model: the OYD model. A, Nonserious SRD. B, Serious SRD

TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLE INFLUENCES ON NONSERIOUS AND
SERIOUS SRD: OYD MODEL

Dependent Variable and Independent Variable	Zero-Order Correlation	Beta Coefficient	Total Influence	Directly Explained Variance	Indirectly Explained Variance	Total Explained Variance	R ²
Nonserious SRD:							
Academic labeling (+)	-.030	0	.005	0	-.000	-.000	.286
Social labeling (-)461	.316	.467	.146	.069	.215	
Academic access	-.030	0	-.049	0	.001	.001	
Employment access	-.021	0	.034	0	-.001	-.001	
School alienation170	0	.057	0	.009	.009	
Home alienation161	0	.034	0	.005	.005	
Delinquent peer group association456	.306	.306	.140	.000	.140	
Serious SRD:							
Academic labeling (+)	-.119	0	.008	0	-.001	-.001	.204
Social labeling (-)302	.159	.309	.048	.045	.093	
Academic access	-.080	0	.009	0	-.001	-.001	
Employment access058	0	.052	0	.003	.003	
School alienation158	0	.052	0	.008	.008	
Home alienation004	-.119	-.080	-.000	0	-.000	
Delinquent peer group association421	.372	.372	.157	0	.157	

the IQ-delinquency model, and in figure 5B only one additional direct influence has been added. Notice also that, in figure 5, the influence of school alienation (the variable common to both models) is mediated through delinquent peer group association.¹⁶ Our first conclusion is that the structuralist OYD model, with twice as many variables, explains over four times as much variance in delinquency as the IQ-delinquency model.

Figures 6 and 7 and table 6 present the results of combining the two models. Figures 6 and 7 display the causal influences on nonserious (fig. 6) and serious (fig. 7) SRD verified empirically through the regression analysis. Table 6 summarizes all independent variable influences on the dependent variables, nonserious and serious SRD.

Figure 6 reveals that all influences on nonserious SRD operate through either perceived negative social labeling or delinquent peer group association. Note that perceived academic labeling was eliminated from the path diagram because it did not head a causal path leading to nonserious SRD. It is replaced by GPA, which has the same influence on perceived employment access here as perceived academic labeling has in the separate OYD model.

The influence of age and both school and home alienation are through delinquent peer group association and are in the expected direction. Sex exerts an insignificant amount of indirect influence on the dependent variable. Perceived academic access has a small, negative, indirect effect, whereas perceived employment access has an indirect though unexpectedly positive total effect on nonserious SRD (although the effect is very close to zero).

Significantly, neither IQ nor DAT nor GPA has any direct effect on nonserious SRD. Their total influences, moreover, are quite small, suggesting that neither intelligence nor institutional response thereto has any substantial effect on the more trivial forms of delinquent behavior.

Overall, none of the indirect influences on nonserious SRD are very large. The constructs assessing individual's perceptions of what others think about them (negative social labeling) and the extent of delinquency among their friends (delinquent peer group association) are essentially alone in explaining nonserious SRD. These two constructs account for nearly 30% of the variation in nonserious SRD.

Figure 7 presents the causal influences on serious SRD; again, association with delinquent peers is an important determinant. Perceived negative social labeling also influences serious SRD, but its effect, unlike

¹⁶ Also worth noting are the relationships involving perceived employment access and home alienation. Some of these relationships are not consistent with those hypothesized by the OYD model. To go into detail regarding these points here would be a distraction from the focus of this paper, but it is perhaps worth noting that these two variables have the lowest known reliability coefficients of all the variables under consideration.

that for nonserious SRD, is indirect. Perceived academic labeling is again dropped from the path model as it exerts no influence, direct or indirect, on serious SRD. Age, however, and school and home alienation all exert indirect influences through delinquent peer group association; their effect is small, though in the expected direction. Both perceived academic access and perceived access to employment exert a weak indirect influence on serious SRD, although again, employment access has an unexpectedly positive (yet close to zero) total effect.

Both sex (female) and DAT have direct effects on serious SRD, but their explanatory power is small (about 2% of the variance for each). The influence of IQ operates through academic aptitude and is comparable to the latter in magnitude.




FIG. 6.—Combined causal model: influences on nonserious self-reported delinquency

Although more of the variables are involved in the model of serious SRD, the explanatory power is greater for the model of nonserious SRD. In particular, only delinquent peer association exerts a strong influence on serious delinquency; dropping all the other variables from the analysis would result in only a 3% reduction in explained variance.

Compared with the separate models, the combined model represents a considerable improvement over the IQ-delinquency model with its explained variance of 4.5% for both serious and nonserious delinquency, but a negligible change from the OYD model. For nonserious delinquency, the explained variance is 28.6%, regardless of whether we use the separate OYD model or the combined model. Results indicate that the variance directly and indirectly attributable to the individual variables in the OYD




FIG. 7.—Combined causal model: influences on serious self-reported delinquency

TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLE INFLUENCES ON NONSERIOUS AND SERIOUS SRD: COMBINED MODEL

Dependent Variable and Independent Variable		Zero-Order Correlation	Beta Coefficient	Total Influence	Directly Explained Variance	Indirectly Explained Variance	Total Explained Variance	R ²
Nonserious SRD:								
Delinquent peer group association456	.306	.306	.140	.000	.140	.286
Home alienation.161	0	.034	0	.005	.005	
School alienation170	0	.057	0	.009	.009	
Employment access.		-.021	0	.034	0	-.001	-.001	
Social labeling (-)461	.316	.467	.146	.069	.215	
Academic access.		-.030	0	-.049	0	.001	.001	
Academic labeling (+)		-.030	0	0	0	0	0	
GPA		-.157	0	-.130	0	.020	.020	
DAT		-.050	0	-.047	0	.002	.002	
IQ		-.077	0	-.064	0	.005	.005	
Sex (female)		-.111	0	-.027	0	.003	.003	
Age073	0	.035	0	.003	.003	
Serious SRD:								
Delinquent peer group association421	.395	.395	.166	.000	.166	.207
Home alienation.004	0	.043	0	.000	.000	
School alienation158	0	.066	0	.010	.010	
Employment access.058	0	.044	0	.003	.003	
Social labeling (-)302	0	.194	0	.059	.059	
Academic access.		-.080	0	-.015	0	.001	.001	
Academic labeling (+)		-.119	0	0	0	0	0	
GPA		-.157	0	-.055	0	.009	.009	
DAT		-.160	-.128	-.148	.020	.004	.024	
IQ		-.155	0	-.126	0	.020	.020	
Sex		-.160	-.122	-.132	.020	.001	.021	
Age082	0	.046	0	.004	.004	

model also remains the same. For serious delinquency, the OYD model alone explains 20.4% of the variance; the combined model explains 20.7%. The direct influences of academic ability and sex in the combined model replace those of negative social labeling and home alienation, respectively, in the separate OYD model. Labeling still accounts (all indirectly) for about 6% of the variation in serious delinquency, and home alienation accounts for less than 0.1% of the variation in serious delinquency in both the OYD and combined models.

Discussion

Brennan and Huizinga (1975) found that nearly one-third of the variance in SRD was accounted for by the OYD model. Our results using a modified version of the OYD model are similar: 28.6% of nonserious delinquency (which accounts for over three-fourths of the delinquency in our sample) is explained by the OYD model. Serious delinquency, with about one-fifth of the variance explained, is not so well explained by the OYD model. Including IQ, academic aptitude, and academic performance in the OYD model contributes very little; the variance explained in non-serious delinquency is not altered, and the variance explained in serious delinquency is increased by a negligible 0.3%.

Other hypotheses are also called into question by results presented here. The strain hypothesis, reflected in perceived academic and employment access, receives even less support than the IQ-delinquency hypothesis. Academic and employment access combined explain less than one-half of 1% of delinquency in the OYD and combined models, all of it indirectly. To some extent, this may be a problem of measurement; employment access has the lowest reliability of all the composite variables, and the only reliability coefficient of less than 0.6. Furthermore, these are measures of self-perceived rather than actual academic or employment access. Whether a more objective (actual versus perceived) and/or reliable measure of access to desirable social roles or statuses might lend more support to strain theory unfortunately cannot be resolved with the present research.

Control theory is by no means exhaustively represented in the OYD or combined model; nevertheless, school alienation and home alienation represent the absence of two potential bonds to conventional society. School alienation indirectly explains only about 1% of the variance in both nonserious and serious delinquency. The indirect influence of home alienation accounts for more than 0.5% of the variance, even in the separate OYD model in which it has a direct and unexpectedly negative influence on serious delinquent behavior. As home alienation is the second-least reliable of the composite variables, and the only variable for which the composite explains less than half of the variance in its components,

again, measurement error is a possibility. Alternatively, it may be that other elements of control theory are more important for the explanation of delinquent behavior, and these may add substantially to the OYD model.¹⁷

The hypotheses derived from differential association and labeling theory appear to be supported satisfactorily by both the OYD and combined models. Delinquent peer group association explains about 17% of the variance in serious delinquency and 14% for nonserious delinquency. Negative social labeling accounts for at least 5% and as much as 22% of the variance (if both direct and indirect influences are considered) in delinquent behavior.

Clearly, further research is needed. Longitudinal research, such as that done by Elliott et al. (1976), may help to both clarify questions concerning causal order and deal with possible feedbacks among the variables examined here. Consideration should be given to respecification of the OYD model. If possible, further research should include structural measures of more objective or actual access to desirable social roles and labeling (in addition to self-perception measures) and the open-ended measures of SRD described by Elliott and Ageton (1980).

CONCLUSION

The results presented above support the OYD model, and prompt the following conclusions:

1. Theoretically, IQ is not causally related to delinquent behavior. It is one of many individual characteristics which social institutional patterns of behavior may or may not reward. It is the institutional pattern of behavior that (a) is causally related to delinquent behavior and (b) must be altered if the frequency or type of aggregate delinquent behavior is to be reduced or changed.

2. Empirically, the association between IQ and delinquent behavior is so weak as to be negligible, given a properly specified causal model of delinquency. This follows logically from the first point above and is confirmed in the earlier analysis. It is also consistent with previous research on delinquent behavior.

We now return to the two questions raised at the beginning of this study: (1) To what extent is the IQ-delinquency hypothesis supported

¹⁷ In a reanalysis of Hirschi's data from the Richmond Youth Project, Matsueda (1982) finds results that support differential association theory over control theory. His measurement of both differential association and control theory are more detailed than ours, but the conclusions he reaches are similar. In Matsueda's analysis, delinquent definitions mediate the effects of other structural variables on delinquency, in particular, variables derived from control theory. In our results, the alienation variables are mediated by delinquent peer association.

empirically, and (2) to what extent does the IQ-delinquency hypothesis augment current theory on delinquency?

In answer to the first question, the IQ-delinquency hypothesis receives, at best, weak support. That support, moreover, might arguably be eroded were race and social class controlled. Structural variables, in contrast, are well supported as influences on delinquency.

Given the answer to the first question, the answer to the second question is necessarily unfavorable to the IQ-delinquency hypothesis. Even had the influence of IQ on delinquency been more substantial, however, the difficulties with the hypothesis we outlined in the first part of the paper would remain. Lacking both empirical support and theoretical utility, the IQ-delinquency hypothesis apparently adds nothing to existing delinquency theory.

APPENDIX

Perceived Academic and Perceived Social Labeling

Academic labeling is composed of four items assessing the individual's perception of how others (friends, students, teachers) rate his or her academic ability. Factor analysis confirmed academic labeling as a factor empirically as well as conceptually distinct from social labeling. The latter is a six-item composite variable which includes items assessing how the individual perceives he or she is being evaluated socially by others (friends, parents, teachers), including whether those others think the individual is a problem and/or heading for trouble with the law.

Perceived Academic and Perceived Employment Access

Perceived access to desirable social statuses, as a result of factor analysis, split into two composite variables—academic and nonacademic access. Items for both constructs were chosen from the Elliott and Voss (1974) Success-Failure scales. Academic access was constructed as an additive variable measuring the difference between how far the individual would like to go in school and how far the individual thinks he or she will actually go in school. Employment access is a two-item composite variable measuring the extent to which the individual perceives it is possible to obtain the type of employment he or she desires.

School Alienation and Home Alienation

The concept of alienation split into two components, academic and non-academic, following factor analysis. All the alienation items were selected

from the Elliott et al. (1976) Impact scales and Elliott and Voss (1974) Alienation scales. School alienation is a two-item composite assessing how much the individual likes school. This variable clearly reflects Hirschi and Hindelang's single-item indicator attitudes toward school. The second alienation composite, home alienation, is a four-item variable tapping the extent to which the individual agrees with parents on questions of right and wrong, as well as the extent to which the individual's family is perceived as close and his parents are perceived as understanding him.

Delinquent Peer Group Association

Delinquent peer association is a three-item composite variable which measures the extent to which the individual's best friends, friends known the longest time, and friends with whom he associates most often are involved in delinquent behavior.

Delinquency

The criterion variables for this study are nonserious delinquency and serious delinquency. Nonserious delinquency is operationalized as an additive scale consisting of five offenses: theft less than \$2.00, liquor violations, vandalism, truancy, and runaway. Serious delinquency is also operationalized as an additive scale consisting of five offenses: gang fights, theft of \$2.00–\$50.00, theft of over \$50.00, auto theft, and robbery. For a discussion of the serious and nonserious classifications, see Elliott and Voss (1974, pp. 65–67). All are self-reported offenses.

Frequency and seriousness of offense have been found to be highly related to one another as well as to other variables (Gold 1966; Williams and Gold 1972). Drawing a distinction between serious and nonserious delinquency couples a concern for behavior that would be considered criminal regardless of age with a recognition that less serious offenses are the most frequently occurring types of delinquent behavior. The two delinquency classifications, although somewhat crudely divided, should yield results indicative of broad patterns of behavior and provide a background for subsequent, more detailed research.

The precise wording of the questions used for each of the indicators above can be found in Elliott and Voss (1974). For abbreviated wording of the questions, see table 1.

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Status, Autonomy, and Training in Occupational Mobility¹

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The effect of socioeconomic background on occupational attainment is well established. But the effect of status does not account for all of the association between occupational origins and destinations. The amount of autonomy accorded to workers and the degree of specialization in the training required of them are also important for mobility. Men whose fathers were entrepreneurs or were employed in other positions that require little supervision are more likely than men whose fathers were closely supervised to enter occupations that offer at least some degree of on-the-job autonomy. Autonomy and training are especially important for immobility. Men whose fathers were autonomous or specially trained are more likely than other men to be immobile. A model incorporating the effects of socioeconomic status, on-the-job autonomy, and specialized training is fitted to the 1962 and 1973 Occupational Changes in a Generation data. The model fits the data well with few parameters. Subpopulations defined by race, age, and education are also analyzed. The analysis provides new insight into the weakening of the association between origins and destinations between 1962 and 1973, the convergence of black and white mobility patterns, and the role of education as an intervening variable in the mobility process.

Social mobility is one of the most studied topics in all of social science. Interest in mobility goes back at least to the turn of the century. Sorokin (1927, pp. 416–17) catalogs 23 mobility tables calculated for data collected between 1900 and 1925. The earliest are French tables for 1900 reported by Limousin and Coste. Yet new findings and analytical developments come faster and more furiously in this field than in any other in sociology.

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This intense activity is warranted by mobility's place in our understanding of social stratification. Because the structure of intergenerational mobility gauges the persistence of material advantage from one generation to the next, answers to fundamental questions about opportunity, class, and privilege depend on the correct specification of that structure.

Until recently, the focus of mobility research has been the occupational mobility matrix as a self-contained entity. The intergenerational flow of manpower from one occupational group to another, the prevalence of occupational immobility, and the rank ordering of occupational categories have dominated this field. Blau and Duncan (1967, p. 8) characterized the thrust of prior mobility studies this way: "Although the results of this analysis describing the mobility pattern occasionally related to other variables, such as education or fertility, the major preoccupation is typically the internal analysis of mobility tables, and relatively little attention is devoted to the systematic investigation of the relationships between other factors and occupational mobility. The tendency to conceive of mobility as a single variable and examine it largely without relating it to other variables has severely restricted the fruitfulness of mobility research."

In the 1960s, Duncan and his associates revolutionized stratification research by "decomposing the concept of occupational mobility into its constituent elements: social or career origins and occupational destinations" (Blau and Duncan 1967, p. 9). The decomposition allowed researchers to express the relations in the mobility table as a causal relation. Other variables were added to the causal sequence, and elaborate models containing a dozen or more variables were proposed (e.g., Sewell and Hauser 1980). These developments led to a divergence of mobility research on the one hand and attainment research on the other. Mobility research continues to mine for nuggets of new data within the mobility table itself, while attainment research continues the search for intervening variables.

Several developments published in this *Journal* in the past five years have bridged the gap between mobility research and status-attainment research. Duncan's (1979) uniform association model and its applications by Breiger (1981), Yamaguchi (1982), and Logan (1983) foster a reconciliation because they share with attainment research the causal imagery of origins determining destinations and because they capture the effects of socioeconomic status within the mobility table in a single parameter or a small number of additional parameters. The power gained by employing few parameters is the potential for multivariate analysis. Yamaguchi and Logan both utilize this aspect of scaled models to incorporate the effects of education on the mobility process. If too many parameters are used for modeling mobility, the sampling errors of those parameters become very large when the cross-classification is elaborated to many dimensions. In contrast, comparing a few mobility parameters across

categories of year, cohort, color, or education is a powerful tool that gets us back to the trail blazed by Blau and Duncan, that is, it "enables us to dissect the process of occupational mobility by determining how various factors condition the influence of origins on occupational success" (Blau and Duncan 1967, p. 10).

This paper contributes three modeling innovations which lead to new substantive results. The first innovation is the use of category scores with more substantive content than in the previous applications of the uniform association model. This innovation leads to the second—the introduction of dimensions other than socioeconomic status. In this paper autonomy and training are added to socioeconomic status as dimensions of the association between father's occupation and son's current occupation. These two together lead to the third. A perennial problem in mobility modeling is a greater than expected number of cases along the diagonal of the table. This paper combines its scaling and multivariate aspects to account for most of this surplus. Together these modeling innovations produce new insights into the weakening of the association between fathers' and sons' occupations over the 1962–73 interval; the convergence of black and white mobility patterns; age and cohort variation in status, autonomy, and training; and the intervening role of education in the attainment process.

THE NEW GENERATION OF MOBILITY MODELS

Duncan's uniform association model specifies a single parameter that "shifts the destination distribution upward or downward [in socioeconomic status] as the origin is shifted up or down" (Duncan 1979, p. 802). This parameter is the only one that applies to the association between origins and destinations in the mobility table, although other parameters are included in the model to fit the marginal distributions of fathers and sons. The uniform association parameter is similar to the regression coefficient in that it produces a linear and additive relationship between independent and dependent variables—in this case fathers' status and the log-odds on sons' attaining a higher status occupation, respectively. Duncan stresses the similarity (see also Haberman 1979, pp. 396–97; Logan 1983; Hout 1983). An important distinction between uniform association and regression that is implicit in Duncan's formulation though not mentioned by him is that, while the regression coefficient predicts the mean status of sons at each level of father's status under the assumption that the error variance is constant throughout the range of the independent variable, the uniform association parameter predicts the entire distribution of the dependent variable across the given categories.

Duncan applies the uniform association model to mobility in Britain

in 1949. It does not fit at conventional levels of significance. The main source of poor fit is immobility; more sons fall into their fathers' occupational categories than the model predicts. Deleting the diagonal cells from the table² produces a significant improvement, but the linearity assumption must be relaxed by application of the row-effects model before an acceptable fit is attained (see also Goodman 1979).

Breiger (1981) applies the uniform association and row-effects models to American mobility data. He finds that, although the models do not fit the full 17×17 tables he starts with, combining certain categories produces an acceptable fit for the row-effects model. Goodman (1981) criticizes the criteria Breiger uses to combine categories. In short, Breiger's method leads to combinations of categories that are not statistically independent and thus to an understatement of the association between origins and destinations. Goodman's criteria require that the odds on origin i versus another origin i' must be constant for all destinations except i and i' , while the corresponding odds for destination i versus destination i' must be constant for all origins except i and i' . Breiger's criteria allow substantial variation in those odds. His criteria are much weaker; they require constant odds only within the intersections of class aggregates formed by collapsing categories. Because of this approach, Breiger masks the part of the association that shifts the odds from class to class (see Hout 1983, pp. 72-76).

Yamaguchi (1982) introduces a distinction between generalized and specific resources for occupational mobility. Education is his example of a generalized resource. It increases the odds on higher status destinations for men of all social origins. Specific resources like property, however, affect only some combinations of origins and destinations. By fitting special parameters to cells linked by specific resources, Yamaguchi obtains an acceptable fit of his modified model to the American data. His contribution is the introduction of concerns that are independent of class and status into the attempt to model the mobility table. This paper advances his contribution by generalizing aspects that he considers specific. The generalized autonomy and training effects introduced here account for a portion of the association between origins and destinations that is essentially the same as that fitted by his specific effects.

Logan (1983) develops partial uniform association models for three-way cross-classifications of origins, destinations, and education. His results are very similar to those of attainment researchers who use regression methods. He does note significant residual immobility that is not attributable to education. The most serious drawback of Logan's research is

² Fitting a parameter to each diagonal cell provides the same result as deleting diagonal cells.

the level of aggregation that he must use because his sample has relatively few cases. This paper extends his research by examining partial mobility tables that contain more occupational detail and dimensions other than socioeconomic status.

THE DIMENSIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

Socioeconomic status is the most important dimension of occupational mobility. Indeed, much of what we know about the distribution of status in American society comes directly or indirectly from the study of occupational mobility. Even researchers who take pains to model mobility tables without reference to the order of the categories (e.g., Hauser et al. 1975*a*, 1975*b*; Hauser 1978, 1979; Featherman and Hauser 1978, pp. 76–78, 147–50; Goldthorpe, Llewellyn, and Payne 1980) refer to status-related concepts such as “upward” and “downward mobility.” In short, the first objective in any mobility study is to determine how socioeconomic origins influence socioeconomic destinations.

Granting the primacy of status in occupational mobility does not deny the possibility that other aspects of occupational roles may also influence mobility. In fact, evidence abounds that socioeconomic status does not exhaust the systematic covariance between origins and destinations in the mobility table (Blau and Duncan 1967, pp. 67–75; Klatzky and Hodge 1971; Hope 1972; Horan 1974; Vannemann 1977; Featherman and Hauser 1978, pp. 30–37; Spaeth 1979). Although previous studies of nonstatus dimensions of mobility differ among themselves in sample and method, they all find two factors that contribute to the pattern of mobility. The first dimension in each analysis is clearly socioeconomic status. The substance of the second dimension is much less clear. After reviewing their results and many of the others cited here, Featherman and Hauser (1978, p. 34) conclude that the second dimension—whatever it is—is “weak and volatile with respect to measurement and analytic procedures,” and they advocate closing the issue.

Closing the issue of a second dimension of occupational mobility is premature. Despite researchers’ difficulties in finding substantive interpretations for their results, each analysis has turned up something in the pattern of mobility that is orthogonal to socioeconomic status. Although the results may have been “volatile,” the volatility may be an artifact of method more than a finding of substance. All of the statistical models applied to the multidimensional problem to date—smallest-space analysis, canonical correlation, and cluster analysis—are exploratory; they give the researcher no control over the dimensions to be extracted from the data. Under those circumstances, interpretation of the results is closer to divination than to hypothesis testing.

Furthermore, the methods generate second dimensions that are orthogonal to the first dimension by construction. The possibility that any variables that are important for mobility are uncorrelated with socioeconomic status is remote. So it is no great surprise that the substance of second-dimension results is difficult to divine; researchers are not looking at the second variable itself but at its residual stripped of covariance with socioeconomic status. Nor is it surprising that results differ according to the data and methods used. The correlation between status and the second variable is almost sure to differ from data set to data set, and each method purges that correlation somewhat differently in the course of calculating the coefficients which form the basis of interpretations.

The point of this paper is to specify the substance of the second dimension *a priori* and to develop a model that realizes the given specification. This is accomplished by a confirmatory approach that posits a second dimension and submits it to the data for acceptance or rejection.

The second dimension to be tested is autonomy. Autonomy in the form of control over the work process is a fundamental part of occupational differentiation in modern society. Some workers are supervised by others as they do their jobs. Other workers are relatively free of the constraints of supervision. The proposition tested here is that the odds on a son being in a position of autonomy (freedom from supervision) instead of a position that requires supervision increase as the autonomy of his father's occupation increases.³

Role modeling by the son leads to the association between father's autonomy and son's autonomy. The son first learns about earning a living by observing his father. While specific skills are not acquired in this way by most sons, an orientation toward what makes up "earning a living" is acquired. Does earning a living mean setting up shop and living on the proceeds, or does it mean finding a good, secure position with a reliable employer? Miller and Swanson (1958) label these contrasting outlooks entrepreneurial and bureaucratic, respectively. They find that the entrepreneurial orientation toward self-sufficiency or the bureaucratic orientation that favors security is a basic outlook developed at an early age. More important, placement on the entrepreneurial-bureaucratic spectrum is correlated with the objective conditions of the father's employment. The more entrepreneurial a man's occupation is, the more self-sufficient is his outlook (Miller and Swanson 1958).

The autonomy of the father's job affects the son not only directly through role modeling but also indirectly through child-rearing practices

³ Of course, not all workers with supervisors are low in autonomy (Hall 1968). Factors other than supervision are important for autonomy, too, but most of those influences are controlled by including socioeconomic status and specific vocational preparation in the model.

and values that parents hold for their children (Miller and Swanson 1958; Kohn 1969). In entrepreneurial households children are raised to be self-sufficient; in bureaucratic households social skills are favored. Each type of family sees its goal as instrumental for occupational success. And it is. Entrepreneurs must be self-sufficient; bureaucrats must be adroit in interpersonal dealings.

Kohn (1969; Kohn and Schooler 1969) elaborates this work, concluding that, for socialization and self-concept, autonomy is a more important dimension of occupation than is socioeconomic status: "Occupational position matters for values and orientations because it determines the conditions of self-direction that jobs provide or preclude. . . . In industrial society, where occupation is central to [workers'] lives, occupational experiences that facilitate or deter the exercise of self-direction permeate their views, not only of work and of their role in work, but also of the world and of self" (Kohn and Schooler 1969, p. 677). Friends and associates of the parents might lessen some of the effects of the father as a role model by serving as alternative role models were it not for the fact that workers select their social contacts from their own side of the entrepreneurial-bureaucratic divide (Laumann 1966, 1973).

Of course, the effects of autonomy are material as well as psychological. Fathers with their own business or professional practice may assist sons with gifts, loans, and access to commercial credit to a greater extent than men more dependent on salary income. Although most men would like to help their sons, ready access to cash and credit is one of the fruits of autonomy. In short, capital assets and the freedom to use them increase the odds on autonomy for the sons of self-employed and similarly autonomous fathers relative to the same odds for the sons of salaried workers at the same level of income.

Perhaps other researchers would consider variables other than autonomy important for mobility.⁴ Autonomy was selected for this analysis for a combination of theoretical and empirical reasons. Mills (1946) marks autonomy as crucial to the distinction between the "old" and "new" middle classes—the entrepreneurs and independent professionals, on the one hand, and the salaried white-collar workers, on the other. The entrepreneurial/bureaucratic distinction is identified by Lipset and Bendix (1952) as an important facet of intragenerational mobility. Blau and Duncan's (1967, pp. 67–73) concepts of "intuition" and "rational principles" are consonant with the entrepreneurial/bureaucratic distinction of Mills, Lipset and Bendix, Miller and Swanson, and Kohn and Schooler.

Another approach that has arrived at this destination is that of Kluegel

⁴ The choice of independent variables is not limited to status and one other variable. The model can estimate the effects of up to $R - 1$ dimensions (where R is the number of rows in the table).

(1978), Spaeth (1979), Wolf and Fligstein (1979a, 1979b), and Kerckhoff, Campbell, and Trott (1982). All are concerned with the inability of occupational status to account for aspects of occupational differences in earnings. Their findings show consistently that, while autonomy (and related concepts like power and authority) is correlated with status, it has independent effects on earnings. The research in this paper extends this line of work by specifying the intergenerational component of autonomy.

IMMOBILITY

Immobility presents theories and models of social mobility with serious problems. The orientation of mobility theories and models is toward change. Yet a significant number of any cohort follow their fathers' footsteps into the same or similar occupations. Mover-stayer models (Spilerman 1972; Singer and Spilerman 1974, 1976; Clogg 1981), quasi-independence models (Goodman 1965, 1969, 1972; Pullum 1975), quasi-uniform association and related models (Duncan 1979; Goodman 1979; Breiger 1981), and the diamond model (Hope 1982) are all ad hoc treatments of immobility. While these models achieve their goal of estimating mobility parameters that are not contaminated by residual immobility, they are unsatisfying because they control for immobility without accounting for it.

The model proposed in this paper uses two independent variables to predict the amount of immobility for a given occupational category. The two explanatory variables are autonomy and training. Questions about the importance of these variables for immobility are among the oldest concerns in mobility research. Sorokin (1927, p. 419) quotes a 1908 Italian mobility study: "F. Chessa in his *Trasmissione Ereditaria dei Professioni* came to the tentative conclusion that 'hereditary transmission of occupation is stronger in those occupations which demand a greater technical experience and specialization or a more or less large amount of money for their performance than in the occupations which do not demand either of these conditions.' . . . These statements . . . however, are still only tentative and need to be tested by further studies." Autonomy is included as a cause of immobility under the supposition that the effects described above intensify for occupations most similar to the father's own occupation. Role modeling and material support are probably both more effective at short range. The other predictor of immobility is training—not how much but how specialized the training required by an occupation. Specialization is one of the hallmarks of postindustrial society (Bell 1973). The leading indicator of specialization is the requisite amount of training that precedes employment. Some occupations require a great deal of specific vocational preparation, for example, surgeon, carpenter, or computer programmer. Others require more general skills, for example, jour-

nalist, machine operator, or farm laborer. Although it is highly correlated with general educational requirements of an occupation (Cain and Treiman 1981), specific vocational preparation is proposed as an important independent influence on immobility.

The effect probably works through socialization and through occupational networks. Whether a father is a generalist or a specialist at work influences his son's orientation (Kohn 1969). That is the socialization part. The network part of the training effect works through the tendency of specialists to band together in networks held together by formal organizations like professional associations and craft unions. These networks provide sons of incumbents with useful information about training opportunities and job openings, information not available to other men's sons. More important, they inculcate occupational subcultures (Collins 1975, p. 62). A certain amount of nepotism can be expected to boost immobility among the sons of specialists, too. The effect of clout is not given its due in most stratification research. Here it is treated by inference only, but at least it is not ignored.

This substantive approach to scaling the relative size of diagonal cells to variables of interest—such as autonomy and training—is an advance over prevailing practice. Many studies delete the diagonal or, equivalently, treat each diagonal cell as a special case with its own parameter (Goodman 1965, 1969, 1972, 1979; Blau and Duncan 1967, pp. 44–48; Hauser et al. 1975*a*, 1975*b*; Featherman and Hauser 1978, pp. 76ff; Duncan 1979; Clogg 1981; Breiger 1981). Duncan (1979) and others have decried the ad hoc nature of this approach. Clogg (1981), however, argues that each diagonal cell contains a residual class of “stayers”—individuals who will not change their original category owing to unspecified social inertia. This is not a viable interpretation. It has both conceptual and methodological flaws. First, the concept of social inertia, vague as it is, hardly applies to most of the excess immobility that is observed. For example, consider the occupations “judge” and “high school teacher.” In most classifications, judges and high school teachers are coded in the same category: salaried professional, upper nonmanual, white collar, and so on. Yet in what sense is the son of a judge who becomes a high school teacher exhibiting social inertia? In principle, statistical models could be developed to adjust for this phenomenon somehow, but so far they have not been. The proportion of stayers in the diagonal cells of a mobility table should increase as the number of occupational categories is increased because more categories means less heterogeneity. In practice, the opposite occurs. As the classification is refined, leaving true stayers as a higher proportion of sons in the diagonal cells, the estimated proportions of stayers decline (e.g., Clogg's [1981] comparison of 5×5 and 8×8 tables for Britain). Clogg is not to be singled out on this count. Other applications

of the mover-stayer concept (Spilerman 1972; Singer and Spilerman 1974, 1976) have the same problem of heterogeneity and implausible estimates.

THE MODEL

The model proposed here is a generalization of Duncan's (1979) uniform association model. The uniform association model can be written in terms of expected frequencies, odds, or odds ratios (Goodman 1979). Expected frequencies are given by the log-linear equation

$$\log(F_{ij}) = a_0 + a_{1i} + a_{2j} + bX_iX_j, \quad (1)$$

where $\sum_i a_{1i} = \sum_j a_{2j} = 0$, $\log(F_{ij})$ is the natural logarithm of the expected count in row i and column j ; the a_{1i} fit the row marginals, the a_{2j} fit the column marginals, b is the uniform association parameter, and $X_iX_j = ij$ (the product of the row and column numbers). As Haberman (1974) points out, using the row and column numbers as scores is an arbitrary choice; other scores could be used if other information made a substitution reasonable. For example, we could set $X_iX_j = S_iS_j$ (the product of the Duncan [1961] SEI scores for categories i and j). This is the first extension of the uniform association model adopted here. Haberman calls it the linear-by-linear interaction model.

Further extensions of the linear-by-linear interaction model are proposed. First, a second linear-by-linear term is added to capture the hypothesized effect of autonomy on mobility. Furthermore, a set of terms is added to capture the hypothesized effects of autonomy and training on immobility:

$$\log(F_{ij}) = a_0 + a_{1i} + a_{2j} + b_1S_iS_j + b_2A_iA_j + d_1D_iS_i^2 + d_2D_iA_i^2 + d_3D_iT_i, \quad (2)$$

where A_i is autonomy in occupation i , T_i is training in occupation i , and $D_i = 1$ if $i = j$ and 0 otherwise.⁵ Expected log-odds on one destination (j) versus another (j') under this extended model of status, autonomy, and training (referred to hereafter as the SAT model) are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi_{jj'} &= \log(F_{jj'}/F_{j'j}) \\ &= (a_{2j} - a_{2j'}) + b_1S_j(S_j - S_{j'}) + b_2A_j(A_j - A_{j'}) \\ &\quad + d_1D_jS_j^2 + d_2D_jA_j^2 + d_3D_jT_j, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

⁵ Note that eq. (2) includes the effect of status on immobility despite the lack of justification for such an effect in the text. This term is included as a control for the correlation between general educational requirements of an occupation and the specialized training of substantive interest.

where $D_i = 1$ if $i = j$, -1 if $i = j'$, and 0 otherwise. Equation (3) states that for the son of a man in occupation i , the odds on one destination relative to another are a log-linear function of the status and autonomy of that occupational origin, the difference between the statuses of the two destinations compared, the difference in autonomy between the two destinations compared, and the expected rate of immobility for men from that origin which is given by the status, autonomy, and training of the origin. In the tables, the b 's are labeled "scaled-association" parameters and the d 's are labeled "scaled-diagonal" parameters.

DATA AND METHODS

Data for this paper are from the Occupational Changes in a Generation (OCG-I) survey directed by Blau and Duncan (1967) and its replication (OCG-II) directed by Featherman and Hauser (1978). Sampling, measurement, and other technical information are available from those sources. Data are weighted to approximate the counts that might be expected under simple random sampling (Featherman and Hauser 1978, pp. 507–14). The counts obtained in this manner are referred to as "effective counts."

The occupations analyzed in this paper are father's (or other head's) occupation at the time when the respondent was 16 years old and the respondent's occupation at the time of the survey. Both father's and respondent's current occupations are identically coded into 1960 census codes (for both 1962 and 1973) and recoded to the 17-category classification introduced by Blau and Duncan (1967, pp. 23ff) and used in nearly all of the previous attempts to analyze nonstatus dimensions of mobility.

The scores for status, autonomy, and training are means and odds for men in the 17 occupational categories during the 1970s. *Status* scores (S_i) are the means for Duncan's (1961) socioeconomic index (SEI) for OCG-II respondents' current occupations in 1973. The other two variables are not available in the OCG data. Data from the pooled 1972–80 NORC General Social Survey (National Opinion Research Center [NORC] 1980) are used. Male respondents were selected on the basis of age and employment to construct a sample of men 20–64 years old in the experienced civilian labor force, so that these measures refer to the same population as the status scores and mobility tables. *Autonomy* scores (A_i) are derived from answers to a question which asks whether the respondent is supervised on the job. Responses are coded as the odds on having a supervisor.⁶ *Training* scores (T_i) are the mean of the specific vocational preparation (SVP) for occupations in the 17 occupational categories (Temme 1975).

⁶ The square of odds on having a supervisor is multiplied by -1 so that d_i has the sign appropriate to *autonomy*.

Scores used in this analysis are shown in Appendix table A1.

Preliminary analyses showed that cells involving farm occupations have significantly larger residuals than cells involving other occupations. Instead of deleting farm-origin men, as is often done (e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967; see p. 177 for their reasons), I add a set of four dummy variables to equations (2) and (3). These dummy variables apply to classes of interstratum mobility into and out of farming. The cells to which each of the dummy variables apply are given in a note to table 2 below. Note that the model is still symmetrical because each dummy variable applies to both farm origins and destinations. Note also that coefficients are in metric form, so, whereas the coefficients for some farm dummies are greater than 1.0 and the status coefficients are small, the scales are not comparable, nor are the coefficients.⁷

RESULTS

Table 1 assesses the fit, to the two replicate surveys, of the SAT model in equations (2) and (3) as augmented by the dummy variables for farm. The column heading L_o^2 refers to the model of independence. The large numbers in this column attest to the substantial association between father's and son's occupations. The heading L_m^2 refers to the SAT model. The numbers in this column are much smaller than those in the L_o^2 column, indicating that the model accounts for most of the association in each year: 86.9% in 1962 and 85.8% in 1973. Even though the model fails to attain the conventional level of significance, it is quite powerful, capturing all but about 15% of the association with just nine parameters. Further evidence of the goodness of fit is the small index of dissimilarity

TABLE 1
GOODNESS OF FIT FOR
SAT MODEL BY YEAR: MEN 20-64 YEARS OLD

Year	L_o^2	L_m^2	$L_o^2 - L_m^2$	Δ	N
With diagonal:					
1962	3,462.51* (256)	453.16* (247)	3,009.35* (9)	.033	10,740
1973	4,868.08* (256)	691.23* (247)	4,176.85* (9)	.032	21,635
Without diagonal:					
1962	1,800.51* (239)	411.53* (233)	1,388.98* (6)	.031	10,740
1973	2,455.05* (239)	620.82* (233)	1,834.23* (6)	.029	21,635

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are degrees of freedom.

* $P < .05$.

⁷ Models were fitted using FREQ (Haberman 1979, pp. 571-85).

between effective counts and those expected under the model for each year. The Δ s show that only 3% of the effective count is misclassified by the model.

To test whether the approximately 15% of the association not accounted for by the SAT model is attributable to failure of the attempt to model immobility, I fitted a quasi-SAT model to a table without diagonal cells. The results in the bottom panel of table 1 show that the diagonal does not contribute more than its share to the residual. While roughly half of the association between father's and son's occupation lies on the diagonal,⁸ less than one-fifth of the residual association is on the diagonal. Deleting the diagonal improves the fit by less than two percentage points, and it reduces Δ in each year by at most .003. Nonetheless, the fit of the quasi-SAT model is a significant improvement over that of the SAT model,⁹ so parameter estimates for both models are presented.

Parameter estimates are in table 2. They show very clearly the strength of the model. Each variable is significant, and each coefficient has the expected sign. As expected, the results show that an increase in origin status increases the odds on higher destination status. A very important result is the significant weakening of the status effect between 1962 and 1973. In their extensive analysis of the same data, Featherman and Hauser (1978, pp. 137–38, 217) conclude that the link between the generations loosened over this period, but they were unable to pin down the nature of the loosening. The results given here suggest that the change was exactly the kind of across-the-board reduction to which their methods are relatively insensitive. While the blocking methods that they apply are sensitive to threshold effects and other nonlinearities, a linear shift may not be detectable. It is interesting to note that their regression analyses do pick up the linear shift (Featherman and Hauser 1978, pp. 227–32).

Autonomy also has a strong, positive effect. Although the value of the autonomy coefficient for 1973 is less than that for 1962, the difference is not significant at the .05 level. Thus, part of the reason that uniform association, quasi-uniform association, and their modifications do not fit the OCG data is that mobility in the United States is multidimensional. A complementary interpretation focuses on the occupational classification employed: these results also indicate that the 17-category scheme is not a unidimensional classification. Future mobility research might be directed toward the development of a new classification scheme that is a unidimensional status hierarchy.

⁸ The proportion of the association on the diagonal is one minus the ratio of L_o^2 without the diagonal to L_o^2 with the diagonal: for 1962 $(1 - 1,800.51/3,462.51) = .480$ and for 1973 $(1 - 2,455.05/4,868.08) = .496$.

⁹ The test is the difference between L_m^2 with and without the diagonal: for 1962 $L_m^2 = 41.63$ ($df = 14$, $P < .05$) and for 1973 $L_m^2 = 70.41$ ($df = 14$, $P < .05$).

TABLE 2
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR
SAT MODEL BY YEAR: MEN 20-64 YEARS OLD

PARAMETER	WITH DIAGONAL		WITHOUT DIAGONAL	
	1962	1973	1962	1973
Scaled association:				
Status (b_1)*	.780* (.032)	.561* (.019)	.772* (.032)	.557* (.019)
Autonomy (b_2)*	.398* (.037)	.331* (.027)	.396* (.037)	.328* (.028)
Scaled diagonal:				
Status (d_1)*	-.161* (.023)	-.136* (.015)
Autonomy (d_2)*	.153* (.034)	.137* (.024)
Training (d_3)	.158* (.012)	.151* (.008)
Farm with: ^c				
Upper nonmanual	-1.163* (.086)	-1.097* (.062)	-1.175* (.097)	-1.069* (.070)
Lower nonmanual	-.854* (.078)	-1.001* (.067)	-.867* (.089)	-.960* (.074)
Upper manual	-.733* (.071)	-.719* (.056)	-.736* (.081)	-.697* (.063)
Lower manual	-.692* (.063)	-.744* (.051)	-.689* (.074)	-.703* (.059)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

* Coefficients multiplied by 100.

^b Coefficients multiplied by 10.

^c The occupational categories are: upper nonmanual = professionals, managers, and nonretail salesmen; lower nonmanual = proprietors, clerks, and retail salesmen; upper manual = craftsmen (all industries); lower manual = service workers, operatives, and laborers (all industries); and farm = farmers, farm managers, and farm laborers.

* $P < .05$.

The effects of autonomy and training on immobility are positive, as expected. They show no signs of weakening between 1962 and 1973. The hypotheses that role modeling and specialization are important for immobility are supported by these data. The negative effect of status on immobility is not an expected result. Status is among the diagonal variables only as a control for the general educational component of training, so none of the specific hypotheses guiding this analysis is affected by this unanticipated result. Part of the negative effect of status is attributable to high immobility among farmers' sons (i.e., immobility net of marginal shifts away from farming). There is more to this effect than farming, though, as it remains significant when farm-origin men are deleted. Another approach to interpreting the diagonal is the estimation of modified

immobility ratios (Duncan 1979). These modified immobility ratios are obtained by deleting diagonal cells and fitting the off-diagonal parts of the model. Estimates of modified immobility ratios are presented in Appendix table A2.

The dummy variables for farming indicate that, net of the marginal shifts away from farming and the general pattern of status and autonomy effects, there is less movement out of the farm stratum than would otherwise be expected. There is also less movement into farming than would otherwise be expected. The effects are neatly stratified. The effect is stronger for nonmanual occupations (the difference between upper and lower nonmanual is not significant) than for manual occupations.

In discussing the fit of the model, I noted that deleting the diagonal improved the fit slightly but significantly. Deleting the diagonal does not greatly affect parameter estimates. Estimates of the status and autonomy effects are insensitive to treatment of the diagonal. Nor do the farm effects change much. Diagonal cells are retained for the remainder of the analysis.

CONVERGING MOBILITY OF BLACKS AND WHITES

The effect of father's status on son's status is weaker for black men than for white men (Blau and Duncan 1967, pp. 208–27; Duncan 1968; Featherman and Hauser 1976). For black men this weak association results from a kind of perverse openness of mobility channels that balances upward and downward mobility within the narrow range of statuses occupied by most black men. Although Featherman and Hauser (1976) find evidence that the color gap in returns to origins (and schooling) is narrowing, "differentials in returns to education and family resources remain" (p. 647). This pattern is particularly invidious because it so often sorts black men into industries and authority relations with the lowest returns to education (Stolzenberg 1975, 1978; Wright and Perrone 1977). In this section, new insights into differential mobility chances are gleaned from the SAT model. Wilson (1978) hypothesizes that increased opportunities for blacks have led to a stronger association between socioeconomic origins and destination among blacks, but his data do not support his contention (see Hout 1984).

Tables 3 and 4 give the goodness of fit and parameter estimates for the SAT model by race (black and white; men of other races have been excluded owing to small numbers of cases) and year. Since the OCG data are the primary source of the findings summarized in the preceding paragraphs, it is not surprising to find a pattern in the status results that is similar to what Featherman and Hauser found using regression models. The racial gap in the effect of status on mobility closes between 1962 and 1973 because of countercurrents in the white and black populations. The

TABLE 3
GOODNESS OF FIT FOR
SAT MODEL BY RACE AND YEAR: MEN 20-64 YEARS OLD

Year and Race	L_0^2 (<i>df</i> = 256)	L_m^2 (<i>df</i> = 247)	$L_0^2 - L_m^2$ (<i>df</i> = 9)	Δ	<i>N</i>
1962:					
White.....	3,035.92*	422.54*	2,613.38*	.035	9,795
Black.....	307.92*	186.09	121.83*	.068	822
1973:					
White.....	4,314.27*	678.67*	3,635.60*	.034	19,478
Black.....	362.81*	153.61	209.20*	.042	1,875

* $P < .05$.

TABLE 4
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR
SAT MODEL BY RACE AND YEAR: MEN 20-64 YEARS OLD

	1962		1973	
	White	Black	White	Black
Scaled association:				
Status ^a761* (.033)	.247 (.168)	.527* (.020)	.499* (.091)
Autonomy ^a372* (.038)	.671* (.188)	.335* (.028)	.254* (.110)
Scaled diagonal:				
Status ^a	-.154* (.024)	.020 (.151)	-.132* (.016)	-.032 (.075)
Autonomy ^b151* (.035)	.110 (.168)	.127* (.025)	.133 (.102)
Training.....	.156* (.012)	.069 (.045)	.148* (.009)	.100* (.033)
Farm with:				
Upper nonmanual.....	-1.074* (.090)	-2.498* (.530)	-1.082* (.064)	-1.764* (.265)
Lower nonmanual.....	-.796 (.082)	-1.159* (.335)	-.969* (.070)	-1.480* (.247)
Upper manual.....	-.675* (.075)	-1.163* (.286)	-.717* (.058)	-.733* (.210)
Lower manual.....	-.731* (.068)	-.790* (.194)	-.793* (.054)	-.862* (.181)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

^a Coefficients multiplied by 100.

^b Coefficients multiplied by 10.

* $P < .05$.

effect of status declines for whites while it increases for blacks, reducing the differential in the process.

Autonomy affects the mobility of white men in both years but affects the mobility of black men only in 1962 (although the autonomy coefficient for blacks in 1973 is not significantly different from that of whites, it is not significantly different from zero either). Detailed examination of the 1962 father-to-current-job table for black males (not shown) reveals that this effect is due to intergenerational circulation of black men in two distinct channels. In one channel are men whose fathers worked in manufacturing. These men circulate among manufacturing occupations (with no effect of father's skill level on son's skill level). In the other channel are men with farm origins. They are likely to be working in farming or other nonmanufacturing occupations. Farming and other nonmanufacturing occupations have high autonomy relative to manufacturing jobs. Thus the existence of these channels is responsible for the strong autonomy effect in 1962. By 1973 farm origins are much less common (down from 46% to 17% of sons), and the remaining men of farm origins are recruited into manufacturing occupations as well as into nonmanufacturing occupations. Furthermore, nonmanufacturing occupations recruit more from manufacturing in 1973.

Blacks have very low rates of net mobility (Featherman and Hauser, 1978, pp. 325–27). The low rates are due to high circulation mobility rather than to immobility. This is reflected in the near lack of significant diagonal effects. Only the effect of training on immobility in 1973 is significant.

The discussion to this point understates the extent to which mobility chances of black and white men converge between 1962 and 1973. Convergence is evident not only in the status dimension—a conclusion already reached by Featherman and Hauser (1976, 1978, p. 128)—but in other dimensions as well. Hout (1984) shows that the convergence of status effects is attributable to upward mobility between 1962 and 1973, not to the entry of new workers into higher-status occupations. The effects of autonomy on mobility and immobility are not significantly different from the corresponding effects for whites. Nor is the difference between blacks and whites in the effect of training on immobility significant. In fact, recalculating L_m^2 from expected frequencies for black males that are obtained by substituting the values of the five SAT parameters estimated for whites into the equation for blacks increases L_m^2 by only 8.83.

The SAT model fits the data for black males, but it does not fit (at the .05 level) for white males. The indexes of dissimilarity (Δ) for whites show that it does pretty well—misclassifying only about 3.5% of the cases in each year. But the departures from expectation that remain are, nonetheless, significant.

The lack of fit could indicate one of three things. More dimensions may be important, the functional form of the relationships may be misspecified, or the population may not be homogeneous with respect to some aspects of the mobility process. Evidence on black-white differences indicates heterogeneity. Subsequent sections of this paper show heterogeneity by age and education within the white population. These findings do not rule out the first two possibilities, but they do show heterogeneity to be a very important component of the lack of fit in the general population.

AGE AND COHORT DIFFERENCES

Life-cycle differences in the salience of current occupation and cohort differences in the context of the mobility process may well combine to produce heterogeneity among men of different ages in a cross-sectional survey. This heterogeneity can be further enhanced by long-term trends in the structure of the U.S. economy. Circulation mobility may well increase as production becomes concentrated in large-scale, rationally organized enterprises (Stolzenberg 1978; Chandler 1979; Bergesen 1981) and as the economy shifts from the production of goods to the production of services (Bell 1973; Featherman and Hauser 1978, pp. 227-32). In particular, these trends can be expected to weaken the effects of both status and autonomy as scale increases and rational universalism replaces more traditional terms of employment (Treiman 1970; Stinchcombe 1975). Trends in the effect of training are more difficult to anticipate. On the one hand, specialized training is becoming an important component of many jobs in new industries. On the other hand, jobs in older industries are being deskilled. Furthermore, the effect of training on immobility stems in part from the control incumbents have over the labor supply, and that control came under fire in the building trades and the professions between 1962 and 1973.

To assess age, period, and cohort differences in mobility processes (recognizing the intractability of separating the three in this kind of analysis), I divided each sample of white males into 11-year age groups. The unconventional width of the age groups reflects the 11-year gap between surveys. Cohorts may be traced by comparing a coefficient for men in one age group in 1962 with men in the next age group in 1973, for example, men born 1921-31 were 31-41 years old in 1962 and 42-52 years old in 1973. Men 64 or 65 years old are excluded. The results of fitting the SAT model to mobility tables for these age groups appear in tables 5 and 6. To save space, coefficients for the farm dummy variables are not reported.

The SAT model fits the data at the .05 level for white men over 30 years old but not for younger men. The fit for younger men, however, is not much worse; the proportion of cases misclassified is not appreciably

greater for men 30 and under. There is not much pattern to the residuals for 1962. None of the residuals with a z -score (Haberman 1979, pp. 272–75) greater than 1.96 involves more than 20 cases, that is, the significant residuals are all in small cells. For 1973, two interesting patterns appear. First, the sons of upper nonmanual fathers are more likely to have service occupations than the model predicts. Second, immobility is unusual for manufacturing occupations: there is less immobility than expected for craftsmen, more than expected for operatives and laborers.

The coefficients in table 6 show that the intergenerational link between father's and son's status is strong in each age group in both years. It is stronger for men over 30 years old than for younger men. The decrease in the effect of status noted above is apparent in all age groups. The decrease is greater for men younger than 42 than for older men.

Comparing cohorts gives a different perspective on the pattern of changes. The only significant intracohort change is the decrease of .160 for men born 1921–31 (31–41 years old in 1962). The strong effect of status for this cohort is an aberration in an otherwise orderly progression of intercohort changes. From the 1899–1909 cohort to the 1943–53 cohort, the effect of status on mobility loses nearly half its value.

Deciding between a cohort perspective and a period perspective is difficult in general and very difficult in this situation. In this case I lean toward the period interpretation. Given the importance of early promotions for the socioeconomic career coupled with variance in age of labor force entry, the increase in the status effect around 30 years of age is to be expected as part of the life cycle. None of the differences among later

TABLE 5
GOODNESS OF FIT FOR
SAT MODEL BY AGE AND YEAR: WHITE MEN

Year and Age (Years)	L_0^2 ($df = 256$)	L_m^2 ($df = 247$)	$L_0^2 - L_m^2$ ($df = 9$)	Δ	N
1962:					
20–30.	803.62*	287.92*	515.70*	.060	2,265
31–41.	1,140.20*	283.64	856.56*	.054	2,874
42–52.	930.29*	254.61	675.68*	.049	2,674
53–63.	757.42*	238.37	519.05*	.055	1,886
1973:					
20–30.	1,371.48*	381.18*	990.30*	.044	6,147
31–41.	1,279.00*	289.16*	989.84*	.043	4,666
42–52.	1,200.72*	285.55*	915.17*	.041	4,747
53–63.	1,073.53*	269.74	803.79*	.046	3,562

* $P < .05$.

TABLE 6
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR SAT MODEL BY AGE AND YEAR: WHITE MEN

Age (Years)	SCALED ASSOCIATION				SCALED DIAGONAL			
	Status ^a		Autonomy ^a		Status ^a		Autonomy ^b	
	1962	1973	1962	1973	1962	1973	1962	1973
20-30.....	.673*	.449*	.298*	.359*	-.186*	-.171*	.157*	.079
	(.062)	(.032)	(.082)	(.053)	(.049)	(.026)	(.070)	(.042)
31-41.....	.840*	.641*	.366*	.248*	-.184*	-.142*	.212*	.203*
	(.060)	(.042)	(.069)	(.057)	(.042)	(.031)	(.065)	(.052)
42-52.....	.776*	.678*	.424*	.322*	-.161*	-.114*	.106	.155*
	(.068)	(.046)	(.071)	(.055)	(.051)	(.033)	(.068)	(.053)
53-63.....	.826*	.715*	.247*	.395*	-.072	-.100*	.080	.097
	(.085)	(.056)	(.089)	(.067)	(.058)	(.040)	(.088)	(.063)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

^a Coefficients multiplied by 100.

^b Coefficients multiplied by 10.

* $P < .05$.

age groups is significant. The period perspective is preferable because it is consistent with all of the data. The cohort perspective must reconcile the size of the effect of status on mobility in the 1921-31 cohort.

The effect of autonomy on mobility is strong and positive for all age groups (cohorts) in both years. The only significant change between 1962 and 1973 is for men 31-41 years old. None of the three intracohort changes is significant. Despite that simplicity, the cohort perspective is not preferable as an explanation of the autonomy effects. The sawtooth pattern of intercohort differences does not correlate with cohort size, wartime mobilization, economic growth at the time of labor force entry, or other variables that might be important for cohort differences.

The effect of status on immobility decreases with age in each year. It does not change over time. There is no pattern to the intercohort differences, and the intracohort changes can be explained with reference to the decreasing effect over the life cycle.

The effect of autonomy on immobility increases first and then decreases with age. The effect of training on immobility appears to decline with age, although none of the differences is significant at the .05 level.

Note that the effects of status, autonomy, and training on immobility all diminish over the life cycle. From this result one might suppose that immobility is less important for older men. In fact, a larger proportion of older men than younger ones are immobile in 1962, and the relationship between immobility and age is curvilinear in 1973 (see table 7). The decrease in immobility between surveys is due almost entirely to the decline of farming.

Two possibilities regarding the persistence of immobility in the face of diminishing diagonal effects suggest themselves: (a) immobility of older men is related to a variable or variables not included in the model, or (b) the immobility so closely parallels mobility as the latter is related to status and autonomy that no special diagonal parameters are necessary to fit the association between immobility and these variables. If alternative a

TABLE 7
IMMOBILITY BY
AGE AND YEAR: WHITE MEN

Age (Years)	1962	1973
20-30	14.3	15.3
31-41	16.0	14.6
42-52	16.2	13.4
53-63	18.1	14.6

is right and some excluded variable is responsible for the immobility of older men, its influence will show up in the form of larger residuals for the diagonal cells of older men than of younger men. Standardized residuals for diagonal cells are presented in table 8. These data cast considerable doubt on alternative *a*. The oldest group has only one significant diagonal residual in each year. Alternative *b* is preferable. Scaled diagonal parameters for status and autonomy are needed to capture the pattern of immobility for younger men, but over the course of the socioeconomic life cycle, immobility gets integrated into the same patterns of status and autonomy relations that affect mobility.

EDUCATION AND MOBILITY

Most of the total effect of father's occupational status on son's occupational status is mediated by the son's education. This suggests that status may not be an important dimension of mobility for men with similar amounts of education. Tables 9 and 10 present the results of disaggregating the data for white males by education. Black men are excluded because the difference between blacks and whites in the effect of education on occupational status is too great (Featherman and Hauser 1976) to combine blacks and whites, and there are too few blacks for a separate analysis at this level of detail. Men younger than 31 are also excluded because of the differences by age discussed in the preceding section.

The SAT model fits the data in each education group. The model misclassifies from 3.7% to 9.1% of the cases, but none of the L_m 's is significant at the .05 level. Considering the numbers of cases involved, the fits are excellent.

Education diminishes distinctions based on origin status. In every education group the effect of status is less than the weighted averages of .810 in 1962 and .671 in 1973 for white men over 30 years old (see table 6). The leveling effect of education intensifies as length of schooling increases; the effect of status decreases with increasing education. For men with a college degree, status has no effect on mobility.¹⁰ Most of the decrease in the effect of status discussed in preceding sections is the result of large decreases for men without high school diplomas coupled with an upward shift in the distribution of education away from those categories in which the effect of status is strongest.

The relationship between autonomy and mobility is relatively unaffected by education. Only among college graduates in 1962 is the autonomy effect for one educational category different from the effect for the others, and that difference is not statistically significant.

¹⁰ Note, moreover, that the educational transition most affected by status of origin is the transition to college degree (Featherman and Hauser 1978, p. 244).

TABLE 8
STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS FOR
SAT MODEL BY AGE AND YEAR: WHITE MEN FROM FOUR AGE COHORTS

OCCUPATION	1962					1973				
	20-30	31-41	42-52	53-63		20-30	31-41	42-52	53-63	
1. Professionals, self-employed	1.06	3.12*	2.57*	2.46*		2.96*	3.74*	2.36*		-.23
2. Professionals, salaried	1.30	.25	-.22	-1.04		.31	.44	.47		1.72
3. Managers	-3.01*	-3.35*	-.91	.07		-1.09	-2.84*	-2.90*		-2.66*
4. Salesmen, nonretail32	2.86*	1.31	.50		1.04	2.73*	2.17*		1.68
5. Proprietors	1.59	-.56	-.82	-1.01		.01	-1.61	.71		1.63
6. Clerks	1.79	-.85	-1.29	-.85		.36	.06	1.25		-.06
7. Salesmen, retail	-.62	1.30	-1.32	.22		.40	-.74	1.46		.78
8. Craftsmen, manufacturing	-.83	.31	-.02	-.55		-2.48*	.78	-1.58		-1.08
9. Craftsmen, other	-1.15	.19	-.04	-.55		-1.20	-1.32	-1.57		-.78
10. Craftsmen, construction	1.48	.51	.67	.75		1.77	-.28	2.15*		-.30
11. Service workers	-.15	2.69*	1.00	-.65		-1.60	-.04	1.71		-.52
12. Operatives, nonmanufacturing	-.46	-1.22	-.50	.60		.44	.87	-.63		1.41
13. Operatives, manufacturing	-.76	-.02	.27	1.34		2.17*	-.92	.52		.70
14. Laborers, manufacturing	1.31	-.29	3.52*	.38		2.53*	.24	1.24		.26
15. Laborers, nonmanufacturing65	-.40	.59	1.18		-.38	.92	.09		-.77
16. Farmers and farm managers38	-.30	-.35	.16		1.24	2.39*	-.60		.31
17. Farm laborers	-.53	1.02	.02	-.68		-1.10	.79	-.31		-1.12

* $P < .05$.

Immobility parameters depend on education. Only four of 10 status coefficients are significant. Considering that status is among the predictors of immobility only to control for the possible general educational component of the training measure, it is somewhat surprising that any status effects are significant. The effect of autonomy on immobility is weakest for high school dropouts. The rest of the variation in the effect of autonomy on immobility is insignificant. The effect of training on immobility deviates little from its average for men over 30 years old, except among college graduates, for whom the effect of training is not significant. Indeed, none of the immobility effects among college graduates is significant.

CONCLUSIONS

Occupational mobility is a multidimensional process. Status is central to mobility, but the opportunity for self-direction on the job is also important. Men whose fathers ran their own businesses, professional practices, and farms are themselves more likely than other men to enter occupations that promise a degree of autonomy. The complementary assertion is equally true. Men whose fathers worked on an assembly line or in a closely supervised white-collar position tend toward occupations that are closely supervised but promise a degree of job security in return.

Occupational immobility deserves special attention. Occupations that require specialized training are the ones with the greatest immobility. Incumbents in these occupations use training requirements to control the

TABLE 9
GOODNESS OF FIT FOR
SAT MODEL BY EDUCATION AND YEAR: WHITE MEN
31-64 YEARS OLD

Year and Education (in Years)	L_0^2 (df = 256)	L_m^2 (df = 247)	$L_0^2 - L_m^2$ (df = 9)	Δ	N
1962:					
0-8	607.41*	222.87	384.54*	.045	2,213
9-11	442.39*	193.61	248.78*	.060	1,430
12	609.95*	248.18	361.77*	.058	2,112
13-15	279.52	205.09	74.43*	.091	746
16+	218.14	162.37	55.77*	.061	1,028
1973:					
0-8	463.20*	211.90	251.30*	.042	2,356
9-11	425.27*	202.35	222.92*	.050	2,049
12	846.18*	258.62	587.56*	.037	4,769
13-15	413.94*	240.24	173.70*	.064	1,683
16+	381.30*	251.87	129.43*	.043	2,473

* $P < .05$.

TABLE 10
PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR SAT MODEL BY EDUCATION AND YEAR:
WHITE MEN 31-64 YEARS OLD

EDUCATION (In Years)	SCALED ASSOCIATION						SCALED DIAGONAL					
	Status ^a			Autonomy ^a			Status ^a			Autonomy ^b		
	1962	1973	1973	1962	1973	1973	1962	1973	1973	1962	1973	1973
0-8.....	.504*	.338*	.338*	.301*	.392*	.392*	-.120	-.285*	.228*	.176*	.176*	.176*
	(.132)	(.131)	(.131)	(.086)	(.090)	(.090)	(.111)	(.143)	(.079)	(.081)	(.081)	(.025)
9-11.....	.550*	.194*	.194*	.456*	.348*	.348*	-.192	.000	.065	.093	.138*	.101*
	(.118)	(.099)	(.099)	(.095)	(.081)	(.081)	(.105)	(.086)	(.084)	(.070)	(.034)	(.027)
12.....	.286*	.301*	.301*	.358*	.260*	.260*	-.111	-.137*	.122	.179*	.148*	.151*
	(.076)	(.050)	(.050)	(.075)	(.052)	(.052)	(.061)	(.042)	(.073)	(.050)	(.028)	(.018)
13-15.....	.247*	.204*	.204*	.199	.339*	.339*	-.194*	-.274*	.213	.232*	.175*	.198*
	(.114)	(.070)	(.070)	(.134)	(.094)	(.094)	(.095)	(.061)	(.153)	(.099)	(.054)	(.035)
16+029	.096	.096	.554*	.335*	.335*	-.090	.046	.552	.140	.137	.049
	(.039)	(.081)	(.081)	(.146)	(.099)	(.099)	(.106)	(.072)	(.226)	(.135)	(.073)	(.052)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

^a Coefficients multiplied by 100.

^b Coefficients multiplied by 10.

* $P < .05$.

supply of qualified applicants. The combination of father's knowledge, network ties, and clout in this situation gives an advantage to sons of incumbents not available to sons of men in less specialized fields who (a) want to enter the specialized occupations or (b) cannot control competition from men with different backgrounds who wish to fill positions in the sons' occupations of origin.

The link between father's occupation and son's occupation loosened between 1962 and 1973. The loosening was due to a drop in the effect of status on mobility for white men. The change touched all age groups. Education was important for the change because the educational distribution shifted toward the categories in which status is unimportant and because the effect of status decreased most for white men with less than high school education.

The results in this paper replicate the findings of others that blacks and whites have appreciably different mobility patterns. Net upward mobility for blacks was greater in 1973 than in 1962. This is reflected in the increase in the effect of status on black men's mobility. The period was marked by a general convergence in mobility chances of black and white men. The substantial differences in the effects of status, autonomy, and training that were evident in 1962 disappeared by 1973. Too much should not be made of this trend because blacks still get less return on their investments in schooling than whites do. The convergence in mobility chances is a trend toward equality based in part on diminished stratification among whites and in part on increased stratification among blacks (Wilson 1978).

Education mediates much of the intergenerational transmission of status. The effect of status decreases as education increases. Origin status does not affect destination status among college graduates. But education does not account for the importance of autonomy for mobility or of autonomy and training for immobility. The effect of autonomy on mobility is especially important for college graduates, reflecting the considerable advantage enjoyed by sons of self-employed professionals in the pursuit of their own career choices.

This paper makes three contributions to mobility research. It specifies a theory of role modeling that spells out the implications of occupational differences in socialization practices for mobility. Formally, this paper integrates the concerns of a number of writers with nonstatus dimensions of mobility and attainment (Spaeth 1978; Kluegel 1979; Wolf and Fligstein 1979a, 1979b; Hodge 1981) in a model that simultaneously estimates status and nonstatus effects on mobility. Finally, this research extends the work of others on the topics of change in mobility chances, differences between black and white men, and the importance of education for mobility and attainment.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
 SCORES ON STATUS, AUTONOMY, AND TRAINING:
 MEN 20-64 YEARS OLD

Occupation	Socioeconomic Index (Duncan SEI) (S)	Minus Odds on Having a Supervisor (A)	Specific Vocational Training (T)
1. Professionals, self-employed	80.479	-.263	7.555
2. Professionals, salaried	73.756	-9.000	7.115
3. Managers	69.029	-3.592	7.242
4. Salesmen, nonretail	62.552	-1.525	5.076
5. Proprietors	49.573	-.163	6.572
6. Clerks	44.243	-14.900	4.222
7. Salesmen, retail	38.052	-3.000	4.055
8. Craftsmen, manufacturing	38.037	-16.333	6.678
9. Craftsmen, other	32.010	-5.121	5.237
10. Craftsmen, construction	26.218	-2.732	6.851
11. Service workers	19.518	-8.350	4.053
12. Operatives, nonmanufacturing	19.714	-6.577	3.906
13. Operatives, manufacturing	18.518	-15.312	3.933
14. Laborers, manufacturing	7.751	-10.250	2.870
15. Laborers, nonmanufacturing	8.207	-5.000	2.959
16. Farmers and farm managers	14.438	-.135	6.627
17. Farm laborers	7.880	-2.125	3.892

TABLE A2

MODIFIED IMMOBILITY RATIOS (Log Form) FOR DIAGONAL
CELLS FOR SAT MODEL WITHOUT DIAGONAL BY YEAR

Occupation	1962	1973
1. Professionals; self-employed	1.229	1.183
2. Professionals, salaried128	.307
3. Managers	-.008	.152
4. Salesmen, nonretail742	.758
5. Proprietors585	.688
6. Clerks006	.184
7. Salesmen, retail290	.638
8. Craftsmen, manufacturing363	.308
9. Craftsmen, other552	.448
10. Craftsmen, construction	1.113	1.050
11. Service workers620	.519
12. Operatives, nonmanufacturing387	.528
13. Operatives, manufacturing231	.266
14. Laborers, manufacturing867	.739
15. Laborers, nonmanufacturing587	.424
16. Farmers and farm managers997	1.134
17. Farm laborers657	.467

NOTE.—Modified immobility ratios are ratios of observed frequencies to the frequencies that would be expected for the diagonal cells given the marginal and scaled association parameters estimated for the SAT model without the diagonal cells.

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Commentary and Debate

To conserve space for the publication of original contributions to scholarship, the comments in this section must be limited to brief critiques. They are expected to address specific errors or flaws in articles and reviews published in the *AJS*. Comments on articles are not to exceed 1,500 words, those on reviews 750 words. Longer or less narrowly focused critiques should be submitted as articles. Authors of articles and reviews are invited to reply to comments, keeping their replies to the length of the specific comment. The *AJS* does not publish commenters' rebuttals to authors' replies. We reserve the right to reject inappropriate or excessively minor comments.

WEBER AND THE JUDAIC ECONOMIC ETHIC: A COMMENT ON FAHEY

Of the curious studies that constitute Max Weber's *The Economic Ethics of the World Religions*, *Ancient Judaism* has probably been treated the most curiously of all by modern scholarship. For decades it has been common for sociologists writing on *The Economic Ethics*, which increasingly is being hailed as Weber's central substantive achievement, to concentrate almost exclusively on the sections devoted to China and India and to leave the analysis of Judaism entirely by the wayside. Against this backdrop, Tony Fahey's "Max Weber's *Ancient Judaism*" (*AJS* 88 [July 1982]: 62–87) is particularly welcome, not least for its instructive explanation of the specific historical argument of Weber's difficult study and its deft demonstration of the study's "instrumental dependence on the conceptual apparatus" that Weber had previously constructed in *Economy and Society* (p. 77).

Yet, despite its accomplishments, Fahey's article is marred by certain erroneous claims about *Ancient Judaism* which sever the work thematically from Weber's writings on religion and economic life. The misleading depiction of the book that results has quite serious implications, on the one hand because it serves to reinforce the prevailing sociological judgment that *Ancient Judaism* is for the most part marginal to an under-

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standing of the Weberian perspective on the practical consequences of religious belief, on the other because it ramifies to a broader category of sociological concerns. This is not the place to spell this out and document it fully; therefore I will limit myself to some brief remarks on the two most troublesome aspects of Fahey's characterization of *Ancient Judaism* and defer until the end a single more general comment.

The first and most basic problem arises when Fahey, in attempting to identify what Weber's study is actually about, emphatically declares that "*Ancient Judaism* . . . shows no interest in the consequences of Israelite religion on the economic life or thought of Israel" (p. 73). This line of argument effects a considerable misrepresentation of Weber's stated position. Fahey might have been alerted to this by the very title Weber gave to the collection of essays of which *Ancient Judaism* is a part. For if the work were all that oblivious to the economic consequences of Judaic religious ideas, surely there would have been little reason for Weber to place it squarely within *The Economic Ethics of the World Religions*.¹ But one is not reduced to examining titles in order to discover that *Ancient Judaism* does indeed take as a primary interest what from Weber's standpoint are the decisive economic ramifications of the religion of ancient Israel. Rather, at the outset of his investigation, Weber bluntly reports—in a passage of which Fahey, who quotes a less pregnant adjacent statement of intent, takes no note—that his "central concern [will be with] the practical ethic of Israel" (1952a, p. 428). The phrasing used here is significant, for "practical ethic" is one of Weber's favorite synonyms for "economic ethic," which in turn is his shorthand for those broad and compelling directives for the conduct of economic affairs that have sometimes emerged from firmly held religious convictions (see esp. Weber 1946b, pp. 267–68). In other words, far from "show[ing] no interest in the [economic] consequences of Israelite religion," Weber explicitly announces the ultimate focus of *Ancient Judaism* to be the ethical distillate whereby, in his judgment, religion exerts much of its effect on the economic world.

Weber then delivers on his promise, offering, as *Ancient Judaism* unfolds, a serious analysis of the "religiously substructured [practical] ethic [that existed in] pre-exilic Israel" (1923, p. 271; 1952a, p. 254). The components of this analysis are far too numerous to be considered here, and it must suffice to observe that at the center of Weber's presentation is the contention that ancient Judaism promulgated a dualistic economic ethic that upheld one code of behavior toward those who belonged to the Israelite community and another code toward outsiders. With regard to

¹ Even when Weber's study of Judaism originally appeared all by itself in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, it likewise carried—for each of six installments, no less—*The Economic Ethics of the World Religions* as its lead title.

in-group members, there were "highly significant prohibition[s against] usurious loans and against the charging of interest," coupled with various provisions for the social protection of "widows, waifs, [and the like, notably a forceful ban on] glean[ing] . . . the field[s and thus depriving a person in need from stilling his or her] hunger from the fruit of the field . . . of another," and sundry additional "far-reaching stipulations concerning payment of wages, debt remission, limitation of pledges, and general charity" (1952*a*, pp. 63–64, 67, 255). But with regard to those from an out-group, such principles swiftly gave way to an acceptance of practices of a vastly different type; when directed at strangers, fraud and deception were "completely inoffensive," while usury—always a weighty issue for Weber, the erstwhile economic historian—was at times not only "expressly permitted" but even regarded as something that "Yahwe [might] bless . . . with success" (1952*a*, pp. 50–51, 338, 64, 342).

This "double-standard morality" was actually older than the Israelite religion itself. Originally, in Weber's view, it was part and parcel of the "universal and primordial . . . economic ethic of neighborliness," according to which one's "duties differed naturally with respect to a tribal brother as over against a tribal stranger" (1923, p. 357; 1946*a*, p. 329; 1952*a*, p. 338). Yet rather than recede as it did amid certain religious developments elsewhere, in the instance of Israel this ethic was recast and ever more affirmed as a host of political and religious circumstances gradually forged a scattering of seminomadic tribes into a distinctive political confederacy bound by covenant to Yahweh, and then ultimately transformed this "political [alliance in] to a religious association," which was seen to contain an often wayward and beset people that had nonetheless been specially chosen by a majestic God who was at best "indifferent to other nations," while demanding that the persevering Israelites give "fellowship and brotherly aid in need [to one another as an ethical] obligation toward him" (1952*a*, pp. 334, 341–42, 165). The old "economic in-group and out-group ethic" was here suffused with a tremendous "supporting pathos"—and this in a situation in which the work of priests and prophets had coalesced to endow "once accepted ethical commandments [with] greater practical importance" than they had ever had (1952*a*, pp. 343, 342, 263). The upshot of such a state of affairs was that "rational economic activity on the basis of formal legality," as well as the "idea of 'proving' one's self religiously through 'inner-worldly asceticism,'" failed to take hold: outcomes of this sort, Weber argues, were long blocked by the "all-pervasive . . . dualism of the economic ethic which stamped as adiaphorous certain forms of behavior toward the outsiders which were strictly forbidden with respect to brothers in belief" (1952*a*, p. 343).

If this extended train of thought, however its fairness and accuracy be judged, does not evince a concern on the part of *Ancient Judaism* with

precisely those economic implications of religious creeds that Weber set out to explore, one would like to know what would. But Fahey makes no mention at all of this inquiry into the dualistic economic ethic, and then advances the scarcely tenable conclusion that it is Weber who is silent on the economic import of religion in ancient Israel.² It is true that there is much in *Ancient Judaism* besides a treatment of the practical ethic of the Israelite religion. Although he commences his book on this note, Weber is quickly carried away into a protracted examination of other historical problems with lives of their own, problems that Fahey's article goes far to unravel, even though it stops short of relating any of these additional matters to the intricate process by which, according to Weber, the substance of the Judaic economic ethic congealed. Fahey is wrong, however, in assigning centrality in *Ancient Judaism* to such additional matters on the basis of counting up how many chapters of the book these considerations consume (see p. 67 and n. 6). Weber's monographic studies elude a content analysis that gauges significance by the proportion of space devoted to this item over that, since these studies (see esp. Weber 1958b; 1968) are wont to fly off at exasperating length on all sorts of divergent and redivergent paths and to return to the affairs that are paramount to Weber himself only at the very end (cf. Marianne Weber 1975, p. 338). Reading *Ancient Judaism* with this fact in mind makes it all the more evident how much the text of this work embodies Weber's stated intentions; for when everything else at long last is done with, Weber harks back, in both the final section of the first part of the study and the penultimate section of its second and concluding part, to nothing other than the provisions and the workings of the dualistic economic ethic of ancient Judaism (see 1952a, pp. 252–60, 336–45).³ His surely is not a

² Given Fahey's evident knowledge of Weber's other writings, this conclusion is odder still, since the fundamental significance of the dualistic ethic (or elements thereof) is a theme that Weber hastens to emphasize in all of his mature work in which the practical effects of Judaism are at issue (see 1950, pp. 267–68, 359–60; 1952b, pp. 415–17; 1958a, p. 270; 1976, pp. 142–43; 1978, pp. 498, 583, 614–17, 621, 824, 1188). That, in the face of all this, Fahey continues to overlook Weber's analysis of the ethical double standard may perhaps be due to the fact that these other works frequently discuss this standard in conjunction with observations on Jewish pariah capitalism, which was essentially a post-exilic development and one Fahey (pp. 62–63, n. 2) wisely sets aside on the grounds that *Ancient Judaism* concentrates on the period before the Exile. However, what is true of pariah capitalism is not true of the spirit that fostered it. As even the abbreviated account of Weber's argument presented above should make clear, *Ancient Judaism* traces the dualistic economic ethic to the very start of Israelite history and then takes up the burden of charting its subsequent evolution through the long course of pre-exilic times (see also Weber 1950; pp. 267–68; 1978, p. 615).

³ The very last section of *Ancient Judaism* is a postscript on the exilic period—a point that, along with those just made in the text, comes across most clearly in German editions of the study (especially the original edition). Some of the wording and sectioning

book that overlooks the economic consequences of religious ideas and institutions.

Fahey's confusion on this point is probably the source of the second problematic claim that he puts forth: the insistent thesis that there is no "clear-cut substantive continuity between [*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and *Ancient Judaism*] that would identify them as a pair among the rest of [Weber's] works" (p. 76). It is, after all, not difficult to see, once it is recognized that *Ancient Judaism* is expressly concerned with the religious foundations of an economic ethic, that Weber's province here is exactly the same nexus between religion and practical life that he had previously examined in *The Protestant Ethic* using a different set of case materials.

But the "substantive continuity" between the two works goes even further than this. Integral to 17th-century Calvinism, as it is described in *The Protestant Ethic*, were various cultural items—a transcendent conception of God, a derogation of magical means of salvation, and so on—that also were central to ancient Judaism. On a rather liberal interpretation of Weber's scattered warnings against exaggerating the parallels between Puritanism and Judaism, Fahey's article elects to pass by these basic commonalities without discussion. For Weber himself, however, the matter was by no means at an end. In view of the several elemental creedal similarities between Calvinism and Judaism, what above all had still to be determined, particularly as he came to place the problems broached in *The Protestant Ethic* into a broader and more comparative framework, was wherein and why the economic ethics of the two religions differed from one another.⁴ When he proceeded to *Economy and Society*, Weber decided to confront this issue head-on (see esp. Weber, 1978, pp. 611–23, 1200–1204), his comparative religious studies having by then made the affinities between Calvinism and Judaism loom all the larger

changes introduced in the English translation tend to becloud these matters, though even there the essentials of Weber's position seep through.

⁴ This question took on special urgency in the light of the work of other German scholars of the time, including the Protestant biblical scholars who freely equated their religion with ancient prophetic Judaism (see Berger 1963, pp. 942–44), and the economic historians, such as Sombart in particular, who attempted to find the genuine spirit of capitalism in Judaic teachings, both ancient and modern (see Sombart 1962, pp. 187–237; see also Liebschütz 1962; Mendes-Flohr 1976; Oelsner 1962). Weber was quite concerned to rectify such positions (see 1946b, p. 267; 1950, p. 358; 1958a, pp. 187, 270; 1978, pp. 611–12, 1202), and had Fahey given this point a more proper emphasis, perhaps he too would have been struck with what *Ancient Judaism* says about the economic ethic of Judaism. The fact that Weber happened to draw so many historical insights from Eduard Meyer's differently focused writings on ancient Israel does not provide Fahey with a persuasive rationale for treating these writings as the preeminent context in which to interpret *Ancient Judaism*.

and having convinced him that of "all [the] religions that promise salvation [*only two* are without] an anti-capitalist ethos . . . : Puritanism and Judaism" (1978, p. 1198). That the latter nevertheless stood apart from the growth of modern Western capitalism was due primarily, Weber maintained here, to Judaism's failure to encourage inner-worldly asceticism, a failure that resulted chiefly from none other than its age-old "double-standard morality" ([1978], pp. 620, 621, 614; for a valuable critique, see Oelsner [1962]). With this conclusion established, at least to his satisfaction, Weber still needed, in order to achieve his wonted completeness at the historical level, to delineate the process through which the dualistic ethic of Judaism originally took shape. And it is exactly this development, which *Economy and Society* had offered little forum to investigate, that he went on to explore in detail in *Ancient Judaism*, thus completing a task that had grown out of *The Protestant Ethic*, namely, the task of differentiating the nature and directions of the Judaic ethic and the Calvinist ethic while continuing to acknowledge their manifest resemblances. This accomplished, Weber promptly carried the results of *Ancient Judaism* back to *The Protestant Ethic*, incorporating in his revision of the latter a dozen pointed additions—including some of the most significant of all the late alterations made in *The Protestant Ethic*—which highlight both the similarities and the dissimilarities between Protestantism and Judaism in the field of practical ethics.⁵ If one accepts Fahey's minimizing of the connection between the questions addressed in *The Protestant Ethic* and in *Ancient Judaism*, such changes simply cannot be adequately accounted for; they are further clear testimony to the marked continuity between Weber's two great studies.

In overlooking *Ancient Judaism*'s treatment of economic ethics and then dissolving its link with *The Protestant Ethic*, Fahey does more than foster a pair of serious misunderstandings about one of Weber's monographs. Inadvertently, he also obscures important components of the perduring sociological message that emerges from Weber's researches, as one example may serve to indicate. Weber's account of the Judaic ethic is actually the capstone of his analysis of the currently much oversimplified and abused idea of "traditionalism"—an analysis that, though widely neglected, runs throughout his comparative essays on religion and arguably remains sociology's fullest effort to grapple with and disentangle the various different kinds of traditionalism. This effort culminated in his writings on Judaism, for it was in observing the effects of the dualistic ethic that Weber came to identify the most elusive, yet nonetheless potent,

⁵ This statement derives from my own comparison of the texts of the two editions of *The Protestant Ethic* that Weber had issued. The emendations of interest here appear interspersed in the standard English edition of the study (see 1958a, pp. 57, 105, 109, 117, 165–66, 180, 197, 221–22, 234, 265, 269, 270).

of all strains of traditionalism, the strain that embraces many of the cultural beliefs that favor modern capitalist activity but still adheres to customary economic practices. Our capacity to formulate a supple Weberian approach to the study of the past is not enhanced if the underpinnings of Weber's position on this matter are glossed over and *Ancient Judaism* is viewed in a more restricted light.

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TEXT AND CONTEXT IN INTERPRETING A TEXT:
REPLY TO CAMIC

Charles Camic's disagreement with me on the interpretation of *Ancient Judaism* is, at first reading, a disagreement on substance—what *Ancient Judaism* is really about—but it is also implicitly a disagreement on method—how one should go about interpreting the purpose or meaning of a text. Neither in my original article nor in Camic's comment is the question of method explicitly raised, but I feel we can have little dialogue on the meaning of *Ancient Judaism* until we first clarify the evident differences in the way we handle the textual interpretation. So it is to that issue I will turn first.

I approached the interpretation of *Ancient Judaism* at three successive levels: first, the text itself; second, the immediate intellectual context represented by the author's other published works; and third, the wider intellectual context represented by the bodies of literature to which the author referred in his text and to which his thinking seemed to be related. In other words, in reading the text I took the text itself as the focal point, but I made some attempt to trace the external influences which contributed to its formation and which would shed some light on its nuances of meaning.

Camic does not explicitly question this procedure, but the logic of his comment is to turn it on its head. The context becomes the primary guide to the meaning of the text, and the text itself takes second place as a mirror in which the interpreter seeks reflections, however pale or minor, of what the interpreter feels to be the main external theme that surrounds the text—in this case the main idea in Weber's related work on religion. Those parts of the text which re-echo the main contextual theme constitute the real meaning of the text; those parts which do not, no matter how great their length or prominence in the text, are digressions and therefore show nothing of what the text is "really about."

Camic's version of what *Ancient Judaism* is really about reveals his procedure. It is put together as follows:

1. The question of the economic ethics of religious belief, he suggests, is the main theme of Weber's studies of the religions of India, the religions of China, and Protestantism (evidence: "the very title Weber gave to the collection of essays of which *Ancient Judaism* is a part"—the *Economic Ethics of the World Religions*—plus the universally accepted concern of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* with this theme).

2. He finds references to this theme scattered, though sparsely, through *Ancient Judaism* (these references comprise principally, according to Camic's citations, a part-sentence extracted from the lengthy first footnote

of the book, an eight-page "final section of the first part of the study," and a nine-page "penultimate section of its second and concluding part").

3. He admits that the bulk of *Ancient Judaism* does not deal with his imputed theme; this is not to admit, however, that his imputation is faulty, but to suggest that *Ancient Judaism* is faulty—he implies that it is thematically incoherent in that for most of its course it meanders aimlessly away from its own main purpose (to quote Camic: "It is true that there is much in *Ancient Judaism* besides a treatment of the practical ethic of the Israelite religion . . .," but, far from "assigning centrality in *Ancient Judaism* to such additional matters . . .," they are to be treated as incidentals, products merely of Weber's tendency "to fly off at exasperating length on all sorts of divergent and redivergent paths and to return to the affairs that were paramount to Weber himself only at the very end").

4. Consequently, *Ancient Judaism* really is about those brief reflections in the text of the main contextual theme which surrounds it and not about those divergences and redivergences which constitute the bulk of the book.

I have difficulties with every element in this argument, but it is elements 3 and 4 that I find hardest to accept. In order to maintain the continuity of *Ancient Judaism* with the theme of religion and economic ethics in Weber's other work, Camic is forced to suggest a complete lack of thematic unity within *Ancient Judaism* itself. In other words, the possibility of an internal integrity or coherent meaning in the text is put at second place to the claim for a limited strand of continuity between text and context. Camic's approach not only implies—perhaps unthinkingly—that Weber exercised little intellectual control over the structure of *Ancient Judaism* (a suggestion that is not impossible but one that I would dispute in this case). It implies also, at the level of method, that large sections of a text can be dismissed routinely as evidence for the meaning of that text, a procedure which, if accepted, would leave the text open to as many interpretations as there are possible linkages with whatever external themes interpreters might fancy. This means, in effect, that if decimation of the text is accepted as a routine interpretive procedure, there is no telling how anyone might cut it.

My original contextual positioning of *Ancient Judaism* was necessarily limited, but it was based, first, on a view of the text as a whole as an expression of the author's intentions and, second, on a regard for the complexity and many-sidedness of the linkages between the text and its context. Camic's comment suggests to me, first, a denial that the bulk of the text is in any real sense a genuine expression of the author's purpose and, second, a belief in a simple, one-dimensional theme as a unifying linkage between all of Weber's works on religion (but excluding, presumably, the extraneous "divergences" which are enclosed within each work).

Aside from this question of interpretive procedure, I find that, even

within the limited sections of *Ancient Judaism* to which Camic refers, his evidence for his argument is unsound on practically all points. I now turn very briefly to these substantive points.

First, for Weber, "practical ethic" and "economic ethic" are not synonymous, as Camic suggests. The practical ethic of pre-exilic Yahwism was military and political before it was economic, and the practical ethic of post-exilic Judaism dealt not only with the narrow issue of economic conduct but also with the more general problem of social cohesion through self-segregation for a people dispersed among unsympathetic host communities. Second, in his analysis of Yahwism, Weber refers to economic factors not as the products of religious belief but as "co-determining" factors in the historical development of that particular cult. Camic erroneously cites every mention Weber makes of economic behavior in pre-exilic Israel as if Weber were demonstrating the causal force of religious belief on such behavior in each case. I stick to my claim (which Camic rejects) that this was not at all Weber's interest in his discussion of this topic. Third, in his analysis of post-exilic Judaism, Weber did refer to the dualistic economic ethic of the Jews but not as the main focus of his investigation. Rather, he was concerned with the origin and operation of the process of ritualistic self-segregation which set the Jews apart and which underlay their double-standard economic morality toward insiders and outsiders. In this part of the study, in other words, the economic ethic of Judaism was a subsidiary rather than a principal aspect of his interest.

Fourth, the aim of *Ancient Judaism* was to examine the historical origins of the unique existence of the Jews as a stateless people, held together by a ritualistic segregation which was based on a unique religious promise and which brought them a widespread odium among the peoples among whom they were dispersed. In *Ancient Judaism* Weber asks: What was the Judaic religious promise, how did it come into existence in Israel, how was it transformed into an effective basis for communal solidarity in the exile, and how did it lead to the widespread antipathy which the Jews experienced from outsiders after they emerged as a self-segregated people? The wider purpose of this investigation was to contribute, first, to the historical analysis of the origins of Christian and Islamic civilizations and, very much second, to the debate on the role of the Jews in the European economy, both contemporary and historical. However, while these purposes provide the overall intellectual motivation behind the analysis conducted in *Ancient Judaism*, they do not constitute the main themes of that study.

Viewed in this way, the substance of *Ancient Judaism* differs greatly from that of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, and I cannot see how one could pick out the economic ethic of religion as the

dominant and unifying theme in both. Weber may indeed have developed many new ideas on the economic ethics of Judaism or Protestantism in the course of writing *Ancient Judaism*, but this is not to say, as Camic says, that such ideas were therefore the main themes of that work.

Finally, I turn to Camic's concluding point about "traditionalism" as an underlying theme in all of Weber's considerations of Judaism. As a handy summation of Weber's central concern on this topic, it is but one among many (offhand I can think of "charisma," "prophecy," "rationalization," "religious breakthrough" as plausible alternatives), and I doubt that it will have any greater value than the others.

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A COMMENT ON "THE STANDARDIZATION OF TIME" BY ZERUBAVEL

In "The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective" (*AJS* 88 [July 1982]: 1-23), Eviatar Zerubavel discusses several time-reckoning frameworks, in particular, the standard-time zone system now used almost universally. Unfortunately, there are many technical misunderstandings in the article. When these are coupled with the article's secondary sources—a number of which are in error—they lead to incorrect conclusions regarding time systems, the processes associated with the adoption of specific time frameworks, and those concerned with "the dissociation of standard time from nature" (p. 1).

The author begins by stating that clocks in use before 1780 gave a time that was "quite different from the time clocks show today," and "clock time was a direct reflection of solar time" (p. 5). This is a confusion of two different concepts. One of these is apparent solar time—the time given by sundials—which is sometimes called true solar time (Bartky 1934, p. 32). The other is mean solar time—the uniform time always given by clocks—which is based on a "fictitious" sun that moves uniformly across the sky. Noon by the clock can lead and lag behind the actual sun's meridional crossing by as much as 16 minutes—certainly not a "direct reflection of solar time" (p. 5). A construct, the Equation of Time, displays the calculated daily difference between time from a sundial and time from a clock. In 1683, the famous English clockmaker Thomas Tompion published one such construct, giving these differences in minutes and seconds (Symonds 1951, p. 75). The date, 1780, is simply the year

when Geneva altered the public's time from apparent time to mean solar time (Howse, 1980, p. 82).

The author discusses local time, writing that "there was a plurality of local times which were not coordinated with one another" (p. 5). This statement is not the case: local time is the mean solar time along a locale's meridian and differs among localities in a uniform, systematic way around the globe. The system of local times continues to this day as the basis for determining one's land, sea, or air position on the globe, and the essence of standard time is 24 local times spaced precisely one hour apart around the globe.

Throughout the article, the author uses "actual solar time" when he should be indicating "mean solar time." This general misunderstanding of time systems culminates with the statement that "the introduction of supralocal standards of time [i.e., standard-time zone system] mark[s] a most significant point . . . , the transition from a naturally based manner of time reckoning to a socially based one. Since we no longer set our clocks by the sun, the time they indicate is no longer derived directly from nature" (p. 19).

Other errors of fact and interpretation in the article include the following:

1. The author mentions the British mail-coach service of 1784, stating that "the numerous local times *had* to be coordinated . . ." (p. 6). He neglects to include the fact that the mail guard's timepiece was regulated, to gain or lose so as to reflect the local time of the town at the end of the route (Smith 1976, p. 220; Howse 1980, p. 83). Thus we have a case of accommodation, not one of "coordination." Uniform time was not used until six decades later.

2. "Each [railroad] company . . . [used] one standard of time . . ." (p. 8). In 1879, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was using two; the New York Central, two; the Chicago and Northwestern, two; and so on. Rather than being in the chaos suggested by those who advocated uniformity at the time and all writers afterward, the North American railway time system can be viewed as comprising several, sectional time regions: of the 316 railroads using 49 different times, two-thirds were encompassed by the times of eight cities (*Travelers' Official Railway Guide to the United States and Canada* 1883).

3. Contrary to what Zerubavel writes (p. 10), the General Time Convention was a voluntary group, and its secretary was not authorized to put a plan in effect in 1881. In 1883, four standards were not imposed on the railroads—the process was one of negotiation and was completed on January 1, 1887.

4. The railroads did not "delegate the authority for making such decisions to any single governmental agency" in order to resolve conflicts at time-zone boundaries (p. 10). Instead, the federal government needed

a base system from which to advance clocks for daylight-saving time. The federal time zones were entirely different from the railway "zones" and superseded them. The specialized time needs of the railroads were handled by a system of "operating exceptions."

5. The petition to Congress to hold an international meridian conference was not from "American geographical and meteorological societies" (p. 12) but from the American Metrological Society, 1873-94. This society is of extreme importance in the adoption of standard time in the United States, publishing over 200 pages on the subject in its journal. The focus of the International Meridian Conference itself is quite different from that given by the author (pp. 14-15): The discussions on the universal day were the consequential ones after the selection of a prime meridian, and the time-zone issues were of almost no importance to this group that was continuing a decade-long international effort (Smith 1976, p. 226; Howse 1980, pp. 144-51; U.S. Congress 1884).

6. The issue of daylight-saving time is not one of "clock times . . . at which people must get up in the morning" (p. 18). Rather, it is that people rise at their same clock times, and daylight-saving time can mean that it is dark outside during the morning's first activities (Bartky and Harrison 1979, p. 43). Also, we would not expect much international coordination or world uniformity (p. 17) in this area because there is no use for daylight-saving time near the equator, and Southern Hemispheric use is necessarily out of synchrony with Northern Hemispheric use.

7. Statements and activities of many federal government officials and others show that the possibility of adopting a single standard of time for the United States was indeed considered (Langley 1869, p. 5; 1872, p. 386; 1874, p. 272; *Railroad Gazette* 1870; Abbe 1875, 1879, 1881; U.S. Naval Observatory 1882; U.S. Congress 1882). The author's conclusion, based on his statement that at no time has the United States ever seriously considered such a possibility, is therefore weak (p. 21).

Here, I would like to comment on two out of a number of other conclusions.

First, the author suggests that expansion of telegraphy would have brought about standardization of time had the railroads not done so (pp. 7-8). In sharp contrast with Great Britain, neither of these factors led to uniform time in the United States. From its very beginnings, telegraphy had been exploited in this country for longitude determinations (a prime use for accurate time indexed to one location), and the Civil War had led to an enormous increase in the use of telegraphy. Thus any difficulties arising from the use of a nonuniform time system in telegraphic operations would have been noted. The timetable era of railroad safety—which conceivably might have driven uniformity efforts—was over by 1855 when the railroads began adopting telegraphy (Shaw 1978, pp. 33, 118-

20). By 1869, when Charles F. Dowd proposed the first uniform time system (p. 9), everything was prepared for its adoption. Four years later his proposal—which was for *two* times everywhere—was rejected by the railroads, and it was not until 1883 that a zone system of uniform time was adopted.

There are many reasons why the system was adopted when it was (Bartky 1983, 1984); why it was not adopted earlier is probably rooted in geography. The United States can be viewed as a set of regions partially separated by mountains and rivers. When each railroad region keeps the same time, there is no real need for greater uniformity. Scheduling at the terminals, even when railroads use different operations times, is not really the safety problem suggested in the article, because 10-minute changes were ignored when Standard Railway Time was finally adopted (Allen 1883*a*). Nor could there really have ever been a problem of trains scheduled “to arrive only after the connecting train had . . . left” (p. 9), because schedulers are not fools, and any error of this sort would have been detected at once (Haines 1919, pp. 384–86, 641). Dowd’s proposal was not useful to the railroads, which had already adopted regional times for their operations, and had a mechanism for examining connections at the boundaries of these regions: their General Time Convention meetings. Dowd’s plan was actually for the convenience of some fraction of railway travelers, not for that of railway operations. Thus, Zerubavel’s description of the North American adoption process as being driven primarily by railroad needs is not correct.

A second major point is that the author does not seem to realize that the Standard Railway Time proposal was presented in terms of modest differences from the local times (mean solar times) of the public’s experience. Allen (1883*b*) stated frequently that the differences would “not in any case . . . exceed about thirty minutes.” With adoption, the actual differences ranged from –32 to 38 minutes in the Eastern zone and –45 to 66 minutes in the Central zone. The opposition to Railway Time in the 1880s and after, in cities like Detroit, Indianapolis, Savannah, and Bangor, is correlated directly with these large differences, which are manifest as shifts in sunrise and sunset times. The conclusion I would draw from the hundred years of turbulence regarding standard time and daylight-saving time is that any “rational” system designed for the public must be sensitive to natural effects (Bartky 1981, pp. 24–26). A U.S. Naval Observatory statement (1945, p. 12) is apt: “Since practical life is so largely regulated by daylight and darkness, it is desirable to have a system of time-keeping which conforms more or less closely to the daily course of the Sun.”

Large differences between time systems—local time and standard time,

standard time and daylight-saving time—have always generated controversy, for people appear to want a system of time reckoning that remains close to nature. Thus, Zerubavel's theme—"the dissociation of standard time from nature"—does not appear tenable.

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REPLY TO BARTKY

I would like to use this opportunity to thank Ian R. Bartky for his comment on my article on the standardization of temporal reference. While I appreciate and accept some of his corrections, I see no point in debating with him over others, as they do not seem actually to challenge the basic *sociological* thrust of the article. I believe that these relatively minor technical and historical aspects of the general process of the standardization of temporal reference have little, if any, significance for sociologists.

EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL

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Review Symposium

American Sociology and Pragmatism: Mead, Chicago Sociology, and Symbolic Interaction. By J. David Lewis and Richard L. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. xx + 356. \$25.00.

ON INTERPRETING AN INTERPRETATION¹

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American Sociology and Pragmatism is an important book, but not for the reasons its authors, their supporters, and their publishers perhaps believe. It purports to shatter a number of sociological myths with counter-arguments including the following: (1) American pragmatism (Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead), contrary to belief, is not a unified philosophical perspective. Instead, there are two clusters of thought—James-Dewey and Peirce-Mead. Any student of the Peirce-James correspondence would sense that for these two pragmatists there was little if any agreement over the meanings of pragmatism (see Kuklick 1977). (2) George Herbert Mead is not after all at the heart of Chicago-style sociology. Students of Thomas, Park, Hughes, Burgess, Blumer, Faris, and Mead would surely have sensed that there were breaches between Mead's thought and Cooley's and that Mead disagreed deeply at times with James. Although the actual participation of Chicago-trained sociologists in Mead's courses was not known before David Lewis and Richard Smith's study, certainly a theoretical affinity with other social psychologists and philosophers besides Mead was common knowledge among most scholars of early Chicago sociology (Stone and Farberman 1980). (3) George H. Mead is a social behaviorist, not a symbolic interactionist. Had Herbert Blumer in 1937 termed the new perspective in social psychology "social behaviorism" and not "symbolic interaction" perhaps the myth of Mead's supremacy would not have grown. That Blumer was drawing from diverse sources in his formulation of the perspective has always been apparent in his published work. To rework Blumer's thought into Mead's social behaviorism does a disservice to both authors and certainly does not further the cause of theoretical development in social psychology.

This book is important not because it shatters myths which are actually of the authors' making but because it will force serious students of social psychology to reread not only William James but also Peirce, Dewey,

¹ This essay was originally prepared for the "Author Meets the Critics" session concerning American sociology and pragmatism, American Sociological Association annual meetings, San Francisco, September 6, 1982.


Royce, Schiller, Bergson, Whitehead, Mead, Cooley, Simmel, Durkheim, Weber, Marx, Wittgenstein, Keynes, Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, Schutz, Freud, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. It should lead to a deepening of social psychology's theoretical roots, beyond Mead and pragmatism. For this reason the text of Lewis and Smith is important. A rereading of the basic texts in pragmatism should serve to clarify the key philosophical implications of this perspective for symbolic interactionists (see Apel 1981). In a sense Lewis and Smith have rendered difficult sources (James, Peirce, James, Mead) more accessible to new readers, and they challenge their own readings of those sources. They have attempted to capture a part of sociology's past through Smith's, Paul Baker's, and Bernard's interviews with sociologists trained at Chicago after 1920 and to make a part of that past available to historians of social theory. They offer a metatheoretical perspective for the study and practice of the history of sociology and social theory. Although many will argue with their formulations (see the reviews of the work by Henrika Kuklick on pp. 1433-40 of this issue of the *AJS* and by Mills [1982]), they have given the discipline another case study which can be debated, built on, and learned from.

These points notwithstanding, I hope the conclusions of the work will not be taken at face value. The interpretations offered by Lewis and Smith are questionable on a number of grounds, including a confusion of the history of sociology with the systematics of social theory (Merton 1968; Jones 1983). Their book is not an essay in intellectual history, and it suffers from the problems of works which attempt to analyze theory systematically while doing history. Furthermore, the work suffers from problems of "presentism" (interpreting past theories from the vantage of the present), and certain violations of the principle of privileged access to authors' intentions are committed (pp. 51, 121). Finally, the work commits certain naive errors in the analysis of the nominalism-idealism-realism issue, and the authors' analyses of their historical and interview data often violate the principles of objective science they appear to hold. An ethnomethodological interpretation of their presentation and analysis of these materials appears to be required.

Criticism

I will take up the foregoing criticisms in reverse order.

1. *Interpretation of historical-interview data.*—The analysis of interview materials is not set by the scientific procedures Lewis and Smith appear to advocate (the methodology of social behaviorism). They admit into their analysis (chap. 9) introspective, subjective recollections and reports of living sociologists from the post-1920 period in Chicago sociology (pp. 232-33, 235, 315, 317). Such reports do not appear to be consistent with their stated methodology. The situated, negotiated, interpretive character of those interviews; the categories employed by those interviewed; the rules of objectification and verification utilized by the sociologists interviewed by Smith; the meanings they gave to their terms;



and Smith's rules of verification and objectification in accepting those reports as evidence of Mead's influence are not given in the text. The interview findings are accepted as social facts, independent of the actions and interpretations that produced them.

The citation analysis of journals and dissertations utilizing Mead, although it offers quantitative indicators, fails to clarify either Mead's influence or the effect of his recognition on the work of Chicago-trained sociologists. The arbitrary grouping of the data into five-year intervals glosses over and blurs the time relationship between influence and recognition (H. Orbach, personal communication, 1982). The quantification of influence and recognition into numerical indicators bypasses the study of the process by which each empirical instance was itself produced. That is, as Blumer (1969, p. 57), Garfinkel (1967), Cicourel (1968, p. 336), and others have indicated, the grouping of instances of "social action in the same class because of their similar appearance as products . . . [of] common causes because of such similarity" ignores the fact that each instance is a "social action . . . [which] has had a career of being formed by its respective actor" (Blumer 1969, p. 57).

Citation analysis objectifies, as social facts, interactional productions, which are not static phenomena. It applies a member's (an archivist's, a sociologist's, Lewis and Smith's) category system to an interpretive process that itself must be interpreted. Citation analysis extracts so-called objective-quantitative facts from a universe of discourse that is constantly being interpreted and constructed. Instead of objectifying social influence and social recognition, citation analysis merely objectifies its user's category system. The study of influence and recognition in scientific communities through citation methods is a relatively fruitless endeavor. Smith and Lewis ignore such problems as the study of how Mead or any other figure enters into the lines of interpretive action of another person, becomes a part of that action, is interpreted by the person, is given meaning by the person in his own fields of experience, or is even recognized as a figure to be recognized. Their methods, procedures, aims, theory—their interpretive procedures—preclude the study of how Mead became a social object in the field of experience of Chicago-trained students during his tenure as an instructor on the Chicago faculty. The interpretive procedures of Smith and Lewis, are, then, worthy of study in their own right. They are, as Garfinkel might say, "a topic of ethnomethodological inquiry." For Smith and Lewis have simply produced an instance of "scientific work" which, by my canons of interpretation, has failed to elucidate and reveal the phenomenon they set out to investigate. How they produced this work and how it came to be produced as a book perhaps deserve separate inquiry. But that is a study of another set of interpretive procedures.

Nor does their analysis of the materials of the Chicago years exemplify Mead's dictum that, to quote Lewis and Smith (p. 133), "a scientific problem consists of an exception to some generalization which links together the objects within the perspective." The study of exceptions to

generalizations sets the basis of scientific inquiry for Mead. The exception or the deviant case illuminates underlying patterns which would not otherwise become apparent. Lewis and Smith do not make use of Mead's suggestions on this critical point, and this is most evident in their rather cryptic analyses of Blumer (pp. 170-79), Karpf (p. 223), Husserl (p. 248), Schutz (p. 248), Garfinkel, and ethnomethodology (p. 248). To an even greater degree this failure to treat the deviant case, or the exception, so as to illuminate universals underlies the application of their metatheoretical perspective to the theories of James and Peirce. This problem is exaggerated because Lewis and Smith begin and end their study with the belief that Mead was not "a progenitor of symbolic interactionism" (p. xix), although they assume that others have believed he was.

2. *Interpretation and application of the metatheoretical framework: nominalism-idealism-realism.*—The application of the metatheoretical framework, which strictly speaking is a philosophical framework, is open to a number of questions. First, the authors fail to establish clearly their usage and meaning of the terms "nominalism" and "realism." At times they refer to realism and nominalism "scholastically defined" (p. 119). On other occasions (pp. 8-9, 115, 119) they refer to sociological realism, philosophical realism, subjective idealism, and nominalism "classically defined" (p. 115). Their use of the nominalist-realist dichotomy waivers and shifts to fit their intentions. While they clearly favor Peirce's views on nominalism and realism and tend to use his meanings of the terms, they often confuse the reader in their use of these pivotal concepts. Nor do they resolve obvious contradictions which arise when James and Dewey use the terms, for by their analysis they intend to classify James and Dewey as nominalists. The searching analysis of Peirce's views on nominalism, realism, and meaning-critical pragmatism that one finds in Apel's (1980) work on Peirce and pragmatism is sorely absent from the Lewis and Smith text. I fear that they flounder in their application of their key metatheoretical perspective.

A second problem arises in their use of the nominalist-realist dichotomy. In many respects they repeat fruitless, even scandalous, philosophical debate regarding yet another proof and discussion of the existence of reality. It is not that Lewis and Smith do not offer an adequate proof for their position (p. 8) but, rather, that they do not address the *underlying ontological* question of "the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and makes requests for the proof" (Heidegger 1962, p. 249). In the case of the human being as conceived by James, Peirce, Dewey, Mead, and Blumer, the proof of reality's existence is rendered meaningless, for in its Being it already "is what subsequent proofs demonstrate for it" (Heidegger 1962, p. 249). The human subject of pragmatism and symbolic interactionism is already present in the world. There is no "worldless subject" or a subject who must confront a brute reality in order to prove reality's existence. The subject is already in the world, part of the world. "The problem of reality in the sense of whether there is an external world

that can be proved is impossible because the entity which serves as its theme repudiates any formulation of the question" (Heidegger 1962, p. 250). The human being buries the external world.

The pursuit of this question by means of various epistemological approaches has not gone very far because of their frequent neglect of an explicit existential analytic of the being of the human subject. While Lewis and Smith (1980, p. 8) raise the problems of social ontology and epistemology, they do not offer an analytic of the human subject in pragmatism, nor do they offer their own analytic of the human subject. Their essay proceeds by assertion, not analysis. Consequently, they offer no philosophical or sociological insight into the realism-nominalism-idealism controversy.

Had they offered such an analysis they might have argued that realism tries to explain reality ontically by "real connections of interaction between things that are Real" (Heidegger 1962, p. 251). They might also have argued that nominalism and idealism have an advantage in principle because they hold that "being cannot be explained through entities," real or otherwise (Heidegger 1962, p. 251). But the nominalist and idealist conceptions of reality are empty because they do not clarify Being ontologically. However, as Heidegger (1962, p. 251) argues, "if idealism emphasizes that Being and Reality are only 'in the consciousness,' this expresses an understanding of the fact that Being cannot be explained through entities." But if idealism (and nominalism) do not clarify the status of the Being of the human subject, then they are "no less naive in . . . method than the most grossly militant realism" (Heidegger 1962, p. 252).

To declare that a theorist is an idealist and subjective, as Lewis and Smith seem to do in their discussions of Dewey (1980, pp. 115-16), James (p. 69), and Blumer (1970-79), can be a very "dexterous partisan stroke in outlawing [the theorist's position], but it is not a real ground of proof. . . . Until the ontology of Dasein is made secure in its fundamental elements, it remains a blind philosophical demagoguery to charge something with the heresy of subjectivism" (Heidegger 1982, p. 167).

3. *Access to an author's intentions.*—It is a basic principle of intellectual history that authors of texts must be permitted to have privileged access to their own intentions. Any attempt to reinterpret an author's intentions must be made with extreme caution, and then only in the face of overwhelming evidence that an author apparently did not intend to write what he wrote (Jones 1983). Lewis and Smith assume on a number of occasions that they have access to the thoughts and intentions of the authors they analyze. When confronted with evidence that an author contradicts himself or makes a statement that does not agree with their own interpretive framework, they correct the author. Statements such as "he [Peirce] surely meant that the purpose of inquiry is to settle the opinion of the scientific community, not the individual inquirer" (p. 51) violate the principle of author intentionality. The unsettling, unfinished portions

of Peirce's texts are molded into a coherent whole by Lewis and Smith so as to forward their interpretation of him as a thoroughgoing realist (but see Apel 1981).

Similarly, when confronted with evidence that Dewey drew from Mead in five chapters of *Experience and Nature*, they suggest that the former "may have been a victim of what Merton (1973, pp. 402–12) calls 'cryptomnesia'—unconsciously asserting as one's own the ideas gained from another person" (p. 121). It is necessary for Lewis and Smith to put a great distance between Dewey and Mead, if their split among the pragmatists is to be maintained.

4. *Presentism*.—Interpreting a body of work from a contemporary understanding of it, and not from within the universe of discourse in which it was written, is a version of "presentism." It involves a rewriting of history to fit current understanding. Lewis and Smith engage in this form of argument on a number of occasions. Late James is used to reinterpret early James; Dewey and Peirce are treated similarly. Recent readings of Mead are applied to earlier readings of Mead (pp. 119, 221–22, 223, 249). Presentism often results in a crass form of historical analysis. It suffers from what Blumer has called the fallacy of objectivism.

A variant of presentism involves the criticism and interpretation of a body of work from a theoretical perspective that is antithetical to the work in question. Blumer is criticized for not being a realist and for distorting Peirce's triadic theory of meaning. (But see his triadic theory of meaning in Blumer 1969.) This form of misplaced intentionality involves criticizing an author for not having written what the critic wanted written.

5. *Establishing the myth*.—A great deal of *American Sociology and Pragmatism* turns on establishing that there is a belief that Mead is (was) the father of symbolic interactionism. Lewis Coser is quoted on page 26 as an authority on this myth and Nicholas Mullins is quoted on page 191 to establish further the myth regarding Mead's place in Chicago sociology. The foundations of the Chicago School myth are weak at best. Perhaps Lewis and Smith's work will serve to solidify further the myth of a school. However, as Peter Mills argues (1982), Chicago-style sociology would never have been produced if the reading of Mead proposed by Lewis and Smith had been adopted. After reading this book, sociologists are left with an extensive body of literature that calls itself Chicago style—interpretive, case study, ethnographic, subjective—but no longer has a name if Lewis and Smith are granted their reading.

6. *Phenomenology*.—The discussion of phenomenology (p. 28, 60, 65), Husserl, Schutz, Garfinkel, and ethnomethodology (pp. 248, 251) is superficial. Distinctions between eidetic, descriptive, existential, and analytic phenomenology are not made. The philosophical foundations of ethnomethodology are clearly misunderstood (e.g., Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty), as is Schutz's project. The suggestion that phenomenological sociology and humanistic sociology are similar and that these

subjective-idealist orientations trace their "roots to such an unlikely source as Edmund Husserl" (pp. 247-48) represents no understanding of these bodies of work. That Lewis and Smith should have returned to Cooley and Ellwood (p. 247) is similarly naive.

Conclusions

The reader of this work is left wanting more. What would a Peirce-Mead sociology (as interpreted by Lewis and Smith) look like? How would a Peirce semiotic fit with Mead's views of language and symbols? Could a Saussurean semiotic be fitted with Mead's theory of the symbol (Stone 1982)? Why have symbolic interactionists not given more attention to the symbolic in symbolic interactionism? How do the traditional etic/emic (Pike 1954), ideographic/nomothetic (Allport 1942) distinctions in the social and psychological sciences fit into the nominalist-realist framework of Lewis and Smith? Why were these distinctions not utilized by the authors?

Finally, what pragmatic difference does this study make? Let us hope it will promote a rereading of the pragmatist literature and a renewal of social theory within symbolic interactionism and interpretive sociology. Perhaps these developments will lead sociologists to understand at last the word "pragmatic" and the philosophical tradition termed "pragmatism" in American sociology and philosophy. Unfortunately, Lewis and Smith fail to provide me, at least, with such an understanding.

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THE ECOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGY¹

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Scholarly etiquette demands that, as a book reviewer, I refrain from criticizing authors for failing to write the book I would have written on their topic; instead, I should evaluate authors' success in solving the problems they set for themselves. J. David Lewis and Richard L. Smith's *Chicago Sociology and Pragmatism* defies such judicious consideration, for it is not a conceptually and methodologically integrated work but two discrete essays, each originally a doctoral dissertation. Both Lewis and Smith seek to prove false a common account of sociology's history according to which, from 1894 to 1931, while George Herbert Mead taught in the philosophy department of the University of Chicago, he significantly influenced Chicago sociologists, especially the symbolic interactionists among them. Lewis and Smith argue that the authentic philosophic ancestors of symbolic interactionism are William James and John Dewey, whose pragmatism was quite different from that of Mead and Charles Peirce.

The authors' approaches to the history of ideas are incompatible, however. Lewis believes that intellectuals accept philosophical positions on theoretical grounds alone, that they are unaffected by such social factors as the opinions of their scholarly colleagues or the pressures they feel as citizens. In contrast, Smith assumes that personal contact is crucial to the transmission of ideas and that his quantitative data show that Mead could have had little impact on the Chicago sociological community because he was not an integrated member of it: the majority of students in the sociology department between 1894 and 1931 did not study with Mead; sociologists trained at Chicago during Mead's era who responded to Smith's questionnaire, as well as those who recorded their professional memories for James Carey and L. L. Bernard, recalled little personal contact with Mead; and Mead was not much cited in Chicago sociology dissertations.

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Since the authors have not reconciled the two parts of their book, if we are to find any merit in it, we must consider its two parts separately.

Lewis argues that two schools of pragmatist philosophy can be defined through the use of "metatheoretical categories that are applicable trans-historically" such as "holism/individualism, objectivism/subjectivism, materialism/idealism, and nominalism/realism" (p. 7). He classifies James and Dewey as "social nominalists," psychological reductionists who believed social relationships to be the sum products of biologically based individual actions; Peirce and Mead are labeled "social realists," philosophers who saw mind as the product of socialization and social relations as emergent properties of group interactions. The pragmatists as a group anticipated the behaviorist critique of introspectionist psychology: they agreed that observation of behavior was essential to scientific generalization but did not conclude that psychology could not study human consciousness. Pragmatists differed in their explanations of the origin of consciousness and its consequence—the propensity for innovation. For nominalists, the roots of innovation lay in individual biology: organisms with the capacity to adapt would be favored in evolutionary selection. For realists, adaptive capacity was a function of socialization, and the most creative individuals were those who had become critical of social conventions after learning to behave appropriately in a wide range of social groups.

Lewis's distinction between varieties of pragmatism is plausible only if one interprets turn-of-the-century thought in anachronistic, "presentist" terms. For the pragmatists, biological inheritance and cultural conditioning were *interdependent* components of human behavior. They were all evolutionary naturalists, who described social advance as a consequence of humans' increasing capacity to reason logically in order to manipulate the social and material environment. For most of them, as for their sociologist contemporaries, evolution was explicable in Lamarckist terms—as a product of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. (For a discussion of Lamarckism in American social science, see Stocking [1968].) The loss of conceptual specificity that their theories sustained in translation into a program for sociological analysis makes their differences of opinion irrelevant to the historian of sociology, however much interest they may hold for the historian of philosophy. They all stressed that both individual self-consciousness and social relationships were malleable, their transformations joined in an interactive process; sociologists who shared their premises saw their task as *historical* analysis of this interactive process.

Smith recognizes that his quantitative indicators may be inadequate measures of intellectual influence yet suspends his reservations about his methodology. If we follow his example, we will nevertheless find many of his calculations irrelevant to his argument. The historian of sociology will learn little from Smith's analyses of the disciplinary affiliations of the members of Mead's graduate student audience. He shows, for example,

that sociologists constituted only 13.2% of the students Mead taught between 1894 and 1931, whereas philosophers constituted 37.2% of this group. Such comparisons might be useful if Smith were trying to establish that Mead had a greater impact on philosophy than sociology; the very improbability that any historian of philosophy would seriously entertain this proposition suggests that Smith's approach to the history of ideas is problematic. Furthermore, because Mead did not have the sort of specialized career characteristic of a later generation of elite academics, it makes no sense to treat his diversified course offerings as a set of minor variations on a single theme, which different disciplines appreciated in unequal measure. Certainly, Mead's theoretical framework integrated his interests, but the substantive bases of his courses made them differentially attractive to students in different departments. Sociologists enrolled in 31.5% of his offerings; they were not interested in such subjects as the history of ancient and medieval philosophy or logic but enrolled in Mead's courses in comparative psychology, the logic of the social sciences, development of modern thought, and, especially, social psychology, as Smith's appendixes show. Smith calculates that during the period when Mead taught social psychology, from 1900 to 1931, 71.3% of his students in this field were sociologists. Nevertheless, this finding no more demonstrates Mead's influence on Chicago sociology than the aforementioned figures disprove it.

When Smith approaches his problem directly, taking as the base figure for his calculations the population of sociology graduate students, his data suggest that Mead performed an important service role for the sociology department. He taught a substantial proportion of the department's doctoral students—who were to figure in the development of the profession—and relatively few of the recipients of terminal M.A.'s; 43.3% of those whose Ph.D.'s were conferred between 1894 and 1935 had studied with him, in contrast to 24.4% of those whose M.A.'s were granted in this period. His services were evidently especially useful to the department from the early 1900s through the early 1920s; I calculated that 72.2% of the recipients of Ph.D.'s from 1910 to 1924 had studied with Mead.

Mead's subsequent decline as an instructor of sociology students coincides with the ascendancy of Ellsworth Faris as a teacher of social psychology within the department of sociology. A disciple of Mead's with a Chicago Ph.D. in psychology, Faris joined the department in 1919, becoming its chairman in 1925. Evidently, most students enrolled in social psychology, and after 1919 most were taught by Faris. In all of his courses—not just social psychology—Faris transmitted Mead's ideas. Because Faris was a surrogate for Mead within the sociology department, then, the significance of changed enrollment patterns seems more apparent than real. For as Mead's courses became less attractive to sociology students, citations of his work in their Ph.D. theses rose; though only 23.1% of the recipients of the Ph.D. between 1930 and 1935 had studied with Mead, 28% of them acknowledged his work in their dissertations.

Furthermore, Smith's findings indicate that Mead's ideas were widely circulated among Chicago sociologists, albeit usually indirectly, by members of the faculty. Faris was not the only member of the department to make favorable references to Mead in his courses. Herbert Blumer, whose 1928 dissertation was directed by Faris, also did so, as did Thomas, Vincent, Small, Henderson, Burgess, Park, Wirth, and Ogburn. In addition, most of Smith's informants recall that as graduate students they discussed Mead among themselves. Hence, it seems improbable that formal citations to Mead are an adequate measure of his importance within the Chicago milieu, for his ideas were so widespread that they were taken for granted, requiring no specific attribution. We may take as representative Nels Anderson's statement that he did not seek personal exposure to Mead because he was "getting Mead second-hand enough for my needs" (p. 244).

In the sociological world outside Chicago, Mead's reputation grew throughout his career, especially after 1920, and continued to grow after his death. In Smith's sample of sociological books and monographs published between 1894 and 1935, for example, 27.8% of the works published between 1925 and 1929 cited Mead, and 40% of the works published between 1930 and 1935 did so. Smith acknowledges that Mead's professional recognition continued to increase after this period, following the posthumous publication of his books. Thus Smith's narrative of the diffusion of Mead's ideas departs in no significant way from the discipline's folk tradition of its history. In sum, Smith wishes us to believe that Mead was an insignificant figure in the development of American sociology for two reasons: one, for the most part sociologists were persuaded of the merits of Mead's ideas either by reading his work or learning of it from other sociologists, rather than through personal contact with Mead; two, Mead's reputation was greater after his death than it had been during his lifetime. Neither of these findings has much bearing on the question Lewis and Smith raise: How much were the theory and practice of Chicago sociology either affected by or compatible with Mead's ideas?

The answer to this question may be determined by the simple expedient of reading the works of Chicago sociologists. If we do this, we will find that Lewis and Smith are both wrong and right. They are wrong in their analysis of Chicago sociology during Mead's era. They are right that Mead had no sustained influence on symbolic interactionism, but they are right for the wrong reasons.

Two books stand out as charter formulations of Chicago sociology's research mission during Mead's era: Small and Vincent's *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (1894) and Park and Burgess's *The City* (1925). Both analyze social life in evolutionist terms: qualitative changes in the moral order have attended changing patterns of social organization, brought about primarily by the progressive division of labor. Both describe social life in terms Lewis would be obliged to recognize as "realist": humans' capacity for abstract reasoning is a function of social interaction and

cannot be explained by biological reductionism (e.g., Small and Vincent 1894, p. 89; Park and Burgess 1925, p. 14); individuals' personalities both shape and are shaped by the groups to which they belong (e.g., Small and Vincent 1894, p. 61; Park and Burgess 1925, p. 14); and sociology must take as its elemental units of analysis the groups of which individuals are interdependent parts—neighborhoods, professions, even transient entities such as crowds (e.g., Small and Vincent 1894, p. 61; Park and Burgess 1925, pp. 6–23).

The mandate of these two books was sustained in pre-World War II Chicago empirical research, whether it was the descriptive work Park preferred or the statistical analysis Burgess encouraged. The well-known studies of changing urban settlement patterns described individuals' choices of residences and life-styles as products of collective processes (e.g., Kulklick 1980). Ecological studies permitted holistic analyses of statistical data, far different from the methodologically individualistic surveys of the postwar era; it is of more than parenthetical interest that Burgess may be credited with the development of modern census tract statistics (Bulmer 1981, p. 315). Studies of occupations showed how group processes molded individual character and simultaneously permitted individuals to act creatively within the limitations of their situations. When Chicago sociology came under professional attack in the late 1930s, it was criticized for various reasons; it is particularly significant for the purposes of this review essay, however, that Park's work was faulted as overly deterministic, granting too much importance to the restrictive power of impersonal forces over individual action (Matthews 1977, p. 181). That is, at this time Chicago sociology was criticized because it did not reflect the voluntaristic individualism Lewis falsely attributes to Park's teachers James and Dewey. Thus, if we can accept the work described above as representative of pre-World War II Chicago sociology, we will conclude that it rests on assumptions *compatible* with Mead's, and this conclusion is sufficient for purposes of countering the argument Lewis makes.

I deliberately chose to describe above the work of sociologists usually categorized as the "human ecologists" among the Chicagoans, rather than that of men like Thomas, Ellwood, and Faris, who are claimed as intellectual ancestors of symbolic interactionism. For these two branches of Chicago sociology are divisible only in retrospect. I do not mean to suggest that there were no differences of opinion among the Chicago faculty or that the Chicago analytical approach was unmodified during the course of 40 years. But the historian can convey the peculiarities of pre-World War II Chicago sociology only by identifying its unifying themes. Viewed in this context, postwar symbolic interactionism is but a desiccated remnant salvaged from the earlier tradition. No longer grounded in the evolutionary theory that joined the various aspects of Chicago research, it became microsociological analysis unrelated to macrosociological generalization. The recent interactionist approach, developed most notably initially by Herbert Blumer and latterly by Erving Goffman, treats social

actors as wholly autonomous individuals, acting strategically to achieve their personal ends; actors are not assumed to be serving any larger social needs, whether these be the advance of cultural evolution or the maintenance of the established order. When interactionists purged their work of the evolutionist taint, they necessarily also eschewed any sort of determinist account of individuals' motives, whether biological, psychological, or sociological. Thus, recent interactionism does not fit into *either* of Lewis's categories of "social nominalism" or "social realism."

Hence, there is a legitimate point to Smith's argument that he did not intend: Mead's posthumous recognition does not reflect his lasting influence, for his writings have been and are still invoked by sociologists whose perception of his ideas is selective, who interpret them in contemporary interactionist terms (e.g., Maines, Sugrue, and Katovich, 1983). Lewis and Smith's work is obviously of this genre. I do not want to suggest that sociologists cannot profit from the "presentist" reading of past works, for it is evident that a rediscovery of forgotten issues can inspire significant research. Nevertheless, we must recognize that we do not—and possibly do not wish to—recapture past ideas entire. Recently, some theorists have urged the adoption of a reconstructed social evolutionism; they argue that the conception of the actor as a conscious, purposive being can thus be justified in naturalistic terms, for human survival depends on the proliferation of new forms of social organization and modes of thought, some of which will be favored in evolutionary selection. This explanation of the interdependence of human biological and cultural nature is clearly more attractive than the sociobiologists' simplistic scheme, and it owes much to the evolutionary naturalism of thinkers like Dewey and Mead (Toulmin 1981, pp. 31–32). Only if sociologists return to such an evolutionist approach, however, will we be able to make full use of Mead's theories in our work. I leave in abeyance any judgment of the desirability of such an outcome.

How could Lewis and Smith have failed to pay sufficient attention to the evolutionist context of Mead's ideas? They would have recognized it had they appreciated his view of the practical implications of his thought. For Mead was a committed social reformer, convinced that scientific investigation would be instrumental in the realization of man's potential to achieve higher levels of social evolution. I have not the space here to detail Mead's reformist activities in the causes of public education, labor relations, immigrants' rights, and state constitutional reform (see Diner 1980, pp. 86–100, 124–30, 148–50, 160). Still, it is worth quoting at length Mead's description of the role of the university in society, published in 1915, for it shows that a unified theory joined together his activities as a social reformer and as an academic who wrote about both social problems and philosophic issues. The ideal society was not a technocratic dictatorship, managed by university based and trained experts. Rather, the university "is a part of the community within which the community problems appear as its own. It is the community organized to find out

what culture is as well as to give it; to determine what is proper professional training as well as to inculcate it; to find out what is right and what is wrong as well as to teach them; to state and formulate research problems as well as to solve them; in general to fix from moment to moment the changing meaning of life and the fitting tools for appropriating it" (quoted in Diner 1980, p. 29).

I am not the first to point out that we cannot read the works of our intellectual ancestors as if they had been written by our contemporaries, that our reading must be informed by a consciousness of the historical character of their ideas. Nevertheless, the virtues of historically grounded, "contextualist" analysis do not seem self-evident to many who would practice the history of sociology, Lewis and Smith among them, so that one must counter the objections to it. Certainly, we find our forebears' works provocative because they treat issues that matter to us today, seemingly transcending the conventional wisdom of their historical moments (e.g., Gerstein 1983). But we cannot repudiate contextualist analysis on these grounds. Even if the social thinkers we deem most profound did indeed overcome the biases of their contemporaries, we can only identify the ways in which they did so by distinguishing the typical and exceptional aspects of their thought. When we are analyzing scholars who were addressing then-current practical issues, we are obliged to treat the relationship between their ideas and behavior. We cannot treat Mead's ideas in the abstract, avoiding consideration of his civic activities; like many of his contemporaries among social scientists and philosophers, he saw his intellectual and public roles as inextricable. Several recent books exemplify the approach one wishes Lewis and Smith had taken. Rosalind Rosenberg's *Beyond Separate Spheres* (1982) locates late 19th- and early 20th-century feminist scholarship in the context of controversies over women's rights. John Burrow's *A Liberal Descent* (1981) shows the British Victorian "Whig" tradition of historical interpretation to be the product of an era of debate about and reform of the British constitution. John Allett's *New Liberalism* (1981) interprets the political economy of J. A. Hobson as a brief for an enlarged definition of the British state's obligations to protect the welfare of its citizens. Let us have more books like these.

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Book Reviews

The Individual and the Social Self: Unpublished Work of George Herbert Mead. Edited by David L. Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. viii+229. \$12.95 (paper).

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All contemporary sociological theorists should be as well remembered posthumously as Mead. About 40 years after *Mind, Self and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934) and *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), taken largely from students' classroom notes, and *The Philosophy of the Act* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938) and *The Philosophy of the Present* (Chicago: Open Court, 1932), from Mead's own notes and papers, several more collections of Mead's published papers have appeared. Now David L. Miller, a philosopher and recognized Meadian scholar, has published Mead's 1914 and 1927 classroom lectures on social psychology plus one unpublished paper in *The Individual and the Social Self*. The 1927 lectures actually formed the basis for Charles Morris's piecing together, along with some segments of the 1930 lectures and bits of other years' notes, of *Mind, Self and Society*. Anyone who has had the opportunity to study the sets of class notes housed at the University of Chicago library where there is a fairly extensive Mead collection (or has studied photocopies at the Archives, University of Constance) will have noted that Morris's book does not read entirely true to the actual flow of the lecture notes. (Morris also probably did some rewording, as well as writing connective tissue in the volume.) A reader of the Mead collections will have also been intrigued by the development in his thinking about social psychology over the 20-year span. My own recollection is that an even earlier set of student notes (1908) exists but that the 1914 ones are substantially the same; presumably the latter were chosen by Miller because they were either more complete or seemed more reliable.

Miller states clearly that the student's 1914 notes "were not in good shape," so he himself did "extensive editing in punctuation . . . also inserted words to make grammatically correct and clear sentences. In no case have I changed what I strongly believe was the actual intention and original meaning of what Mead said" (p. 1). He also furnished subtitles for this edition (as did Morris for his) and "changed the word order in several places." This editing makes reading easier, but, alas, anyone really wishing to get close to the original Mead has no option but to visit either the Chicago or the Constance collection. The 1927 notes were in

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better shape, so only subtitles were added. The paper titled "Consciousness, Mind, the Self, and Scientific Objects" was, Miller estimates (p. 2), written around 1917 "prior to the influence of Whitehead's writings. It is a profound article involving problems in epistemology and metaphysics. His chief aim is to offer a philosophical justification for his theory of mind, self, and reflective intelligence"—one which, in the tradition of pragmatism, carefully avoids the usual dualism of mind and body, a problem to which he addressed himself so successfully in much of his writing. To my disappointment, Miller chose not to reprint the fascinating set of notes on Mead's course on Dewey, given, I think, in the early 1920s. There we see Mead filling in gaps in Dewey's thought and beginning to come to grips with Whitehead, an enterprise spelled out so painstakingly in *The Philosophy of the Act* and *The Philosophy of the Present*. Rather than reprint these valuable lectures, Miller elected to reproduce two essays, given to him in 1963 by the late John Brewster. Miller judges these were written about 1925 and suggests they may have been written by W. I. Thomas or E. Faris or A. W. Moore. "They are concerned with a very important problem and I think they are among the finest ever written about Mead" (p. 2). I doubt that they are by Faris and doubt even more that they are by Thomas, whose style and thinking were distinctly different from Mead's. Although they are historically interesting they could have been published in a journal. Even the inclusion of excerpts from Mead's lectures on Hegel, Hume, or Bergson would have had more value to Meadian scholars or to his devotees among the sociologists.

Rereading the 1914 notes was an especially interesting experience. They begin: "We approach this subject of social psychology from the point of view of the psychology of perception. The social object is the self. What are the conditions under which we perceive selves?" (p. 27). Mead next assigns the students materials on perception written by psychologists but signals that "this treatment deals with physical objects rather than social." We recollect that Herbert Spencer was still an influential figure on the American scene at this time, not only for people like Sumner but also for Mead. Dewey is also there: Mead is drawing on the important reflex-arc paper and later on writings about emotions. Mead is already also using Wundt's writing on communication and the gesture and using in addition Darwin's expression of emotions, in referring to those celebrated dogs that everyone remembers from *Mind, Self and Society*. Mead is already evolving his own treatment of the act, of the development of language, of consciousness and self-consciousness, and of the crucial problem of the self's development. For the last problem, we see him drawing on Cooley's views but differing sharply from them, as in his later appreciative but critical article on Cooley. And we see Mead grappling with one of his central issues, that of social control. Thus, the Meadian social psychology is under way. Close to half of the 1914 notes are devoted to the kinds of materials included in the "society" section of *Mind, Self and Society* that tend to get overlooked by sociological readers, although really to understand Mead's thinking and where his social psychology fits

in it, one needs to consider these materials. Of course, the 1927 notes will seem familiar. They reflect Mead's attack on behaviorism, the treatment of additional topics, and the working out of central concepts and themes.

Despite the few strictures I have made regarding Miller's editing and inclusions, he is to be commended for arranging the publication of these valuable items and for his useful introduction to them. Also, he has located a number of publications by people referred to by Mead, a chore for which many readers will thank him. The book is, as is usual with publications of the University of Chicago Press, well printed and well bound. There is an index of major topics and authors cited that includes Whitehead, but not Thomas or Park or Faris—a reminder that Mead was a philosopher and in no way a sociologist, even though sociology students took his courses and took him into their disciplinary hearts, much like later generations of sociologists.

Max Weber. By Frank Parkin. Chichester, London: Ellis Harwood and Tavistock Publications, 1982. Pp. 123. \$3.95 (paper).

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Thomas Hardy once said of the literary critic Leslie Stephen that "his approval was disapproval minimized." In *Max Weber*, Frank Parkin seems to emulate Stephen. Although this slender volume appears in a series "aimed primarily at the undergraduate . . . and others who are interested in the main ideas of sociology's major thinkers," its approach is so sharply critical of its subject that one may wonder if readers whose first meeting with Max Weber is in these pages may not ask whether an author whose work is so deeply flawed is worth bothering with at all. Not that Parkin should not criticize Weber after he has presented Weber's thought fully and fairly. But in these pages he does justice neither to himself nor to Weber in letting his criticism overshadow an adequate exposition of Weber's thought.

To be sure, Parkin is reacting against the cloying piety that has marked much recent writing on Weber, but, here, he has gone much too far in the opposite direction. Almost nothing that Weber wrote passes muster in these pages. As a result, the beginning student will receive no sense of the overall vision and import of Weber's sociology but will be left with a painstaking record of what he allegedly failed to do or did badly.

While some of Parkin's critical comments are well taken, others come close to mere carping, and still others are simply wrongheaded. Parkin is right, for example, in pointing out that Weber, who, in his other writings on the sociology of religion was always aware that the reception of religious messages depends largely on the class position of actual or potential audiences, does not deal with this in his *Protestant Ethic*, thus leaving the

erroneous impression that the various class strata reacted to Calvin's message in similar ways.

In contrast, Parkin's treatment of Weber's ideal types is largely ill conceived. He does not seem to have grasped Weber's analytical and methodological strategy. How else is one to understand his complaint that Weber's ideal-typical presentation of the structure of bureaucratic arrangements is flawed because it neglects informal relationships and "personal motives, meanings and perceptions" (p. 36)? Weber, aware that his ideal-typical constructions could not possibly reproduce empirical reality, meant them to abstract from it in order to present a constructed analytical type whose "function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergencies or similarities" (Weber as quoted by Parkin, p. 30). To complain that ideal types do not take into account the fullness of empirical reality is to misunderstand what Weber was doing in developing such types for use as measuring rods in the study of empirical phenomena. When Parkin complains that "Weber offers no illustration of this pure type of action" (p. 37), he shows that he does not understand that ideal types are supposed to be intellectual constructs which surely cannot be illustrated by empirical examples.

At times, Parkin seems embarrassingly simpleminded, especially when it comes to issues in the philosophy of science. He writes that to Weber, "because social facts only existed by virtue of the concepts employed to define and organize them, we could in effect bring new facts into being and dispose of others simply by altering our conceptual frame of reference. Entities like social classes, for example, could be abolished at a simple conceptual stroke. Now you see them, now you don't" (p. 31). Here Weber stands accused of not having been a dogmatic logical positivist. But in this respect Weber's approach is closer to the more sophisticated postpositivist positions in the philosophy of science. These days, you hardly need to be a Wittgensteinian, a Kuhnian, or a follower of Feyerabend to realize that facts are always, and inevitably, soaked with theory. Most modern philosophers of science, regardless of their particular stance, still build on Kant's question, How are empirical observations explained in terms of logically structured conceptual systems? Percepts without concepts do not contribute to scientific understanding. Or, as Stephen Toulmin, a leading philosopher of science, put it in his *Human Understanding* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), "Nature has no language in which she can speak to us on her behalf, and it is up to us, as scientists, to frame concepts in which we can 'make something' out of our experience of nature" (p. 246). What is true of nature is also true of society. One can only conclude that Weber's approach was much more sophisticated than Parkin's.

What one misses in Parkin's book is a sense of awe and wonderment at what Weber accomplished even under the most trying personal circumstances. Instead of conveying to the reader an overall sense of Weber's stupendous achievements, he seems bent on minimizing what Weber did while irritatingly highlighting what he failed to do. Parkin even neglects

to point out that Weber's magnum opus, *Economy and Society*, remained only a torso because of its author's untimely death.

I find it tedious and unnecessary to give further illustrations of Parkin's largely misdirected arrows against the genius of Max Weber. Weber's work will survive assaults by a whole battery of Oxford dons. But I cannot forgo quoting one last sentence from Parkin: "Once again, Weber shows how ludicrous he regards the notion that men's [*sic*] actions could be inspired by anything so intangible as values and ideas" (p. 106). As the Duke of Wellington once remarked on an entirely different occasion, "If you can believe that, you can believe anything."

Politics, Character, and Culture: Perspectives from Hans Gerth. Edited by Joseph Bensman, Arthur J. Vidich, and Nobuko Gerth. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xiv+290. \$35.00.

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Politics, Character, and Culture offers a written measure of a person who must have been an extraordinary teacher. At the time of his death on December 29, 1978, Hans Gerth left about 2,000 pages of unpublished manuscripts written throughout his 50-year career. Gerth's widow and colleague, Nobuko Gerth, and two former and now distinguished students, Joseph Bensman and Arthur J. Vidich, have selected, from among these manuscripts, 10 essays that they believe make contributions to sociology beyond those in Gerth's better known publications. To these 10, they have added four previously published but lesser known essays and a transcription of a radio interview in which Gerth reflected on his life. Vidich and Bensman have bracketed these works with introductory and concluding essays evaluating Gerth's career. Gerth's essays hold up well, showing him to be a passionate, brilliant expositor of Weberian sociology. The essays by Vidich and Bensman are less worthy and hamper as much as they help the reader's understanding and appreciation of Gerth's contributions.

In their essays Vidich and Bensman do little to illuminate Gerth's career or to evaluate his writings. Instead these two essays seem to consist of an elaborate apology for the fact that Gerth's ideas were largely unknown to anyone except his students and friends. Most sociologists know Gerth as a translator of Max Weber's sociology (e.g., *From Max Weber, The Religion of China, Ancient Judaism, and The Religion of India*) and as the coauthor of the important and much neglected work on sociological psychology, *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions*. Except for the edition on China, Gerth translated and edited these books with the assistance of his two most famous students, C. Wright Mills and Don Martindale. The rest of his previous works, including a number of essays and several more translations, are less well

known and have not been particularly influential.

Despite the record, Vidich and Bensman want Gerth's contribution to go beyond his excellence as a teacher. To accomplish this, Vidich's introductory essay tells too little, and Bensman's concluding essay tells too much. Missing from the introduction are the details of Gerth's career that help to explain his intellectual choices, such as his early work on a German newspaper that Gerth called the "personal property of Dr. Goebbels" (p. 24), his escape from Nazi Germany, the repudiation by German intellectuals in America, the hardships in finding his first American job, and the intellectual isolation he felt throughout much of his scholarly life. Gerth hints at these and other aspects of his life in the transcribed radio interview, but Vidich does not discuss them in his assessment of Gerth's exile in America. Nor does he discuss Gerth's relations with his students, especially Mills and Martindale. Bensman's essay, "Hans Gerth's Contribution to American Sociology," analyzes Weber's sociology more than Gerth's, distinguishes minute and largely illusive differences between the two, and exaggerates and belabors Gerth's original theoretical contributions.

But the importance of this book, and the reason it should be studied carefully, lies in Gerth's essays themselves. Through these writings one understands that Gerth's real influence on American sociology was as a teacher. After reading these essays, one senses the students' deep gratitude to a teacher who, by his example, taught them how to read and to appreciate the world in less parochial ways. Except in one essay, Gerth did not base these writings on primary sources and did not attempt to explore untracked territory. He worked with the familiar. For instance, in a piece written for classroom distribution entitled "Appearance Values," he contrasted uniforms, costumes, and changing styles of fashion and showed with unusual insight the assumptions and patterns of stratification that underlie each manner of dress. The other essays follow a similar format: Gerth addresses topics that are close at hand or seem well understood, and through a comparative, historical analysis he shows the complexity in the simple and the confusion in the readily grasped. In these pages, he takes on, among other topics, German propaganda (in the late 1930s), the managerial revolution (in 1942), modern intellectuals (in 1956), world communism (in 1961), the reception of Max Weber in American sociology (in 1963), and the student rebellion (in 1966). Gerth achieves such clarity in his prose and such scope in his analysis that one realizes how obscure the familiar really is, and one learns as well the excitement of grasping a larger view. If these uncompromising essays are evidence of Gerth's teaching, as Vidich and Bensman assure us they are, then surely Gerth must have provided a model for Mills's "sociological imagination."

Despite the range of topics represented here, two themes run through most of the essays; both reveal Gerth's person as well as his intellect. The first theme is that of Weber's sociology. Gerth does not use Weber as an authoritative source or Weber's methods as the appropriate model for

sociological analysis. Gerth is quietly Weberian, but Weberian nonetheless. Weber provides Gerth with the heroic example of unrelenting intellect, of a person who wanted to know everything human and could find solace only in the truth. Gerth adopts this heroic posture in these essays, as he must have done in the classroom.

The second theme is Gerth's deep and passionate commitment to human freedom. Like so many of his generation, Gerth fought a running battle with totalitarianism in Germany, in Russia, in America—wherever it was found and in whatever form. Gerth's message, repeated throughout the book, is best summarized in the concluding passage of his analysis of modern intellectuals: "For intellectuals, the exercise of freedom means to criticize error, to unmask ideologies, to reveal the truth and not to accept fatalistically the naked reality of power that denies the possibility of the exercise of reason. . . . [But] our images of the future do not necessarily have to be the horrible images of George Orwell's 1984. Intellectuals, to keep open the possibility of freedom and reason, must project an image of an ideal social order that embodies both qualities; and they must struggle to attain that ideal" (pp. 188–89). These essays show Gerth to be the teacher we would like to have had and the teacher we would like to be. For this reason, if for no other, this book should be studied.

Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. By Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. xii+308. \$29.50.

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The modern state's vulnerability to the potential strain between elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats has been a pivotal concern of political analysts since Max Weber. The principal contribution of *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* by Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman is to demonstrate once again that important issues such as this are susceptible to survey analysis. This topic need not be the exclusive domain of the political theorist or the historical analyst. One of the great burdens of social science is that this obvious fact requires periodic reiteration. The superior quality of the research under review makes the reassertion simple.

This volume summarizes more than a decade's worth of work sponsored by the University of Michigan and directed by Samuel J. El-dersveld. A complete list of the project's prior publications is included. The data are drawn from interviews conducted between 1970 and 1974 with samples of senior civil servants and members of parliament in the United States, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The main goal was not to contrast these states but to compare bureaucrats and politicians across these systems. However, dif-

ferences among the seven are touched on, notably, how the bureaucrat-politician constellation in the United States differs from those in the other six countries. In some cases, data are not available for all seven states.

The study opens with an outline of the four "images" of the possible divisions of labor between bureaucrats and politicians. These constructs are additive insofar as each step from Image I to IV represents the bureaucratic role's progressive intrusion into what was once thought to be the politician's exclusive domain. Image I is the earliest model and the one the authors find least relevant today. This "simple" view holds that politicians make policy and bureaucrats merely implement it. Image II ("the Weberian model") assumes that bureaucrats and politicians each contribute to policymaking: the former brings neutral expertise and the latter provides responsiveness to key constituencies. "According to Image III," the authors say, "*both* bureaucrats and politicians engage in policymaking, and *both* are concerned with politics. The real distinction between them is this: whereas politicians articulate broad, diffuse interests of unorganized individuals, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organized clienteles" (p. 9). While Image II appeared mainly in writings from the first half of this century, Image III has emerged only in the last several decades. Image IV, however, is not an effort to describe a current dominant style but to discern future master trends. This model, dubbed the "Pure Hybrid," speculates "that the last quarter of this century is witnessing the virtual disappearance of the Weberian distinction between the roles of politician and bureaucrat" (p. 16). Suggestive as Image IV is, the authors acknowledge regretfully that their research is not designed to test the hypotheses it implies. Much of the rest of the book is concerned with weighing the relative merits of Images II and III.

Five data chapters present the study's empirical core. First, we learn that politicians and bureaucrats differ in social origins and career tracks (chap. 3). Both groups are virtually all male and have relatively high-ranking socioeconomic backgrounds, although bureaucrats come from slightly higher, more cosmopolitan ones. More bureaucrats report coming from families with a tradition of government service; politicians more often cite family members who were active in politics. Bureaucrats tend to rise via a "guild system" based on entrance examinations, technical competence, and administrative proficiency; politicians' advancement tends to be "entrepreneurial," involving greater indeterminacy, risk, and reliance on external forces.

The bulk of the data in chapters 4-7 are most congruent with the view implied in Image III of politicians as "energizers" and bureaucrats as "equilibrators." Image II, however, continued to have some relevance, particularly when respondents were asked about what they emphasized in their own jobs. In reporting practice, however, bureaucrats do not seem to describe their jobs as being those of neutral technicians. While politicians stress their roles as advocates for broader causes and less organized constituencies, bureaucrats emphasize mediation among the organized interests affected by their administrative mandates. These differing tasks

yield potentially conflicting approaches to policymaking: "Competence, prudence, and above all, balance are the characteristics of the bureaucrats; few convey the passion, conviction, and even occasional vision of the typical politician" (p. 241).

Examination of political ideologies shows that these differences in style have substantive implications and buttress the case for Image III. Politicians' ideologies are more consistent, more polarized, and more likely to stress innovation. Bureaucratic ideologies are less consistent, more markedly centrist, and more cautious about radical change. The authors suggest that bureaucratic centrism is probably fostered by the moderation of the administrative environment, since bureaucrats' ideologies are less influenced by social origins and political identities than are those of politicians. Despite ideological differences, both groups generally support the principles of representative democracy. (Italian bureaucrats are a notable exception here.) Nevertheless, ideological differences continue to be important, since bureaucrats value liberty and orderly procedures more whereas politicians (particularly leftists) are more attuned to equality and populism.

The final data chapter moves beyond how the respondents describe their roles and ideologies and contrasts wider interaction patterns. Here, again, Image III receives added credence: "... bureaucrats are more at home in the intimate and orderly world of organized interests and departmental hierarchies, whereas the ambience of the politicians is one of popular constituencies and party organization" (p. 243). Thus, although bureaucrats must be political, their contact patterns suggest that they are political in ways different from those of parliamentarians. Moreover, varying institutional arrangements force bureaucrats to differ across states. Where cabinet solidarity, ministerial responsibility, and a party-centered parliament prevail (as in Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden), bureaucrats report fewer contacts with parliamentarians and more frequent ones with ministers. In polities without these institutional patterns (as in the United States, Germany, and Italy), links with parliamentarians are more frequent than links with ministers are. The first model—called Mediated Linkage—reduces the need for bureaucrats to be overtly involved in politics outside of the executive arena. The second model—labeled Direct Linkage—compels them to be so. These two models of linkage are not the book's principal foray into cross-national comparisons; however, the case for American exceptionalism is stressed throughout and is a theme second in emphasis only to the relative merits of Image III. Aberbach et al. summarize:

Institutions and history have pushed American bureaucrats toward more traditionally political roles as advocates, policy entrepreneurs, and even partisans, and have led congressmen to adopt a more technical role. American bureaucrats are more polarized ideologically . . . and therein they resemble politicians more. They are much like congressmen in their conceptualization of policy matters and in the consistency of their partisanship

and ideology. The pattern of bureaucratic legislative contacts is also very special in the United States. We refer to it as the end-run model. . . . Even in their respective social origins, bureaucrats and politicians are less distinct in the United States. . . . [Pp. 243-44]

One might quibble that the volume contains little that is startling or that the "images" discussed in chapter 1 lack theoretical rigor. To focus excessively on either of these points, however, distracts from the empirical breadth and richness of the study. This book offers an unparalleled gold mine of information about the differences and similarities between bureaucrats' and politicians' roles, ideologies, and social networks in Western polities. It is subtle and imaginative in discussing those issues that the survey method can illuminate, yet it is aware of the impact of forces not readily tapped by this method. This very sensitivity may, at times, seem to foster a weakness in the analysis. The authors frequently reach for historical and institutional factors to account for key findings. The resort to structural explanatory variables not included explicitly in the survey often gives the analysis an aura of post factum interpretation. Yet, by acknowledging the possible existence of more macrosociological factors, Aberbach et al. avoid the reductionism that plagues all too many surveys concerned with political issues.

My main reservation about the book is that it presents such a broad array of data that some potentially significant findings have to be given short shrift. On page 226, for example, we learn that among bureaucrats with "policy-centered contacts," those just below top levels are more overtly "political" in style than those at the very top. What does this intriguing finding mean, and what are its implications? Unfortunately, the authors' commendable zeal to give us an inclusive final report prevents them from an in-depth exploration of this datum and other possibly strategic results.

Bureaucratic Failure and Public Expenditure. By William Spangar Peirce. New York: Academic Press, 1981. Pp. xii+319. \$29.50.

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Bureaucratic Failure and Public Expenditure is an oddly disjointed book. Its core is a collection of cases of bureaucratic failure based on studies prepared by the General Accounting Office. On each one, William Spangar Peirce makes sensible comments reflecting his background in economics and his interest in organizational failure. The cases could be a useful assignment for public policy students because they are short, clear, and cover a wide range of topics from housing programs to the regulation of pesticides to vocational education.

The cases are sandwiched between two less satisfactory conceptual

sections. While Peirce is an astute observer of particulars, he has difficulty producing generalizations. Thus the first section of the book includes 75 separate hypotheses with no attempt made to link them together or to show how they might interact. They are all statements that, in general, "failure is more likely if" such-and-such is the case. After presenting the cases, Peirce admits the obvious fact that he cannot test even a subset of his 75 hypotheses. Instead, he concludes the book with several chapters of plausible but essentially random observations which attempt to tie together the case studies and the hypotheses. In these he suggests that previous work has emphasized some factors which proved to be unimportant in his cases while ignoring other aspects which he believes to be central to any understanding of bureaucratic failure. The difficulties he discusses can be separated into (1) characteristics of the legislation, (2) characteristics of the program, (3) characteristics of the agency, and (4) characteristics of the environment. First, laws may be oversimplified and contain inappropriate sanctions and ambiguous goals. They may give inefficient incentives to the private sector or violate civil liberties. Legislation which gives an agency budgetary independence through sales or fees may make hierarchical control difficult. Second, the program may be flawed if it is too difficult technically for bureaucrats to administer, gives extensive independence to field personnel, is conducive to corruption, or requires interagency cooperation. Third, the agency that carries out the program may do it poorly because it is overly deferential to client groups, misunderstands what is expected of it, or is badly run and weakly staffed. Finally, the political environment may lead agencies to spend money too quickly or spread the benefits too thinly. Threats of termination or excessive public expectation may also hamper agency behavior. For each of these problems Peirce presents one or more examples from his case studies. The general impression emerging from this list is that students of bureaucracy ought to place more emphasis on problems of interagency and intergovernmental coordination and on mismatches between agencies and programs and less on problems of poorly defined outputs and technical failures of communication.

Given that bureaucratic failure has multiple sources, however, it is not obvious what Peirce has achieved beyond an exhaustive taxonomy which can serve as a critique of the most simpleminded of previous work. The book should, for example, lay to rest the idea that single, simple goals, such as budget maximization or conflict avoidance, can adequately explain bureaucratic behavior. One would have liked to see something more affirmative, such as an attempt to build a theory that links together agencies, the environment in which they operate, and their legislative mandate. This has not been done, and the 75 distinct hypotheses are not helpful in this regard. His "theory" remains merely a list of difficulties illustrated by some pertinent examples.

Neighborhood Mobilization: Redevelopment and Response. By Jeffrey R. Henig. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Pp. x+283. \$25.00.

Joseph Galaskiewicz
University of Minnesota

Neighborhood Mobilization is an important contribution to the growing literature on community organization and citizen participation. It outlines three theories of community mobilization and systematically evaluates each against six case studies conducted in Chicago and Minneapolis during the 1970s. The analyses are done carefully and objectively. The results are a critique of all three theories and the development of a new hybrid theory of political mobilization which, I believe, has great potential. This book will be on my course reading list next fall. It should be on yours, also.

Jeffrey R. Henig attacks pluralist theory as being naïve and insensitive to the various barriers to mobilization faced by community residents who are challenged by an external threat to their well-being. The failure of communities to mobilize has a rationale and is not because of apathy or laziness. The failure of community groups to wield influence does not come from a lack of leadership or inappropriate strategies.

In an effort to highlight the deficiencies of pluralist theory, Henig reviews "rational-choice" and "radical" theories of collective action. In the former we are reminded of the importance of selective incentives in almost all mobilization efforts. In the latter, we are reminded of the information advantage that elites often have over community residents and the difficulty which residents have in recognizing when their interests are being threatened.

On top of this, he argues that it will be easier in some neighborhoods and cities to overcome these free-rider problems and barriers to information than it will be in others. For example, the stability and homogeneity of a neighborhood, its wealth, preexisting organizational networks, attitudes and strategies of elites, political culture, and dominant ideology, among other factors, can influence the mobilization process. This leads him to conclude that pluralist theory can predict collective action or mobilization only under very special circumstances.

But the real appeal of the monograph is that it engages in a comparative neighborhood study to see if pluralist, rational-choice, or radical theories have any utility in explaining successful or unsuccessful mobilization efforts. Altogether, six case studies of urban redevelopment and community response (or nonresponse) are studied. The Chicago cases include the construction of shopping centers on the sites of the abandoned Municipal Tuberculosis Sanitarium and an old northwest-side brickyard, a new junior college in the Uptown neighborhood, and middle-income housing on the city's near west side. The Minneapolis cases include the

construction of a new K-Mart store in South Minneapolis and the reconstruction of Nicollet Island just outside downtown Minneapolis. Except for the junior-college project, all were examples of "public-private partnerships."

The author recognizes the exploratory nature of the study and offers his findings in a responsible and tentative way. To summarize, he rejects pluralist theory, rational-choice theory, and radical theory in their unidimensional and simplified forms. In their place he suggests that residents will mobilize for collective action when they live in a setting where it is relatively easy to equate individual interests with collective interest (e.g., stable, homogeneous areas). This makes the use of selective incentives less important, and therefore mobilization is less costly. Furthermore, residents are better able to mobilize themselves when specialized institutions (e.g., a network of community organizations) mediate and interpret events in the larger political and economic environment. This ensures that the community can keep tabs on the elite's intentions and thus be able to recognize when its interests are being threatened. The appeal of Henig's efforts is that he does not criticize pluralist, rational-choice, or radical theories on ideological grounds but on the basis of his empirical findings.

Whenever a comparative case study appears on the lists, it is always an easy target for critics. How are cases chosen? How can one possibly partial out spurious effects with only six cases? How can one begin to develop new theory with so little to work with? Do not case studies of community mobilization often reflect only one point of view, that is, the community's? This study could also be criticized because it does not offer a rigorous test of pluralist theory or introduce structural variables not already discussed by sociologists.

Yet this study does an amazingly responsible job of recognizing its shortcomings and plowing onward nonetheless. In my opinion the research design is one to emulate. I sincerely hope that future cases will be selected and documented in such a way as to complement the data gathered here, thus helping to make the study of community organization and citizen participation more cumulative. That is the only way that more realistic theories of collective action will be developed.

I am happy to report that the study of community organization and citizen participation is alive and well. Three cheers not only for the author but for Rutgers University Press, a new and valued friend of those who are still fascinated by the "ins and outs" of urban life.

Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962-1968: The Great Refusal. By Wini Breines. South Hadley, Mass.: J. F. Bergin; New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xv+187. \$22.95.

Roberta Garner
De Paul University

The purpose of *Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962-1968* is the analysis of the origin and development of several central values of the New Left between 1962 and 1968. These values include the importance of community; participatory democracy; the building of anti-authoritarian and antihierarchical organizations; prefigurative politics (living one's political ideals in the present); and the search for a new agency of change and revolution among the poor, students, intellectuals, and the new working class. The *leitmotiv* is Marcuse's concept of "the great refusal": "the protest and rebellion of those beleaguered groups who could not or would not share in the coercive consumerism and conformism of late capitalist society" (p. xv).

Wini Breines's method is that of *verstehen*, the search for an understanding of the values of the participants and the meanings that they themselves gave to their situation and actions. This method is also influenced by social historians such as E. P. Thompson and Christopher Hill. Thus, much of the book is an exposition of the theories of social change and organization that the New Left itself fashioned; as highly self-conscious intellectuals, the leaders of the New Left generated a large volume of documents, theoretical statements, position papers, and so on. Breines skillfully summarizes these documents in the context of describing events and organizations as they evolved and changed in the middle sixties. The description of the events and the organizational dynamics provides a commentary on the documents; the analysis lies in these intertwined descriptions of consciousness and history.

The body of Breines's analysis begins with a sketch of the emergence of the New Left and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement. The following two chapters are concerned with politics as community and politics as organization, two central issues for the New Left. The author traces the problem of building effective political organizations within a movement that stressed community, decentralized decision making, participatory democracy, and spontaneity.

Breines then turns to a consideration of the New Left's search for a locus or agency of revolution in the late capitalist society in which the industrial proletariat appeared to be not only shrinking but also hopelessly wedded to capital. She offers a sympathetic discussion of new-working-class theory, according to which the growing mass of white collar, technical, and cultural workers (whose labor is necessary for both production and system reproduction) is the political heir of the older forms of proletariat. She concludes the chapter with a look at the

challengers to new-working-class theory, who saw the agency of revolution in the poor, blacks, and, above all, the Third World, as the escalating war in Vietnam supported their antiimperialist analysis.

Breines's last chapter is devoted to the Economic Research and Action Project, a community-organizing project in which virtually all the values and internal debates of the New Left unfolded—some might say unraveled—in practice.

Breines's account succeeds on its own terms within the limits of its methodology. *The Great Refusal* is an excellent evocation of the framework of discourse established by the New Left. Unfortunately, the method misses the structural or "objective" aspects of the New Left, particularly its interaction with other movements of the period and its consequences for American society. The problem here is not that Breines has failed to deal with these issues (which would be an unfair criticism); rather it is that, by sidestepping these issues, her method leads her to underestimate the impact of the movement. Breines's focus on subjectivity captures the New Left precisely at its weakest; the values of community and participatory democracy were not realized in our society and are perhaps inherently unrealizable. Thus the book has an elegiac quality, a quality that is carried into the pessimism of Breines's conclusion. A more objective analysis of the 1960s would capture better the lasting (albeit sometimes unintended) gains of all the movements of the period: the attainment of legal equality and full citizenship for blacks, the sending of a clear message to the federal government that Americans would not support full-scale wars abroad and that "victories" in the Third World were not to be won with American lives, the rise of the women's movement, and the revitalization of American intellectual life after the doldrums of the fifties. These successes have delegitimated old forms of oppression, set the stage for intensified conflict over the form of the political economy, and provided breathing space for socialist movements in the Third World and for moderate socialist parties in Europe. A structural analysis points to these successes, even if the utopian values of the New Left have not been realized.

Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962–1968 is a valuable study for readers in a variety of areas: social movements and collective behavior; social change and social history; ideology, value systems, and the analysis of consciousness. It can be appreciated by readers at many different levels (advanced undergraduate and professional), although the college freshman may need to look first at a more detailed basic narrative of the period. Within the limitations of its method, it is a timely and readable contribution to our understanding of our own recent past.

The Antinuclear Movement. By Jerome Price. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982. Pp. 207. \$15.95.

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University of Texas at Austin

Since the splitting of the atom, controversies have raged regarding the application of nuclear technology, both as a source of energy and as an instrument of war. In *The Antinuclear Movement*, Jerome Price traces the history of the controversy surrounding the use of nuclear power as an energy source, the development and emergence in the early 1970s of the antinuclear movement, and the ebb and flow of that movement as it challenged the nuclear industry and the polity.

One of the primary strengths of this longitudinal study is that it captures the dynamic nature of a particular social movement. While a social movement represents a collective attempt to bring about change in a political or social environment, the movement itself, during its life cycle, will continuously undergo transformations. Drawing on archival records from movement literature and newspaper accounts, Price documents the complex interplay between internal and external forces that shaped the antinuclear movement. For instance, the Arab oil embargo and ensuing 1973–74 energy crisis resulted in a split among the “national political elite” and a “divisive struggle over government reorganization to manage the energy crisis” (p. 12), the outcome of which was the validation of, and a strengthened commitment to, the “nuclear option.” As a consequence of having lost the struggle on Capitol Hill, Ralph Nader organized “the first antinuclear conference,” which brought together groups that had common interests in opposing nuclear power. Additional exogenous factors that contributed to the emergence of the antinuclear movement as a “distinct” and legitimate contender included the forced resignation of President Nixon and thus “a profound loss of public confidence in political institutions” (p. 9); the suspicious circumstances surrounding the death of Karen Silkwood, a worker at a plutonium-processing facility who had attempted to expose safety violations at the Kerr-McGee plant; a fire at the Brown’s Ferry nuclear power plant; and “criticism of nuclear power from within the political and scientific establishment” (p. 13).

Operating primarily from the resource mobilization perspective, the author examines how diverse groups within the movement acquire and utilize a variety of resources, how linkages are formed between the groups, and how the movement has dealt with failure by changing its predominant tactics. For example, environmental groups were able initially to achieve moderate success in restraining the growth of the nuclear industry through litigation. However, subsequent Supreme Court rulings “lessened the effectiveness of legal tactics” (p. 61), thereby giving rise to the use of “direct-action” tactics by regional groups. This leads to another issue of frequent concern to those who utilize the resource mobilization

approach. To what degree did the government either hinder or assist the efforts of the antinuclear movement? The author suggests that the polity played a "dual role" in the nuclear controversy, in some ways repressing the movement (e.g., court decisions, cooptation, and suppression of agency reports detrimental to the nuclear industry), yet in other ways facilitating it (e.g., limiting the extent of social control over movement activities, support by political elites, etc.). Price concludes that, whereas the antinuclear movement had an impact on electoral politics (its help in Carter's election), public opinion (the reduction of the margin of those favoring nuclear power development), and policies (the increase in government safety regulations, safeguards, and control), these gains should be viewed as evidence of only modest success. Despite these achievements, "many of the basic arguments of antinuclear activists have not yet filtered into the public mind" (p. 135), and "the Carter energy policy represented appeasement of antinuclear sentiment and not a basic redirection of energy policy" (p. 136).

Price also utilizes social action theory to analyze and categorize the value orientations of the disparate antinuclear groups. Thus the ecology and environmental organizations are classified as "instrumental," the scientist groups as "intellectual," the direct action groups as "expressive," and, finally, the religious organizations as "moralist." A separate chapter is devoted to each type of organization, with the exception of the "moralist," treatment of which is curiously appended to the scientist chapter. There are two problems with this organizing scheme. First, it is an artificial creation which may not represent the reflexive orientations of the actors being studied. For instance, while the scientists may in fact view themselves as the "intellectuals" of the movement, it is probable that they also see their role as "instrumental," as might also be true of the activists in the groups categorized as "expressive." Price offers some recognition of this problem in suggesting that "in reality the types of social action overlap, but [that] they do indicate[s] something about the dominant orientations of the groups" (p. 30). The second problem with this approach is that it may lead to some temporal confusion for the reader. Each chapter retraces the same period of time with the introduction of each new antinuclear organization. These are minor flaws, however, when weighed against the enormity of the task of charting the values, organizational histories, and ideologies of approximately 20 groups.

The Antinuclear Movement is a comprehensive and well-documented work. In addition to presenting and analyzing the data collected on the numerous organizations forming this loosely structured movement, Price includes information pertaining to the emergence of "countermovement" groups and their role in the struggle. Moreover, unlike some who work within a resource mobilization framework, the author is careful to note the symbolic significance of certain events (e.g., Three Mile Island, Seabrook, and Silkwood's death). Readers unfamiliar with the nuclear industry and the nuclear fuel cycle will find the second appendix enlighten-

ing and readable. Furthermore, a balanced presentation of the controversial issues and dilemmas surrounding the use of nuclear power is interwoven throughout the book.

The *coup de maître*, however, takes the form of an insightful prognostication. Writing prior to the recent dramatic escalation of the peace movement, Price suggests that "the movement in the 1980s may turn full circle and become more linked with the peace movement" (p. 61). The stage for that eventual convergence was set by the "diffusion" of the antinuclear power movement to Western Europe, the "internationalist" outlook of scientist activists, and a heightened public awareness of the linkage between civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapon technology.

Education and Power. By Michael W. Apple. Boston and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Pp. vii+218. \$17.50.

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Michael Apple's *Education and Power* is written explicitly in the Marxist tradition. The effort is to be up-to-date, complex, and flexible, certainly not "mechanistic" or "vulgar Marxist." But it is, in its own way, even more thoroughly orthodox than most other recent neo-Marxian treatments of education. One sees this not only in the terminology, in the lengthy quotations from Manuel Castells on the shadows of crisis spreading over us, and in the intellectual assumptions within which the argument carefully proceeds but also in the repeated concern for how one can take political action—what Apple calls (in the orthodox fashion) "political work." Even more than Bowles and Gintis, Althusser, or Bourdieu, all of whom have their elements of cynicism or systemic detachment, Apple echoes a continuous refrain: "Organize!" On every level—in the workplace, among teachers, women, minorities, school pupils, and yes, even among engineering and business students—struggle and ideological action are claimed to be appropriate, possible, and fruitful. Workplace democracy and socialism will not come easily, but nevertheless Apple optimistically sees their potential everywhere. The spirit of old orthodox trade-union Marxism is certainly not dead, no matter how far it has had to migrate.

I think that this practical interest is at the core of Apple's sociological argument and usually determines the stance he takes on particular sociological issues. Consider what is novel in this book, compared with all the other "revisionist" sociologies of education of the past 10 years. Not the data, since this book cites and quotes sources published elsewhere. Not even the core of the theory, since that seems to come largely from

Castells and James O'Conner, as well as from the various models of educational "reproduction" of the class structure. What Apple wishes to do above all is to combat the negative political consequences of a too extreme form of the reproduction argument. On the one hand, he dislikes the interpretations of Jencks et al., because they seem to show that equalizing educational opportunities makes little difference in the structure of economic inequality in the larger society. This is *politically* negative because it makes struggles over education irrelevant—certainly a frustration to the tradition of the omnipresent Organizer. On the other hand, Apple rejects structural reproduction theories that seem to make the school an automatic reflection of the ideological hegemony and economic needs of the society. In this case, where the school is seen as locked into the prevailing order, radical analyses become part of the ideological problem because they contribute to a pessimism about changing anything.

How, then, does Apple go about demonstrating that organizing at the school level is possible and fruitful for the long-term goal of socialist democracy? Primarily, he emphasizes that things are complex, flexible, struggle ridden, and not overly determined. This enables him to be very up to date in certain philosophical and methodological respects. He can point out that structures are abstractions and that real-life micro-interactions must be continuously negotiated, that ideology is not imposed from on high but produced in the classroom and the factory and sometimes rejected there as well. He cites studies that show that working-class youths in a technical school play around and thereby insulate themselves by giving minimal compliance; that ghetto children resist the imposition of the official curriculum; that, in factories, workers struggle against bosses' controls. Nothing is automatic; struggle is possible because it exists; there may be ideological imposition, but not without a struggle between the ideologues and "the people," who can fight back even more effectively if they organize themselves.

But does the entire argument follow because of this? One may doubt it. For one thing, Apple's view of education is that it is an institution of the capitalist order that produces technical and administrative knowledge for running the system. There are several reasons, I suppose, to claim this. It enables him to latch onto O'Conner's fiscal-crisis-of-the-state argument, in which the public sector pays for all these kinds of "systemic" goods but the benefit redounds to the capitalist core. Apple can thereby say that struggles within education are part of the larger economic crisis. It also makes education part of the system of production and hence an appropriate place for trade-union style organization. If education produces a real good (Apple stresses that education is not mere reproduction but also production), then educational workers can help bring down the system by organizing around that good. The key, he suggests, is to organize engineering students, because they are at the very technical core; but business administration students are also important.

This strikes me as extraordinarily naive. The image of either business students or our rather entrepreneurially oriented engineers organizing to overthrow capitalism makes one suspect that ideology is running away with reality. More fundamentally, Apple simply asserts this technical-skill interpretation of education without even a glance at the evidence. I notice that he cites my *Credential Society* (New York: Academic Press, 1979) a number of times (though not Ivar Berg and others who have researched this issue) but seems not to have noticed the evidence I systematically marshaled on this point: the lack of correlation between higher educational expansion and economic productivity; a similar lack of correlation on the individual level; and evidence that students do not acquire very much technical knowledge in school, that most technical skills are learned on the job, that the technical component of jobs is small relative to the "political" component of organizational maneuvering over the monopolization of positions. But then there is a reason why Apple's type of Marxist would prefer not to see this sort of thing. For him, struggle in schools and on the job is a real class struggle against the power of capitalism. But this vanishes in a morass of self-interested "credential entrepreneurs" if one sees that people are trying to get credentials with a minimum of effort and to build protected credential enclaves for themselves.

But I am afraid that that is much closer to the truth. "Cultural capital," which Apple insists on interpreting as if it referred to the possession of productive technical skills, is no longer part of the *capitalist* economy when one sees that it is an arbitrary currency of social acceptability. It is subject to inflation if too many people get it, which is one reason why students cynically resist the "imposition" of official cultural ideals; they are just trying to get what credentials they can with a minimum of effort in a bad market. And it is subject to fads, which is the reason why one currently hears all the hype about how government ought to intervene to promote more science education. Computer high tech is just another advertising blitz, with its obvious roller-coaster effects of enthusiasm and oversell. One would think that Marxists should have caught onto this kind of thing by now.

Is there a bottom line? I suppose one is that the educational credential business, for all its lags in confidence, is far from permanently bankrupt. Even the Marxists (especially those that teach in schools of education) are finding ways to keep it alive, so that there will be places to Organize. Of course they are not the only ones. Cultural credentials, under whatever guise, still have some payoff, if one gets there at the right time to impress people with them. This mode of self-interested struggle is deeply engrained and makes cultural capitalists of us all.

Special Education and Social Control: Invisible Disasters. By Julianne Ford, Denis Mongon, and Maurice Whelan. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Pp. ix+179. \$18.95.

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Bucknell University

Special education programs in the public schools have been a growth industry since the mid-1960s, capping off a longer-term expansion of services to special children which began after World War II. This book focuses on one kind of special education, that of maladjusted or emotionally disturbed children in England. The story parallels accounts of programs for the mildly mentally retarded and learning disabled in this country.

Special education programs have been mandated by state and national governments as services for children with individual neurological or psychological problems. Legislation has made a sharp distinction between services intended for children with these individual, constitutional problems and those provided for culturally deprived or otherwise socially handicapped youngsters. This distinction between learning problems that are socially caused and those that can be interpreted as physiological or medical problems has created a gulf between sociological analysts critical of special education and educators and psychologists in charge of planning and administering programs. The authors of *Special Education and Social Control* are especially interested in bridging that gulf. They do the bridging rather well. Unfortunately, they have written some dull sociology.

Like other critics of special education (such as Jane Mercer and Seymour Sarason), Julianne Ford, Denis Mongon, and Maurice Whelan suggest that the individual focus of legislation, which is shared by psychologically oriented special educators, represents a medical model of learning disabilities that is blind to the social context in which problems occur. They argue that if we look at actual school practices, the medical model is not used to identify children who need special education, nor are its conclusions used to design educational programs or therapies. The learning problems addressed by special education programs are generally too vague for precise definition, and treatments have uncertain results at best. What happens in practice is that teachers and principals refer children causing the biggest problems. "Problems" may involve passivity or failure to learn material easily. More often, it seems, problems have to do with aggressiveness and other "discipline" areas. At any rate, only certain kinds of children will be placed in special classes, while other children, less noticeable to teachers, but equally or more in need of help because of their emotional or neurological problems, go unnoticed.

The gulf exists between sociologists and most practitioners of special education because we tend to treat this process of selection and treatment as a variety of social control connected only loosely to any scientific ra-

tionale or course of treatment. Practitioners—or at least those who write—steadfastly accept the medical and psychological models of special education and reasons for referring children for special programs. Sociologists and some psychologists and educators who see student problems emerging from the complex interactional life of schools talk about the precariousness of educational authority, class conflicts in school, how deviance is defined by educators, and social control as a means by which educators survive in their conflict-ridden work environment.

The authors of *Special Education and Social Control* are concerned mainly with bridging this gulf by providing a critique of the medical model approach to special education which practitioners will accept. They themselves are practitioners who have written out of frustration with the role they have been expected to play in their schools. They hope that because they are educators, other teachers, social workers, psychologists, and administrators will not be quick to dismiss their critique of special education as the work of radicals and ideologues. While the authors wish to speak to an audience of practitioners, they provide a careful discussion of the historical origins of special education in Britain and discuss in some detail a survey they conducted in a small number of schools to learn how teachers recognized problem students, how those students were placed in special education classes, and the characteristics of students in special classes for the maladjusted. There is also an extended discussion of the medical model as applied to educational handicaps.

The authors succeed fairly well in presenting their argument in a way that practitioners will understand. The historical section is particularly helpful in this regard. The survey and program descriptions will be most relevant to those who know a little about English schools or are interested in learning more. Apart from its narrow national focus, readers will find this book a useful summary of the argument that special education primarily serves social control functions in schools.

Success in speaking to an audience of practitioners is purchased, however, at the cost of losing the audience of professional sociologists. I found this book excruciatingly dull, particularly when the authors began analyzing their survey data. The book is filled with attempts to smooth possibly ruffled feathers. Many of the survey data are used to make two points over and over: that educators refer for special education children who are more aggressive than other apparently disturbed children who are quiet and that low-income and minority children are more likely to be viewed as aggressive. These are important points to make but should not take up half a book.

The main problem is that the book has no theory. That seems like an odd thing to say given the amount of time these authors spend explaining the medical model and discussing the importance of social control in schools. Lots of theories are mentioned and explained. However, the book itself is not organized around an argument. There is no internal logic to make each section a necessary product of a previous claim or hypothe-

sis. Instead, the book is primarily descriptive. This is most obvious in the presentation of survey data where answers to all the questions are given in raw numbers. The authors do no hypothesis testing and seem more interested in getting the data out than in making sense of them. However, this descriptiveness is also present when they explain theory. They seem to be lecturing to an audience of novices about orthodoxy rather than developing theory themselves. That is what put me to sleep.

Masters of Business? Business Schools and Business Graduates in Britain and France. By Richard Whitley, Alan Thomas, and Jane Marceau. London: Tavistock Publications, 1981. Pp. 241. \$28.00.

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Masters of Business Administration programs are now such an integral and accepted part of the higher education system in the United States that few people question their existence. Indeed, student demand for business education has increased dramatically in the past decade. However, what purposes do MBA programs serve? How, for example, do they affect the careers of their graduates and, more generally, the way key positions are staffed in industry, commerce, and finance? The book *Masters of Business?* by Richard Whitley, Adam Thomas, and Jane Marceau poses exactly these questions in the context of industrialized societies where, in contrast with their acceptance in the United States, MBA programs are a relatively new phenomenon. Specifically, Whitley et al. have made a detailed study of the social origins, educational backgrounds, and career paths of the British alumni of the London and Manchester Business Schools in the United Kingdom and the French alumni of the European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD) in France. It is important to emphasize that the study is limited to nationals of the countries in which each school is located, since at INSEAD, in particular, the majority of students and alumni are not French. Furthermore, the three schools studied are among the leading European business schools and in that sense are not representative of European business education.

The book contains 10 chapters. After a brief introduction (chap. 1), chapters 2-4 discuss, respectively, the changing nature of industrial organization in Europe since World War II, with particular reference to the effects of these changes on needs for managerial skills; the history of management education and the events that led to the founding of the British business schools in the 1960s; and analogous developments in France. These three chapters are well written and informative, and, to this reviewer who has taught in two of the three schools studied (London Business School and INSEAD), they ring true. Some snippets are worth repeating here. For example, much of the impetus for founding business schools in France and the United Kingdom was to emulate U.S. man-

agement practices. However, while there was, in the United Kingdom in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a clear desire to establish a "British Harvard," the concept was not that of a traditional U.S. MBA program; rather, it was inspired by Harvard's short residential courses for experienced managers. British industry wanted the schools primarily to improve the skills of those already engaged in management. Indeed, although today all three schools in the study have MBA-type programs that serve as academic flagships, they are all heavily involved in training programs for managers with different levels of experience. Furthermore, and as discussed by Whitley et al., all three schools have been constantly challenged to define both their markets and objectives. Indeed, the disparity of markets and objectives within schools has led to chronic tension and conflicts. At London Business School, for example, the first MBA programs (in the early and late 1960s) were heavily based on quantitative disciplines and were modeled after the kind of business education championed in the United States by Chicago and Carnegie-Mellon. However, in the early 1970s the pendulum swung sharply in the direction of the more "qualitative" business education associated with the Harvard Business School. However, INSEAD started out mimicking Harvard explicitly but has since evolved a more eclectic style. What is interesting—and this point is made repeatedly in the book—is that, despite large cultural differences between France and the United Kingdom, it is the similarities between the schools and how they are regarded within industry that are most striking.

After describing the context of the study, the book devotes five chapters to its central concern. From a sociological viewpoint, this is summarized by the authors as follows:

We are concerned . . . both with the extent to which the business schools serve, as broader analyses of the role of the education system suggest, to enable those from privileged origins to maintain their social position, with reference to the specific sector of "business," and with the extent to which they provide a new focus of cultural capital that are [*sic*] publicly presented as a value for entry to top positions in business. In other words, we examine the degree to which institutionalized provision of a "particularly appropriate" high-level educational credential is translated in practice into specific career chances in business. [P. 2]

The principal results of the study, based on relatively simple statistical analyses of questionnaire data, can be summarized as follows: (1) The MBA degree does not guarantee access to the higher echelons of management. (2) Holders of the degree do, however, increase their earning power considerably on graduation. In addition, the degree allows many to change the orientation of their careers, for example, move out of technical specialties. (3) The MBA populations studied are not representative of graduates of the British and French educational systems. However, they do not represent an elite. Indeed, the French study shows the MBAs to be

largely those who previously failed to gain access to the higher levels of the French educational system and its associated high-level career opportunities. For these people, therefore, the MBA degree becomes a means of gaining legitimacy outside the traditional system in order to be readmitted later at a higher level.

For the most part, the graduates of these schools are portrayed as being from upper-middle-class families. They are bright but not exceptionally gifted intellectually. They are, however, anxious to preserve, and even improve on, a certain level of social status, and they see the business schools as instrumental toward this end. One interesting finding, for example, is that few students could articulate precisely why they chose to go to business school and what they hoped to achieve from it. However, they clearly associated it with a competitive advantage.

The book also touches on several classic, unresolved issues in management, for example: Is management a profession? Can management be taught in the same way as, say, engineering? Even though no answers are given to these questions, one has the impression that, while the schools studied are saying yes, the business communities in both France and the United Kingdom are saying no. (Although this does seem to vary somewhat by industrial sectors and types of jobs.) How does this state of affairs differ from that in the United States? I know of no empirical studies on the issues, but I suspect that the U.S. schools would be less inclined to say yes, and businessmen less inclined to say no.

There are many ways to orient studies such as this. As noted above, the authors chose to conduct the study within a framework that documents the use of the educational system to perpetuate social inequalities (specifically by limiting access to positions of power). To anyone familiar with the social structures of France and the United Kingdom, this thesis seems hardly novel, or even in need of documentation. Indeed, the authors constantly draw parallels with other professions to make their point. Thus in many ways the orientation of the book is more informative about the authors than about the subject matter. However, and perhaps paradoxically, I am not sure what the authors' major point is. On the one hand, it appears that the more wealthy have privileged access to these presumably "elite" schools. On the other, gaining an MBA does not provide automatic entry to elite positions in business. What does this mean? Does it mean that French and U.K. societies contain fewer inequalities than the authors presumed? Or that the business schools are failures? (On the basis of enrollments, the latter does not seem to be the case.) For a contrast—and I am not saying which view is correct—the authors might have inquired about the value to society of training so many young men and women in the underlying disciplines of management. Where business schools exist, do they at least serve their intended function of improving the efficiency of the economy? For example, what is the value to society of turning a disgruntled young engineer into a productive marketing manager, even though he or she does not become a high flier? The title of the book *Masters of Business?* suggests that the alumni of the schools studied

do not all become "generals," although the success of the schools should, in my opinion, be judged by their impact on the general efficacy of the "officer corps," however this is recruited.

To summarize, *Masters of Business?* is a book that will be of particular interest to the business school communities of France and the United Kingdom. It will also be of interest to American sociologists who might wish to explore the MBA phenomenon in the United States. The book is not pathbreaking in either the development or the use of theory and methodology. However, it is well written and informative.

Overeducation in the U.S. Labor Market. By Russell W. Rumberger. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981. Pp. x+148. \$26.95.

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Those with the most schooling showed the highest degree of overeducation. [P. 97]

In *Overeducation in the U.S. Labor Market*, as implied by the title, the author, Russell W. Rumberger, attempts to investigate empirically how much "overeducation" can be said to exist in the U.S. labor market. He defines "overeducation" essentially as the degree of dysfunction between years of schooling acquired and his own measures of the amount of schooling required to function in one's occupational position. Thus an individual or group is termed "overeducated" when it can be shown that the years of schooling acquired exceed the number of schooling years considered necessary to function wherever the individual or group is placed in the division of labor.

The author tells us that his two objectives are (1) to discuss generally the phenomenon of overeducation and (2) to apply one economic criterion of overeducation in order to measure the extent of overeducation in the contemporary labor market. He divides his study into three parts: (1) a discussion of overeducation from various labor market perspectives, (2) an empirical test of his particular labor market thesis, and (3) the implications of overeducation for the workplace, as well as for public and private policy.

Rumberger reveals his central thrust when he suggests that overeducation implies that too much education is being produced, a firm, albeit regrettable, conclusion to which we are taken by the end of the book. While acknowledging that declines in pecuniary returns, unrealized expectations, and underutilization of educational skills might all be used as working definitions of overeducation, he decides to restrict his empirical test to "the discrepancy between educational attainments of workers and the educational requirements of their jobs (p. 45)." Furthermore, although he discusses both orthodox (human capital, screening, and job

competition) and heterodox (labor market segmentation and radical/Marxist) theories of the labor market, he arrives at a largely atheoretical descriptive analysis. He uses 1960 and 1976 U.S. Bureau of the Census data to measure years of worker educational attainment and categorizes the skills requirements of jobs, as measured by years of school needed, according to the U.S. Employment Service of the Department of Labor. While the methodology itself, such as using and matching data not gathered for this purpose, is questionable, the conclusion of gross overeducation is, according to the author, unfortunately unavoidable.

While I would not consider this a major theoretical or methodological work, I do consider it a potentially important ideological work. What it fails to deliver in substance, I fear, may not inhibit its use as a blatantly conservative definition of the situation. For example, given that this discrepancy between skills brought to the labor market and those used on the job may well exist, one might define such an event as an "underutilization" or "underemployment" of skills and suggest ways that skills brought to the job could be better utilized for self- and market development, instead of concluding, as the author does, that we should cut back on education. One is also left with a sense of a "hidden agenda" in this book, since I would argue that worker absenteeism, strikes, demoralization, drug problems, and so on are not the results of overeducation, as the author suggests, but are, instead, problems of worker exploitation and "aspiration management." To the extent that workers are socialized to expect a given reward for a given educational investment and do not receive it, they can become dangerously frustrated with the system rather than be oriented toward self-blame. The author's conservative bent again reveals itself when he proposes that this attainment-expectation dysfunction be managed through the reduction of education rather than through reorganization of marketplace rewards.

The author concludes, without any discussion of race or sex discrimination, that, given larger discrepancies between their educational attainment and the education requirements of their occupational positions, blacks and women are more overeducated than whites and men. While this follows logically from his definition, it is the argument's *reductio ad absurdum*. This magical linguistic twist allows the occupational losers to become winners in the overeducation sweepstakes and blames certain populations, whom Rumberger acknowledges to be occupying lower-status positions, for acquiring too much education for their slotted positions. Here, too, his suggested solution, although he acknowledges its political difficulty, is less education. In rounding out his concern about overeducation, which he also tells us has increased dramatically between 1960 and 1976, he laments probable future increases in this phenomenon, given, as he indicates, that such programs as compensatory education and public investments in postsecondary education through loan and tuition support programs will only serve to aggravate further the problems of overeducation.

In conclusion, *Overeducation in the U.S. Labor Market*, while a rela-

tively weak and unimportant study, may prove to be an important ideological tool in the era of retrenchment through its use of the term "overeducation," which shifts the focus from the inequalities of the social system to overproduction in the educational system and thus provides another simplistic justification for cutting back selectively.

The Employment Revolution: Young American Women of the 1970s. Edited by Frank L. Mott. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Pp. xviii+234. \$25.00.

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The Employment Revolution, edited by Frank L. Mott, reports on and analyzes data taken from the National Longitudinal Surveys in which a representative sample of 5,000 females who were 14–24 years of age in 1968 was followed over a full decade. The U.S. Bureau of the Census carried out personal interviews each year between 1968 and 1973, shorter telephone interviews in 1975 and 1977, and, in 1978, a lengthy personal interview with the 4,200 young women of the original sample who could still be located and who agreed to be interviewed. In addition, a mother-daughter and sister-brother subsample allowed for cross-generational and cross-sex attitude and behavioral comparisons.

The skill of each of the contributors in using survey data is evident in every chapter. However, given the limitations of closed-ended, precoded categories of responses, many of the questions raised about women's expectations and experiences with the work force were left unanswered.

For example, in an important chapter on the effect of mothers' attitudes and employment history on their daughters' work motivations (an important corollary to the father-son focus), the authors analyze mother-daughter pairs. They attempt to go beyond the neoclassical economic perspective which posits that women rationally balance nonmarket considerations and the market value of their work (income and substitution effects) in their decision making about work. Specifically, the authors look to mothers' views about traditional roles and their actual work histories. Their findings suggest that the neoclassical labor supply theory works best for women whose mothers had nontraditional attitudes about women's roles. Interestingly, although the authors had predicted that mothers' work activity would also be important, the results do not indicate that such activity was significant (p. 73). Here the limitations of the data are most apparent. Surprised by the finding that actual work behavior seemed to have less effect than attitudes, the authors were forced to conjecture about the data set itself. Missing information—such as the nature of the mother's work force activity, her satisfaction with that work, and even the sample size constraints which limited the working-

mother category—clearly limited the operational effectiveness of the variables (p. 75).

Much to the credit of the authors, the issues raised are important ones that are often missing in the usual analyses of women's educational and career attainments. That is, they investigate not only the effect of the mother, but also the influence of male siblings. While Mott and R. J. Haurin found that youths of both sexes gain advantage when encouraged by parents of the same sex, they also found that regardless of parental education or encouragement, young men are more likely to want to attend and complete college than are their sisters, and that in no situation does a young woman have an absolute advantage over her brother (p. 150). However, the question, How much encouragement has your father (mother) given you to continue your education beyond high school? (much? some? none?) is too vague. What are "much," "some," and "none" relative to? What constitutes encouragement (e.g., money put aside, active searching for schools)? And, finally, if working wives earn less than their husbands and/or generally have less influence on budgetary matters, would encouragement from the same-sex parent mean the same thing to brothers as to sisters?

In at least two chapters some unexpected and very important findings about women's fertility intentions and work experience were investigated. Generally, fertility intentions were the same for women irrespective of work plans until a two-child norm was reached. That is, the work experience had an impact on family size only when a woman had two or more children.

The complex interweaving of societal expectations, personal desires, and socioeconomic conditions that operate in the lives of women as mothers, workers, wives, and sisters over the life cycle is acknowledged and handled skillfully within the confines of quantitative analysis. However, the complicated interrelationships among and between these variables are often beyond the scope of this edited volume. Perhaps the major contribution of the book is that it highlights heretofore unacknowledged issues in the working lives of women and the status-attainment models used to analyze them. It forces us to rethink common assumptions about women's employment and the operational definitions of those very important social psychological variables that function differently in the lives of men and women.

Women's Work and Family Values, 1920-1940. By Winifred D. Wandersee. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. 165. \$18.50.

Wartime Women: Sex Roles, Family Relations, and the Status of Women during World War II. By Karen Anderson. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981. Pp. 198. \$22.95.

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These two books are important contributions to the growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship on 20th-century American women's history. Both studies offer valuable insights into the social position of American women in the contemporary period, although their explicit focus is on the particular historical conjunctures of the Great Depression and World War II. Taken together, these books cover the period of transition from a social order in which the world of adult women was defined almost exclusively by family and marriage to one in which paid work has become a normal—and indeed essential—feature of married women's lives. The historical narratives contained in these two volumes reveal as much about this fundamental transformation in the position of women as about the particular dynamics of the social crises of depression and war. Indeed, both authors conclude that these dramatic historical experiences had surprisingly few lasting effects, in themselves, on the complex relationships among women, work, and family. Both stress historical continuities rather than changes, contrary to what one might expect from studies of these particular periods.

Winifred Wandersee's main thesis in *Women's Work and Family Values, 1920-1940* is that the rise of modern consumerism and the "family values" associated with it, which undermined the earlier "family wage" economy, profoundly changed the meaning of paid work for married women. Instead of an undesirable (if sometimes unavoidable) necessity, it became a positive contribution to family well-being, and this propelled "middle-income" wives into the work force alongside their less privileged sisters. After surveying the emergence of this shift in the 1920s, Wandersee demonstrates that it was not reversed but, rather, consolidated and deepened during the Great Depression. She uses this insight to help illuminate the reasons for the rise in married women's labor force participation during the 1930s, which occurred in spite of an intensive political and ideological assault on married women's rights to gainful employment. Although the proportion of working wives remained relatively small during the interwar period on which the book focuses, Wandersee suggests that the developments she traces prefigured the dramatic shift in married women's labor force participation and in family values which followed World War II.

Viewing the experience of women and families during the depression decade through this lens supplies an important contribution to the under-

standing of women's relationship to economic decline—certainly a topic of great relevance today. Wandersee's reconstruction of the ascendance of materialistic family values in middle-income households is a valuable supplement to previous treatments of women's work in the interwar period in which poverty and "economic necessity" were emphasized as the critical forces pushing married women into the paid work force. While her argument that the meaning of "economic necessity" was itself in flux at this time is quite compelling, Wandersee unfortunately does not fully explore the implications of her analysis for understanding class *differences* among women and among families.

Even if one accepts the rather vague distinction between "middle-income" and "poor" or "low-income" households, it is disappointing that the book does not include a fuller examination of the contrasts between them. The convergence in labor force participation of married women from middle-income families, who work to meet new family "needs," and poorer married women, who *must* work to ensure family survival, is obviously important, but is there not also a divergence in what work means in the lives of these distinct class groups of women? This issue arises in regard to the situation of wives in the family economy; however (as Wandersee observes in passing), women of different classes work in different kinds of occupations—which presumably widens the gap between them further still. That these issues are not examined seriously here is particularly surprising, in light of the statement in the final chapter that "the question which underlies this analysis of women's domestic and economic roles concerns the fate of feminism as an ideology and a movement" (p. 118). Of course, feminism was at a low ebb during the period Wandersee covers, but its class-specific character before and since suggests, in itself, the urgency of analyzing class differences among women. While Wandersee does not do so, her book will certainly be a valuable resource for anyone who chooses to pursue this question in the future.

Karen Anderson's study of the World War II years, *Wartime Women*, takes up the issues surrounding women, work, and family in a much broader fashion, looking in detail at women's work experiences as well as their positions in the family. Her book is based on extensive new archival research (unlike Wandersee's, which does not present any new data but instead reinterprets sources used by others) on women's experience during the 1940s in three major war production centers: Detroit, Baltimore, and Seattle. The local focus gives depth to what otherwise might be a rather daunting project and permits some interesting comparisons.

Anderson argues that the dramatic shifts in women's position in the labor force during the economic mobilization for World War II and the associated changes in family and child care did not constitute such a radical break with peacetime arrangements as is often presumed. In a way she takes up where Wandersee left off, showing how the wartime experience paved the way for the postwar "accommodation between women's work and family roles" (p. 9). She suggests that the war *was* a

"watershed" in that it consolidated the presence of married women in the work force (this had begun in the prewar years, as Wandersee shows), but that the kinds of radical changes in women's position that might have been expected were "contained" rather than encouraged by the exigencies of wartime. In an excellent chapter on women's wartime experiences in industry, Anderson shows that there were real limits to the changes in women's position in the work force, and that gender inequality was not even temporarily eliminated. This is followed by the most original part of the study, a chapter on the family (which also deals with sexuality) in wartime, again organized around the theme that the changes in women's position were limited during the war years and generated an ambivalent cultural response rather than a mandate for female independence. This chapter, together with the discussion of wartime child care which follows it, leads to a conclusion that the postwar "feminine mystique" was "part of the legacy of the war experience" rather than a radical break from it (p. 178).

The question is, Why did the war bring so little real change in women's position, in view of the dramatic social restructuring the economic mobilization required? Anderson provides an excellent account of the period, describing with great subtlety and care what happened, but she does not address directly this fundamental question. Still, her book is a major advance on previous treatments of the period, and like Wandersee's, it will be of great value to anyone interested in the analysis of women, work, and family in 20th-century America for many years to come.

Women in Khaki: The American Enlisted Woman. By Michael L. Rustad. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xxi+285. \$21.95 (cloth); \$12.95 (paper).

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The recruitment of increasing numbers of women into the armed forces and into all roles except those involving combat has stimulated many journalistic accounts and social science studies of the sex-integration process. Issues addressed by these studies have included the utilization of women and its effect on the functioning of military groups, problems of incorporating women into existing military structures, and the impact of military service on women and their future status. Unfortunately, such studies are often flawed by military control of the data and by findings that are largely disconnected and atheoretical. Michael Rustad's recent book, *Women in Khaki: The American Enlisted Woman*, remedies some of these deficiencies.

Rustad first reviews the changing roles of women in the military during four historical stages: antiquity to the 17th century, the early industrial

armies from 1600 to 1900, extreme military crises in the first half of the 20th century, and the present-day limited wars. Then he explores the effect of today's military on the daily lives of male and female soldiers and the conflicts experienced by women. Many of Rustad's data are field observations and interviews with 91 females and 141 male soldiers attached to a U.S. Army Signal Corps Detachment in Germany. He also administered questionnaires to respondents to obtain background information and attitudinal data. The study is ethnographic, with no tests of formal hypotheses, but is rich in its use of historical and recent empirical materials.

Using a functional orientation, the author develops an external/internal crisis theory to explain women's changing military roles. He maintains that external crises cannot explain the most recent expansion of women's roles and turns to internal crises. With the advent of the all-volunteer army, more personnel are needed, and Rustad asserts that women provide "temporary dirty workers" for the military, thus alleviating personnel problems. He also discusses "manifest" and "latent" functions of women in the military, combining this with Goffman's notion of "front-stage" and "backstage" organizational realities. An example of a latent function is that the increased use of women has restored public confidence in the military, because front-stage women enhance the military's image as a welfare institution. More negatively, Rustad suggests that women may be used as scapegoats by the military to divert attention from existing racial tensions and to justify a return to conscription. These are all interesting arguments; some are buttressed by considerable evidence, others are not.

One chapter provides a description of the setting and background of the specific army company Rustad studied. He also outlines in detail problems of adjustment that females experience and how tokenism affects them. He uses Rosabeth Moss Kanter's (*Men and Women of the Corporation* [New York: Basic, 1977]) framework to interpret the data, which include vivid excerpts from interviews illustrating isolation from the work culture, sexual shakedowns, problems of heightened visibility, the double bind of conflicting roles, and the typical responses women soldiers make to problems.

However, some experiences in the military are not unique to women, and Rustad describes characteristics of military organizations that contribute to problems for both sexes. He couches this discussion within the framework of "encroaching institutions," which include what Goffman calls "total" institutions, what Coser has labeled "greedy" institutions, and what Rustad describes as "venal" institutions. Venal institutions are social organizations that offer remuneration in exchange for absolute control over people's time, energy, and identity. Thus, groups such as the military are characterized as calculative and controlling, but people still are recruited or join them for a variety of reasons. Rustad shows that enlisted personnel join for employment opportunities or monetary rewards, but they lose control over most aspects of their daily lives and are

deprived of some rights of ordinary citizens. Because of these demands, Rustad claims that military life is unpleasant for both men and women.

The concluding chapter focuses on needed reforms in the military, and the author argues that the numbers of women and minorities must be increased in order to alleviate some of their problems. He also asserts that military groups in general must be reformed more so that the life-style is more humane and individuals are guaranteed more of their rights. With such changes, the military might attain greater legitimacy in the eyes of all citizens and be able to continue to attract enlistees.

Overall, the book is well written and interesting to read, and it provides excellent insights into military life through the use of sociological concepts and frameworks. It will be of interest to those studying the military, work and occupations, and changing sex roles.

However, the book has some weaknesses. Rustad clearly has strong attitudes about the military which are evident in some discussions, but he does not state these explicitly. Also, his use of several sociological frameworks and levels of analyses results in some discontinuity. Rustad does not attempt to synthesize the sociohistorical materials, organizational analyses, or descriptions of tokenism, nor does he attempt to compare sex-integration problems in the military with those in other male-dominated fields. Nevertheless, the strengths outweigh the weaknesses, and this is a needed step forward in the sociological study of changing sex roles in a most significant American social institution—the military.

Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940–1970. By John D'Emilio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. x+257. \$20.00.

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On June 27, 1969, Manhattan's Sixth Precinct detectives set out on what they must have thought would be a routine raid of a Greenwich Village gay bar: the Stonewall Inn. But instead of the customers responding to such a raid passively, they fought back for two days and started a gay liberation movement that was to spread rapidly throughout the Western world. For millions of gays, the Stonewall Riots have meant a decisive break with decades, if not centuries, of oppression.

Social movements, however, never emerge full blown from nowhere. Events like Stonewall are symbolic: the momentary crystallization of longer and slower processes of ambivalent negotiations in obscured social worlds. It is with the documentation of such a process that John D'Emilio's fascinatingly meticulous social history, *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities*, is concerned, as he recalls from the recent past the struggles of a population and a literature for a positive gay identity when all the odds were against them. With great clarity and a minimum of jargon,

D'Emilio's chronicle moves from the immediate postwar, Kinsey period, when small, exclusive gay bars and organizations started to emerge, through the 1950s and the creation of the homophile movement (notably, by the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis) and a homophile literature (notably, the publications *One, Inc.*, *The Mattachine Review*, and *The Ladder*), and on to the increasingly public and political overtones of the gay movement during the 1960s—especially through the convergence of gay worlds and “beat” communities in San Francisco. For those interested in the American political underground this will make illuminating reading because D'Emilio is not preoccupied with gayness but constantly links the emerging gay movement to wider political change. It is also important that this is not a disembodied history of some abstract historical trends before which we are to prostrate ourselves: there is careful attention to the concrete men and women struggling to bring about changes that, at the time, must have seemed wildly utopian and against all odds. This is a case study of radical dreams being slowly realized.

One of the significant issues highlights shifting alignments. Then, as now, there is no one position, and D'Emilio focuses constantly on the significant ambivalences of and contradictions between those with the imagination to grasp a future, more emancipated, world and those whose vision of change is restricted to the present. Nowhere is this clearer than in his discussion of the 1960s debate on homosexuality as an illness, with the radical wing seeing this as a critical issue in the liberation of gay men and women from their own oppressive self-definitions and the conservative wing deferring to the experts (see chap. 9). It was the vision of the former that has brought the gay movement to its current state (and one is tempted to ask where this might leave contemporary experts on minorities). Such splits are found throughout the movement's history; socialists working to establish the movement were challenged by those who sought to maintain a conservative and respectable image, and lesbians saw their allegiance to feminism challenged by those who restricted the debate to homosexuality. Similarly, radical leaders of one generation become the conservatives of the next. Donald Webster Cory was the hero of the 1950s homophile movement but was attacked in the late 1960s when he transferred to the sociology of deviance. The book is a striking study in political alignment and realignments.

D'Emilio's study adds significantly to that growing body of literature which shows how sexual acts have become sexual identities during the middle period of this century, which attempts to provide historical instead of abstract analyses of subcultures and social movements, and which shows constantly how the wider social structure impinges on these changes. It leaves us, however, with a problem and one addressed only lightly by D'Emilio, namely, the recognition that “the momentous shift to industrial capitalism provided the conditions for a homosexual and lesbian identity to emerge” (p. 11). This is a conclusion similar to one reached by Dennis Altman in his complementary study, *The Homosex-*

ualization of America, the Americanization of the Homosexual (New York: St. Martin's, 1982). Yet it is a conclusion whose full implications have not yet been confronted. Because, if, as D'Emilio suggests, many of the key protagonists for gay change were socialists, they still were dependent on capitalist "space," not communist "closure," in order to pursue this change. But, at the same time, it is a change that has set up new markets and new commodities, which may not turn out to be so positive in the long run, as well as new restrictive identities and new attacks on gay men and women. The ambivalences which D'Emilio detected in the period 1940-70 are still in fact present. He is right to steer clear of contemporary polemics in favor of historical documentation.

Role Playing and Identity: The Limits of Theatre as Metaphor. By Bruce Wilshire. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. Pp. xvii+301. \$24.95.

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Northwestern University

Role Playing and Identity is an ambitious and, in many respects, compelling and illuminating book. As the title suggests, Bruce Wilshire examines the rich metaphoric resonance between the "world" of the theater and the everyday world. Wilshire is intrigued by a problem that has been largely unnoticed in the social sciences. Why do we, as social scientists, think of self/other relations in terms of theatrical conceits such as role, script, and performance, without reflecting on the differences between the stage and a world unbounded by artistic devices and conventions?

To answer this question, Wilshire develops a theory of how theater mediates between communal involvement and personal identity through the symbolic and emotional responses of what he refers to as the "conscious body." Throughout this discussion of how drama intensifies and clarifies the ambiguous and contradictory nature of relations with others in the ordinary world, he sustains a penetrating critique of positivist epistemology. Finally, in a very schematic fashion, he explores changing dramatic representations of the dialectic between the dangers of over-identification with an "authoritative source" and the frustrations of necessarily incomplete individuation from that source. Wilshire then argues that this history of theater reveals the peculiar situation of contemporary man vis-à-vis the traditional sources of personal identity.

The idea of imitation is the key to Wilshire's explanation of the power of drama to constitute an integral "world" in which the members of the audience, as witnesses to the actor's words and deeds, experience the latter's fate in ways that are analogous to the feelings they would have about similar persons and events in the everyday world. According to Wilshire, the actor's physical being is able to "stand in" for the audience because human beings learn to imitate others in a prereflective manner

before they can delineate consciously the commonalities that unite and the differences that separate them from others. For Wilshire, it seems that our deepest emotional responses to others are coded, so to speak, in our habitual reactions to the expressive movements and gestures of the other as an embodied presence.

Wilshire argues that we are moved by what happens in the theater because there is an affinity between the audience's unconscious bodily experience of imitative engagement with others and the way in which the actor, as a character immersed in his "world" and unaware of how his projects will turn out, lives through similar relations with others. Using *Oedipus Rex*, *Hamlet*, and *Waiting for Godot* as his principal examples, Wilshire claims that theater deals with the fundamental dilemma of social existence: people desire to "fuse" with a living exemplar of whatever a group recognizes as ideally worth being or becoming, and people fear being absorbed into the very source of their personal identity. In this somewhat Freudian manner, he concludes that theater is inextricably related to the attachments, conflicts, and antagonisms which arise out of our early dependence on others who serve as primordial models of who we can or might become as individuated selves.

The suggestion that the body is the repository of what Wilshire calls the unthematized aspects of social experience is fascinating. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see precisely how this almost completely unacknowledged dimension of human experience is transformed into the most articulate of human enterprises without some explicit awareness on everyone's part that that is what is happening on the stage. To put it another way, Wilshire, in my opinion, tends to underplay the extent to which specific types of actions and their consequences constitute a conscious vocabulary of motives in the theater. It is our ability to recognize the act as a sign of a particular kind of human character or destiny that makes theater as much an intellectual as an emotional experience.

One of the great virtues of this book is that it examines one of the central tenets of the positivist canon—its resolute "literal mindedness"—and finds it incapable of accounting for the metaphorical links between the theater and everyday life. In a passage worth quoting, Wilshire acutely depicts one of the root metaphors that ground positivist epistemology:

... to exist is to be a discrete entity, bounded within its surfaces, which exists in one moment after another in time. Each moment is disconnected from every other, and only what is present and actual, moment by moment, is real. To be real is to be like a stone in the bed of a river. The waters of time wash over it, as do debris and other stones that click against it and wear it away. Reality involves relationships, but only the relationships of clicking and grinding contiguity and particularity, and ones limited to the moment. [P. 48]

The stone is like the ultimate substance of positivist sociology—the individual—whose invariant properties and relations are measured antiseptically by methods that presuppose that there is an absolute line of demarcation between the self and other. Wilshire argues that this position assumes that it is possible to sever the moment in which a human phenomenon is objectified (i.e., the objective, third-person perspective) from the moment in which that phenomenon is perceived as meaningful by those who constitute it as a human reality (i.e., the subjective, first-person perspective). He demonstrates convincingly that this radical separation between the way we know and the way we experience ourselves and others entails a remarkably incoherent social psychology.

In a brief but incisive concluding section, Wilshire distinguishes the ideality and fictionality, which are essential to theater, from the self which is always more than its roles in everyday life. The idea of agency and responsibility combined with the indeterminate nature of the consequences of our actions, for ourselves and others, in the boundless time of the world defines the limits of the theatrical metaphor.

Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France. By Rosalind H. Williams. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982. Pp. xii+451 + 24 pp. photographs. \$29.50.

Priscilla P. Clark
University of Illinois at Chicago

Dream Worlds opens with a striking scene that tells much about the work as a whole: the young provincial, Denise Baudet, freshly arrived in Paris, stands agape in front of Au bonheur des dames, the archetypal department store created by Emile Zola as the "cathedral of modern commerce" (*Au bonheur des dames* [1883], chap. 9). The abundance of detail, the use of literary examples, the felicitous turns of phrases, all amplify the argument by creating a strong sense of time and place. Not content just to describe the consequences of the consumer revolution, Rosalind H. Williams also describes the contemporary wonder and bewilderment. For, as Denise soon discovers, the kind of consumption on display in the department store bespeaks a new and profoundly unsettling way of life.

To correct and complement the more familiar emphasis on the production of material goods, Williams proposes a history of consumption. She takes France as her test case, arguing that French pioneering in advertising and retailing brought mass consumption to Paris (if not to the provinces) sooner than elsewhere and with more immediate effect. In the late 1870s, for example, the Bon Marché, the department store on which Zola based Au bonheur des dames, may well have been the largest retail enterprise in the world (see Michael B. Miller's excellent study, *The Bon Marché* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981], p. 40). More important still, the same concentration of resources—technological, eco-

nomic, and cultural—that made Paris a hothouse for social change also made France a locus of intellectual debate over the problems of mass consumption.

The first half of *Dream Worlds* gives four models of consumption, each elaborated in such vivid detail that, like Denise Baudet entranced by *Au bonheur des dames*, we are overwhelmed by the sheer materiality of the spectacle. The first model is realized in the closed world of courtly consumption (chap. 2). Under the aegis of their consumer-king, the courtiers at Versailles lived according to Voltaire's dictum, "le superflu, chose très nécessaire." Luxury was indeed a necessity, not least because it manifested what Norbert Elias has called "the civilizing process" (pp. 22–25). By the 19th century this ethos of extravagance had been adopted by newly wealthy, upwardly mobile bourgeois to mark their elite status. Although Williams gives rather short shrift to this bourgeois variant of the original aristocratic model, the case is confirmed by recent work of French historians, in particular, Jean-Paul Aron's analysis of bourgeois gastronomic excess (*Le Mangeur du XIXe siècle* [Paris: Laffont, 1973]).

As Paris-Versailles offered the prototype of aristocratic consumption, so modern Paris set the stage for the competing consumer life-styles and accompanying ideologies that multiplied over the 19th century as discretionary consumption became possible for more than a very few. The second model therefore explores the "dream world" of mass consumption (chap. 3), taking the Salon de l'automobile (1898), the cinema, and especially the Paris exposition of 1900 as "scale models" of the consumer revolution. In horrified reaction to this patent democratization of luxury, dandies like Baudelaire or Des Esseintes (the bizarre protagonist of J.-K. Huysmans' novel, *A rebours* [1889]) incarnated a third model as they strove to realize a new hyperelitist style of consumption far from the vulgarity of the crowd (chap. 4). Finally, a fourth model shows "democrats" seeking still another alternative to mass consumption in a functionalist, supposedly utilitarian, aesthetic that made use of industrial materials and design (chap. 5).

Inevitably, the enterprise of defining modern consumption as such obscures traits specific to a single society. By Williams's own account, "mass consumption" did not reach all that far in the masses. The working classes did not frequent the department store (whose prices remained beyond their reach) as much as the bourgeoisie did. Thus Miller (*The Bon Marché*, chap. 5) points out the extent to which the Bon Marché owed its phenomenal success to the marketing of stolid bourgeois comfort and respectability, spiced, for the provincials, with a *souçon* of Parisian glamour. Here and throughout, closer attention to the particularities of French society might have suggested modifications in the models proposed.

Williams has relatively little to say about the possible benefits from mass consumption. In her eyes all these worlds of frenetic consumption are dream worlds, and all are doomed to fail. As the numerous comparisons with the present day make clear, these life-styles, and especially their

failures, are meant to engage us directly. Like Denise Baudet, Williams is a concerned consumer, and that concern informs the entire work. Accordingly, and because these life-styles did not exist in an intellectual vacuum, part 2 of *Dream Worlds* confronts the consumer revolution with its critics, writers who wrote exposés in order to counter the moral crisis that rampant consumption provoked. This body of critical thought on consumption further justifies making France the paradigmatic society of mass consumption. For these critics were social scientists who also wrote within the very old, very French *moraliste* tradition and its concern for the ethical implications of social phenomena.

Aside from Durkheim and, perhaps, Huysmans, the writers around whom the chapters are organized are not very familiar figures. Few will know much about the advocates—for example, Georges d'Avenel, apostle of consumerism, and Camille Mauclair, exponent of the decorative arts movement (chaps. 3 and 5)—or the critics—the economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, his brother Anatole, the Le Playist political scientist—or the solidarists (chap. 6)—the economist Charles Gide, who began preaching the cause of consumer cooperatives as early as 1893 (chap. 7), and, most particularly, Gabriel Tarde, who, along with his lifelong adversary, Durkheim, offered the beginnings of a sociology of consumption (chap. 8).

Skillfully weaving themes and characters with anecdotes and analysis, *Dream Worlds* presents the careers and the works of these men in loving detail. Perhaps in too much detail. The arguments could have been made with greater economy, the book shortened by a third. But then we would miss the sympathetic discussions of solidarism (pp. 267–75) and the beginnings of consumerism, the acute analyses of Huysmans' *A rebours* (pp. 127–51) and Tarde's unfinished utopian novel, *Fragments d'histoire future* (pp. 379–81). If these works do not quite constitute the alternative mode of social science claimed for them, Williams, in resurrecting the debate prompted by the advent of mass consumption, has nevertheless made a signal contribution to the history of social science.

Channels of Desire: Mass Images and the Shaping of American Consciousness. By Stuart Ewen and Elizabeth Ewen. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982. Pp. xiii+312. \$12.05 (cloth); \$7.95 (paper).

Eric Leed
Florida International University

This is a *very* unbalanced and uneven book. The chapters on immigrant women and the movies, fashion and the ready-to-wear clothing industry, and advertising and department stores are substantial and informative. They show in some detail how newly arrived Americans seized on the alternatives offered them by the cornucopia of industrial capitalism to redefine their identities and escape from the rigidities and strictures of their traditional cultures. Those chapters, however, which purport to

provide a historical framework for American industrial civilization are incoherent, "poetic," and overweening. In general, bad work like this is perpetuated by sleeping editors and nonchalant reviewers. *Channels of Desire* tells no story, offers no ideas—other than those exchanged so often that the original imprimatur is utterly defaced. Stuart and Elizabeth Ewen offer something called the "world machine" (which means print, Frankenstein's monster, technology, certain kinds of art, time, the factory system, or system of any sort) as a substitute for an argument. The flaccidity of this book's structure would not be so distressing if it did not seem to come from the growing impotence of our most treasured explanatory rituals and of the repressive model of explanation that underlies them.

Once more we are asked to subsume the mass media and all their creatures under the heading of "Agencies of Control and Manipulation" (suboffice: "Repressive Desublimation"), along with the state, family, church, school, military, giant corporations, and other handmaidens of monopolistic capitalism. The media are a part of that industrialized, democratic despotism that is responsible for the "fragmentation of social life [which] is such a basic component of our understanding of the character of *mass culture*. The displacement of collective modes of living, work, ritual, and sensibility makes room for the elaboration of a media panorama, consumed and understood by people individually" (p. 262). What fragments traditional community is not the desire of people to escape from the ghetto but the symbolic reality generated by industrial capitalism where beauty comes in a tube and freedom is waiting for you at the 7-Eleven store. Here freedom masquerades in diversity, and human beings deny their dignity and intelligence in a world of fetishized commodities. One sees how this kind of thinking has a certain brutal clarity and allows us to distinguish the good guys (the repressed) from the bad guys (the repressed repressors). Even better, it becomes automatic as long as one traces out the lineaments of the repressive model of explanation that is our most cherished exemplary solution to the problems of comprehension posed by modern industrial civilization.

But what would the mass media look like if we abandoned the repressive model and accepted James Carey's suggestion that we adopt a "ritual model" of communication? We could see our society as a "secular eucharist" (I am indebted to Howard Kaminsky for this notion and this term) in which communicants give life to the fictions transpiring before them, just as these fictions in turn provide meaning and intelligibility to the lives witnessing them. We could regard the media, not as the shaper of the human *matériel*, but as a means of social cohesion, and we could regard our culture as something consummated in the act of purchasing and eating a McDonald's hamburger. Perhaps it is best not to take this too far, here. I want only to suggest that much of what is wrong with this book is the threadbare and automatic thinking imposed by assumptions too long unexamined. More seriously, it is a product of the hegemony which the repressive model of explanation exercises over our analytic

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